The Oxford Companion to Philosophy Part 47 potx

Plainly a non-central and precarious kind of law and legal system, there seems no reason to doubt either its positiv- ity, as something added by human decision to natural morality, or its obligatoriness in some measure, in a world where no state can plausibly claim to be a fully complete community entitled to constitute the ultimate and uncon- ditional horizon of a just person’s allegiance. Developments in international law in recent decades have responded to a set of interrelated questions: Has an individual person, or a non-state group, the right to move international organs, as a subject of international law with substantive and procedural rights derived from international law? Has an organization such as the United Nations an international personality comparable to that of a state, and are its rights in international law limited to those conceded by the states party to its establishment? Can the same be said of a non-governmental organization such as the International Red Cross? If ‘persons’ other than states can be subjects of international law rights, can they also be creators of international law rules, as states can? When can individuals, including rulers of states, be tried by internationally authorized tribunals for offences against international law? These questions, like the tenta- tive affirmative answers being given to them, arise from a widespread understanding that new interdependencies, economic, environmental, and cultural, are bringing into being a world-wide human community which might in principle become a fully complete community govern- mentally equipped to supervise, coercively, the doing of justice everywhere, but that no governmental authority can yet be envisaged such as could be relied upon to act with an effective justice sufficient to merit a general trans- fer or subordination of state jurisdiction to it. This last proposition, reasonable though it doubtless is, has the practical implication that international law will remain for the foreseeable future a system largely bereft of sanctions and, for that and other reasons, one that is peculiarly open to violation and to change by fait accompli, not least by states prominent in shaping and appealing to its rules, principles, and institutions. j.m.f. Wilhelm G. Grewe, The Epochs of International Law (Berlin, 2000). Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘The Definition and Nature of International Law and its Place in Jurisprudence’, in his Collected Works, i (Cambridge, 1970). international relations, the philosophy of. The set of doctrines, ideas, justifications, and excuses that guides the study and, perhaps, the practice of sovereign states in their dealings with one another. Two broadly opposed pos- itions have been articulated, the first mostly by students of politics (and also by politicians), the second mostly by students of law (and by lawyers). Only in very recent years has either one attracted much philosophical attention. The first position is commonly called ‘realist’ because its advocates claim to see states as they really are (in the tradition of Thucydides and Machiavelli). On this view, sovereignty is taken as a kind of exemption from the moral restraints that apply to individual men and women. The rulers of states are driven by the ‘necessities’ of international anarchy, standardly conceived as a Hobbesian *state of nature, to defend the interests of their own people without regard to the rights of anyone else. Thus the Greek generals in Thucydides’ Melian dialogue: ‘they that have odds of power exact as much as they can, and the weak yield to such conditions as they can get.’ Strategic and security studies are the political expression of this realist view. The second position is best called ‘legalist’ because it views international society, on analogy with domestic society, as a rule-governed world. In the absence of a global authority that might serve as the source of the required rules, they are derived instead from the tacit or explicit consent of existing states—hence from customs, treaties, and conventions—or from some version of *natural law. *Just war theory is the first moral offspring of this legalist view, though many of its protagonists believe that what the domestic analogy requires is that war should be conceptually, as well as practically, repressed. Unjust wars must be understood as criminal acts, and just wars simply as police actions, aimed at law enforcement. What is at issue between realists and legalists, above all, is the responsibility of rulers. The realist view is only puta- tively amoral; its central claim is that rulers are morally bound to their subjects or fellow citizens and must be per- mitted to do, or be excused for doing, whatever they have to do in order to guarantee the physical security and advance the well-being of those people. The legalist view is that nothing can be done for those people that they could not, as individuals, do for themselves. Since they could not kill innocent people to save their own lives, innocent people cannot be killed on their behalf. As this example suggests, arguments about responsibility have focused mostly on the conduct of war, with realists insisting that inter arma silent leges and legalists refusing to be silent even then. But the disagreement extends also to questions of diplomacy and commerce. Here too rulers of states commonly act as if ordinary moral stand- ards were relaxed or lifted entirely in their case: gentlemen do not open each other’s mail, but statesmen authorize (and pay for) espionage and think themselves morally justified. The same issue also arises in discussions of distributive *justice, which is commonly taken to deal with domestic, but not with international, transactions. Of course, trade across borders is governed by the same prohibitions (against fraud, say) as trade within borders. *Markets are international; the old jus gentium was first of all market law. Governments, however, are not international, and whatever obligations government officials have to pro- mote justice—to redistribute resources, establish a welfare ‘floor’, ban discriminatory practices, and so on—are owed to their fellow citizens and not to foreigners. But this view, standard for a very long time, has come increasingly under criticism by writers seeking some way of addressing the radical *inequalities of international society. Perhaps 440 international law foreign aid is as obligatory as domestic welfare. Perhaps the *difference principle should be applied globally. Legalists are likely to be more sympathetic than realists to such proposals, but even for them these are extensions of law and morality beyond their current reach. It might be said that international distributive justice would not require the reform of international relations so much as its abolition—in favour of a new global domesti- city. The society of sovereign states would be replaced by a new political entity, encompassing all the men and women in the world and treating them with equal respect and concern, as rights-possessing individuals. But it is also possible to imagine states of the world that fall between international anarchy and global rule. Organizations like the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization have something less than governmental power, but they could still act, if the leading states in the global economy wanted them to do so, in the interests of international distributive justice. m.walz. Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton, NJ, 1979). Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Pol- itics (London, 1977). Terry Nardin, Law, Morality, and the Relations of States (Princeton, NJ, 1983). Thomas W. Pogge (ed.), Global Justice (Oxford, 2001). John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, Mass., 1999). internet, philosophy on the. The Internet is awash with philosophy. Type ‘philosophy’ into an Internet search engine, and it returns millions of entries; and EpistemeLinks.com, the leading portal website for philosophy, currently features some 13,000 categorized links to philosophy resources on the Internet. Inevitably, with this quantity of material available, much of it is not of professional standard. In part, this is because the Internet facili- tates publication without editorial control or peer review (which itself leads to difficult questions about the reliabil- ity of information found on the Internet). Nevertheless, professional philosophers and philosophy publishers are increasingly making use of the opportunities presented by the Internet. Most significantly, the worldwide web is beginning to change the face of philosophy publishing. Partly, it is doing so because it offers a number of advantages over trad- itional, non-electronic publishing. (1) A single web publication has a potential audience of millions of people, many of whom, in the case of philosophy, would not other- wise have ready access to such material. (2) The web is a dynamic medium, allowing for published material to be updated frequently. For example, online reference works, such as the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu), are kept up to date in a way that their paper-based counterparts cannot be. (3) By utilizing embedded hypertext links, web publications allow for sophisticated cross-referencing and facilitate non-linear research strategies. (4) The worldwide web makes it relatively easy for individuals to embark on their own publishing ventures, something which philosophers such as David Chalmers (at Arizona/ANU), Peter Suber (Earlham), Ted Honderich (UCL), and Stephen Clark (Liverpool) have exploited to excellent effect. (5) It is relatively inexpensive to publish on the worldwide web. There- fore, the option of an exclusively online journal or collection is an attractive one for publishers. Good examples of these are The Philosophers’ Imprint (www.philosophersim- print.org), an online journal with an editorial board the equal of any trad-itional philosophy journal, and the Marxists Internet Archive (www.marxists.org), a digital library of works by authors sympathetic to Marxism. The Internet is also transforming the way that philosophers interact with each other. In particular, email and mailing lists such as Philos-L (www.liv.ac.uk/Philoso- phy/philos.html) mean that philosophers around the globe are in constant communication. j.s. interpretation. Theoretical or narrative account of facts, texts, persons, or events that renders the subject-matter intelligible. As a genuinely philosophical problem, interpretation became recognized first as a specific feature of the human sciences. Historical interpretation based on lived experience, understanding, and ordinary language is contrasted with scientific explanation based on alien construction, observation, and theoretical concepts. In exist- ential and hermeneutic philosophy, interpretation becomes the most essential moment of human life: The human being is characterized by having an understanding of itself, the world, and others. This understanding, to be sure, does not consist—as in classical ontology or epistemology—in universal features of universe or mind, but in subjective–relative and historically situated interpretations of the social *life-world. Recent trends like *post- modernism or *neo-pragmatism have emphasized the universality of interpretation, arguing that even natural sciences are nothing but interpretations. h.h.k. *hermeneutics. C. Taylor, ‘Interpretation and the Sciences of Man’, in Philosophy and the Human Sciences, ii (Cambridge, 1985). intersubjective. This term refers to the status of being somehow accessible to at least two (usually all, in principle) minds or ‘subjectivities’. It thus implies that there is some sort of communication between those minds; which in turn implies that each communicating mind is aware not only of the existence of the other but also of its intention to convey information to the other. The idea, for theorists, is that if subjective processes can be brought into agreement, then perhaps that is as good as the (unattainable?) status of being objective—completely independent of subjectivity. The question facing such theorists is whether intersubjectivity is definable without pre- supposing an objective environment in which communication takes place (the ‘wiring’ from Subject A to Subject B). At a less fundamental level, however, the need for intersubjective 441 intersubjective verification of scientific hypotheses has been long recognized. j.n. *subjectivism. D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective (Oxford, 2001). intrinsic good: see good in itself. introspection. The nature of introspection and sometimes even its existence are a subject of controversy, and so it is difficult to provide a neutral account of it. It is not just the awareness that accompanies some mental states. It is rather a person’s internal way of ascertaining what mental state he or she is currently in. Sometimes introspection is taken to be a type of perception and there is talk of a ‘mental eye’, or, if minds are thought to be material, brain-scanning. Others deny any similarity with sense-perception and view such talk as mis- leading. They think it is acceptable to talk of introspection as perception only if a very minimal understanding of perception is brought to bear, in which case it is unin- formative. Another alternative is to take introspection to be a form of recollection, or retrospection, in which case we would have to characterize it as a person’s internal way of ascertaining his or her mental states just past. The motiv- ation for this approach is that it is thought implausible for one to have a thought simultaneously with having another thought the content of which is the first thought. Much philosophical discussion has centred around the status of the beliefs we obtain through introspection. ‘Are they justified?’ and ‘How likely are they to be false?’ are questions often asked. p.j.p.n. *apperception; inner sense. W. Lyons, The Disappearance of Introspection (Cambridge, Mass., 1986). intuition. Originally an alleged direct relation, analogous to visual seeing, between the mind and something abstract and so not accessible to the senses. What are intuited (which can be derivatively called ‘intuitions’) may be abstract objects, like numbers or properties, or certain truths regarded as not accessible to investigation through the senses or calculation; the mere short-circuiting of such processes in ‘bank manager’s intuition’ would not count as intuition for philosophy. Kant talks of our intuiting space and time, in a way which is direct and entirely free from any mediation by the intellect—but this must be distinguished from an alleged pure reception of ‘raw data’ from the senses; the intuiting is presupposed by, and so cannot depend upon, sensory experience. Intuitions or alleged intuitions have been important in logic, metaphysics, and ethics, as well as in epistemology. Recently, however, the term ‘intuition’ has been used for pre-philosophical thoughts or feelings, e.g. on morality, which emerge in thought experiments and are then used philosophically. a.r.l. *empirical. D. Pole, Conditions of Rational Inquiry (London, 1961), ch. 1. intuitionism, ethical. Ethical intuitionism is mainly associated with British philosophers; it is sometimes called British intuitionism. But the term ‘intuitionist’ is used for more than one position. In one