politics international relations and diplomacy on the korean peninsula

Politics, International Relations andDiplomacy on the Korean PeninsulaThis edited volume explores the past, present, and future of the KoreanPeninsula, with special focus on South Korea,

Politics, International Relations and

Diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula

This edited volume explores the past, present, and future of the KoreanPeninsula, with special focus on South Korea, by connecting developments inpolitics with those in international relations and diplomacy

The book focuses on how South Korea's politics and international relationshave evolved since the founding of the First Republic in 1948, with particularattention to the period surrounding the 2022 presidential election The authorsprovide new insights into Korean politics, including South Korean electoralreform and relations with China and Japan, North Korea's nuclear capacity,and North-South diplomacy

Beginning with a commentary by Colin Crooks, Britain's currentAmbassador to South Korea and former Ambassador to North Korea, onrecent British foreign policy changes and UK-Korea relations, this book willappeal to scholars and students of politics, international relations, diplomacy,and Korean Studies

Sojin Lim is Reader in Asia Pacific Studies (with special reference to

Korea), Course Leader for both MA North Korean Studies and MA AsiaPacific Studies, and Co-Director of the International Institute of KoreanStudies at the University of Central Lancashire, UK She is the author ofarticles and book chapters on sustainable development and political economy

Her recent publications include International Aid and Sustainable

Development in North Korea: A Country Left Behind with Cloaked Society

(2024) She frequently discusses changes in the Korean Peninsula in mediainterviews.

Routledge Research on Korea

Series Editors: Niki Alsford and Sojin Lim, University of Central Lancashire, UK.

The Research on Korea series surveys key topics in the study of North andSouth Korea (both on the peninsula, and in the diaspora) It is a prestigiousseries that is multidisciplinary, covering the social sciences and arts andhumanities The series seeks to publish best new research from both seniorand junior scholars

1 South Korean Popular Culture in the Global Context

Beyond the Fandom

Edited by Sojin Lim

2 The North Korean Army

History, Structure, Daily Life

Politics, International Relations and Diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula

Edited by Sojin Lim

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© 2024 selection and editorial matter, Sojin Lim; individual chapters, the contributors

The right of Sojin Lim to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

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This work was supported by Core University Programme for Korean Studies through the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and Korean Studies Promotion Service of the Academy of Korean Studies (AKS-2020-OLU-20200045).

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Names: Lim, Sojin, editor.

Title: Politics, international relations and diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula / Edited by Sojin Lim Description: New York, NY : Routledge, 2024 | Series: Routledge research on Korea | Includes

bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2023006861 (print) | LCCN 2023006862 (ebook) | ISBN 9781032491929

(hardback) | ISBN 9781032491936 (paperback) | ISBN 9781003392569 (ebook)

Subjects: LCSH: Korea (South) Politics and government | Korea (South) Foreign relations | Korea (North) Foreign relations | Korea (South) Relations Korea (North) Congresses | Korea Military policy.

Classification: LCC DS917.8 P67 2024 (print) | LCC DS917.8 (ebook) | DDC dc23/eng/20230427

327.519305195 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023006861

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ISBN: 978-1-032-49193-6 (pbk)

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2 South Korea's Democratic Experience: Political

Leadership and Civil Society

Summits: The Limits of Institutionalism in East Asia

ED GRIFFITH

5 Diplomatic Competition between North and South Korea

in the Southern Cone (1950–1977)

CAMILO AGUIRRE TORRINI

6 Why Presenting a Foe as a Friend Can Make Sense:

Explaining Shifts in North Korea's Construction of a South Korean Threat in State Media

BENEDIKT CHRISTOPH STAAR

Index

List of Figures

1.1 (Dis)proportional Seats in the Korean National Assembly

(1963–2020)

6.1 Relative Amount (in Per Cent) of Securitising Moves

Containing International Engagement Claims Compared to All Securitising Moves in New Year's Editorials and

Addresses (2000–2020)

6.2 Relative Amount (in Per Cent) of Securitising Moves

Containing Specific Referent Objects Compared to All Securitising Moves in New Year's Editorials and Addresses (2000–2020)

6.3 Change of Securitisation Strand Ratio Before and After the

ROKS Cheonan Sinking (2009–2010) and the Shelling of Yeonpyeong Island (2010–2011)

6.4 Change of Securitisation Strand Ratio Before, During, and

After the Destruction of the Inter-Korean Liaison Office

6.5 Relative Amount (in Per Cent) of Securitising Moves

Containing Specific Referenced Threats Compared to All Securitising Moves During Political Conflict Between

North and South Korea

6.6 Relative Amount (in Per Cent) of Strands of Securitisation

Compared to All Securitisation and Desecuritisation Moves

6.7 Relative Amount (in Per Cent) of Securitising Moves

Containing Specific Legitimation Claims Compared to All Securitising Moves During Political Exchanges

6.8 Relative Amount (in Per Cent) of Securitising Moves

Containing Specific Referent Objects Compared to All

Securitising Moves Involving South Korean Actors

List of Tables

1.1 Major Reform Proposals and Bills (2012–2016)

1.2 Major Reform Proposals and Bills (2016–2020)

1.3 Results and Hypothetical Simulations of the General

Election (2020)

3.1 North Korean Nuclear Tests – Content Overview

3.2 South Korean Presidential Elections – Content Overview 3.3 Six-Party Talks – Content Overview

4.1 All of the Leaders’ Summits since Their Inception in 2008 6.1 Strands of Securitisation

6.2 Analysing Securitisation and Legitimation Claims in Speech

Acts in North Korea

Camilo Aguirre Torrini is a PhD Candidate at the University of Sussex,

UK, and a Research Associate at the Comparative Korean Studies Center

of the Central University, Chile His work focuses on North/South Koreandiplomacy towards Latin America He holds an MA in Korean Studiesfrom Seoul National University, South Korea

Kyounghee Cho has worked at Coventry University, UK, as a Lecturer and

at Pusan National University, South Korea, as a Project Professor.Previously, she worked at the National Research Council for Economics,Humanities and Social Sciences in South Korea She received a PhD inPolitics and International Studies from the University of Warwick, UK

Colin Crooks has been the Ambassador to the Republic of Korea (South

Korea) since 17 February 2022 Before this, he was the Ambassador to theDemocratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) from 2018 to 2021

Ed Griffith is Associate Dean of the School of Psychology and Humanities

at the University of Central Lancashire, UK He obtained his PhD in EastAsian Studies at the University of Leeds, UK He achieved two MAdegrees: MA Japanese Studies at the University of Leeds, UK; and MAChinese Studies at SOAS, University of London, UK

Virginie Grzelczyk is Reader in International Relations and the Head of the

School of Social Sciences and Humanities at Aston University, UK Her

research focuses North Korean security relationships She holds an MAand PhD in Government and Politics from the University of Maryland,USA.

