Clusters and Competitive Advantage The Turkish Experience_2 ppt

32 Clusters and Competitive Advantage but also by the conditions for resource supply and resource creation in its proximate environment (Öz, 1999). We shall now look at the most relevant debates for the purposes of this study. Geographical unit of analysis and applicability to every context A very interesting debate in the literature is on the most appropriate geo- graphical unit of analysis to apply Porter’s approach. In his 1990 study, Porter argues that many of the determinants of advantage are more similar within a country than across countries. However, because the geographic concen- tration of competitive industries is so important he questions whether the country is the most appropriate unit of analysis since competitive advantage often seems to be localized in an area within the country. International business scholars, however, tend to take the opposite position. Regarding the EU, for example, Dunning (1993) argues that national diamonds should be replaced by ‘supranational diamonds’ in order to capture the true com- petitive advantages of the EU. Jacobs and De Jong (1992), on the other hand, argue that there is a dialectic relationship between divergence and convergence, and concur with Porter’s (1990) idea that globalization para- doxically leads to more emphasis on local conditions and creates an opportunity for firms to take advantage of them. Others (for example Rugman, 1991; Hodgetts, 1993; Rugman and D’Cruz, 1993; Rugman and Verbeke, 1993) share the idea that double and/or multiple-linked diamonds would reflect the sources of competitive advantage better than Porter’s (1990) single diamond framework does for smaller countries that are highly dependent on one or more of the major blocs (Europe, North America and Japan). At the micro level the issue is further complicated by the existence of cross-border clusters (Saner and Yiu, 2000). Relatedly, some researchers consider that Porter’s approach cannot be used for all countries. For instance Rugman (1991) believes that while most of Porter’s (1990) analysis would work for managers based in the EU, the United States or Japan, much of it could not be applied in Canada. The main reason for this, according to Rugman, is that Porter’s study does not incorporate the true significance of multinational activities, an issue that will be discussed below. Similarly, in Hodgetts’s (1993, p. 44) view, ‘since most countries of the world do not have the same economic strength or affluence as those studied by Porter, it is highly unlikely that his model can be applied to them without modification’. Porter’s emphasis on home markets and local firms, according to Bellak and Weiss (1993), may be justified in the case of large countries but is of little relevance for small ones. Narula (1993) and Yetton et al. (1992) make a similar point when arguing that since it is based on and applied to them, the diamond is most relevant for mature, manufacturing-based economies and cannot be used to explain the inter- national competitiveness of developing countries. Similarly Davies and Ellis (2000) argue that since Porter generalizes inappropriately from the American Clusters in the Management Literature 33 experience, developing countries are inadvertently encouraged to pursue policies that might be harmful. Sources of advantage: global versus local Whether sources of advantage are local, as suggested by Porter (1990, 1998), is another issue that has been subject to severe criticism. Porter’s (1990) treatment of multinationals and foreign direct investment in particular has been widely criticized. According to Rugman (1991), the narrow understanding of foreign direct investment is a major conceptual problem with Porter’s model. Relatedly, Davies and Ellis (2000) argue that it is not surprising that Singapore was not included in Porter’s 1990 book, eventhough it had been studied by him: ‘If Singapore’s prosperity were determined by the activities of firms for whom Singapore is a home base its residents would be poor people, but they are not.’ According to Dunning (1993), to suggest that the competitiveness of multinationals rests only on their access to the diamond of competitive advantage in their home countries is ludicrous, regardless of whether or not their initial foray overseas was based on such advantages. The geographical dimension of the criticisms of Porter’s attitude towards FDI is the focus of a work by Lagendijk and Charles (1999), who emphasize the importance of foreign assets in clustering and suggest that at the regional level the issue of multinationality becomes an issue of multiregionality. 7 Rugman and Verbeke (1993, p. 72) challenge ‘Porter’s allegation that the core competencies of large MNEs and the innovative processes occurring within these firms necessarily need to depend upon the characteristics of a single home base’. They argue that multinationals from small countries may rely on a host nation to such an extent that it becomes difficult to make a distinction between the home base and the host country or countries. 