The asia pacific security lexicon

The ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY LEXICON Tai Lieu Chat Luong © 2002 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) was established as an autonomous organization in 1968 It is a regional research centre for scholars and other specialists concerned with modern Southeast Asia, particularly the many-faceted problems of stability and security, economic development, and political and social change The Institute’s research programmes are the Regional Economic Studies (RES, including ASEAN and APEC), Regional Strategic and Political Studies (RSPS), and Regional Social and Cultural Studies (RSCS) The Institute is governed by a twenty-two-member Board of Trustees comprising nominees from the Singapore Government, the National University of Singapore, the various Chambers of Commerce, and professional and civic organizations An Executive Committee oversees day-to-day operations; it is chaired by the Director, the Institute’s chief academic and administrative officer First published in Singapore in 2002 by Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 119614 Internet e-mail: publish@iseas.edu.sg World Wide Web: http://www.iseas.edu.sg/pub.html All rights reserved No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies © 2002 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore First reprint 2002 The responsibility for facts and opinions in this publication rests exclusively with the authors and their interpretations not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the Institute or its supporters Capie, David The Asia-Pacific security lexicon / David Capie and Paul Evans (Issues in Southeast Asian security) National security—Asia—Dictionaries National security—Pacific Area—Dictionaries Asia—Strategic aspects—Dictionaries Pacific Area—Strategic aspects—Dictionaries I Evans, Paul M II Title UA830 A81 2002 ISBN 981-230-149-6 (soft cover) ISBN 981-230-150-X (hard cover) Printed in Singapore by Seng Lee Press Pte Ltd © 2002 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore ISEAS Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data CONTENTS Abbreviations vii Authors xi © 2002 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore Introduction Ad Hoc Multilateralism 11 The “ASEAN Way” 14 Balance of Power 28 Bilateralism 39 Coercive Diplomacy 43 Cold War Mentality 45 Collective Defence 48 Collective Security 53 Common Security 59 Comprehensive Security 64 Concert of Powers 76 Concerted Unilateralism 82 Confidence-Building Measures 84 Confidence- and Security-Building Measures 89 Constructive Intervention 92 Co-operative Security 98 Engagement 108 Ad Hoc Engagement Comprehensive Engagement Conditional Engagement Constructive Engagement v The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon Co-operative Engagement Deep Engagement Preventive Engagement Realistic Engagement Selective Engagement Flexible Consensus 136 Human Security 139 Humanitarian Intervention 147 Middle Power 161 Multilateralism 165 Mutual Security 171 New Security Approach 175 Open Regionalism 179 Preventive Diplomacy 185 Security Community 198 Security Pluralism 207 Track One 209 Track One-and-a-Half 211 Track Two 213 Track Three 217 Transparency 220 Trust-Building Measures 222 © 2002 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore vi © 2002 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore ABBREVIATIONS ABAC AFTA AMM ANZUS APEC APSD ARF ASA ASEAN ASEM CAEC CANCHIS CBMs CDE CINCPAC CPM CSBMs CSCA CSCAP CSCE CUA DFAIT DFAT DPRK EAEC EASI FPDA APEC Business Advisory Council ASEAN Free Trade Agreement ASEAN Ministerial Meeting Australia, New Zealand, United States [Treaty] Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation Asia-Pacific Security Dialogue ASEAN Regional Forum Association of Southeast Asia Association of Southeast Asian Nations Asia-Europe Meeting Council for Asia-Europe Co-operation Canada-China Seminar confidence-building measures Conference on Disarmament in Europe Commander in Chief, U.S Pacific Command Communist Party of Malaysia confidence- and security-building measures Conference on Security and Co-operation in Asia Council for Security Co-operation in the Asia Pacific Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe concerted unilateral action Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Democratic People’s Republic of Korea East Asia Economic Caucus East Asia Strategy Initiative Five Power Defence Arrangements vii G7 GATT GDP GNP HR IAEA IISS IMF INCSEA ISG ISIS ISM JCAPS KEDO MBFR MFN MITI MOF MOFA MRMs MST MTCR NAFTA NATO NEASD NGOs NLD NPCSD NPT NSC ODA OSCE PAMS PBEC PBF PECC The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon Group of Seven General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs gross domestic product gross national product House Resolution International Atomic Energy Agency International Institute for Strategic Studies International Monetary Fund Incidents at Sea Agreement Inter-Sessional Support Group Institutes for Strategic and International Studies Inter-Sessional Meeting Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization Mutual Balanced Force Reduction Talks most-favoured-nation Ministry for International Trade and Industry Ministry of Finance Ministry of Foreign Affairs mutual reassurance measures Mutual Security Treaty Missile Technology Control Regime