Sojin Lim is Reader in Asia Pacific Studies (with special reference to

Korea), Course Leader for both MA North Korean Studies and MA AsiaPacific Studies, and Co-Director of the International Institute of KoreanStudies at the University of Central Lancashire, UK She frequentlydiscusses changes in the Korean Peninsula in media interviews

Hannes B Mosler holds the Chair for Social Sciences of East Asia with a

focus on Politics and Society of Korea at the University of Essen, Germany, where he is affiliated with the Institute of PoliticalScience and the Institute of East Asian Studies (IN-EAST)

Duisburg-Benedikt Christoph Staar is a PhD Candidate in Political Science at the

University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany His research focuses on NorthKorean security, domestic politics, and propaganda

As the first British diplomat to serve as Ambassador consecutively to bothhalves of the Korean Peninsula, it is an honour to be asked to set the scene forthis important and timely collection of scholarship with a short overview ofthe United Kingdom (UK) policy on the Peninsula and the wider region

The Integrated Review, released in March 2021, is the mostcomprehensive articulation of a foreign policy and national security approachpublished by a British government in decades Following our departure fromthe EU, it reconsiders many aspects of our domestic and foreign policy,building on existing friendships but also looking further afield as we set ourown policy in areas like trade and sanctions

The growing importance of the Indo-Pacific region to global prosperityand security is acknowledged as one of the primary geopolitical shifts towhich British foreign policy must respond The region is already critical tothe UK's economy, our security and our global ambition to support opensocieties It is home to half the world's people and by 2030, it will representmore than 40 per cent of global gross domestic product (GDP) There are biggrowth opportunities for UK trade, investment and business There are alsoreal security risks, including nuclear proliferation and cyber threats And withmany of the world's biggest emitters in the region, if we want to tackleclimate change effectively, we need to work with these countries

Some of our most important global partners are in this region, and we need

to work even more closely with them on these regional challenges, and toaddress global issues together We are committed to long-term integrated

engagement to ensure we safeguard UK economic and security interests, andthat open societies and values are protected This means investing in newpartnerships such as through our new status as Association of SoutheastAsian Nations (ASEAN) Dialogue Partner and our application to join theComprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership(CPTPP) We will also work very closely on the Indo-Pacific with the BidenAdministration, with whom we share many interests and values.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) isexplicitly mentioned in the Review as an example of our global ambitions,where we are determined to remain the most engaged non-regional partner ondenuclearisation and sanctions enforcement Our embassy in Pyongyanggives us unique insights and access among our partners – especially giventhat, for example, no other Five Eyes partner has such representation Sadly,

we were forced to temporarily close the embassy in May 2020, followingNorth Korea's restrictions on entry to the country in response to the COVID-

19 pandemic But we will seek to re-establish our presence in Pyongyang assoon as we are able to return to smooth embassy operations In the meantime,

we maintain diplomatic relations with the DPRK and have appointed a newambassador

We continue to believe diplomacy and negotiations are the best way tosecure North Korea's denuclearisation and look forward to working in closepartnership with the United States (US) and other allies and partners toachieve this goal We urge the DPRK to show restraint and work towardspeace Through cooperation, diplomacy, and dialogue, we are also committed

to working together with the DPRK authorities to tackle mutual challenges,such as climate change and pandemic preparedness

Alongside our concerns about North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missileprogrammes, we are concerned that humanitarian needs may be growing.Before COVID-19, we worked with partners to provide humanitarianassistance to the most vulnerable people in North Korea, principally throughour assessed contributions to the United Nations (UN), as well as throughinternational non-governmental organisations (NGOs) These partners havealso been unable to maintain their operations under the border closures and

we encourage the DPRK to allow entry for humanitarian workers to carry out

an independent assessment of these needs, and to allow aid to flow freely intothe country

The human rights situation is also a focus for our government and our

ambitions to protect our values globally We regularly call on the DPRKgovernment, through bilateral and multilateral channels, to acknowledge andaddress the many reports of serious and wide-ranging human rights violations

in the country, and to uphold its human rights obligations As Group of Seven(G7) Leaders made it clear in June 2021, we call on the DPRK to respecthuman rights for all, and we urge the DPRK to cooperate with all relevant

UN bodies, including allowing access by the UN Special Rapporteur on theHuman Rights situation in the country

If, as the ambassador to North Korea, I was confronted by examples of thechallenges in the Indo-Pacific region that the Integrated Review seeks toaddress, in my new assignment as the ambassador to the Republic of Korea(ROK or South Korea), I will be at the forefront of trying to grasp theopportunities The UK and the Republic of Korea are friends and partnerswith dynamic and successful developed economies, and a broad base ofshared values and global interests The Republic of Korea is at the heart ofthe UK's approach to the Indo-Pacific region and is precisely the kind ofcountry with which we seek to deepen our cooperation across the board

Trade and investment sit at the heart of the relationship South Korea wasone of the first countries to agree to trade discussions with the UK followingthe EU Exit referendum The FTA that we signed with the ROK in August

2019 has now entered into force and we will begin negotiations this year toupdate and upgrade it, ensuring that it delivers prosperity and social benefit toboth our economies and people