8 According to Rugman and Verbeke (2001), a major problem with Porter’s approach is that he concentrates solely on non-location-bound, firm-specific advantages (FSAs) developed by companies in their home country prior to engaging in FDI, which is only one of many possible combinations that can be observed empirically in respect of the locational determinants of competi- tive advantage. For example one alternative is for non-location-bound FSAs to be created jointly by subsidiaries located in various countries and exploited throughout the network. Here we have an increasingly complex and blurred picture of the relative contribution of FSAs versus CSAs (country- specific advantages) and home CSAs versus host CSAs to overall multinational competitiveness. Another point of disagreement concerns the identification of the home base of a multinational. According to Rugman and Verbeke (ibid.), it is necessary to define a threshold percentage of core assets, competencies and strategic decision-making power, below which a firm would be viewed as functioning with several home bases. In addition, if a firm is able to enhance its accumulated competencies through interactions with location advantages 34 Clusters and Competitive Advantage in host countries, it will again be viewed as functioning with several home bases. This implies that most multinationals will have several home bases, which is in sharp contrast to Porter’s approach. It should be remembered that Porter (1990) uses the world export shares of industries as a proxy to measure international competitiveness at the industry level. An industry is also considered to be competitive when domestic firms in the industry are engaged in substantial outward FDI. With regard to inward FDI, a methodo- logical problem arises when a country has an internationally competitive sector (measured by world export share) that is dominated by foreign companies. What Porter does in such cases is to try to locate the source of advantage through in-country research. This requires determining whether the firms in the industry operate as branches of a multinational company or can be clearly associated with the host country. In the former case the industry is excluded, and in the latter case it remains on the list of competitive industries. This is confusing but logical, and the real challenge is to locate the source of advantage. What is even more confusing is Porter’s (1990) argument that ‘inward FDI is not entirely healthy’, especially when examples of relatively prosperous countries such as Singapore, Canada and Ireland, which host considerable inward FDI, are taken into account. Dunning (1993) argues that Porter’s interpretation of the link between FDI and competitiveness rests on the idea that outward FDI reflects the possession of firm-specific tangible assets that give a competitive edge prior to undertaking the FDI. While this is a valid explanation of why individual firms are able to engage in FDI, it does not follow that inward FDI has a negative effect on the competitiveness of the recipient economies (Davies and Ellis, 2000). Recently Lin and Song (1997) have taken up Dunning’s (1995) extension of the diamond framework, which adds ‘multinational business activity’ as a determinant of competitive advantage. Applying the model to China, Lin and Song conclude that the country’s recent success owes much to inward FDI. Similar findings are available for other countries, including Mexico (Hodgetts, 1993) and Singapore (Chia, 1994). The crucial point here is that foreign investors might and do choose competitive locations because the environment offered by a particular industry cluster acts as a magnet for other firms in the industry, so both national and foreign firms gravitate to favourable cluster locations even if corporate ownership is based elsewhere. 9 This being the case, there is no reason why inward FDI should be considered ‘unhealthy’. In summary, many international business scholars (Rugman, 1991, 1992; Rugman and D’Cruz, 1993; Jacobs and De Jong, 1992; Yetton et al., 1992; Bellak and Weiss, 1993; Cartwright, 1993; Dunning, 1993; Hodgetts, 1993; Rugman and Verbeke, 1993; Yla-Anttila, 1994) have found fault with Porter’s (1990) insistence that firms’ ability to compete depends on the strength of the diamond in their home base. As Davies and Ellis (2000) point out, however, this difficulty with the diamond goes deeper than these researchers realize Clusters in the Management Literature 35 since the argument can be extended to suggest that not only multinational companies but also other companies that are exposed to international influences in one way or other (for instance via exporting) may sharpen their advantages as a result of such interactions. If, however, ‘firms in one country are able to draw upon diamonds in another, the concept of the national diamond is stripped of its content’ (ibid., p. 1204), since the whole concept of the diamond is based on the hypothesis that the sources of competitive advantage are local. Porter thinks that such criticisms mainly stem from an unnecessary confusion: the geographic scope of competition and the geo- graphic locus of competitive advantage are two different things. In his view, competition can be global but the sources of advantage are local (Porter and Amstrong, 1992). It is therefore clear that the two sides of the debate, that is, Porter versus the international business scholars, are arguing for two competing hypotheses: that the sources of advantage are local, or that advantages can be sourced globally. The point made by international business scholars, in other words, is in fact a counter-hypothesis rather than a criticism. Needless to say the burden of proof lies on both sides when there are two competing hypotheses, and this calls for further empirical research. This book hopes to contribute to this by investigating not only the local circumstances of but also the global linkages associated with the Turkish clusters. The debate on policy issues Another noteworthy debate focuses on regional