sense, intuitionism is the view that basic moral truths are known by intuition—that is, directly, rather than by inference. In this sense, Sidgwick was an intuitionist. More recently, intuitionism has been taken to be a form of pluralism, pluralism in the theory of the right. Monists in the theory of the right say that there is only one way in which an action can get to be right. Kant was a monist, and so was G. E. Moore, who held at one time that for an action to be right is for it to have the best consequences. Against Moore, Ross argued that actions can be made right in any of a number of ways. j.d. W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford, 1930). intuitionism, mathematical. A school founded by L. E. J. Brouwer (1881–1966) which construes mathematics as mental constructions, opposing the view that mathematical reality is independent of our thought. (Intuitionism is thus a species of *constructivism about mathematics.) The intuitionist criticizes classical mathematics for its unrestricted use of the law of excluded middle, the claim that ‘A or not-A’ is always true. Classically, one may prove A by refuting not-A, or by showing that A follows both from B and from not-B. But for the intuitionist, if a state- ment is neither provable nor refutable, we cannot assume that either it or its negation is true: there is no mathematical reality, independent of our thought, to settle the truth- value of all mathematical statements. See *intuitionist logic for the framework in terms of which intuitionists investigate how much of mathematics survives their cri- tique. The applicability of intuitionist thought outside mathematics has been explored by Dummett. d.e. M. A. Dummett, Elements of Intuitionism, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 2000). A. Heyting, Intuitionism: An Introduction (Amsterdam, 1956). intuitionist logic. A logic in which truth is equated with provability, or warranted assertibility, or something of the kind. Let us use ‘ ٗ’ to abbreviate ‘We have grounds for asserting’ or ‘We have a proof’ or ‘We have a method which, if applied, would yield a proof’, and so on. Then the intuitionist connectives answering to ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘if’, and ‘not’, are explained thus: ٗ(P & Q) if and only if ٗP and ٗQ. ٗ(P ∨ Q) if and only if ٗP or ٗQ. ٗ(P → Q) if and only if ٗ (If ٗP thenٗQ). ٗ ¬P if and only if ٗ not ٗP. In words, the explanation of ‘→’ would often be given thus: ‘We have grounds for asserting that P → Q if and only if we have a method of transforming any grounds for asserting that P into grounds for asserting that Q’. And the explanation of ‘¬’ would be: ‘We have grounds for asserting that ¬P if and only if we have grounds for asserting that we could never have grounds for asserting that P’. (An equivalent account defines ‘¬P’ as abbreviating ‘P →⊥’, 442 intersubjective where ‘→’ is understood as above and ‘⊥’ represents an arbitrary contradiction.) As for the quantifiers, where D is the domain of quantification, the explanation is ٗ∃xFx if and only if for some object a, ٗ(a is in D) and ٗFa. ٗ∀xFx if and only if ٗ(for every object a, if ٗ(a is in D) then ٗFa). The logic that results from these explanations differs from classical logic primarily where negation is con- cerned. Notoriously, it lacks the law of *excluded middle ‘P ∨ ¬P’, for on the intuitionist account we should have grounds for asserting that P ∨ ¬P only if we have grounds either for asserting that P or for asserting that we could never have grounds for asserting that P. But of course it may be that we do not have grounds for either. Similarly, this logic lacks the law ‘ ¬¬P → P’, and many other classical laws for negation. This has some unexpected consequences. For example, none of the connectives and quantifiers listed above can be defined in terms of any combination of the others. The simplest way of formulating intuitionist logic is in a style suitable for *natural deduction, with one introduction rule and one elimination rule for each sign. The rules are just the same as the classical rules in all cases except for negation, where the introduction rule is reductio ad absurdum and the elimination rule is ex falso quodlibet. There are several ways of giving a formal semantics for this logic, the most popular being that based on ‘Kripke trees’, but this topic is too complex to be explained here. There are also several ways of ‘translating’ some or all of intuitionist logic into classical logic. The most interesting one, because it seems to be most in accordance with the intended meaning of the intuitionist connectives and quantifiers, is this. In the explanations given earlier, assume that the English expressions used on the right are the classical connectives and quantifiers. Then where φ is any formula of intuitionist logic, the formula ٗ φ will translate, via these explanations, into a formula φ* containing only classical connectives and quantifiers, interspersed with occurrences of ٗ. It turns out that φ is valid intuitionistically if and only if φ* is valid in the modal logic S4. Intuitionist arithmetic is obtained by adding to this logic the same axioms as for classical arithmetic. The two arithmetics differ only on formulae involving quantifiers. The intuitionist theory of the real numbers is a *predica- tive theory. d.b. M. Dummett, Elements of Intuitionism (Oxford, 1977). M. Fitting, Intuitionistic Logic, Model Theory, and Forcing (Amster- dam, 1969). D. Scott et al., Notes on the Formalization of Logic (Oxford, 1981), part iv. inversion. A term introduced by J. N. Keynes to signify inferences in which from a given proposition another proposition is inferred having for its subject the negation of the original subject. One such inference is interesting because it violates a rule of *distribution. A series of *immediate inferences permits us to infer ‘Some non-S are not P’ from ‘All S are P’, but P is undistributed in the premiss, distributed in the conclusion. c.w. J. N. Keynes, Formal Logic, 4th edn. (London, 1906), 137–40. inverted spectrum. That two people outwardly indistin- guishable in their colour discriminating may nevertheless systematically differ in their colour experiences was a possibility raised by Locke (Essay, bk. ii, ch. xxxii). Under the title ‘spectrum inversion’ it has entered modern debate via objections to *behaviourist accounts of the mind that at least some conscious mental states have no clear relations to behaviour. Similarly, the causal relations that *functionalists appeal to in accounting for colour discrimin- ation are dogged by the possibility of subjective differences which, being systematic, escape the functional net. Some functionalists argue that spectrum inversion is a metaphysical possibility, but scarcely credible, while, being epiphenomenalists, they may not care anyway. Those who take colour experiences to be states of the brain rely on the possibility of inversion being discounted explana- torily by future neurobiological advances. It is nevertheless difficult to say what precise discoveries would enable science to explain what Locke himself could only describe as God ‘annexing’ ideas in our minds to certain objects. a.h. William G. Lycan (ed.), Mind and Cognition (Oxford, 1990). John R. Searle, The Rediscovery of Mind (Cambridge, Mass., 1992). invisible hand. Although in a free transaction the butcher sells me meat to profit himself, and I buy his meat as cheaply as possible, we each benefit the other as well as ourselves. Adam Smith regarded the *market as a whole as a universally beneficent order which comes about spontaneously (as by an invisible hand) from countless such acts, whose agents have no thought of their systemic effects. Any order which arises spontaneously without intention or design can be regarded as an instance of the invisible hand, but Smithian economics was the first study of the phenomenon. a.o’h. *conservatism. Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (1776). inwardness. The inner form or quality of a person’s out- ward-looking engagement, rather than self-scrutiny or silent pondering. A concept associated with existentialism and central in Kierkegaard (Inderlighed—drawing on the senses of ‘fervent’, ‘intimate’, ‘tender’, ‘sincere’, ‘with longing’, but not of ‘directed inward’). Inwardness is measured not by external criteria but by the mental pitch, as it were, of a person’s engagement. Kierkegaard’s concept is well captured in his ironical reference to ‘town criers of inwardness’. It is only when matters of moment are grasped with appropriate inwardness that they can be properly addressed. Noise and show rob human activity of all of the positive characteristics of inwardness. Kierkegaard was especially occupied with those cases in inwardness 443 which the noise and show were marketed as expressions of the very matters that call for inwardness. a.h. S. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript (Princeton, NJ, 1992). Iqba¯l, Alla¯meh Muh . ammad (1877–1938). Born in Sialkot (now in Pakistan), Iqba¯l was a Muslim thinker and poet. Educated in Berlin, his goal was to revitalize Islamic thought and re-establish its creative role in philosophy. His prose work, The Development of Metaphysics in Persia, is one of the first modern non-polemical Muslim texts reflecting Western scholarly methodology. Most of his works are in Persian and Urdu poetry, inspired by classical Persian mystical poetry, especially that of the great Per- sian mystic Jala¯l al-Dı¯n Ru¯mı¯ (1207–73). Iqba¯l’s most accomplished poem, the Persian The Secrets of the Self, is a modern reaffirmation of Islamic philosophy’s widely held epistemological principle of the primacy of intuition and experience by the self-cognizant ‘I’, or ‘knowledge by presence’. h.z. B. A. Dar, Iqba¯l and Post-Kantian Voluntarism (Lahore, 1944). Irigaray, Luce (1932– ). French feminist philosopher, lin- guist, and practising analyst. Her early work focused on psycholinguistics, analysing speech patterns in senile dementia and schizophrenia. She studied with Lacan but was expelled from his Vincennes school for dissenting from his views on women’s sexuality. Speculum of the Other Women (1974) is a large-scale critical reading of the history of Western philosophy as ‘the master discourse’, which exposes an exclusion or suppression of the feminine and the maternal and an undue bias towards masculinity, written in her characteristically allusive style. Many of her texts attempt to construct a version of feminine subjectivity (‘speaking (as) woman’) in the light of the above exclusion, using the strategic and symbolic positioning of Woman as *Other (e.g. This Sex which is not One (1979)). Some of her recent work is more explicitly political, some more lyrically poetic. a.c.a. *feminism. Margaret Whitford, Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine (London, 1991). Irish philosophy. There has been only one period of con- tinuous, creative philosophy in Ireland—from the 1690s to the 1750s. Before that the only prominent figure is John Scotus Eriugena, whose work has some points of contact with that in the eighteenth century, particularly in its tendency towards *pantheism, negative theology, *idealism, and heterodoxy; although Irish philosophy has been traced back to the so-called Irish Augustine, c.sixth century. After the 1750s, the most noteworthy philosophical activity—at least until now—has been derivative and scholarly, either within Catholic scholasti- cism, or in elucidating and editing the work of Berkeley (A. A. Luce), Kant (T. K. Abbott), and Hegel (H. S. Macran). The outstanding figure in Ireland’s one creative period was George Berkeley, whose principal writings indicate the main concerns of Irish philosophy, i.e. epistemology, theory of perception and language, and philosophy of religion. Also important, however, is the contribution in aesthetics by Francis Hutcheson—who was born and died in Ireland and produced most of his important books while teaching in Dublin in the 1720s—and Edmund Burke, whose chief philosophical work, Philosophical Enquiry into the Ideas of the Beautiful and the Sublime (1757), was largely written while he was a student at Trinity College in the late 1740s. While Berkeley, Hutcheson, and Burke are probably the best-known names, there were other able philosophers—among them, John Toland, William Molyneux, William King, Peter Browne, Robert Clayton, and Edward Synge. There were also popular writers, most notably Jonathan Swift, some of whose writings reflect key theories and arguments in Irish philosophy. The seminal work is Toland’s Christianity not Mysterious (1696), which, drawing chiefly on Locke’s theories of meaning and essence, argues that Christianity either asserts meaningless doctrines—‘Blictri’—or is a non- mysterious religion. Toland’s rationalist challenge was answered by Browne, then a Fellow of Trinity College, first in his Letter (1697) and, more weightily, in his Proced- ure, Extents and Limits of the Human Understanding (1728), which argues for the old negative theology by developing a radical sensationalist account of mind. Browne, like Toland, was influenced by Locke, whose Essay is the most important external influence on Irish philosophy. There are two principal tendencies in Irish philosophy—the left- and right-wing Lockeans. Toland is a left- winger, drawing on Locke’s rationalism and enlightened attitude to religion. Browne is in the right-wing, which uses Locke’s empiricism and the sceptical and quietistic trends in the Essay. Yet neither those on the left nor those on the right were slavish adherents of Locke; instead, they were often his most astute critics, boldly drawing out con- clusions from his work which he was either unable or unwilling to accept. Molyneux comes closest to being a follower; yet he is more a collaborator than a disciple. Indeed, the final form of the Essay owes more to him than anyone (apart from Locke), as their correspondence, published in 1708, clearly shows. Another creative response to Toland from the right was by Archbishop King, whose Sermon on Predestination (1709) defends religious mystery by applying *representationalism and the *primary–sec- ondary quality distinction to theology. King is also remembered for his influential De Origine Mali (1702), which is appreciatively discussed by Leibniz in his Théodicée. Toland’s challenge also gave rise to Berkeley’s preco- cious emotive theory of meaning, which Berkeley uses in Alciphron (1732), dialogue vii, to explain religious mystery. Yet Berkeley was not a clear adherent of the right wing. Thus in Alciphron, dialogue iv, he forcefully attacks the Browne–King theological position and in ways remark- ably similar to those he had earlier used against matter. 