The visit to South Korea of the Queen Elizabeth Carrier Strike Group inher maiden voyage in 2021 demonstrates our commitment to develop ourdefence cooperation And our invitation to South Korea to participate in theG7 Summit during our G7 presidency demonstrates our commitment todevelop our political and multilateral cooperation President Moon'sattendance at the leaders’ summit and his return to the UK for the COP26Conference in Glasgow represented for the first time that a South Koreanpresident had visited the UK twice in a year He also had meetings with ourprime minister during the UN General Assembly in New York, breakingfurther ground in the frequency and depth of interactions between ourleaders

Of the various areas highlighted in the Integrated Review, we enjoy sharedinterests with South Korea in all of them: climate change; supply chainresilience; protecting cyberspace; technological development; human rights;

free trade; and disarmament All of these areas offer rich potential to expandour cooperation for the benefit of people in both countries South Korea is aprime example of both the reason for our Indo-Pacific tilt and its realisation.

Colin CrooksBritish Ambassador to South KoreaFormer British Ambassador to North Korea

in 1987, power shifted between conservatives and progressives every tenyears South Korean presidents are limited to a single five-year term Twoconservative presidents – Roh Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam – held officebetween 1988 and 1998, while the next two presidents – Kim Dae-jung andRoh Moo-hyun – who held office between 1998 and 2008 were fromprogressive political parties They were followed by two conservativepresidents again: Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye This secondconservative hold on power fell just short of ten years though, with PresidentPark Geun-hye getting impeached one year before the end of her five-yearterm Continuing the pattern, she was followed by a progressive in office –Moon Jae-in, who served as the president until the 2022 election.

However, this pattern was broken in 2022, when the conservativecandidate, Yoon Seok-youl, beat his progressive opponent, Lee Jae-myung,

by a very small margin: Yoon won 48.45 per cent of the votes, while Leereceived 47.83 per cent Many foreign observers, who were unfamiliar withthe Korean election system, wondered as to how this narrow margin, with theleading candidate securing less than 50 per cent of the votes, could determinethe final result without any further balloting For example, in France, if the

leading candidate does not win 50 per cent of the votes, a second round ofvoting is held In the US, the winner is decided through the electoral collegeprocess Neither South Korea's presidential election process nor its overallelectoral system is widely understood yet Thus, in Chapter 1, Hannes B.Mosler explores South Korea's electoral system and discusses recent changeswith reference to the country's historic transition to democracy FollowingMosler's examination of South Korea's representative democracy, in Chapter

2, Kyounghee Cho, reassesses the country's democratic experience in terms

of its political leadership and civil society Cho argues that South Koreancivil society has played a critical role not only in the transition to democracybut also in the process of democratic consolidation, providing acounterbalance to the political leadership

The pattern of clear differences between conservatives and progressives inmatters of diplomacy and international relations as well As democratisationhas progressed over the past seven decades, South Korea has become amiddle power in the diplomatic arena For example, in 2021, President MoonJae-in was invited to a meeting of the G7, held in the UK, as therepresentative of a non-member country, along with the leaders of Australiaand India This moment confirmed South Korea's status as a middle power.While sharing the pursuit of middle-power status, conservatives andprogressives have tended to show somewhat different understandings of whatthis means Conservative President Kim Yong-sam developed his predecessor

President Roh Tae-woo's Nordpolitik into a policy of globalisation (or

internalisation) A decade later, Conservative President Lee Myung-baksimilarly set out a Global Korea policy, with President Park Geun-hye

continuing the conservative vision with her Trustpolitik In comparison,

progressive President Kim Dae-jung was more well known with his SunshinePolicy towards North Korea, which was continued by President Roh Moo-hyun Then, during President Moon Jae-in's administration, a new era of theSunshine Policy was pursued, along with his peaceful unification drive.Altogether, this resulted in fluctuation in South Korea's foreign relations withits regional partners, including the US, Japan, and China Most recently, thefiercely competitive presidential election in 2022 garnered great interest inthe two candidates’ respective foreign policies towards the region – forexample, North Korea and surrounding countries

Given this, in Chapter 3, Virginie Grzelczyk examines South Korea'snuclear diplomacy, including its relation to presidential elections in South

Korea and in the US Ed Griffith's analysis, in Chapter 4, expands thediscussion of South Korea's international and diplomatic activities.Considering the South Korean government's efforts to position the country as

a middle power in the global arena, Griffith revisits South Korea-China-Japantrilateral summit cooperation, which has its secretariat in Seoul, and discussesthe dynamics of institutionalisation in the region, which have not beenadequately addressed in the scholarly literature Then, in Chapter 5, CamiloAguirre Torrini takes a look at another rarely examined aspect of SouthKorea's international relations Aguirre Torrini analyses the historicdiplomatic competition between North Korea and South Korea in SouthAmerica, which was influenced by US hegemonic aspirations Finally, in

Chapter 6, Benedikt Christoph Staar provides a slightly different angle onNorth Korea-South Korea relations, analysing them from the perspective ofNorth Korea Staar explains how North Korea considers South Korea to be apotential ally rather than a threat, through an exploration of North Koreanmedia

Existing literature tends to deal with South Korean politics, diplomacy, andinternational relations separately due to the different disciplinary approaches

A key benefit of this can be found in the in-depth analyses that focus solely

on politics, diplomacy, or international relations However, as the aboveaccount shows, the development of democracy and presidentialcharacteristics in South Korea are highly linked to developments in thecountry's politics, diplomacy, and international relations While this is not aunique phenomenon, as a country's diplomatic and international relationstend to change under different presidential leaders, the case of South Koreahas not yet been examined in this manner, especially in view of the recentpresidential election in 2022 Also, the analysis presented in each chapter ofthis edited volume is not widely found in existing works Therefore, thisedited volume serves as a venue for new perspectives on one of the mostanalysed aspects of South Korea

Sojin Lim

institutionalised political processes (jeongchi gwan’gyebeop), this is

especially true for the election law Elections belong to the core institutions

of liberal and representative democracy because they have the elementaryfunction of enabling and realising participation and representation as a basisfor the selection of personnel, accountability, and system legitimisation.