North American Free Trade Agreement North Atlantic Treaty Organization Northeast Asia Security Dialogue non-governmental organizations National League for Democracy North Pacific Co-operative Security Dialogue Non-Proliferation Treaty National Security Council Official Development Assistance Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Pacific Armies Management Seminar Pacific Basin Economic Council Pacific Business Forum Pacific Economic Co-operation Conference © 2002 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore viii © 2002 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore Abbreviations PKO PLA PMC PRC ROK SDF SDSC SEANWFZ SEATO SLOCs SLORC SOM SPDC START TAC TBMs TCOG U.N UNDP U.S USSR WMD WPNS WTO ZOPFAN ix peacekeeping operations People’s Liberation Army Post-Ministerial Conference People’s Republic of China Republic of Korea self-defence force Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Southeast Asia Treaty Organization sea lines of communication State Law and Order Restoration Council Senior Officials Meeting State Peace and Development Council Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty Treaty of Amity and Co-operation trust-building measures Trilateral Co-ordination and Oversight Group United Nations United Nations Development Programme United States Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Weapons of Mass Destruction Western Pacific Naval Symposium World Trade Organization Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality AUTHORS David Capie is a Post-doctoral Research Fellow at the Institute of International Relations in the Liu Centre for the Study of Global Issues, the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada © 2002 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore Paul Evans is Professor and Director of the Program on Canada-Asia Policy Studies and cross-appointed at the Institute of Asian Research and the Liu Centre for the Study of Global Issues, the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada xi 210 The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon governmental channels that bring together military officials from the region These include the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) and the Pacific Armies Management Seminar (PAMS) for military officers Similarly, annual “quadrilaterals” bring together representatives of policy planning staffs from the so-called likeminded foreign ministries of Australia, Canada, Japan, and South Korea Note © 2002 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore Track One Reports from the TCOG meetings can be found on the U.S State Department’s website at © 2002 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore Track One-and-a-Half 211 Track one-and-a-half (or one-and-a-half track) is a term coined by Paul Dibb, head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC) at the Australian National University in Canberra Track one-and-ahalf was originally used in the context of a seminar sanctioned by the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) on regional confidence-building that took place in Canberra in November 1994 There are, however, at least two interpretations of the term’s meaning operating in the region: one focusing on the content of the agendas, the other based on the background of the participants For those who suggest an interpretation of the term based on content, the question of “who sets the agenda” is key.1 According to this definition, track one-and-a-half meetings are non-official meetings usually attended by officials (acting in their private capacities) and academics, where the agenda is set by the officials to focus on specific issues of concern to the official track (track one) Examples of this include the Northeast Asia Security Dialogue (NEASD) process and (confusingly) meetings that are often referred to as coming under the ARF’s second track To further complicate matters, at a meeting between Chinese and Canadian officials in 1998, one Chinese participant stated his view that the Council for Security Co-operation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) was a track oneand-a-half institution This approach to the term would suggest that regional security institutions have no fixed “track identity” Whether CSCAP, for example, is a track two or a track one-and-a-half institution, would presumably be a question of who set the agenda at a given meeting.2 A second meaning of the term hinges on the background of a meeting’s participants In this context, a track one-and-a-half meeting is an unofficial meeting dominated by officials participating in their private capacities For example, while the 1994 Canberra seminar was unofficial (the channel usually referred to as second track), most of the participants were military personnel or government officials from ARF member states, not academics, journalists, or analysts from regional policy institutes The fact that they were mostly, although not exclusively, officials attending a seminar sanctioned by a track one organization (the ARF) meant that the 211 Track One-and-a-Half Track One-and-a-Half 212 The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon seminar was closer to the official channel of dialogue than most track two meetings Indeed, it was as close as it could be to the official track without becoming track one A slightly