1227 line in the waters the south china sea dispute and its implications for asia

JJDurham University WILEYBLACKWELL LINEINTHE wATERS TheSouthChinaSeaDi sputeand itsImplicationsforAsi a EditedbyAbhijit Singh ©2017ObserverResearchFoundation LineintheWaters:TheSouthChinaSeaDisputeanditsImplicati onsforAsiaISBN:978-81-86818-27-5 Coverimage: jiangX/ChinaNavyaircraftcarrierbattlegroup/Flickr/CCBY-NC-SA2.0 Designer: SimiJaisonDesigns Printer: MohitEnterprises,NewDelhi Contents ArbitrationontheSouthChinaSea-ImplicationsforMaritimeAsia AbhijitSingh Freedomo f N a v i g a t i o n A C r i t i c a l S e c u r i t y I m p e r a t i v e 13 JeffM.Smith TheSino-USSecurityDilemmaTheRootCauseandWayOut TengJianqun 22 Singapore’sSecurity Imperatives 30 KohSweeLeanCollin Indonesia’sSouthChinaSeaProblem 38 RistianSupriyanto Vietnam’sRegionalSecurityChallenges 47 HaAnhTuan Duterte’sGeopoliticalGameplay RichardJavadHeydarian 55 AJapan-IndiaPartnershipinMaritime-Asia 64 SatoruNagao CourtesyofAsiaMaritimeTransparencyInitiative https://amti.csis.org/atlas/ ArbitrationontheSouthChinaSea –ImplicationsforMaritime-Asia ABHIjITS I N G H AbhijitSinghisSeniorFellowandHeadofMaritimePolicyInitiativeatt heObserverResearchFoundation (ORF) in New Delhi A former Indian naval officer, he has edited two books onmaritime security - Indian Ocean Challenges: a Quest for Cooperative Solutions (2013) andGeopolitics of the Indo-Pacific (2014), and written extensively on India’s growing maritimereach, security of sea-lines of communication, Indian Ocean governance issues and maritimeinfrastructureintheAsianlittorals I n2 , a s e r i e s o f d e v e l o p m e n t s i n m a r i t i m e A s i a d r e w i n t e r n a t i o n a l a t t e n t i o n t o t h e t e r r i t o r i a l disputesintheSouthC hinaSea,nonemoresothanthePhilippinesvs.ChinaA r b i t r a t i o n o v e r maritimer ightsandjurisdictioninthelittoralseas.On July12,2016,atribunalattheP ermanentCourtofArbitration(PCA)atHaguepassedalandmarkonthemat ter,rulingthatBeijing’sclaimsof historicrightswithintheninedashlinearewithoutlegalbasis.ItfurtherconcludedthatBeijing’sactivitieswithinthePhilipp ines’two-hundred-nauticalmileexclusiveeconomiczone(EEZ),suchasillegalfishingandenvironmentallydam agingartificial island constructions, constitutedand infringement ofMa nila ’s sovereignrights In many ways, China had only itself to blame for the debacle Beijing’s first reaction to the Philippines’legalappealhadbeentoignorethematteraltogether– asifnotacknowledgingthecasewouldeffectivelydelegitimise it Given the high level of international interest in the affair, however, it was forced to makea course correction, issuing a position paper in December 2014clarifyingitsofficialstanceontheissue.1Unfortunately forBeijing, itscontention thatManila had violated theUnited NationsConvention of theLawof the Sea (UNCLOS) by filing a petition on a matter of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘territorial jurisdiction’failedtoconvincejudgesatthePCA,whoruledcomprehensivelyinfavourofth ePhilippines.2 Notwithstanding the maritime legalese surrounding the case, the technical nuances of the points raisedreveal an underlying narrative It is important to note that when Manila filed proceedings under AnnexVII of the UNCLOS in July 2013, it was smart enough to invoke only those provisions that allow forcompulsorya r b i t r a t i o n F u l l y a w a r e t h a t t e r r i t o r i a l d i s p u t e s a r e beyondtheremitofUNCLOS,the ArbitrationontheSouthChinaSea Manilaframedits petitiontoseekaclarific ationf r o m thecour twhetherstateright sandobligationsint hewaters,seabed,a ndmaritime featuresoftheSCScoul d bedemarcated bysomethingasarbi traryasahanddrawnlineona chart Philippines’ legal team dressed-up their case as one of historical rights andjudicial clarifications on the applicability of UNCLOS provisions Thisis significant because many of China’s operational moves in the regionaftertheverdictreflectasenseofbetrayalatbeinglega llyambushedbya‘lesser’,though legallystronger, opponent At the heart of the Philippines’ submission were questions about the legalvalidityofChina’sninedashline’intheSouthChinaSea.Manilaframeditsp e t i t i o n t o s e e k a c l a r i fi c a t i o n f r o m t h e c o u r t w h e t h e r s t a t e r i g h t s and obligations in the waters, seabed, and maritime features of the SCScouldbedemarcatedbysomethingasarbitraryasahanddrawnlineonachart.Simplyput,ManilaassertedthatChina’s maritimemapoftheSCSwasofdubiousprovenance,andclaimsarising fromitwereanoutrightviolationof the law AFlawedLegalStrategy China’s belatedly mounted legal defence was innately flawed Beijingimplausiblyarguedagainstthetribunal’smandat etointerprettheapplication of the UNCLOS; erroneously invoked Art 298, citing itsvoluntaryoptoutofcompulsorya r b i t r a t i o n u n d e r t h e U N C L O S ; andunconvincinglypetitionedforthedismissaloft h e P h i l i p p i n e s ’ case, invoking the Declaration of the Conduct of Parties (DOC) in theSouth China Sea.4Nothing in the text of that agreement, the judges pointed out, imposed any obligation on a state to eschew legal remediesin pursuing a just redressal Yet, until July 12, 2016 when the Tribunalpasseditsfinaljudgment,fewhadbelievedthatChina wouldfacesuchahumiliating loss It came as a surprise that the tribunal ruled in favor ofthe Philippines on almost every count, unanimously rejecting nearly allof China’s maritime claims in the region The felicity with which the tribunal tackled legal technicalities deservesacknowledgment.Thecourtr i g h t l y h e l d t h a t a l l t h e t e r r i t o r i e s i n the contested Spratly Islands are reefs or rocks, and not islands – animportantdistinction,asunderUNCLOS,reefscannotg enerateaclaimto the surrounding waters or airspace, and rocks serve as the basis onlyfor a maritime claim of 12 nautical miles The judges’ classification ofthefeaturesontheSpratlysas“lessthanIslands”negatedt