In this respect, the introduction in 2004 of the parallel mixed-membermajoritarian (MMM) system for allocating the National Assembly's 299 seatswas a major leap forward This reform of the Public Office Election Act

(PEA; gongjikseon’geobeop) combined the parallel elections in two separate

tiers through two ballots per voter While with the first vote, seats wereallocated in the 243 single-member districts (SMDs), with the second vote,the remaining 56 proportional representational (PR) seats were distributedaccording to the percentage of the party vote Though the ratio of PR seats inthe national assembly was still low at barely 19 per cent, the reform clearlyhelped to promote diversification of representation in parliament, as vividlyattested to by new political forces entering the National Assembly, as well asother positive effects on representativeness (Song and Lee, 2021) However,during the almost two decades since the PR turn in 2004, Korea's electionsystem has not seen any further progress in this regard (Mosler, 2021)

On the contrary, the number of seats allocated based on PR voting havedecreased despite continuous, substantial consensus on extending them toenhance the quality of democracy There was no lack of reform demands,ideas, or initiatives Most prominently, assemblywoman Shim Sang-jeong of

the progressive Justice Party (JP; Jeongui Dang) – a splinter successor of the Democratic Labor Party (DLP; Minjunodong Dang) – had been continuously

pushing for reforms to further and more effectively promote parliament'srepresentativeness Her proposal was to introduce a full-fledged mixed-member proportional (MMP) system modelled after the German electoralsystem with the particular aim of extending the share of PR seats to ensure amore proportionate representation of the people's will.2 After passing throughtwo legislative periods since 2012 that seemed like a Sisyphean odyssey, attimes like a Kafkaesque novella, her bill was finally adopted in 2019.However, in the meantime, the original reform had metamorphosed beyond

recognition into a deform that instead contributed to further deteriorating the

electoral system

The new law introduced a semi-MMP system at the same SMD-PR seatratio of 5.4:1 without properly regulating any possible loopholes that wouldallow major parties to misuse the law to their advantage This happened eventhough the presidential office was at that time occupied by the outspoken

liberal-reformist Moon Jae-in despite a general demand for furtherdemocratising reforms among the citizenry, and despite corresponding reformpledges and proposals by a majority of the political class.3 The existingliterature on the matter concurs that this seeming contradiction can beexplained by the major political parties’ cartel-like tactics to safeguard theirhegemony irrespective of the severe repercussions for the overall politicalsystem and democracy (Chang, 2020; Cho, 2020; Jang, 2020; Yoon, 2020).Despite the obvious dominance of the two major parties and their vitalinterests in maintaining the rules of the game in their favour, the questionnevertheless remains how they put this self-serving strategy into practice inconcrete terms The present investigation attempts to contribute tounderstanding the recurring pattern of idling political reforms in Korea(Mosler, 2012) by shedding light on this most recent instance of democracypruning Accordingly, this chapter addresses the question: Who subverted the

2019 electoral reform, how, when, and why? Drawing on the barriersapproach (Rahat and Hazan, 2011), the analysis focuses on the legislativeperiods of the 19th (2012–2016) and the 20th (2016–2020) parliament toinvestigate the electoral reform's process, contents, and outcomes to help tounderstand what keeps Korea's electoral system and representativedemocracy in this state of disproportion

Theoretical Settings: The Usual Obstacles to Reform

The reform of electoral systems is a demanding endeavour that involvescomplex institutional structures and diverse actors, which is why there ishardly one single approach that sufficiently accounts for the various factorsinvolved Therefore, increasingly eclectic strategies are preferred that addressthis challenge such as the ‘barriers approach’ by Rahat and Hazan (2011),which combines factors related to structural effects with agency-relatedfactors (Rahat and Hazan, 2011: 479) Based on extensive and multifacetedliterature on political reforms, they produced a catalogue of seven sets ofvariables that they identify as the main hurdles for reformers to overcome ifthey are to successfully realise their objectives for change (Rahat and Hazan,

2011: 479–490) While these potentially frustrating barriers are not alwaysnecessarily equally high or tricky, and their degree of difficulty may evenvary greatly across polities, issues, time, and other factors, they neverthelessrepresent dynamics that are always at play in representative democracies In

addition, the seven barriers are also interrelated and variably interdependent,

as the following brief overview on the ‘barriers’ – divided into the twosubsets of structural constraints and actors – will show

Structural Constraints

The first and most obvious barrier to change is the challenge of formally

initiating a legislative reform procedure, and to make sure that it is not

derailed at one of the multiple venues (committees, hearings, executive veto,popular veto, and so on), which the bill must pass through before it can be

finally adopted (for example, procedural superiority of the status quo) While

basically, reforms are possible outside of formal change, for the most part,any significant changes in the electoral system can be produced through legalmodification only, which can be more or less demanding, for example, costly.Indirectly, the barrier of ‘procedural superiority over the status quo’ alsoincludes the question of agency Procedures can be more or less facilitatingfor initiating and processing a reform, but it needs actors to do so The second

barrier, that of the culture and political tradition of a given polity refers to

the larger historical conditioning of a population that usually provides for astrong path dependency in determining its setting's institutional design Theso-called older democracies are typically divided into majoritarian-leaningAnglo-American and consensual-leaning European-Continental politicalcultures So-called young democracies, on the other hand, are assumed to bemore open to reform because they often do not have a comparably maturedtradition with respective effects The third barrier is premised on the

necessary compatibility of the institutional setting with the social structure of

a given society For this reason, it is anticipated that divided andheterogeneous societies are inclined to either hold onto or strive for aconsensual situation, while homogenous societies are incentivised to eithermaintain or pursue a majoritarian electoral system It follows that socialchange – either suddenly or incrementally – is a potential source of demandsfor amendment in the established design, and that reform attempts can beeither a way of adapting to or countering social change The challenge of the

fourth barrier depends on two qualities regarding the election system-level

rationale – efficiency and consistency An electoral system is deemed

efficient and thus weatherproofed against possible reform attempts if itbalances the beneficial properties of proportionality and majoritarianism,

together with personal accountability and party-centeredness Reform mightbecome more probable if a system produces outcomes contradicting theexpected effects of its design, such as producing stable majorities or PR.