different interpretation along these lines was put forward in an article in Jane’s Defence Weekly in 1995 This suggested that “‘track two’ events include the participation of academics and non-governmental organizations, while ‘track one-and-a-half’ events see some government officials added.”3 This interpretation does not quite square with the participation at the Canberra seminar, however, which was made up mostly of foreign ministry officials and defence practitioners and included only “selected academics.” As a practical matter, the difference between these definitions may be only a question of emphasis Presumably when the majority of participants at a meeting are officials (even if they are there in their private capacities) then it will be very likely that the meeting’s agenda will also be determined by officials Moreover, the proliferation of “ARF track two” meetings (a non-official channel of dialogue directly orchestrated by the ARF) calls into question the need for the term track one-and-a-half This point was made by Brian Job during discussions at the Second Canada-China Seminar (CANCHIS II), Toronto, January 1998 This definition is based on discussions with Chinese and Canadian academics and officials at the Second Canada-China Seminar (CANCHIS II), Toronto, January 1998 Jane’s Defence Weekly, 24 June 1995 © 2002 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore Track One-and-a-Half Notes Track Two Track Two 213 it is difficult to label organizations or individuals as “government” or “non-government” Membership of forums and organizations is usually described as being “mixed” or “blended”, in that the participants include academics, other intellectuals, and government officials, usually from foreign ministries and occasionally from defence ministries, attending in their “private capacities” In addition, some “academic” members have a number of identities: also holding government and industry positions or acting as regular policy consultants to governments Some come from institutes which, despite being labelled non-governmental, are government funded and in some cases the research arm of foreign and defence ministries.4 The second track process is based upon principles of informality, inclusivity, and non-attribution, in order to encourage frank debate and openness by the participants It works from the assumption that the unofficial status of the meetings will permit the discussion of 213 Track Two © 2002 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore According to Louise Diamond and John McDonald, the term track two was coined in 1982 by Joseph Montville of the Foreign Service Institute to describe “methods of diplomacy that were outside the formal governmental system”.1 According to their definition, track two refers to the “non-governmental, informal and unofficial contacts, and activities between private citizens or groups of individuals, sometimes called citizen diplomats or nonstate actors” Its basic premise is the assumption that “the expertise for dealing successfully with conflict and peacemaking does not reside solely within government personnel or procedures.”2 In the literature on Asia-Pacific security, track two (or the second track as it is often called) is the “unofficial” channel for political, economic, and security dialogue in the region Second track meetings and organizations are typically made up of scholars, journalists, and occasionally politicians, as well as civilian and military officials acting in their “private” or “unofficial” capacities.3 As Pauline Kerr notes, track two in the Asia-Pacific is better described as an unofficial rather than non-governmental channel, because The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon subjects that might be considered too sensitive or controversial for official discourse or formal negotiations Track two encourages the floating of “trial balloon” policy proposals and “has helped establish building blocks for supporting cooperative arrangements at the official level”.5 It is also said to help “socialize” the idea of regional co-operation among regional élites.6 The policy relevance of the subjects discussed is vital As Desmond Ball has noted, “the prospects for implementation should count for as much as the intrinsic worth of any ideas generated in the second-track process.”7 While individual governments often fund track two events and are involved in shaping their agendas, the leading second track organizations are usually universities or private institutions that have an arm’s length relationship with their national governments Despite that, it has been suggested that the close relationship between states and track two institutions restricts the autonomy of these groups and their ability to advance critical thinking As Herman Kraft has noted, “this problem is becoming more evident as the distinction between official and non-official tracks becomes increasingly blurred.”8 According to the Dialogue and Research Monitor: An Inventory of Multilateral Meetings on Asia Pacific Security Issues, second track meetings take place at the rate of about two per week.9 Some are small, single-issue groups, such as on the security of sea-lanes or the Indonesia-organized workshops on the South China Sea The largest and most inclusive second track meeting is the annual Asia-Pacific Roundtable hosted by