policy issues. According to Markusen (1996b), agglomeration effects are largest for industries that are high-tech, knowledge-intensive, innovative and young. She implies that developing countries need these industries because they support a higher standard of living. Porter (1996), however, believes that this perspective may be misleading, and that the productivity of an industry matters more than its being high-tech. Markusen also challenges Porter’s argument that industrial clusters are the most significant unit of analysis for investigating regional economic advantage. According to her, this is an empirical question and far from self-evident. As an example she cites Seattle, the dynamism of which is explained by the presence of five distinct sectors: shipping, forestry- related activity, aircraft, software and biotechnology (Markusen, 1996b, p. 91). Porter agrees with Markusen’s view that the significance of generalized versus cluster-specific agglomeration economies is an empirical question. With regard to the Seattle example, Porter underlines that he is not suggesting that all clusters in a regional economy have to be connected. Another major point of divergence for the two researchers is that Markusen supports government targeting of particular industries, which in her view is appropriate and effective, whereas for Porter, the whole premise of targeting is flawed. Porter and Markusen also disagree on the types of regional policy that should be followed. Markusen favours a traditional formulation of regional policy that includes broad incentives for firms to locate in less developed regions, 36 Clusters and Competitive Advantage whereas Porter thinks that such measures are doomed to failure. According to him, cluster formation can only be encouraged ‘by locating specialized infrastructure and institutions in areas where factor endowments, past industrial activity, or even historical accidents have resulted in concentrations of economic activity’ (ibid., p. 88). Moreover in Porter’s view there are strong arguments for the greater decentralization of economic policy to subnational regions, marking yet another area in which he disagrees with Markusen. 10 Another dimension of policy issues that has been subject to debate is the revitalization of inner-city areas. 11 Based on his approach to the locational determinants of competitiveness, Porter (1995a) argues that this task can only be done through private initiatives based on economic self-interest and competitive advantage. In the associated debate in the literature, Blakely and Small (1995) state that Porter’s analysis is incomplete, while Johnson et al. (1995) argue that Porter has devoted too little attention to the role of the business community in revitalizing such areas. In their view, Porter’s assertion that the private sector – in exchange for a more business friendly environment – will step in to fill the gap is not convincing given that this has rarely happened in the past. Businesses need steady customers and reliable employees, and people who are ‘ill-housed, ill-fed or just plain ill’ cannot be either (Lowery, 1996, p. 64). Overall the critics agree that Porter’s (1995a) approach can serve to supplement other efforts, but it can never be an all-in- one solution or as important as affirmative action. In his reply to his critics, Porter (1995b, p. 304) insists that many of the criticisms indicate a misun- derstanding of his arguments. According to him, as a general principle it is necessary to view the disadvantages suffered by inner-city areas as an economic problem and the result of poor strategies and obsolete public policies. It is therefore necessary to develop a new strategy for each area, tailored to its unique characteristics and building on its advantages (ibid., p. 333). With regard to the role of government, Porter (1990) believes that clusters often emerge and grow naturally so there is only an indirect role for the government. This is one of the most criticized aspects of his approach. Several scholars (for example Stopford and Strange, 1991; Van den Bosch and de Man, 1994; Öz, 1999) are of the opinion that in developing countries a more active part should be played by the government as poor countries cannot afford the luxury of letting market forces determine outcomes. In his later work Porter (1998) continues to argue that the essential role of government is to challenge and press industries, and that too much help can undermine the industries’ success. A detailed discussion of the ideal level of government intervention is beyond the scope of this study. However the discussions in this book on the part played by the government in shaping the sources of competitive advantage of the Turkish clusters examined may provide some insights into to the role of government in cluster development. 