Actors

The fifth barrier is the first of the remaining three hurdles that differ from the

previous four in that they relate to agency effects Vested interests of the

established and powerful actors (political parties) represent the well-knowngatekeepers watching over and often frustrating change if it does not benefitthem, for example, in maintaining or maximising seats This is notnecessarily limited to the biggest fish in the pond but also applies to thesecond biggest if it serves to secure their shared outcomes against anychallenge from outside the cartel On a different note, primary vestedinterests might be sacrificed in situations of potential loss of legitimacyamong the electorate (Rahat and Hazan, 2011: 484) The coalition politics

between or within political parties (factions) is the sixth barrier, whichalludes to the involved actors’ calculation in regard to stable coalitions thatare beneficial for their effective and sustainable access to governing, forwhich they might even sacrifice the prospect of maximum power (number ofseats) (Rahat and Hazan, 2011: 485–486) The seventh and last barrier

concerns disagreement over the contents of a reform and is based on the

premise of a ‘game of chicken’ that can lead to unintended consequences –mostly in the form of thwarting a reform This describes situations in whichthe majority might be in favour of reform but cannot reach an agreement onthe actual form as a result of the involved actors trying to maximise theirrespective interests

Stuck in the Passable Barriers

This section considers the barriers of political tradition, social structure, and

system-level rationale first, as these relate to general characteristics and

conditions, and thus share the common trait of being the most stable variables

to be observed in this case study of the reform of the PEA in Korea

Heterogeneous Political Culture and Tradition

In principle, it is reasonable to assume that Korea is open to reform ratherthan not because it belongs to a category usually defined as ‘youngdemocracies’, which are therefore assumed to be relatively open to change Infact, this hypothetical openness (Rahat and Hazan, 2011: 481 & 491) isvividly confirmed by the country's history of incremental electoral reforms,which have become more numerous since the formal turn to democracy at theend of the 1980s (Mosler, 2021) The introduction of the MMM system in

2004 is a case in point It can be best understood against the backdrop of the

historical development of the share and quality of additional seats in Korea's

National Assembly.4 There are four phases that can be identified since theinstituting of additional parliamentary seats (see Figure 1.1) While the firsttwo phases cover the military dictatorships between 1963 and 1987, the thirdphase starts after formal democratisation in 1988 and ends in the early 2000s,when – shortly after the first government turnover – the fourth phase begins,characterised by various reform initiatives More specifically, during the firstphase (I), based on an MMM SMD FPTP5 single-ballot system during theThird Republic (1963–1972), one quarter of parliament's total seats (bonusseats) were allocated to the three largest parties based on their seat share inthe constituency election as is typical for an authoritarian regime attempting

to maintain its façade of democracy.6 In the beginning of the second phase(II), the openly authoritarian Fourth Republic (1972–1980), one third of allseats were given unconditionally to the government party.7 This share wassomewhat scaled back in the ensuing Fifth Republic (1980–1988), which wasstill a military dictatorship Now only two thirds of this one-third share wasgiven to the largest party, and the rest distributed among the remainingparties The third phase (III) begins after formal democratisation in 1988 andreduces additional seats back down to a quarter, which afterwards decreasedeven further Also, the method of allocating seats to parties began to change

to a relatively fairer method so that the fewer additional seats were distributedsomewhat more evenly among the electoral contenders.8

Long Description for Figure 1.1

Figure 1.1 (Dis)proportional Seats in the Korean National Assembly (1963–

2020)13

Source: Mosler (2021)

What is remarkable in this respect is that at this point progress in politicalreforms, including this aspect of the electoral system, remained at a low levelcompared to the possibilities and demands at such a watershed event as aconversion to formal democracy Major reforms of the electoral system at thebeginning of the new century (2004/2005) mark the beginning of the fourthphase (IV), and again, we see for the first time noteworthy improvementswith the introduction of an MMM system in general elections, where votershad two votes: one for a candidate in their electoral districts and one for aparty on the national level (NAPA, §146).9 Now, additional seats wereallocated through a decoupled secondary vote on a national party list andbased on proportionality and, not as before, based on the number of seatswon Even if the share of 18.7 per cent among all seats was still limited, thereform helped to boost diversity in representation.10 This was vividlydemonstrated by the historical entry into the National Assembly of the left-

leaning DLP (Minjunodong Dang) in 2004, which since then has remained in

parliament with 6 to 13 seats.11 However, despite these undeniably positive

effects, the share of additional seats never again reached the scale of theFourth or Fifth Republic On the contrary, the ratio of the now PR seats hasbeen shrinking continuously In other words, the fairer the allocation processbecame after the formal democratic turn, the smaller the share of additionalseats to be allocated.12

As a non-Western country, Korea has a different political history, and thus

is not directly linked to either of the two political traditions presumed by theliterature (Rahat and Hazan, 2011: 481) Due to its particular postcolonialcondition, however, there are numerous indirect links to both the Anglo-American as well as the Continental-European political culture Before, and

in particular, during the Japanese occupation (1910–1945), the politicalstructure and reasoning was strongly influenced by the German theory ofstate and jurisprudence, which is, for example, evident in its various modernconstitutions beginning with the (Imperial) Constitution in 1897 Many legalscholars trained in continental legal tradition and in some of its governmentsystem design's core characteristics that are still in place today (Mosler,

2017) Specifically, the affinity with features of parliamentary cabinetsystems, including the important role of political parties, had been a notablefeature since before Korea's founding Constitution in 1948 (Mosler, 2017),and thus affects the way the electoral process is conceived in acorrespondingly specific way Since liberation in 1945, however, Korea hadalready been experiencing great influence from the USA and respectivepolitical traditions and concepts, which is likewise visible in many respects –the presidential system of government is one of the most apparentmanifestations in this regard Even after liberation, the influence of Japaneselaw persisted, which is strikingly visible in the reform of 1952 when a largeset of restrictive stipulations concerning the regulation of campaigning wasmore or less copied verbatim from the Japanese election act (Song, 2005)

