The Hundred-Year Marathon_ China’s Secret Strategy To Replace America As The Global Superpower.pdf

The Hundred Year Marathon China''''s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower Tai Lieu Chat Luong For Susan CONTENTS Title Page Copyright Notice Dedication Author’s Note Introduction W[.]

Tai Lieu Chat Luong For Susan CONTENTS Title Page Copyright Notice Dedication Author’s Note Introduction: Wishful Thinking The China Dream Warring States Only China Could Go to Nixon Mr White and Ms Green America, the Great Satan China’s Message Police The Assassin’s Mace The Capitalist Charade A China World Order in 2049 10 Warning Shots 11 America as a Warring State Notes Index Acknowledgments Also by Michael Pillsbury About the Author Copyright AUTHOR’S NOTE The CIA, the FBI, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and an agency of the Defense Department reviewed this book prior to publication to ensure that there was no disclosure of classified information I appreciate the work of the reviewers to remove any sensitive operational details that might jeopardize methods used in the field INTRODUCTION WISHFUL THINKING “Deceive the heavens to cross the ocean.” —The Thirty-Six Stratagems At noon on November 30, 2012, beneath a clear late-autumn sky, Wayne Clough, the white-bearded, affable secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, appeared before a collection of cameras and microphones As he spoke, a cold wind blew across the National Mall The audience stood bundled in their overcoats as a representative of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton held aloft a mysterious gold medal The Smithsonian’s honored guest that day was the famed Chinese artist Cai Guo Qiang, who had been feted the night before at a tony gala inside the Sackler Gallery of the Smithsonian’s National Museum of Asian Art —an event cohosted by my wife, Susan Some four hundred guests, among them House minority leader Nancy Pelosi, Princess Michael of Kent, and the seventyfour-year-old widow of the shah of Iran, clinked glasses to celebrate the Chinese-American relationship and to catch a glimpse of Cai, who had won international acclaim for his awe-inspiring fireworks display during the opening ceremony of the 2008 Beijing Olympics Cai was known to celebrate Chinese symbols with performance art, and had once used lighted fires to extend the Great Wall by ten kilometers so it could be better seen from space Our evening gala raised more than $1 million for the Smithsonian and made the social pages of various newspapers and magazines.1 The following day, as Cai was introduced, he was dressed in a Western-style suit, gray overcoat, and orange-red scarf A trim, handsome man with graying hair, he looked out upon the Mall and the subject of his latest piece of performance art, a four-story-tall Christmas tree decorated with two thousand explosive devices As Cai twisted a handheld trigger, his audience watched the tree explode before their eyes, with thick black smoke emerging from the branches Cai twisted the trigger again, and the tree exploded a second time, then a third The five-minute display sent pine needles across the vast lawn in all directions and dense black smokesymbolizing Chinas invention of gunpowderbillowing up the faỗade of the Smithsonian’s iconic red sandstone castle.2 It would take two months to clean up the debris and residue left by the explosion I don’t know if any of the guests contemplated why they were watching a Chinese artist blow up a symbol of the Christian faith in the middle of the nation’s capital less than a month before Christmas In that moment, I’m not sure that even I appreciated the subversion of the gesture; I clapped along with the rest of the audience Perhaps sensing the potential controversy, a museum spokesman told the Washington Post, “The work itself is not necessarily about Christmas.”3 Indeed, the museum labeled Cai’s performance simply, “Explosive Event,” which, if one thinks about it, is not much more descriptive than what Cai called it on his own website: “Black Christmas Tree.”4 Secretary Clinton’s aide waved the gold medal for the press corps to see, as Cai smiled modestly He had