37 3 Industrial Clusters in Turkey The Turkish business environment, past and present During the first ten years of the newly established Republic of Turkey (1923–32), state involvement in economic activities was rather limited. This was mainly because (1) the basic principles adopted in the Izmir Economic Congress (1923) committed the government to the establishment of a private enterprise economy, and (2) some economy-related provisions in the Lausanne Treaty (1924) considerably restricted the area in which the government could operate. For instance the country was bound to apply the Ottoman tariffs for another five years. Over this period little was achieved in terms of industrialization since the private sector lacked the necessary technological competence and capital. These factors, combined with external ones such as the Great Depression, were enough to convince the policy makers that the private sector could not be entrusted with the task of leading the country’s economic development. This marked the beginning of a new period (1933–45) in Turkish economic history called ‘etatism’, during which the government heavily intervened in the production of goods and services. The First Five Year Industrialization Plan (1934–38) placed strong emphasis on the indus- trialization process, particularly in the case of textiles, iron and steel. As a result of the related policies the pace of industrialization accelerated, with industry’s share of GNP rising from 14 per cent to 18 per cent during the period in question (Kepenek and Yentürk, 1997). Between the end of World War II and 1960, some attempts were made at liberalization, shaped by a new type of etatism in which the government supported the private sector. The transition to a multiparty regime and the provisions of the Marshall Plan are considered to be the major reasons for this policy shift. Significant investment in energy and motorways as well as a boom in the housebuilding sector associated with rapid urbanization created a considerable demand for construction firms, thus promoting the development of the Turkish construction industry. Another feature of the period was that special emphasis was placed on agriculture in accordance with the Marshall 38 Clusters and Competitive Advantage Plan, which brought modern practices to the sector. The government was clearly committed to encouraging the private sector and therefore pursued pro-business policies. However this fostered rent-seeking activities, which subsequently became an increasingly deep-rooted problem. Interestingly, since the pro-business policies did not bring stability, both politicians and business people started to question whether it was possible to achieve stability and liberalization at the same time. In this respect it is worth mentioning that even Prime Minister Menderes, who was very sceptical about planning, had a change of mind and took certain steps to prepare a development plan in his last year in office, prior to the military intervention in 1960. The disappointing results of liberalization, together with the tendency else- where in the world for greater government intervention, caused the military government of the early 1960s to introduce a 20-year import-substitution development strategy for a mixed economy, to be implemented via five-year plans. During this period there were improvements in the growth rate of overall output and industrial production. Big businessmen were also in favour of a planned approach and stressed the importance of having a long-term economic strategy to reduce the uncertainty in the economic environment. The need to clarify the boundaries of private sector activity was another factor in this. The sense of responsibility felt by the newly emerging bour- geoisie for the economic development process resulted in the establishment of influential business associations such as TÜSIAD (Bugra, 1994). The period 1960–80 was a time of unusual political turmoil and there were three military interventions (in 1960, 1971 and 1980). After these interven- tions, concern about the position of the private sector was soon replaced by concern about the instability generated by the regimes’ macroeconomic policies. In the 1970s two additional developments, the oil shock and the Cyprus crisis, exacerbated the already bleak scene. The coincidence of an unfavourable global economic environment with the political instability in Turkey led the country into a major crisis in the late 1970s, resulting in another military takeover in 1980. In that year the ‘January 24 Resolutions’ introduced a comprehensive stabilization programme under the auspices of the IMF and the World Bank. The structural adjustment policies adopted in accordance with the programme were intended to shift the economy from an inward to an outward orientation, with an emphasis on export-led growth. Reforms were conducted in a number of key areas, one of which was trade policy, with the introduction of extensive export promotion measures and the gradual liberalization of imports. The results were impressive in terms of exports in general and manufactured exports in particular, although the increase in exports was matched by a boom in imports (Öz, 1999). In the second half of the 1980s there was a considerable reduction in export subsidies. Tariffs and quotas, and therefore the level of import protection, were also reduced. With the unexpected but comprehensive finan- cial liberalization achieved by making the Turkish lira convertible in 1989, Industrial Clusters in Turkey 39 the main policies of the liberalization programme were completed. The immediate result was a worsening of the trade deficit, mainly stemming from the increase in imports rather than a decrease in exports, which actually continued to increase gradually (Figure 3.1) and Turkey’s world export share remained fairly stable. It is argued that the frequent and unexpected changes to key policies created a chaotic business environment in Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s (Bugra, 1994). Under the circumstances it was essential for business people to have good state contacts so that they would at least have a vague idea about what was going on. In fact, they often complained not about the changes themselves but about the way they were handled. What was worse, however, was that such an