444 inwardness Browne counter-attacked in his Divine Analogy (1733), whose scornful and incredulous comments on Berkeley’s emotive theory of mystery shows the revolutionary char- acter of the theory, a theory which Burke uses in his Philo- sophical Enquiry along with sensationalism, which he probably derived from Browne. Another topic which shows the inner unity and interest of Irish philosophy is the *Molyneux problem. Not only was it devised by an Irishman, but some of the most interesting responses to it were made by Irishmen—Berkeley, Hutcheson, Synge, as well as (less directly) Swift and Burke. d.ber. *English philosophy; Scottish philosophy. D. Berman, ‘Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment in Irish Philosophy’ and ‘The Culmination and Causation of Irish Phil- osophy’, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie (1982). —— and P. O’Riordan, The Irish Enlightenment and Counter- Enlightenment (Chicago, 2002). (Contains an introduction, chart and bibliographical notes to six volumes of mainly eighteenth-century Irish philosophical writings, from Toland to Burke.) T. Duddy, A History of Irish Thought (London, 2002). (Now the most comprehensive work on Irish thought and philosophy). R. Kearney (ed.), The Irish Mind: Exploring Intellectual Traditions (Dublin, 1985). (The pioneer book on the subject.) J. Laird, ‘Ulster Philosophers’, Proceedings of the Belfast Natural His- tory and Philosophy Society (1923). iron block universe: see determinism. irony, Romantic. Notion of irony as an attitude or ethos that calls everything into doubt, from utterer’s intentions to our knowledge of the world as given (supposedly) through sensory acquaintance or the concepts and cat- egories of reason. Such ‘infinitized’ irony—as distinct from its ‘stable’ or unproblematic varieties—aroused great interest among poet-philosophers in the early-to- mid-nineteenth century, notably Novalis, Hölderlin, and Friedrich Schlegel. These thinkers pursued the various problems bequeathed (as they saw it) by Kant’s critical philosophy, e.g. the *antinomies of subject and object, of *freedom and *determinism, and of thought as a perpet- ual striving for truth in the face of human finitude. Hence their fascination with the giddying depths of uncer- tainty—the interpretative mise-en-abîme—opened up by reflection on this topic. Such thinking was attacked by Hegel and Kierkegaard on account of its sceptical or nihilist implications. c.n. David Simpson (ed.), The Origins of Modern Critical Thought: Ger- man Aesthetic and Literary Criticism from Lessing to Hegel (Cam- bridge, 1988). irony, Socratic. Socrates, in the early dialogues of Plato, is depicted as claiming to know nothing, as having no superior doctrine to offer even as he confounds and defeats his interlocutors by his pointed questions. This famous Socratic ‘profession of ignorance’ is also regarded as an instance of Socratic irony, of his saying less than he thinks or means (as the root of the term in the Greek eiro¯n, a dis- sembler, suggests). He adopts this affectation, it is said, simply to avoid being subjected to the same critical treatment himself. It would seem, however that there was no dissembling involved. n.j.h.d. S. Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony (1841) is a classic treatment. G. Vlastos, Socrates (Cambridge, 1991) contains a recent discussion. irrationalism is the opposition to reason on principle as distinct from the mere tendency to lapse into ad hoc illogic- ality or unreason. What this outlook amounts to more specifically depends on the answers to the following questions. What is the reason thus opposed? What is counter- posed to it? And what is the extent of the opposition? To start with the last: irrationalism has never involved a total disavowal of *reason. For example, an irrationalist falsely accused of murder can be expected to marshal evi- dence and argument in proof of his innocence as best he can. Nor is he likely to ignore well-established algorithms in the solution of a computational problem. What he would insist upon is that principles such as those of prob- able and demonstrative reasoning that are used in the mental activities mentioned are, though appropriate and effective in their own spheres, inapplicable to issues of superior importance like the spiritual self-realization of the ego, the ultimate destiny of humankind, and the tran- scendent ground of the existence of the world. Within the domain to which these issues belong, he would contend, knowledge can only be attained through some non-logical and non-empirical modes of direct cognition such as are encountered (in purest form) in mystical intuition or in faith induced by some transcendental source. Faith and *intuition, then, on this reckoning, are and ought to be recognized as the superiors of reason in matters that matter. Although the concept of reason has been variously interpreted, it has an uncontroversial core of reference which includes deductive and inductive inference, to which allusion has already been made, and the logical and semantical analysis of concepts and statements based on clearly ascertainable rules. Given that these procedures of thought are supposed to be incapacitated in the areas of cognition reserved by the irrationalist, it is apparent that any inquiries by the unconverted into the intelligibility, not to talk of the validity, of the deliverances of faith and intuition are irremediably handicapped. And this is, pos- sibly, the most striking thing about irrationalism: it is apt to become a constraint on dialogue. It is a remarkable fact that some of the greatest thinkers in the history of Western philosophy have had some irrationalist leanings, however peripheral in some cases. Thus so ingenious a dialectician as Plato seems to have credited knowledge of the profoundest truths exclusively to some superior mode of unmediated cognition, exempt from all possibility of error and therefore of debate; and St Thomas Aquinas, for all his demonstrated powers of reasoning, conceded some truths to the sole competence of faith. Even Kant, giant of the Enlightenment, confessedly found it necessary to ‘deny knowledge in order to make room for faith’. irrationalism 445 But, of course, reason has not lacked its philosophical celebrants. It is not for nothing, for example, that the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in European history have been called the Age of Reason. The rational foundations laid in the teachings of seventeenth- century thinkers like Bacon, Locke, Leibniz, Spinoza, reached their denouement in the optimistic rationalism (using this word in the broad sense) of the stalwarts of eighteenth-century Enlightenment such as, to mention only a few, Bentham and Godwin in England and Voltaire, Diderot, and Montesquieu in France. Their shared con- viction, which may not at times have been without a touch of hyperbole, was that it was entirely possible to improve the human condition out of all recognition through the expansion of the role of reason in human affairs. It was in reaction to this enthusiastic trust in reason that Romanticism emerged in art, literature, and philosophy in the nineteenth century as perhaps the most self- consciously irrationalist movement in Western thought. In contemporary culture there are not a few currents of irrationalism—witness, for instance, the ‘new age’ movement and the even grosser tendencies to demonism in sectarian life—but in serious philosophy familiar animad- versions against Reason, when duly analysed, are frequently revealed to be in reality more against certain conceits about reason than against reason itself. k.w. Henry D. Aiken (ed.), The Age of Ideology: The Nineteenth Century Philosophers (New York, 1956). Peter Gay (ed.), The Enlightenment: A Comprehensive Reader (New York, 1973). W. T. Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy (New York, 1960), esp. chs. 5 and 6. Irwin, Terence H. (1947– ). A noted classical philosopher at Cornell University, Irwin has written books on Plato’s ethical ideas (Plato’s Moral Theory (Oxford, 1977)) and on Aristotle’s metaphysical and epistemological theses (Aris- totle’s First Principles (Oxford, 1988)). His work is marked by a strong current of active philosophical questioning. Irwin’s task has been not only scholarly, but one of understanding and evaluating the theses under examination as significant and living ideas. He has done the bulk of his mature work in America, where he stands alongside a number of other North American classical philosophers in demonstrating the continued power of the intellectual inheritance of Plato and Aristotle. n.j.h.d. ‘is’: see ‘to be’; being; real; subject and predicate. ‘is’ and ‘ought’. Moral philosophy has to give an account of how, if at all, we can legitimately move from is to ought, from describing how things do in fact stand, to expressing an urgent concern either that they be changed or that they be respected, preserved as they are. If the is–ought gap is over-dramatized, value is detached altogether from the world and becomes a function of sheer decision. But moral deliberation does not and cannot work in a factual vacuum. To underplay the gap is to suggest, no less implausibly, that an ought can be simply read off from an is. A satisfactory account must start from the idea that ought and is interpenetrate. We may grasp a situation as demanding action: conversely, reflection on values and obligations powerfully affects our understanding of human nature and its potentialities. The classical formulation of the ‘is’–‘ought’ issue is David Hume’s, in A Treatise of Human Nature, iii. i. 1. r.w.h. *fact–value distinction. W. D. Hudson (ed.), The Is/Ought Question (London, 1969). Islamic aesthetics. Much Islamic aesthetics, like Islamic philosophy as a whole, is thoroughly Neoplatonic. This replaced the earlier theories of thinkers like al-Kindı¯, for whom beauty is taken to be derived from perfection, and since God is the most perfect being in the universe, he is also the most beautiful. He is constantly aware of his beauty, while we are only occasionally able to come close to experiencing it, since it is an essential feature of the deity, but its perception is merely an accidental human attribute. This version of Pythagoreanism was replaced by the argument that we operate on the level of imagination, so our ideas of beauty are limited to what we can experience and abstract from those experiences. On the other hand, we can use our material ideas and experiences to construct more abstract and perfect concepts of beauty, and so come closer to the range of completely pure beauty which exists far from the material world. The area of aesthetics which came in for much discussion was poetry, and the ways in which poetry works logic- ally. Many of the Islamic philosophers such as al-Fa¯ra¯bı¯, Avicenna, and Ibn Rushd were convinced that poetry follows a syllogistic pattern of proof, albeit with far weaker premisses than most such reasoning processes, and with the conclusion that the audience should be moved to action or emotion. Imagination is again crucial here, blending our ability to be both spiritual and material. Our material ideas reflect our experiences, yet they can be made more abstract, and thereby extend those experiences in novel and exciting ways.Were we to be entirely rational, we would not need imagination, and could be spoken to entirely in terms of what we regard as logical; but since we are emotional creatures, we require to be addressed at least partially through our emotions, and this is where poetry and other art-forms come in. They appeal to us both intellectually and emotionally, and persuade us that we should adopt a certain attitude or share a particular feeling. o.l. S. Kemal, ‘Aesthetics’, in S. Nasr and O. Leaman (eds.), A History of Islamic Philosophy (London, 1996). Islamic ethics. Ethics in Islamic philosophy is a surpris- ingly uncontroversial area, since most thinkers agreed on the general principles of ethics. There was an early 446 irrationalism theological dispute as to how objective the principles of ethics are, but this did not really become part of the debate in philosophy. The latter took off when the views of Plato and Aristotle became familiar to Islamic philosophers, especially the notion of the just society in the Republic of Plato and virtue as a mean in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. One of the issues which the Islamic thinkers had to address was how to discuss happiness in such a way that it would be available to all who were prepared to behave well, as opposed to just those who were intelligent. The Aristotelian debate about how far the moral and social life is important, as compared to the life of the mind, was of particular interest, since the idea that salvation was restricted to those who are intellectually gifted is hardly compatible with Islam. Al-Fa¯ra¯bı¯ and Ibn Sı¯na¯ (Avicenna) imply that the masses’ route to salvation is through religion and morality, while the philosophers’ route is through philosophy. Ibn Miskawayh (d. 1030) and Nas . ı¯r al-Dı¯n al-T . u¯sı¯ (d. 1274) produced very elaborate discussions of ethics, and the philosophical psychology which accompanies them displays considerable acuity. God is taken to be the epitome of the religious law which incorporates both spiritual and physical goods. We should obey not only God, but also his representatives on earth, and all those who are superior to us morally. The view of human beings being the representatives of God is particularly attractive to Shı¯‘ite thinkers, who can relate the imam or spiritual leader with the deity in this way. A particular interesting debate arose in the work of al-Ghaza¯lı¯ (d. 1111) and is his response to an argument produced by Ibn Miskawayh. The latter argues that the religious and moral law is based on what is in our interest, and that we can see what the point of the law is by asking what its point is. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯ replies that the point of the moral and religious law is that it has no point; it is entirely arbitrary and rests on nothing but the will of God. Some people may follow the principles of morality out of some confused idea that they are the right principles, but unless they follow those principles because they believe they are commanded by God to do so, their action is without value. Here al-Ghaza¯lı¯ is using the ideas of an earlier theological debate between the Mu‘tazila and the Ash‘ariyya on the basis of morality. For the former, morality can be derived from reason, and that is why God establishes it, since he acts in accordance with reason. The Ash‘arites argued, by contrast, that morality means nothing more than what God demands of us, and it has no basis apart from that. It was the Ash‘arite view that prevailed in Islamic philosophy. The objectivist account of ethics of the Mu‘tazilites was held to suffer from a number of problems. It places huge reliance on the ability of human reason to determine our moral duty. It also implies that religion plays no significant role in determining morality, and that religious law is not an essential part of that morality. Yet the Qur’a¯n itself points frequently to the signifi- cance of guidance for human beings, and although reason is clearly important in assessing what form of guidance is valid, it cannot replace the authority of God as revealed to his representatives on earth. This notion of human beings being divine representatives is often taken to be important morally, and has implications for how we can behave and what our relationships should be with each other and with our environment in general. It is worth pointing out that the starting-point for working out what our duties as God’s representatives on earth are is Scripture, and without divine guidance we would have no idea how to behave. o.l. O. Leaman, Brief Introduction to Islamic Philosophy (Oxford, 1999). —— Introduction to Classical Islamic Philosophy (Cambridge, 2002). Islamic philosophy. Originally based on Arabic translations of Greek texts, developed as a syncretic yet systematic body of thought in the Islamic world, from Andalusia to India, from the