the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) which involves hundreds of participants from throughout the region.10 Bunn Nagara has described the strength of the Roundtable as lying in “its seemingly understated and latent potential for influence in official circles … The substance, tenor, and direction of the dialogue filter[s] back into the relevant official circles of each country … This mode of operation … is a subtle and nuanced mode, consonant with what is culturally a highly nuanced region.”11 Perhaps the most ambitious second track organization is the Council for Security Co-operation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) The © 2002 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore Track Two 214 215 concept for CSCAP was developed at a conference in Seoul in November 1992 and formally announced in June 1993 by its ten founding members According to Paul Evans, CSCAP is “the most ambitious proposal to date for a regularized, focused, and inclusive non-governmental process on Asia-Pacific security matters”.12 CSCAP aims to create a more structured security dialogue process, open to all countries and territories in the region It has sixteen member countries — Australia, Canada, China, Indonesia, Japan, North Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, the United States, and Vietnam; two associate members — the European Union, and the Indian think-tank IDSA; and an affiliate — the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia-Pacific Each member committee in turn is supposed to have a “broad-based” national member committee CSCAP currently has five working groups — Comprehensive and Co-operative Security, Confidence- and SecurityBuilding Measures, Maritime Security, North Pacific, and Transnational Crime In addition to CSCAP, a number of track two dialogues have taken place under the auspices of the Northeast Asia Co-operation Dialogue (NEACD) The dialogue, founded by Susan Shirk and organized by the University of California, San Diego, is composed of the United States, Russia, China, Japan, and South Korea After attending the first preparatory meeting, North Korea has refused to take part The ARF has also added to the already busy track two schedule by holding several second track meetings of its own, a development which has further blurred the already imprecise line between official and non-official dialogues Notes Louise Diamond and John McDonald, Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace (West Hartford: Kumarian Press, 1996), pp 1–2 Ibid., p See, for example, Stuart Harris, “The Regional Role of Track Two Track Two © 2002 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore Track Two 10 Track Two 11 12 The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon Diplomacy”, in The Role of Security and Economic Cooperation Structures in the Asia Pacific Region, edited by Hadi Soesastro and Anthony Bergin (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1996); Desmond Ball, “A New Era in Confidence Building: The Second Track Process in the Asia/Pacific Region”, Security Dialogue 25, no 2, (1994) Pauline Kerr, “The Security Dialogue in the Asia-Pacific”, Pacific Review 7, no (1994): 399 Herman Joseph S Kraft, “Track Three Diplomacy and Human Rights in Southeast Asia: The Case of the Asia Pacific Coalition for East Timor”, Paper presented at the Global Development Network 2000 Conference, Tokyo, 13 December 2000, p Jusuf Wanandi, “The Future of ARF and CSCAP in the Regional Security Architecture”, Paper presented at the Eighth Asia-Pacific Roundtable, Kuala Lumpur, 5–8 June 1994, p Desmond Ball, “CSCAP: Its Future Place in the Regional Security Architecture”, Paper prepared for the Eighth Asia-Pacific Roundtable, Kuala Lumpur, 5–8 June 1994, p 18 Herman Joseph S Kraft, “The Autonomy Dilemma of Track Two Diplomacy in Southeast Asia”, Security Dialogue 31, no (September 2000): 346 Dialogue and Research Monitor is a available online at or For more on ASEAN-ISIS’s important role in the development of track two and official regional dialogues, see Kerr, “The Security Dialogue” and also Carolina G Hernandez, “Governments and NGOs in the Search for Peace: The ASEAN ISIS and CSCAP Experience”, Paper presented at the Alternative Security Systems Conference, Focus on the Global South, Bangkok, Thailand, 27–30 March 1997, available online at Bunn Nagara, “Preface”, in The Making of a Security Community in the Asia-Pacific, edited by Bunn Nagara and K S Balakrishnan (Kuala Lumpur: ISIS Malaysia, 1994), p ii, cited in Kerr, “The Security Dialogue”, p 405 Paul M Evans, “Building Security: The Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP)”, Pacific Review 7, no (1994): 125–39, 125 © 2002 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore 216 Track Three 217 While the term track three suggests a natural link with tracks one and two, the relationship between them is a little more complex than the name implies Generally speaking, track three refers to the activities and meetings of groups such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), transnational networks, and advocacy coalitions While tracks one and two seek to engage and inform policy-makers about specific issues of concern to states, track three is made up of advocates claiming to represent “communities and people who are largely marginalized from the centre of power”.1 These groups seek to “build