environment offered considerable opportunities for abuse. Allegations about tax rebates for exports, for instance, caused some scholars to question the export success achieved by Turkey in the post-1980 period, and to ask whether the export figures were fictitious (see Arslan and van Wijnbergen, 1990). While the 1980s are associated with major reforms, the 1990s are often considered ‘lost years’ in Turkish economic history (Kumcu and Pamuk, 2001). With regard to the key events that shaped the 1990s, the first was the Gulf crisis in the beginning of the period, which damaged Turkey’s economic relations with Iraq. In 1994 Turkey faced yet another economic crisis, due mainly to mismanagement of a programme to reduce interest rates. The customs union between Turkey and the EU, which had been in effect since January 1996, brought challenges as well as opportunities for Turkish industry. 0 10 000 20 000 30 000 40 000 50 000 60 000 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Exports Imports Figure 3.1 Exports and imports, Turkey 1982–2000 (US$ 000s) Sources: SIS (2000); ITC (2002). 40 Clusters and Competitive Advantage Towards the end of the decade the Asian crisis broke out, affecting many parts of the world. The impact of this on the Turkish economy was indirect and occurred after a one-year lag, but the Russian crisis caused considerable damage to the construction and leather sectors, whose main trading partner was Russia. In 2000 the government introduced a disinflationary programme, but this collapsed in February 2001. Finally, Turkey implemented yet another stabilization programme, under the auspices of the IMF and the World Bank and aimed at ‘empowering the Turkish economy’. Turkey is classified by the World Bank as a middle-income developing country. It has close ties with the EU, including a customs union agreement. It occupies a very advantageous geographical position, constituting a natural link between West and East, and recently it has started to take greater advantage of this, especially in respect of trade and tourism. Turkey’s standard of living, as measured by GDP per capita, has gradually increased (Figure 3.2) but is still rather low at US$ 2200–6080, based on purchasing power parity (PPP) (2001 figures, SPO, 2002). The average annual growth rate of the economy, as measured by the rate of growth of real GDP, on the other hand, averaged about 4 per cent in the post-liberalization period. This rate, though fluctuating widely, was slightly above the average attained by middle-income countries (around 2–3 per cent) during the same period (World Bank, 1999). However, although overall domestic production and per capita income have been increasing at above average rates compared with other middle-income developing countries, inequalities in income distribution remain significant. Persistently high inflation rates and external debts, when taken together with Turkey’s ‘grey’ economy, present a bleak outlook for the country’s macroeconomic future. This is further complicated by the continuing political uncertainty. Such an environment is preventing firms from improving their 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 199 1 1992 1993 1994 1995 19 9 6 1997 1998 1999 200 0 2001 GDP per capita GDP per capita (PPP) Figure 3.2 Standard of living, Turkey, 1980–2001 (US$) Source: SPO (2002). Industrial Clusters in Turkey 41 competitive advantages. Given this picture it is not surprising that Turkey has failed to attract much FDI, the annual average being less than US$ 1 billion in recent years, a figure that compares unfavourably with those achieved by other emerging economies (SPO, 2002). An examination of the broad characteristics of the Turkish business envir- onment shows that small and medium-sized enterprises account for more than 90 per cent of Turkish firms, but larger firms’ contribution to value-added and exports are much higher (Taymaz, 1997). Big corporations are a rela- tively new phenomenon in Turkey: of the 405 TÜSIAD member companies, only 22 were incorporated before 1950 (Bugra, 1994, p. 55). The 1950s were an important decade for many of the largest Turkish companies, reflecting the government’s shift to more liberal policies. Many of today’s leading Turkish construction firms, for example, were either established or made an important turn in their business during that decade (Öz, 1999). Family-dominated management of firms of all sizes is a common phenome- non in Turkey as there is a lack of confidence in salaried managerial personnel. Educating young members of the family in top universities, integrating a professional manager into the family via marriage, and strong relationships established over the years between family members and professional managers, making the latter ‘part of the family’, appear to be common ways of achieving a delicate balance between professionalization and family control (Bugra, 1994). According to Bugra (ibid., pp. 68–9), all Turkish business tycoons have certain characteristics in common, including family support in commercial activities at the start of their career, the arbitrary – and rather opportunistic – choice of their initial area of activity, heavy engagement in unrelated diver- sification as the business grows, and good connections especially in state circles. Rent-seeking behaviour is common, and real-estate speculation is particularly widespread. The high degree of state involvement in business activity, be it in the form of subsidized credits, input supply or output demand, has been detrimental to the Turkish business environment. Given the key role of government in the economy, good connections in government circles have contributed significantly to business success. The slow bureaucracy and unexpected changes in key policies, on the other hand, have caused problems for Turkish business people. Turkey’s position in international competition This section provides an overview of the evolution of the competitive struc- ture of Turkish industry. The analysis is conducted with the help of Porter’s (1990) methodology. The basic measure used to determine the international competitiveness of an industry is its share of world exports, which is defined as a country’s exports for an industry divided by total world exports for that industry in a given year. All industries defined in the Standard International [...]