ninth century to the present. Most works were originally written in Arabic, many in Persian. Though marked during its formative period by Mu‘tazila theologians, who were influenced by issues of revelation and reason in Christian theology (e.g. Origen, John of Damascus), Islamic philosophy does not constitute a religion; nor was it the ‘handmaiden of theology’. Most prac- titioners were Muslims of various cultural, social, and linguistic backgrounds; some were notable members of other religions. The Formative Period: The Late Eighth to Mid-Ninth Century. Philosophical activity at this time centred in Baghdad’s new Academy (‘House of Wisdom’). Supported by the caliphs, notably al-Ma’mu¯n (reigned 813–33), the school was known for its academic tolerance and freedom of scientific inquiry. Learned representatives of all subject nations participated in the state-endowed centres where a universal world-view was sought to sustain the Empire. Some extremist groups questioned the caliphs’ authority, introducing critical political issues (later addressed by theologians such as Ba¯qilla¯nı¯ and Baghda¯dı¯) and theoretical problems (later picked up by Fa¯ra¯bı¯ and Avicenna). Others, drawing upon older traditions (materialist, Manichaean, Jewish, Christian, Zoroastrian, Arabian, and Indian), challenged Islamic philosophy’s fundamental doctrine of revealed truths by identifying its supposed contradictions and inconsistencies. The Mu‘tazila thus established a set of doctrines regarding anthropo- morphism and God’s knowledge, creation, prophecy, human free will, and immortality. Greek thought became the most attractive tool for the construction of a defined Islamic theology, providing a rational defence for revealed teachings. One major thinker of this period was al-Kindı¯, who was interested in philosophical investigation per se. Although upholding the validity of revealed truth, he also proposed its recovery by demonstration. He did not attempt a systematic ‘harmonization’ of prophecy with philosophy, however, one of the primary goals of the Islamic philosophy 447 following period. His main contribution was identifying Greek texts and refining their Arabic translations, some of which he commissioned. They include extensive paraphrases of Pre-Socratic authors; Plato’s Laws,Timaeus, and Republic, plus paraphrases of Phaedo, and other Platonic texts; most of the Aristotelian corpus except the Politics; selected Neoplatonic texts, some incorrectly identified (notably parts of Plotinus’ Enneads iv–vi, thought to be ‘Aristotle’s theology’), as well as works by Porphyry (especially the Isagoge) and Proclus; plus many other texts and fragments, including elements of Stoic logic and physics associated with the late antiquity schools of Alexandria and Athens; and significant Aristotelian commentaries, notably those of Alexander of Aphrodisias, along with their Neoplatonist interpretations. Al-Kindı¯’s syncretic approach is based on Neoplatonist theories of emanation and the concept of the One, Aris- totelian metaphysics of causality and intellectual knowledge, and Platonic doctrines of the soul and dialectic method. Aristotelian logic was used to investigate Hel- lenic-defined problems as well as the ‘new’ set of issues fundamental to Islamic revelation. Al-Kindı¯ argued for creation ex nihilo as a type of emanation, but not natural causation where the First Being is created simply by God’s eternal will. He also argued for immortality of the individual soul as the rational explanation for resurrection. His arguments as well as some of their corollaries were later rejected or revised, but his writings, especially in theoretical philosophy, represent the foundations of Islamic philosophy. The Creative Period: The Ninth to the Eleventh Century. The rise of anti-rationalist sentiments proclaimed by al-‘Ash‘arı¯ (912), along with political events and populist movements, curtailed Islam’s spirit of scientific discovery, while radical advancements were taking place in areas such as computational mathematics and astronomy. Two notable philosophers of this period, al-Fa¯ra¯bı¯ and Avi- cenna, met the challenge by harmonizing reason with revelation, introducing innovations, and refining philosophical technique and analysis. There are three seminal innovations of this period: 1. Al-Fa¯ra¯bı¯’s commentaries on Aristotelian texts of the Organon define a standard Arabic logical terminology and improve formal techniques. His independent technical works, such as Utterances Employed in Logic and the Book of Letters, describe a new linguistic structure and examine ‘how many ways a thing is said’. 2. Al-Fa¯ra¯bı¯ creates the first works on Islamic political philosophy within the context of Islamic religion. His Attainment of Happiness and the Political Regime are novel in their technical discussions of prophecy and creation, and the roles of the lawgiver and divine law in the city. Redefined metaphysically as the ‘science of politics’, these philosophical domains are promoted as the means for attaining happiness and the establishment of just rule, stipu- lated to be the ultimate purpose of philosophy. Fa¯ra¯bı¯’s most popular work, The Ideas of the Inhabitants of the Virtuous City, furthered the doctrine of just rule by encour- aging philosophical discourse on prophecy and law, which affected the beliefs and actions of the entire Muslim community. The text describes an epistemology based on Aris- totelian theories of intellectual knowledge and active intellect wherein human prophetic knowledge is not restricted by God’s will. Thus any person devoted to philosophical inquiry may gain access to unrestricted, objective knowledge, or union with the active intellect. This theory of knowledge, later refined and reformulated by Avicenna into a unified theory of prophecy, is one of the most significant components of Islamic philosophy. It informs the Shı¯‘a political doctrine in the sixteenth century and its later refinements, where the ‘Virtuous City’ is invoked to describe divinely inspired just rule by the philosopher-ruler, then called ‘jurist-guardian’. 3. Avicenna defines Islamic Peripatetic philosophy in the first independent, comprehensive corpus on the subject. Most of his texts were later translated into Latin, and their arguments used by scholastic authors from Bacon to Ockham. Avicenna is distinguished from previous thinkers by his recomposition of the entire range of philosophical subjects, adding fresh arguments and refining earlier ones. He incorporates political theory into a recon- structed metaphysics, describing prophecy as a general- ized theory of intellectual knowledge capable of describing mystical experience. His ontological distinction between contingent and necessary being became accepted doctrine. He is the first thinker to state the psy- chological theory that an individual suspended with no spatial or temporal referents will necessarily affirm his soul as an act of self-identification and that the soul’s active imagination is responsible for the feeling of pain or pleas- ure after separation from the body. These novel concepts were considered by Sohravardı¯, the founder of Illumin- ationist philosophy, as essential components in the chain of being. Avicenna’s theories of prophetic knowledge, based on notions of ‘holy intellect’ as well as Koranic exegesis, were accepted by religious scholars, especially in the post- medieval period. Avicenna’s students, including Gorga¯nı¯ and Bahmanya¯r, become identified as Peripatetics, consti- tuting Islam’s first ‘school’ of philosophy, as such. The Period of Reconstruction and Reaction: The Twelfth to the Fifteenth Century . Several political and intellectual currents run through this period, which is also marked by the rise of