Thus, this historic background does not provide significantly unambiguous

clues in favour of or against certain reform attempts, except in the definingdecades where the major political parties were overrepresented

Homogenous Social Structure

Korea is well known for having a relatively homogenous social structure

compared to many other countries with strong religious, regional, gender, orother diversities.14 Despite the experience of centuries of wars between

frequently changing alliances of different kingdoms on and around thepeninsula, and despite the fact that also during the five centuries of theJoseon period (1392–1910), the country had distinct regional features andinterests; a strongly centralist tradition in premodern, modern, andparticularly in contemporary Korea, is one of the most characteristic features

of the polity Nevertheless, from the 1980s, at the latest, regionalistsentiments have been influencing the outcomes of elections, and thusrepresents a fairly deep-seated geopolitical cleavage This regionalism,however, is not rooted in distinct ethnicities, traditions, religious beliefs, orother typical factors, but is mostly a result of the political leaders of the twomajor camps mobilising voters of the province from their hometowns (Kwon,

2004) In terms of political demography, despite a growing share ofimmigrants, multicultural diversity is still at a comparatively low level (Kleinand Mosler, 2021; Lee, 2016) It might seem even more surprising given thishistorical backdrop that in 2005, Korea became the first country in Asia tointroduce voting rights for foreigners (Mosler and Pedroza, 2016) Thisenfranchisement, however, was limited to local elections only, and thenumber of those who are actually eligible for voting under this scheme isvery small compared to the total number of foreigners in the country Inaddition, those who are eligible belong to only a very few groups ofnationals, and thus they do not represent the diversity of foreigners in Koreavery well (see Chung, 2020) In addition, while the number of foreignersparticipating in elections has risen sharply since 2006, the actual voterturnout has been steadily decreasing Thus, while in some respects, the votingrights for foreigners is a major achievement, it also does, at the same time,include major insufficiencies regarding their representation

Somewhat similar issues can be observed regarding gender representation.Beginning in 2000, candidate gender quotas were introduced to the Political

Parties Act (PPA; Jeongdangbeop), and were moved to the electoral law two

years later According to the latest changes, not less than 50 per cent ofproportional representative candidates must be women, who must berecommended for every odd number in the ranking of the candidate list, andefforts must be made to nominate at least 30 per cent female candidates forthe SMD elections (PEA, §47).15 These reforms undeniably have led to theimprovement of women's participation and are a descriptive as well assubstantive representation in the institutionalised political sphere (Kweon andRyan, 2021) Not only has the share of women increased who were elected to

PR seats but the number of female representatives of local constituencies hasalso risen (Kim, Eun-Hee, 2020) It is also true that during the legislationprocess, there were surprisingly weak fundamental objections to theintroduction of a women's quota as such And, with increasing numbers ofwomen in politics, the image and perception of female politicians as being atleast as able as their male counterparts has been promoted At the same time,the law prescribes legally binding quotas for proportional representative listsonly, which is in itself a very small fraction of the total seats of Korea'sassemblies as discussed above, and features other peculiarities that, ratherthan fostering the participation of women, still inhibit their representation(Mobrand, 2019a).

Thus, in sum, these characteristics are in line with the assumption that arelatively homogenously structured society tends to prefer a majoritarian,pluralist system over consensual, proportional representative electoraldesigns (Rahat and Hazan, 2011: 482) There has been increasing change inKorea's social structure, and reform attempts in this regard can be understood

as effects of that in the sense of adapting to, or even promoting them But thehomogenous-centralist legacy still weighs heavily on the political system'sdesign, which is evident in the stringently limited reforms as discussed abovethat were successful to some degree but had the overall effect of maintaining

a majoritarian system In other words, the electoral system is simultaneously

a cause for and an effect of a homogenously structured society, which thus

contributes to explaining the system's stability

System-Level Rationale

Nevertheless, the obvious stark imbalance of Korea's electoral system due toits ‘non-efficiency’ has indeed been inducing pressure for reform – in linewith the assumed system-level rationale (Rahat and Hazan, 2011: 483) Up tonow, electoral systems have not successfully translated the will of the votersinto policymaking because of the discrepancy between the extremely smallfraction of assembly seats filled according to proportionality and the restbeing allocated by the principle of majoritarianism However, at the sametime, the electoral system is quite effective in the sense that it providesoutcomes that it promises, or what its reformers of 1987 expected of it todeliver, namely an overrepresentation of the two largest political parties Inthis way, the system's inefficiency is compensated for by effectiveness, that

is, in delivering to the powerful actors in the polity, and thus strongly incentivising more fundamental reform attempts, leaving the system crippleddespite reform pressures In other words, the electoral system caters to theparty cartel (Katz and Mair, 1995) rationale, which reproduces the hegemony

de-of the two major parties by guaranteeing overrepresentation in parliament,and by insulating the system from potential challenges, namely hithertounderrepresented minor political parties such as the DLP from entering theinstitutionalised political arena in anything approaching substantial numbers

The Major Delaying Barriers as Stumbling Blocks for Reform

This section examines how far the remaining barriers, disagreement over

content, procedural superiority of the status quo, coalition politics, and vested interests can be considered for explaining the frustration of the 2019

electoral reform

(Dis)agreement Over Content

In Korea, extending the share of PR seats has always been met withscepticism, mostly in political circles, as well as in academia and the media.The reason is that this kind of change would entail either creating moreparliament seats to level the number of PR seats with those of the electoraldistrict seats’ or it would lead to reducing electoral district seats Both optionsare said not to be realistic reforms The former faces resistance from apopulace ever more opposed to adding to the numbers of untrustworthypoliticians (Gallup, 2015, 2018a) who prey on their tax money, while thelatter will meet strong opposition from the established political parties whoare naturally afraid of losing their guaranteed strongholds