constituencies … which can question conventional practices and beliefs and present alternatives to official government positions” According to Herman Kraft, their “discussions are based on a critical framework with agendas that tend to oppose mainstream government policies” Consequently, these meetings “are more adversarial than what is usual for a track two forum”.3 The label “track three” is a misnomer, in that most of these groups have only an indirect link to the policy process and some reject outright the notion that they are a “track” in any way linked to state-centred institutional arrangements As Pierre Lizee has noted, many civil society groups have been “reluctant to involve themselves within structures they perceive to be too close to the prevailing centres of power”.4 They fear that they will be co-opted, which will compromise their independence and autonomy Likewise, some participants in track two have also been wary in their approach to track three actors Given that many track three groups advocate causes such as human rights and democratization, their participation in regional security dialogues has often been strongly opposed by non-democratic regimes Specific examples of track three actors in the Asia-Pacific include the Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma (Alt-SEAN), the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (known as FORUMASIA), Focus on the Global South, the Council for Alternative Security in the Asia-Pacific (CASAP), the Forum on Alternative Security, the Asia Pacific Coalition for East Timor (APCET), and Peace, Disarmament and Symbiosis in the Asia-Pacific (PDSAP).5 The issues 217 Track Three © 2002 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore Track Three The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon Track Three tackled by these groups typically include socio-economic and gender inequalities, environmental degradation, lack of political participation, and democratization Such groups have often made their presence felt at the “People’s Summits” that parallel official regional gatherings such as Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) or Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM).6 Track three groups have also articulated critical positions on regional security While there is no single line of thought, typically they are opposed to the presence of foreign bases in the region, high levels of military spending, and the acquisition and proliferation of weapons systems, including missile defences.7 However, as Kraft points out, “it is in the area of human rights that track three networks have been most active.”8 While many track three actors are hesitant about engaging track one or track two channels, there have been some attempts to establish more formal links between them Perhaps the most important development was the first meeting of the ASEAN People’s Assembly (APA), which took place in November 2000 in Batam The idea for a People’s Assembly was first raised at the official level during the 1995 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Brunei when the Thai Foreign Minister proposed a congress of ASEAN peoples and requested that the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEANISIS), through ISIS Thailand, investigate the possibilities for organizing such a gathering.9 According to one Singaporean account, the APA is based “on the rationale that community building in ASEAN must include all sectors of society on a step-by-step basis … ASEAN must be made relevant to the ordinary citizen of each of the member states, as it has become relevant to many members of their élite communities, if wider and deeper support for ASEAN among the citizens of the ten member states is to be built.”10 The inaugural meeting in Batam included more than 300 representatives from all ten ASEAN member states.11 The Indonesian think-tank, the Centre for Security and International Studies (CSIS), acted as the APA Secretariat Participants were invited by ASEAN-ISIS, on the recommendation of national ISIS members, and their travel and accommodation expenses were paid for by ASEAN-ISIS The composition of representatives was supposed to be “as diverse as © 2002 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore 218 Track Three 219 possible and should include a few representatives from government and business.”12 It was planned that the APA will be held annually to coincide with informal and regular ASEAN Summits Herman Joseph S Kraft, “Track Three Diplomacy and Human Rights in Southeast Asia: The Case of the Asia Pacific Coalition for East Timor”, Paper presented at the Global Development Network 2000 Conference, Tokyo, 13 December 2000, p 2 Navnita Chadha Behera, Paul Evans, and Gowher Rizvi, Beyond Boundaries: A Report on the State of Non-Official Dialogues on Peace, Security and Cooperation in South Asia (Toronto: University of TorontoYork University Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, 1997), p 19 Kraft, “Track Three Diplomacy”, p Pierre Lizee, “Civil Society and Regional Security: Tensions and Potentials in Post-Crisis Southeast Asia”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 22, no (December 2000): 551–70, 559 More information about FORUM-ASIA can be found at its website at Focus on the Global South can be found at For example, the People’s ASEM Summit in Seoul, October 2000 For