just been given the State Department’s Medal of Arts, the first of its kind, which was presented to the artist by Clinton herself, along with $250,000, courtesy of the American taxpayer The medal was awarded, she said, for the artist’s “contributions to the advancement of understanding and diplomacy.”5 Cai seemed to agree with the sentiment: “All artists are like diplomats,” he said “Sometimes art can things that politics cannot.”6 I was a little suspicious and mentioned Cai the next day during a secret meeting with a senior Chinese government defector He was incredulous at the award and explosion We scoured the Internet I wanted to investigate Cai and his works of art a little more closely I didn’t bother reading the English articles proclaiming Cai’s genius, but rather what the Chinese were saying on various Mandarin-language websites about one of their most acclaimed citizens Cai, it turned out, has quite a large following inside China He was and remains arguably the most popular artist in the country, with the notable exception of Ai Weiwei Many of Cai’s fans were nationalists, and applauded him for blowing up Western symbols before a Western audience China’s nationalists called themselves ying pai, meaning “hawks” or “eagles.” Many of these ying pai are generals and admirals and government hard-liners Few Americans have ever met them They are the Chinese officials and authors I know the best because since 1973 the U.S government has instructed me to work with them Some of my colleagues wrongly dismiss the ying pai as nuts To me, they represent the real voice of China.7 Cai and the hawks appear to be very supportive of the narrative of the decline of the United States and the rise of a strong China (By coincidence, his given name, Guo Qiang, means “strong country” in Mandarin.) Cai’s earlier exhibits featured variations on this theme For instance, while American soldiers were coming under nearly constant assault by IEDs in Afghanistan and Iraq, the artist simulated a car bomb explosion to ask “his viewers to appreciate some kind of redeeming beauty in terrorist attacks and warfare.”8 The artist raised eyebrows when he said that the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, was a “spectacle” for the world audience, as if it were—in some twisted sense—a work of art Shortly after the attacks, an Oxford University professor reported that Cai Guo Qiang proclaimed that his favorite book9 was Unrestricted Warfare: War and Strategy in the Globalization Era, a work of military analysis in which two Chinese colonels recommended that Beijing “use asymmetrical warfare, including terrorism, to attack the United States.”10 Even now, Chinese bloggers were enjoying the spectacle of their hero destroying a symbol of the Christian faith only a stone’s throw from the U.S Capitol The joke, it appeared, was very much on us Only later did I learn that the U.S officials responsible for the payment to Cai had not known about his background or his dubious artistic strategy I couldn’t help but feel that my wife and I had also been caught unawares—happy barbarians gleefully ignorant of the deeply subversive performance taking place before us This wasn’t much different from U.S policy toward China as a whole Chinese leaders have persuaded many in the West to believe that China’s rise will be peaceful and will not come at others’ expense, even while they adhere to a strategy that fundamentally rejects this * * * We Americans still don’t see China the way it sees us—a condition that has persisted for decades Why else would the Smithsonian Institution and the State Department pay a famous Chinese artist $250,000 to blow up a Christmas tree on the National Mall? The answer lies, at least in part, in an ancient proverb that says, “Cross the sea in full view” or, in more practical terms, “Hide in plain sight.” It is one of the Thirty-Six Stratagems, an essay from ancient Chinese folklore.11 All of these stratagems are designed to defeat a more powerful opponent by using the opponent’s own strength against him, without his knowing he is even in a contest Perhaps unwittingly, Cai alluded to this idea in remarks he delivered later to an audience at the