Regarding the expansion of the PR electoral system as a core reform issue,there were five key questions on which the opinions of the involved politicalparties differed according to their respective vested interests, which have,accordingly, been increasingly debated since the last great reform in 2004.First, there was the question of whether to increase the overall number ofdeputies in the National Assembly to accommodate additional PR seats, orwhether the total number was to be maintained, reducing the number ofconstituency seats instead.16 The two major parties – the conservative Liberal

Korea Party (LKP; Jayuhan’guk Dang) and the liberal Democratic Party (DP;

Deobureominju Dang) – were, in principle, for maintaining the status-quo,

taking advantage of a system that stems from their resourceful organisationand regionalist effects They were also opposed to the proposal to add moreseats in general based on the rationale that this ‘reform act’ (Rahat andHazan, 2011) would be criticised by the citizens as a further waste of taxmoney, and thus lead to less support The more direct reason was that more

PR seats would mean more potential challengers to their quasi-monopoly ofthe National Assembly However, the DP had some incentive to present itself

as more reformist and progressive, hence the increase in PR seats, since itspresident had been elected in the wake of the candlelight protests demanding

an end to elite corruption and the recognition of popular sovereignty (Jang,

2020: 84) In fact, President Moon Jae-in, during election campaigning in

2017, was already making pledges for doing so once in office The minor

People's Party (PP; Gungminui Dang) advocated reforms even more strongly

because of the strategic reasons related to their size and resources, whileretaining a somewhat in-between position because of the potential to tap intothe advantages of its relative stronghold in the southwestern region ofHonam The progressive JP put forward the strongest argument for the PRexpansion, due to their representatives being few in number, but also forideological reasons – not least the hardly deniable assessment that theexisting electoral system distorts the appropriate representation of thepeople's diverse interests In summary, regarding the number ofparliamentary seats, several proposals were made, ranging from maintaining

300 seats to expanding the number to 360, to 368, or even to 400, andincreasing the share of PR seats from 18 to 50 per cent.17

The different conditions and therefore strategies of the political partiesinvolved are also reflected in their positions on the remaining issues Besides

the size of the PR seats’ share, the question whether to interlink (yeondong)

the allocation of PR seats with SMD seats was another key issue The ideabehind linking or interlocking the two tiers was to alleviate thedisproportionality between the vote and the seat share, and thus compensatefor underrepresented parties by way of making the overall distribution of seatshares dependent on the electorate's votes on political parties, as in theGerman election system In addition, part of the discussed reforms was todivide the country into six electoral districts according to the proportion of

the population (gwonyeokbyeol), in which the MMP election would be held.

In this way, it was argued, the various opinions and interests of the individual

voters would be reflected more accurately, and thus contribute to alleviatingthe problem of regionalism and the underrepresentation of small parties Arelated proposal was to introduce a double-track candidacy that allowscandidates running for a constituency to be saved even if they are defeated inthe constituency by putting their name on the PR list at the same time Theelectoral loser, by the difference of the smallest percentage of votes in the

SMD election (seokpaeyul), can overcome this and win the election through

the party's PR list Again, this was thought to alleviate regionalist effects andpromote more successful candidates from smaller parties Somewhat similarwas the suggestion of reforming the SMD into multi-member electoral

districts (MMDs; jungdae seon’geogu) to facilitate increased representation

through politicians from smaller parties

Initiating Reform in Two Acts

Assemblywoman, Shim Sang-jeong became a key actor among thoseinvolved in the reform process Since she was a member of the minor JP, theinstitutional challenges to her activities to reform the system vividlydemonstrate the constraints of the procedural superiority of the status-quo.Introducing a new law or reforming a law in Korea is not particularlydemanding compared to other liberal democracies, but the process doesinvolve various stages, venues, and potential veto players (Rahat and Hazan,

2011: 480) The initiation of legislative process begins with either thepresident or at least ten members of the parliament submitting their respectivebills to the national assembly This minimum number used to be 20 but washalved in 2003 to promote access to legislation for minority interests Inaddition, the chair of a parliament committee is eligible to submit a reformbill, and citizens can petition parliament to introduce a bill It then will betransferred to the respective committees or might be deliberated on inspecialised sub-committees; after that, having been cleared by the judicialcommittee, the bill is put in front of the national assembly's plenary for thefinal vote, which is decided by a simple majority After review by the state

council (gungmuheoui), the president then signs the bill before it is officially

put into force Regarding changes in the election law, this depends on thedegree and quality of the changes on whether the Constitution must bechanged, which would of course, entail a much more demanding reformprocess, including a confirming national referendum in the end (Mosler,

2020a) But even if this is not the case, the president can veto a bill, and send

it back to parliament Then, presupposing opposition in one of the severalcommittees, a bill can also be challenged by calling upon the ConstitutionalCourt In the case of the 2019 reform, however, this did not take place, and,

on the contrary, a decision by the Constitutional Court, as discussed later,provided it with yet another persuasive argument

Act I – A Sisyphean Challenge (2012–2016)

The 2004 reform that introduced the MMM system for the first time enabledthe JP (then DLP) to enter the parliament, including Shim, and thus was aprecondition for a reformist representative, not unlike her, to become areform agent at this level in the first place Four years later, Shim ran for asecond term in her district but was defeated by her conservative contender bysix percentage points Shim successfully re-entered the parliament in herdistrict in April 2012, where she joined the Environment and LaborCommittee, which became the main stage of her reform activities during thefirst year of her term Only half a year later, Shim was elected presidentialcandidate for her newly established minor JP.18 The campaign period leading

up to the presidential elections in December 2012 provided favourableconditions for advocating reform of the PR system After five years ofPresident Lee Myung-bak's conservative administration, the oppositionattempted to pool resources as a way of regaining power, which is why themain contenders like Moon Jae-in and Ahn Cheol-su announced their