al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s ‘Ash‘arite theology. After the Abba¯sid caliphate was overthrown by Mongol conquests (thirteenth century), Islamic philosophy subsisted in multiple intellectual centres, which had also spread to the West. In the fourteenth century, fundamentalist traditionalism was promulgated through the eclectic polemics of Ibn Taymiyya, who called for believers to rid Islam of all forms of innovation. Two main types of philosophical writing emerged in Andalusian centres such as Cordoba and Seville in the twelfth century: the philosophical writings of Ibn Ba¯jja (d. 1138), Ibn T . ufayl (d. 1185), and others extend al-Fa¯ra¯bı¯’s 448 Islamic philosophy political doctrine; and the Aristotelian commentaries of Averroës, called ‘the Commentator’ in Latin texts. Ibn Ba¯jja interprets al-Fa¯ra¯bı¯’s political doctrine in a pessimistic light. Although upholding the virtues of the ideal city, he considers it non-existent, emphasizing the dark aspect of actual cities in which the populace lives in the cave (after Plato) but perceives only shadows. Unlike al-Fa¯ra¯bı¯, he considers the city incompatible with the philosopher’s need for solitude. He supports Avicenna’s idea of experiential knowledge, or ‘enlightenment’, through conjunction with the active intellect (Directives and Remarks, ix, x), but considers the value of ‘prophetic’ knowledge to be individual not collective. Ibn T . ufayl also extends al-Fa¯ra¯bı¯’s political doctrine in a pessimistic direction. Inspired by Avicenna’s philosophical allegories and mention of an ‘Eastern Philosophy’ with non-Peripatetic ‘wisdom’, he created an allegory in which a wise hermit from a deserted island comes to civi- lization with the gift of theoretical knowledge but fails to save the multitudes (translated in English as The Improve- ment of Reason (London, 1708)). In the East, the philosophy of illumination, constructed by Sohravardı¯, represents Islamic philosophy’s most suc- cessful response to this period’s reactionary stance. Com- mentaries by Molla¯S . adra¯ and others extend its political doctrine to other areas. Sohravardı¯ offered a clear and accessible system, calling for the enlightened rule of the divinely inspired, appearing in every age, who manifest signs indicating knowledge and power, and thus become authorities who serve as rulers or ‘hidden’ guardians of justice. The sixteenth-century Shı¯‘a scholars readily identified with the philosophy of illumination and used it in the formulation of Shı¯‘ite political doctrine. It remains one of the three accepted schools of Islamic philosophy to date. The philosophy of illumination includes many technical innovations. In logic these include definition of an independent modal operator ‘necessarily/it is necessary that’ in defining a superiterated modal proposition as the form to which all other propositions are reduced; the impossibility of the ‘necessary and always true’ validity of the universal proposition because of the necessity of future contingency; and reduction of the figures of syllo- gism. The principal epistemological innovation was a unified theory of knowledge capable of explaining all types of knowledge—prophetic, inspired, and sensory. In a highly innovative manner, Sohravardı¯ posits a reformulated proposition of the sameness of knowing and being as the foundation for a unified epistemological theory. A most general concept of ‘knowing’ is assumed, for which the verb ‘apprehension’ (idra¯k) is used. It is then stated that any type of ‘knowing’ is that the ‘knower’ and the ‘known’, as the apprehender (mudrik) and the appre- hended (mudrak), the sensing and the sensed, the intel- lected and intellect, and so on, form a sameness relation. Such a relation is identity preserving one-to-one correspondence among each and every member of the set of all ‘knowers’ and the set of all ‘knowns’ in any type of ‘knowing’. New ideas in ontology and cosmology involved cosmological light essences and time-space continuum, where measured time and Euclidean space apply to the corporeal realm, and time without measure and non- Euclidean space define a separate realm called mundus imaginalis. The notion of an intermediary realm of imagination, the mundus imaginalis, was a crucial development, especially as elaborated by illuminationist commentators Shahraz‘rı¯ (thirteenth century), Ibn Kamm‘na (thirteenth century), Davva¯nı¯ (d. 1501), Dashtakı¯ (d. 1542), and others, whose work contributed to the origins of Islamic religious philosophy. During the second half of the twelfth century, a new genre of philosophical works by theologians emerged which continue to be taught today. The most significant impetus for these were al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s demands on theologians to defend the faith against rational philosophy by use of philosophical technique and language. Two texts by Athı¯r al-Dı¯n Abharı¯ (d. 1264), Guide on Philosophy and Commentary on the Isagoge, established the range of subjects and language, and elucidated the forbidden aspects of philosophy. These include Avicenna’s cosmic motion and Sohravardı¯’s time-space ‘will-less’ continuum theories of the propagation of lights. The Guide on Philosophy is divided into three parts—logic, physics, and metaphysics—consisting of metaphysica generalis and metaphysica specialis. The most popular commentary on this work, written in 1475 by Mir Husayn Maybudi, is custom- arily read along with the text. Commentary on the Isagoge, a primer in logic, is also read with commentaries, such as that by al-Fana¯rı¯ (d. 1470), often along with glosses, super- glosses, and versifications. While numerous works of this genre continue today, most tend to lack the philosophical depth and creativity revived in the sixteenth century by Molla¯S . adra¯ and extended by Molla¯ Hadı¯ Sabzeva¯rı¯ (d. 1878). Exceptions include the treatise Sun-Radiance (Shamsiyya) by Dabı¯ra¯n Qazvı¯nı¯ (d. 1276), presented in Nicholas Rescher’s Temporal Modalities in Arabic Logic (Dordrecht, 1967), which includes one of the most precise pre-modern defin- itions and comprehensive listing and discussion of simple and compound modal propositions and modalities, their contradictories, rules for their conversions, as well as an intricate analysis of validating modal syllogisms. Qazvı¯nı¯’s text, together with its commentary by medieval theologian-philosopher Tafta¯za¯nı¯ (d. 1389), author of Refinements on Logic and Theology, became a textbook. The Period of Revival: The Sixteenth to Early Seventeenth Cen- tury. This period coincides with Safavid rule in Iran, which established Shı¯‘ism as the state religion, primarily as a defensive measure against conquests by the Ottoman Sunnı¯ Empire. A new world-view with rational but wider appeal was sought to re-establish the ruling Safavid’s legitimacy and to defend his position against the better- established theology and judicial doctrine of the Sunnı¯. Similar to the academies of the formative period, the Safavid’s well-endowed centres supported scholarship Islamic philosophy 449 . debate in philosophy. The latter took off when the views of Plato and Aristotle became familiar to Islamic philosophers, especially the notion of the just society in the Republic of Plato and virtue. Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine (London, 1991). Irish philosophy. There has been only one period of con- tinuous, creative philosophy in Ireland—from the 1690s to the 1750s. Before that the only. supposed to be incapacitated in the areas of cognition reserved by the irrationalist, it is apparent that any inquiries by the unconverted into the intelligibility, not to talk of the validity, of the

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