State Department “Everyone,” he said, “has their little tricks.”12 It is generally understood among those of us calling ourselves China experts that our life’s work is devoted to reducing misunderstandings between the United States and China We have our work cut out for us Americans have been wrong about China again and again, sometimes with profound consequences In 1950, the Chinese leadership believed that it had given a clear warning to the United States that its troops should not come too close to the Chinese border during the Korean War, or China would be forced to respond in kind No one in Washington got that message, and in November of that year Chinese troops surged across the Yalu River into North Korea, engaging U.S troops in numerous battles before the war was halted by an armistice in 1953, after more than thirty thousand American soldiers had died The United States also misunderstood China’s relationship with the Soviet Union, the reasons for its overtures to the Nixon administration in the 1970s, its intentions regarding student protesters at Tiananmen Square in 1989, its decision to treat an accidental U.S bombing of a Chinese embassy in 1999 as an act that Chinese leaders equated with the atrocities of Hitler, and more Many of us who study China have been taught to view the country as a helpless victim of Western imperialists—a notion that China’s leaders not only mutual funds Myanmar NASA NASDAQ Nathan, Andrew Nation national champions See also state-owned enterprises National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) National Economic Council National Endowment for Democracy National Foreign Affairs University National High-Technology (863) Program National Intelligence Estimate National Medium- and Long-Term Plan (MLP) National Patriotic Education Program National Security Council (NSC) National Security Decision Directives (NSDD) NSDD 11 NSDD 12 NSDD 140 NSDD 166 National Security Review on Foreign Investment (China) National Taiwan University natural resources natural selection Naval War College Review Newsweek New Warring States Era, The (Wang et al.) New York Times Nie Rongzhen Nixon, Richard Nobel Peace Prize Nokia nonproliferation agreements nontariff barriers Normandy invasion North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Northern Sword exercise North Korea North Vietnam Nosenko, Yuri NTDTV (anti-China TV station) nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) nuclear weapons Nye, Joseph Obama, Barack Office of Net Assessment Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive oil and gas Okinawa Oksenberg, Michel Olympics (Beijing, 2008) On China (Kissinger) one-child policy On Grand Strategy (classic ying pai text) Opium War, First Orde, Ann Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) overseas propaganda project Pacific Ocean Pakistan panda huggers Pang Tong paper industry Paradox of Power, The (Gompert and Saunders) particle beam weapons patents patience patriotic education Patriot Missile system peak oil Pearl Harbor attacks Pei, Minxin Peking University Pelosi, Nancy Peng Guangqian penicillin Pennsylvania, University of pension funds Pentagon in Action, The (video) People’s Daily People’s Liberation Army pesticides petrochemical industry Petrovski, Vladimir pharmaceutical industry Philby, Kim Philippines Pillsbury, Susan Pillsbury company “Plan, the” Politburo, anti-Americans on political prisoners pollution POLO studies polymers population size portfolio holding companies Powell Doctrine power generation power projection preemptive surprise attack Presidential Directive 43 (1978) presidential elections, U.S 1972 1976 1980 1992 Press, Frank Prevention of Nuclear War agreement private property privatization See also free markets partial productivity Project 328 propaganda protectionism Protestants Qiao Guanhua Qiao Liang Qin dynasty Qingdao Qing dynasty Quality Brands Protection Committee radar Radio Free Asia Radio Free Europe RAND Corporation rare earth exports Reagan, Ronald Recasting the Imperial Far East (Xiang) Red Army Red Cliff, Battle of Red Flower Red Team reformers religious freedom Reporters Without Borders Rise of the Great Powers, The (TV series) Rites