... same industry in the production of all other countries It is then possible to measure the difference between 46 Clusters and Competitive Advantage the industrial structure of a country and all other countries by taking the absolute values of the difference between these shares, summed over all industries They call this the Krugman specialization index (following Krugman, 1991a) It takes the value of zero... largely responsible for the high export share of the cluster Thus like the entertainment/leisure industry, the personal industry is hardly a strong contributor to the Turkish economy In addition to these six leading clusters, some competitive positions are held in the transportation, power generation and distribution, and defence clusters, although their world export shares are rather low at around 0.2... contains the food/beverage, textiles/apparel, housing/household goods, health care, personal, and entertainment/leisure clusters The industries in each cluster are further classified into four groups, revealing the vertical relationships among industries and the depth of national clusters These four groups are primary goods, the machinery used to produce these goods, the special inputs required and the. .. competitiveness since the former has been found to be usually necessary for the latter Finding a suitable methodology for the analysis of clusters Once the relatively more competitive and concentrated industries (as well as the relatively less competitive and concentrated ones) are identified, a method is needed to choose and analyse the clusters in-depth This section will outline and discuss the method that... telecommunications and health care Finally, there have been a few isolated successes, such as that by the construction services sector in the otherwise uncompetitive multiple business cluster.1 The most striking finding of the examination of the competitive structure of Turkish industry over time is that there has been little change in terms of the types of industry in which Turkey is internationally competitive. .. in the entertainment/leisure cluster, on the other hand, exclusively produce primary goods and have virtually no presence in other vertical categories Despite the considerable rise in this category’s position in the world market in the 1990s, the range of competitive industries in the cluster is rather limited The personal cluster has a different structure from the ones outlined above as its strength... structure to the rest of the EU, and the maximum value two if it has no industries in common with the rest of the EU They calculate this as a four-year moving average for the period 1970–97 to remove spurious fluctuations due to the differential timing of country and sectoral business cycles Next they use the Gini coefficient of concentration of the variables for all manufacturing to measure the concentration... firms on the one hand and related and supporting firms on the other can be fuzzy In general a narrow definition is preferred since in a broadly defined cluster, linkages are likely to be less strong and less complete In the end there should indeed be a limit before the cluster is defined as the whole economy’ Otherwise, in the extreme case, it would be possible to define a cluster encompassing the whole... industries at the four-digit (ISIC) level A summary of the results is presented in the next section.6 Spatial patterns in Turkish industry In the present study,7 geographic concentration indices (C4EMP, C8EMP and LQs) are calculated for all Turkish provinces and the 231 sectors for which the necessary data are available at the four-digit level.8 The top 100 Turkish industries, as ranked by the C4EMP indices,... examination in each of the relevant chapters Finally, Tables 3.4 and 3.5 show the proportion of the total Turkish population in the four (C4POP) and eight (C8POP) most populated provinces, plus the cumulative totals The population figures provide a base line to compare the geographic concentration of Turkish industry Analysis of the information provided in the tables shows that on average Turkish industries . transport 0 .27 80 22 1410 Quarrying of stone, sand and clay 0 .25 89 23 1531 Manufacture of grain mill products 0 .25 47 24 4010 Production, collection and distribution of electricity 0 .25 42 25 20 22 Manufacture. 0.8 323 74 29 12 Manufacture of pumps, compressors, taps and valves 0. 828 8 75 21 09 Manufacture of articles of paper and paperboard 0. 827 5 76 51 42 Wholesale of metals and metal ores 0. 823 2 77 21 02. 000 19 82 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 19 92 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 20 00 Exports Imports Figure 3.1 Exports and imports, Turkey 19 82 20 00 (US$ 000s) Sources: SIS (20 00); ITC (20 02) . 40 Clusters and Competitive Advantage Towards