reformist ‘new politics’ (saejeongchi) Taking this opportunity, Shim

proposed that the two contenders include concrete reform tasks (MoneyToday, 2012), and later in a joint declaration with Moon announced theircoalition formed around key reform issues such as the introduction of a PRsystem styled after the German model (Newsis, 2013) This attempt,however, failed shortly after the contenders Moon and Ahn unified theircandidacy and neglected earlier reform pledges Later, the liberal candidateMoon lost against the conservative Park Geun-hye, and thus, the DPremained in opposition Again, Shim saw the opportunity to advocate for PRreforms in parliament, as the opposition had to demonstrate their reformpotential, and took her cause to the National Assembly's Special Committee

on Political Renewal (Jeongchi Swaesin Tuekbyeol Wiwonhoe), which was

formed in April 2013 This committee's subcommittee became the new venue

for Shim's continuous reform efforts, while the reform of the PR systemremained one of her core concerns.19 The main task of this reform committeeand those which followed was to prepare reforms related to the upcominglocal elections in the summer of 2014 In this regard, Shim waged acontinuous campaign to expand the 10 per cent share of PR seats in the localelection to 30 per cent, even though her party originally had demanded 50 percent In December 2013, she introduced a bill with this proposal, which was,however, together with several other similar proposals not adopted, and thelocal elections were held without changes in the share of PR seats (MoneyToday, 2013).

Meanwhile, in January 2014 in a closely related matter, Shim had filed acomplaint with the Constitutional Court to review the electoral law'sstipulation regarding the proportionality of election districts which at thattime displayed a discrepancy of 3:1 between the constituency with the largestpopulation and the constituency with the lowest population, and whichshould, according to her, be narrowed to at least to 2:1 This was a strategy tocircumvent the common venue of the National Assembly in which she andher party were not strong enough (due to the electoral system!) to submitsuch a reform In October 2014, the Constitutional Court decided in thecomplainants’ favour It ruled in a 6:3 decision that the difference inpopulation by constituency should be changed to less than 2:1 and that thelaw should be revised accordingly by the end of next year in the NationalAssembly (2014-heonma-53) In ensuing press conferences on the verdict,Shim referred to the Constitutional Court's finding that the existing single-member constituency system has limitations, and in its current form, cannotguarantee the people's equal rights (Shim, 2014b) To further expand the right

to equal representation, she made an appeal to take the opportunity that thisdecision implied to completely reform the electoral system, linking thisquestion of rectifying the disproportionality in election districts in particular

to the expansion of the PR system (Chosun Ilbo, 2014)

Drawing on this success and referring to the major parties’ several pledges

to reform politics before the upcoming general elections in 2016, Shim inNovember 2014, made the case for introducing the German-style PR systemand called upon the mainstream parties to jointly decide on the respectivetasks for the soon to be established reform committee in the NationalAssembly (Shim, 2014a) This window of opportunity was further opened by

the report of the National Election Commission (NEC; Jungang

Seon’geogwalli Wiwonhoe) to the National Assembly in February 2015,

which proposed changes in the electoral to expand the share of PR seats toone third (100 out of 300 seats), and to introduce the double-track candidacy(NEC, 2015) (see Table 1.1) Consequently, Shim repeatedly pushed for her

PR reform campaign in press statements and parliament speeches (Shim,

2015), and simultaneously called on every member of the parliament toindividually sponsor her proposal Additionally, in March 2015, Shim joinedthe newly formed parliamentary committee for political reforms, where sheagain advocated for the PR reform (Money Today, 2015b) Predictably, nomembers of the National Assembly sponsored her bill, nor could sheconvince her fellow members of the reform committee to consent to a PR seatexpanding reform It is an important detail here: Deputy Shim had not beenable to introduce the bill before because no other deputy would sponsor itexcept those from her own party, which was insufficient even under theimproved regulations for submitting a bill (as mentioned above) This is whyshe once again chose to circumvent the conventional route of reforminitiation in April 2015 (Money Today, 2015a; News1, 2015); when sheturned to civil society, and attempted by way of popular petition to introducethe bill to the Reform Committee In other words, only by bypassing heropponents (Rahat and Hazan, 2011: 488), she was able to finally table the billbefore the committee.20 Her proposal increased the number of seats from 300

to 360, out of which 120 seats were reserved for proportional representatives(Choe et al., 2015), which had already been watered down from the originalobjective of a 1:1 PR ratio This would have improved the ratio betweenconstituency seats and PR seats from 5.4:1 to 2:1, which also would havebeen in line with the earlier proposal by the NEC (see Table 1.1) However,she was still not able to garner the necessary support of the committee'smembers to adopt the bill and to transfer it to the next stage in the legislationprocess And thus, the bill that in March 2016 was finally passed byparliament, had a ratio that was even worse than the existing one, as thenumber of PR seats were reduced from 54 (18 per cent) to 47 (16 per cent)out of the total 300 seats Moreover, neither regional allocation nor coupling

of PR seats were introduced; the double-track candidacy or second rule was not adopted either And so, the 20th general elections of 2016 (May)were held based on this even further degraded election law

chance-Table 1.1 Major Reform Proposals and Bills (2012–2016)

26 December 2013

25 February

dong

jeong(ChoeByeong-mo)

Sang-Committee forSecurity andAdministration

National

Source: Author's own compilation.

Act II – A Kafkaesque Drama (2016–2020)

The steeplechase started again after the new National Assembly wasconstituted in the Spring of 2016, with Shim being re-elected as well, who ayear later re-joined the parliamentary committee for political reforms

(Jeongchigaehyeok Teukpyeol Wiwonhoe) Meanwhile, the conservative

President Park Geun-hye was removed from the office and liberal Moon

Jae-in was elected president Jae-in 2017 The mass demonstrations (candlelightvigils) in 2016/2017 that led to the impeachment of Park were not onlycrucial for her removal but were also interpreted as a strong mandate forreforms In particular, the new ruling camp styled themselves as the

‘candlelight government’ to push for reforms in diverse areas, includingpolitical institutions This opened a potential for an even wider window of