of Zhou “Road to Rejuvenation” exhibit robotics Rockefeller Foundation Romance of the Three Kingdoms, The (novel) Roosevelt, Franklin D Rotterdam School of Management Royal Dutch Shell Ruan Ming rubber industry Rubin, Robert Russell, Terry Russia, post-Soviet Ryukyu island chain Salisbury, Harrison Samore, Gary sanctions Sasser, James satellites Saunders, Phillip C savings rate Sawyer, Tom (character) Schoonover, Claudia Bird science education Science of Campaigns, The (Zhang) Science of Strategy (Peng) scientific aid and exchanges sea lanes sea mines Second Nuclear Age, The (Bracken) securities regulation Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 204 September 11, 2001, attacks Serbia Seven Fears Shambaugh, David Shandong colony Shanghai Communiqué Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Shen Guofang Shevchenko, Arkady shi Assassin’s Mace and Battle of Red Cliff and defined encirclement and need for U.S to study opening to Nixon and shift in China’s favor U.S rise and warning strike and shipping Shirk, Susan Shi Yinhong Shkval rocket torpedoes Shultz, George Siemens signals intelligence Silent Contest (film) Singapore Sinopec company Smith, Adam Smithsonian Institution, National Museum of Asian Art Snow, Edgar “socialism with Chinese characteristics” Solarz, Stephen SOLO operation Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr Sonnenfeldt, Helmut South China Sea South Korea sovereign wealth funds Soviet Mission to UN Soviet Politburo Soviet Union balance of power and border clashes Chinese rift with collapse of military buildup and offensive of 1969 vs space technology Spacey, Kevin Special Administrative Regions Spence, Jonathan splittists Spratly Islands Spring and Autumn Annals Sputnik Stalin, Joseph Stanford University Star Wars (films) State Department state-owned enterprises (SOEs) stealth technology steel industry Stinger anti-aircraft missiles Stockholm University stock markets Strassmann, Paul Stratagems of the Warring States Strategic and Economic Dialogue Strategic Lessons from China’s Ancient Past student exchanges submarines Sudan Suettinger, Robert Summers, Lawrence Sun Bailin Sun Tzu Sun Yat-sen superpower China as only U.S and China as dual U.S as only supply lines surface-to-air missiles Sweden Sydney University Syria Szady, David Taiwan Taiwan National University Taiwan Strait Tajikistan Taliban “Tang, Ms.” Tang Jiaxuan Tang Qing Taoism tariffs technology exports theft of telecommunications Tenet, George Tennessee Valley Authority Terrill, Ross terrorism textbooks Thailand Thermopylae, Battle of Thirty-Six Stratagems, The Thompson, Fred threat perceptions Tiananmen Papers, The Tiananmen Square obelisk protests and massacre (1989) Tibet Time Titan Rain cyberattacks To Change China (Spence) Tomahawk cruise missiles Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission Tomsen, Peter TOP HAT operation Town and village enterprises (TVEs) toxic chemicals Toyota trade embargo Treasury Department Triplett, William C., II Truman, Harry S Trump, Donald Tsinghua University Turkey Twitter Tyler, John Tyler, Patrick Tyson, Laura Uighurs Under-Heaven System, The (Zhao) unipolar dominance Unirule Institute of Economics United Front Work Department United Nations Charter Iraq sanctions oil-for-food program Secretariat United States decline of rise of U.S Air Force U.S Bill of Rights U.S Central Command U.S Chamber of Commerce U.S.-China Congressional Commission U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission U.S Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People’s Republic of China U.S Congress U.S dollar U.S embassy (Beijing), protests of 1999 U.S House of Representatives U.S.-Japan security treaty U.S National Academy of Sciences U.S National Defense University U.S Naval War College U.S Navy U.S Pacific Command U.S Senate Budget Committee Chinese influence attempts delegation to Beijing (1983) Foreign Relations Committee U.S Special Forces universities Unrestricted Warfare (Qiao and Wang) urban collectives USAID Usual Suspects, The (film) Uzbekistan V-22 Osprey values Venezuela Versailles Treaty (1919) vertical alliance Vietnam Chinese attack of 1979 occupation of Cambodia Vietnam War Visa visas Volkswagen Wales, Jimmy Walesa, Lech Wall Street Journal Wang, Ning Wang Chun Wang Jisi Wang Xianglin Wang Xiangsui Wangxia Treaty (1844) war games warning strike War of Resistance Warring States adapting concepts of Washington Post Washington Times watering hole technique Waterloo, Battle of water pollution weapons of mass destruction (WMD) Weapons of the 21st Century (Chang) Weary Titan, The (Friedberg) wei qi game Weng, Meicun Wen Jiabao Wen Yunchao Westad, Arne Wharton Business School “White, Mr.” White House Office of Science and Technology Policy Wikipedia Wilson, Charlie Wilson, Harold Wilson, Woodrow Wolf, Frank World Bank World Economic Forum World Military Trends World Trade Organization (WTO) World War I World War II Wortzel, Larry wu wei concept (get others to do work) Wu Zixu Xiang, Lanxin Xi Jinping Xinjiang area Xu Xiangqian Yahoo! Yan Fu Yang Jianli Yang Zhibo Yan Jiaqi Yasukuni Shrine Ye Jianying Zambia Zhang Qianfan Zhang Wenmu Zhao Tingyang Zhao Ziyang Zhou dynasty Zhou Enlai Zhou Xiaochuan Zhou Yu Zhu Chenghu Zhuge Liang Zhu Rongji Zimbabwe Zimmerman, Warren ZTE company ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This book has been five decades in the making It would have been impossible had I not been accorded the unusual opportunity to discuss and debate ideas with thirty-five Chinese “scholar-generals.” Most have published books and articles about Chinese strategy Some I have known for more than twenty years None ever violated his or her oath to protect national secrets and uphold the Party line However, all of them have lively intellects and a desire to enlighten those of us considered “friends from afar,” as Confucius might say Their insights proved instructive, even if they not agree with all of my conclusions Henry Kissinger assisted directly and indirectly with understanding the context of ideas the Chinese put forward Most of the generals have worked their entire careers at the prestigious Academy of Military Science They include: Chen Zhou, Gao Rui, Huang Shuofeng, Li Jijun, Li Qingshan, Liu Jingsong, Liu Tinghua, Liu Yuan, Luo Yuan, Mi Zhenyu, Pan Junfeng, Peng Guangqian, Wang Pufeng, Wu Chunqiu, Wu Rusong, Yao Youzhi, Yao Yunzhu, Zhang Shiping, Zhao Xiaozhuo, and Zheng Minxia I also appreciate the advice and publications provided by seven scholar-generals in military intelligence headquarters, all former military attachés: Chen Xiaogong, Gong Xianfu, Wang Naicheng, Zhang Tuosheng, Zhang Wutang, Zhao Ning, and Zhen Zhiya I have benefited from suggestions and books provided by eight scholar-generals at the National Defense University in Beijing: Liu Mingfu, Liu Yazhou, Pan Zhengqiang, Wang Zhongchun, Yang Yi, Yu Guohua, Zhang Zhaozhong, and Zhu Chenghu Major General Zhai Yuqiu, dean of the military academy in Nanjing, contributed ideas from his three volumes on ancient stratagems I am heavily indebted to Professor Shi Yinhong, a counselor to the State Council, who once taught today’s generals in Nanjing Shi relishes his iconoclastic role as a candid, prolific author on China’s strategy, but always stays within the limits of Party and military discipline dealing with foreigners To protect the identity of a few other important sources, I have used pseudonyms or otherwise disguised them I also acknowledge my debt to two professors of Chinese philosophy, Roger Ames and Franỗois Jullien, for providing the proverbial key to unlocking the Chinese concept of shi In addition, I acknowledge the decisive role of Andy Marshall, the legendary director at the Office of Net Assessment in the Department of Defense, who allowed me the opportunity to study Chinese strategy and share my insights with successive administrations Many Western specialists on Chinese strategic thinking contributed ideas to this book: not all will agree with my interpretations, and they certainly do not all agree among themselves They are: Roger Ames, Dennis Blasko, Dan Blumenthal, Anne-Marie Brady, Richard Bush, Dean Cheng, Thomas Christensen, Warren Cohen, John Culver, Robert Daly, Daniel de Mots, David Dorman, Elizabeth Economy, Andrew Erickson, Evan Feigenbaum, David Finkelstein, Rick Fisher, Rosemary Foot, Christopher Ford, Aaron Friedberg, Banning Garrett, John Garver, Bonnie Glaser, Paul Godwin, Carol Hamrin, Paul Heer, David Helvey, Charles Horner, Iain Johnston, Franỗois Jullien, Robert Kagan, Roy Kamphausen, Henry Kissinger, Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, David Lai, Michael Lampton, Richard Lawless, Deborah Lehr, Cheng Li, Kenneth Lieberthal, Thomas Mahnken, Mark Mancall, James Mann, Evan Medeiros, Alice Miller, Frank Miller, James Mulvenon, Andrew Nathan, Douglas Paal, Robert Ross, Gilbert Rozman, Phil Saunders, Ralph Sawyer, Andrew Scobell, David Shambaugh, James Shinn, Randy Shriver, Abram Shulsky, Mark Stokes, Michael Swaine, Jay Taylor, Ashley Tellis, Timothy Thomas, Drew Thompson, John Tkacik, Peter Tomsen, Christopher Twomey, Jan Van Tol, Arthur Waldron, Thomas Welch, Allen Whiting, Dennis Wilder, Larry Wortzel, Lanxin Xiang, Michael Yahuda, Maochun Yu, and Xiaoming Zhang This book would not exist without the genius of its editor, Paul Golob, who I suspect knows mysteriously how to channel his role models, like the great editor Maxwell Perkins, to inspire, discipline, reward, and persuade authors to produce something beyond what anyone realistically thought possible My thanks as well to my gifted agents, Keith Urbahn and Matt Latimer of Javelin, who shaped and guided this effort from the start Two brilliant graduate students assisted with the research and editing: Nick Bellomy and Ashley Frohwein I also thank graduate students Jon-Michael LaGray and Mark Hanson, who helped start the draft Chris O’Connell, a production editor at Henry Holt, contributed to the final draft The Hudson Institute’s esteemed founder, Herman Kahn, taught me how to think critically and strategically and look beyond the conventional wisdom of the day I benefited greatly from reading a selection of Kahn’s work in a 2006 volume written by the Hudson Institute’s president, Ken Weinstein “History,” Herman Kahn advised, “happens in straight lines and curves.” Most important, my everlasting appreciation to my wife, Susan Pillsbury Susan contributed specific ideas to this book based on her eight visits to China, all of which were taken before she married me We were introduced in London, as I was en route to Beijing in April 1989 to interview the Tiananmen Square student demonstrators Back then, she had a premonition that Beijing’s leaders were not going to live up to our wishful thinking about democracy, free trade, and human rights As always, she proved both wise and prescient ALSO BY MICHAEL PILLSBURY China Debates the Future Security Environment Chinese Views of Future Warfare (editor) ABOUT THE AUTHOR Michael Pillsbury is the director of the Center on Chinese Strategy at the Hudson Institute and has served in presidential administrations from Richard Nixon to Barack Obama Educated at Stanford and Columbia Universities, he is a former analyst at the RAND Corporation and research fellow at Harvard and has served in senior positions in the Defense Department and on the staff of four U.S Senate committees He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute for Strategic Studies He lives in Washington, D.C THE HUNDRED-YEAR MARATHON Copyright © 2015 by Michael Pillsbury All rights reserved For information, address Henry Holt and Co., 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y 10010 www.henryholt.com Cover design by Faceout Studio eBooks may be purchased for business or promotional use For information on bulk purchases, please contact Macmillan Corporate and Premium Sales Department by writing to MacmillanSpecialMarkets@macmillan.com The Library of Congress has cataloged the print edition as follows: Pillsbury, Michael The hundred-year marathon: China’s secret strategy to replace America as the global superpower / Michael Pillsbury pages cm Includes index ISBN 978-1-62779-010-9 (hardback) — ISBN 978-1-62779-011-6 (electronic book) Strategic planning—China 2 China—History 3 National security—China 4 China—Politics and government 5 China—Foreign relations 6 United States—Foreign relations—China 7 China— Foreign relations—United States I Title JZ1734.P55 2014 327.1'120951—dc23 2014012015 First Edition: February 2015