details, see For an example, see Walden Bello, “Towards a Just, Comprehensive, and Sustainable Peace in the Asia-Pacific Region”, Speech at the opening session of the Okinawa International Forum on People’s Security, Okinawa, 29 June–2 July 2000, available at The group maintains a project on security and conflict, which is described on its website, and also a series of bulletins under the heading “Focus-on-Security” Kraft, “Track Three Diplomacy”, p “ASEAN People’s Assembly”, Article on the website of the Singapore Institute for International Affairs (SIIA) available online at 10 Ibid 11 John Aglionby, “ASEAN Starts to Reinvent Itself”, eCountries online news service, available at 12 Ibid Track Three © 2002 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore Notes The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon Transparency The term transparency is used in both security and economic discourse in the Asia-Pacific region In the security discourse, transparency is associated with confidence- and security-building measures Put most simply, transparency assumes that openness on military matters encourages trust between states and reduces the suspicions that can lead to miscalculation and conflict It does not require openness on all defence matters but rather limited and carefully defined openness about a particular set of military issues Transparency works primarily by reassuring states that other governments to not intend to take military action against them It can also assure states that potential adversaries not have the capability to launch a major assault against them without taking obvious preparations While a state’s intentions can obviously change over time, its military capability can only be expanded by a programme of acquisitions over a long period If transparency is pursued consistently across an entire region, it therefore becomes difficult for any one state to acquire the capacity to launch an unexpected attack Desmond Ball has identified transparency as one of the “first and most basic” building blocks for creating confidence in the Asia-Pacific region.1 Practically there are many different ways to work towards transparency These include military-to-military contacts, visits by military delegations, prior notification of military exercises, and the sharing of strategic perceptions, military doctrine, and force structures, right through to the actual physical inspection of military installations In the Asia-Pacific, it has been generally agreed that intrusive measures such as inspections are unacceptable to most states More attention has, therefore, been placed on exchanges of information such as encouraging the publication of White Papers by regional governments, or explanations of the rationale behind their defence structure A second track proposal has called for the publication of a “generic” Defence White Paper by all the states in the region Another specific transparency measure that has been discussed is the creation of a regional register of arms transfers While no agreement on this suggestion has yet been possible, regional states 220 © 2002 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore Transparency 220 221 have undertaken to actively support the United Nations’ Register of Arms Transfers Transparency has also been used in a similar way as a concept in Asia-Pacific economic multilateralism At the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation) meeting held in Bogor in November 1994, transparency was identified as one of APEC’s non-binding investment principles In its 1995 report, the Pacific Business Forum (PBF) described transparency to mean “programmes, rules, regulations, guidelines, all these must be clearly documented and easily accessible to all concerned Guesswork, discretion, and double standards should be eliminated The transparency principle should also apply within individual economies.”2 In its 1996 Report to APEC’s Economic Leaders, the APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC), which succeeded the PBF, said transparency requires that all APEC member economies make their laws, regulations, administrative guidelines, and policies pertaining to investment “publicly available in a prompt … and readily accessible manner”.3 © 2002 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore Notes Desmond Ball, “Building Blocks for Regional Security: An Australian Perspective on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) in the Asia/Pacific Region”, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No 83, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1991, p 29 The Osaka Action Plan: Roadmap to Realising the APEC Vision, Report of the Pacific Business Forum 1995 (Singapore: APEC Secretariat, 1995), p 11, para Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) Business Advisory Council, ABAC Report to APEC Economic Leaders (Singapore: APEC Secretariat, 1996), p 53 Transparency Transparency The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon Trust-Building Measures The term trust-building measures (or TBMs) refers to a concept closely related to the family of confidence- and security-building measures While TBMs is not a new term — in fact it was used as long ago as the Camp David process in the Middle East — some scholars have suggested they offer a “more indigenous” Asia-Pacific alternative to confidence-building