the metaphysics of knowledge nov 2007

[...]... hence truth, in terms of knowledge; the referent of a concept is that object knowledge of which is made possible by possession of the concept A version of the picture theory of thought is now possible: a thought is a picture of a fact, in the sense that the thought is true if there is a fact that combines the referents of the concepts activated by the thought With the theory of modes of presentation in... provenance of the knowledge If the knowledge arises from some mental act of the subject, then the content of the mental act is relevant to provenance My suggestion is that an English knowledge attribution mentions a content not to report the object of knowledge, but to report the content of the mental act in virtue of which the subject has knowledge The knowledge itself is not a relation to this content: rather,... necessary and the a priori It examines these counterexamples, and argues that none of them is convincing Finally it offers an account of the philosophical discourse of ‘possible worlds’ within an ontology that presupposes only knowledge and the one real world Chapter 5 applies the metaphysics of knowledge to the mind, the other relatum of the knowledge relation The chapter discusses the problem of consciousness,... Epistemology is the theory of knowledge, so if knowledge is a simple relation, the task of epistemology cannot be the analysis of knowledge in terms of truth and warrant Rather the task must be the study of warrant, taking the concept of knowledge for granted; as Williamson (2000) puts it, knowledge should be the ‘unexplained explainer’ in epistemology Chapter 1 accordingly offers accounts of epistemic... discovery, in the sense that it led to a flood of new knowledge; but the flood did not include new knowledge of the self-identity of Hesperus, for that was a fact they already knew 1.3 Knowledge and Mental States When a mind knows of some fact, usually there will be some mental events in virtue of which the mind has the knowledge For example, if the knowledge is perceptual, the knowledge will be caused by the. .. of the shining of Hesperus What now of Frege’s puzzle? Pharaoh does not know that Hesperus is Phosphorus, but does he know of Hesperus’s being Phosphorus, i.e., of the identity of Hesperus and Phosphorus? Since the fact of the identity of Hesperus and Phosphorus is the same fact as the fact of the identity of 10 the metaphysics of knowledge Hesperus and Hesperus, it seems this is a fact of which Pharaoh... error, there is no need to make room for mistaken knowledge by invoking contents, and so there is no need to take contents to be the objects of knowledge; we can simply take the facts themselves as the objects of knowledge But although contents are not needed as the objects of knowledge, they may still be needed in reports of knowledge, for often a report will indicate not only the fact known, but also the. .. virtue of its skin being red, but the red skin constitutes rather than causes the redness of the apple The ‘tripartite analysis’ and its descendants say that knowledge is a species of justified true belief—having the knowledge is nothing over and above having the belief in the right circumstances On such an account, one has the knowledge in virtue of the belief, in the constitutive sense of ‘in virtue of ... principle at least, there is a definition of belief and other psychological states that does not presuppose the concept of knowledge; they take knowledge itself to be only a belief of a certain sort But the Causal Thesis prefers to define belief in terms of knowledge According to the Causal Thesis, a system of functional states can be a system of beliefs only if some at least of them cause knowledge On this... kind of particulars, namely the mental beings For an individual is mental or a mind only if it knows something: that which never knows anything is not a mind Just as betweenness is the essence of matter, so knowledge is the essence of mind This hypothesis echoes the claim of Descartes that extension is the essence of body and thought the essence of mind But xii the metaphysics of knowledge it is not the . only knowledge and the one real world. Chapter 5 applies the metaphysics of knowledge to the mind, the other relatum of the knowledge relation. The chapter discusses the problem of consciousness,. and the unity of the self. To the extent that the arguments given in the book succeed, they suggest that the concept of knowledge is a theoretically fruitful one, in terms of which many other. hence truth, in terms of knowledge; the referent of a concept is that object knowledge of which is made possible by possession of the concept. A version of the picture theory of thought is now possible: