[...]... above The second part of the antecedent ("his perceiving an F is epistemically in the clear") pertains to the 22 n A VERSION OF FOtJNDATIONALISM class of things we singled out by means of principle P3 The consequent of the first part of the principle refers to the "nonpropositional sense of perception" also singled out above The property of being F will be what we have called a sensible property The. .. FOUNDATIONALISM PI t If the property of being F is self-presenting, then, for every x, if x has the property of being F and if x considers his having that property, then it is certain for x that he is then F Every self-presenting property provides us with an instance of PI Thus we could say: For every x, if x has the property of being sad, and if x considers the question whether he is sad, then it is certain... appearance; yet by varying the color, say, of the left half of the table-top we can vary the color of the left half of the visual appearance (If we restrict ourselves to the language of being appeared to, we cannot thus speak of the "parts" of a way of being appeared to But we can distinguish various aspects of the way of being appeared to and we can put our point by reference to them.) The way that an external... each other and each of which is beyond reasonable doubt, then the attribution is evident , What, then, is the requisite sense of "mutual support"? We may say that the members of a set of two or more properties "mutually support" each other for a subject S provided each of the properties is such that (1) the conjunction of all the others confirms it for S, and (2) it is confirmed for S by a self-presenting... Version of Foundationalism Introduction The present essay is an attempt to deal with the basic problems of the theory of knowledge The general view that is here defended is appropriately called "foundationalism." What are the presuppositions of the theory of knowledge? I shall list six such suppositions In formulating them, I shall use the first person, but I am quite confident that I am speaking for others... a member of a set of properties, which mutually support each other and each of which is beyond reasonable doubt for x, then it is evident for x that he perceives something that is F Let us note certain features of this principle The first part of the antecedent of the first part of the principle ("x perceptually takes there to be something that is F") refers to the "self-presenting sense of perception"... only on the thing that is appearing, but also on the relevant sense-organ Perhaps we can distinguish the role of the senseorgan from that of the object of appearance by saying this: the nature of the appearance is directly dependent on the state of the sense organ; and it is indirectly dependent on the state of that physical thing on which the state of the sense-organi is directly dependent The medium... self-presenting by our definition but they may be entailed by what is selfpresenting—say the property of thinking and not believing ghosts exist (The latter property may be self-presenting even to those who do not have the concept of a ghost This consequence is essential to the theory of evidence.) But in saying that such properties are selfpresenting, we are not saying that they are self-presented The. .. first clause of the antecedent we refer to the primary sense of perception and in the second to the nonpropositional sense of perception A VERSION OF FOUNDATIONALISM D 23 This final perceptual principle introduces the de re epistemic locution: "y is such that it is evident to x that it is F." Therefore the principle is, in a certain respect, less pure than the preceding principle, P5 For, in theory at... for a person provided these conditions hold: the direct attribution of that property is beyond reasonable doubt for that person; and it is at least as reasonable for him as is the direct attribution of any other property If the attribution of the property of being F is thus certain for a subject, then he may be said to be certain that he is F These epistemic expressions may be read in another way For . The Foundations of Knowing Financial assistance for this book was provided by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. The Foundations of Knowing Roderick M. Chisholm University of Minnesota. Minnesota Press n Minneapolis Copyright © 1982 by the University of Minnesota. All rights reserved. Published by the University of Minnesota Press, 2037 University Avenue Southeast,. Foundationalism Introduction The present essay is an attempt to deal with the basic problems of the theory of knowledge. The general view that is here defended is appropriately called