measures (CBMs) or confidenceand security-building measures (CSBMs).1 Trust-building measures were the subject of the first ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) inter-sessional seminar held in Canberra in November 1994 The term has been used extensively by Paul Dibb, Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC) at the Australian National University, and chair of the 1994 meeting According to Dibb, “dialogue and political trust are necessary preconditions for developing specific security measures” in the Asia-Pacific.2 His understanding of TBMs includes both military and non-military measures designed to promote that trust Dibb argues that “multilateral security dialogue is itself the first and perhaps most important regional trust-building measure.”3 Dibb suggests that specific TBMs discussed by the ARF and the ARF-Senior Officials Meetings (SOMs) fall into two groups: those that involve information-sharing; and those that require specific measures of constraint.4 Of these two types, he groups TBMs into three baskets Measures in Basket include exchanges of strategic perceptions; military-to-military contacts; observers at military exercises (on a voluntary basis); and participation in the United Nations Conventional Arms Register These measures should be “relatively easy” to get agreement on Basket measures include exploration of a regional arms register; the establishment of a regional security studies centre; the publication of Defence White Papers; and the creation of maritime information databases Dibb labels these as a “little less easy” and says they would need to be implemented in the medium term Basket measures, the most difficult to implement, include notification of major military exercises and maritime surveillance co-operation.5 Like CBMs and CSBMs, trust-building measures have the broad objective of promoting confidence, reducing uncertainty, 222 © 2002 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore Trust-Building Measures 222 © 2002 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore 223 misperception, and suspicion in the region and lowering the chances of armed conflict occurring According to some proponents, they differ from confidence-building measures in the way TBMs tend to place greater emphasis on a gradual or incremental approach to building political trust between states rather than spectacular breakthroughs.6 Others claim they are less formal and more flexible than CBMs and are based upon consensus William Tow and Douglas Stuart add that TBMs are often “built on personal political contacts and relationships” Such differences, however, have been exaggerated It is difficult to see how TBMs offer much in the way of an “indigenous” alternative to the CBMs Use of the term in the Middle East long pre-dates its use in Asia Even the terminology used by proponents of TBMs, such as Dibb’s “baskets of measures” emulates the language of the Helsinki process A Chinese perspective presented at a seminar on Canada-China relations in 1997 drew a subtle distinction between the terms trust and confidence It noted that “in most security writings by Western scholars, the word ‘trust’ is used interchangeably with ‘confidence’ … In Chinese, xinren and xinlai correspond roughly to ‘confidence’ and ‘trust’ respectively and have different shades of meaning Xinlai implies that someone is not only believable but also dependable Whereas xinren emphasizes more on the believability of someone or something.” The participant went on to say, “‘Confidence’ and ‘trust’ also imply different degrees of belief ‘Confidence’ is the accumulating process towards the final trust While ‘confidence’ is more procedural and with more psychological assurance, ‘trust’ is more conclusive with more assured action.”8 Notes In his foreword to an Australian paper proposing TBMs, Gareth Evans claims that “as Foreign Minister of Australia for the past six years, I have been a strong proponent of the need for preventive diplomacy and trust-building measures At the outset, I recognized that Cold War language and concepts were not appropriate to the entirely different political, cultural and strategic situation in the Asia Pacific region I Trust-Building Measures Trust-Building Measures The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon therefore encouraged Professor Dibb to develop a fresh, new approach and language; new but also based firmly on the security practicalities and expectations of the region.” See Gareth Evans and Paul Dibb, Australian Paper on Practical Proposals for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1994), p Paul Dibb, “How to Begin Implementing Specific Trust-Building Measures in the Asia-Pacific Region”, Working Paper No 288, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, p Emphasis in original Ibid., p Ibid., p Ibid., p Evans, in Evans and Dibb, Australian Paper, p Douglas T Stuart and William S Tow, A U.S Strategy for the AsiaPacific, Adelphi Paper No 299 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995), p 73 note The comments were offered by Chinese participants at the Second Canada-China Seminar (CANCHIS II) held in Toronto in January 1988 The extent to which the term has been used in this particular sense by Chinese government officials is unclear © 2002 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore Trust-Building Measures 224