plotinus on intellect apr 2007

[...]... common, everyday conceptions We say, for instance, that something stands to Reason or that Reason forbids this or that Reason is in such locutions conceived of as one impersonal and common thing that is identically shared by all who are at all rational; and it is shared in such a way that we can appeal to it when 6 introduction the question arises what is and what isn’t, what is right and what is wrong... of Intellect consists in That is to say: when Intellect thinks its contents, the Ideas, it thinks in the first person If this were to be rendered propositionally—in Chapter IV I discuss the question whether Intellect thinks propositionally and come to a negative conclusion Intellect s thought would have to be rendered by ‘I am being’, ‘I move (am motion)’, and other such statements in the first person... that it is not conventional Both the conventional terms, however, ‘substance’ or ‘essence’, strike me as potentially misleading The question may be raised whether it is not important to keep on (being) and ousia distinct Plotinus himself after all explicitly mentions a distinction between the two in II.6.1, 1 ff.: being (on) is along with motion, rest, identity, and difference one of the constituents of... Companion to Plotinus (Emilsson 1996) and of which a shorter version appeared in Archiv f¨ r Geschichte der Philosophie 77 as u Plotinus on the Object of Thought’ (Emilsson 1995) The fourth chapter is a much expanded and thoroughly rewritten version of ‘Discursive and Non-Discursive Thought’, which appeared in Non-conceptual Aspects of Experience (Emilsson 2003) As this prehistory indicates, my concern... shaped our conceptions, has indeed been heavily coloured by Plotinus notion of Intellect We should, however, be on our guard in transferring features of the Christian God to Intellect The latter, for instance, lacks all the personal characteristics of the former Another concept that it is natural to compare Intellect with is that of Reason I am then thinking of Reason as it appears in rationalists such... fully-fledged Intellect comes about by a conversion (epistrophˆ ) of the inchoate intellect e towards the One as a result of which the former becomes informed This conversion is commonly described, as here, by means of visual metaphors: The inchoate Intellect ‘looks’ back to the One and ‘is filled’ by it The potential, inchoate intellect is then no longer merely potential, and by this stage we have an actual Intellect. .. limitations characteristic of our human cognitive powers of sense-perception and discursive reason Thus, both considerations of ontology and considerations of cognition lead to the positing of intelligible principles In this context Plotinus makes a clever move: at the intelligible level, being and knowledge, ontology and epistemology, are unified That is to say, the intelligibles, the Platonic Ideas,... endorses this proposal, since he continues to say e.g that motion in the intelligible world is ousia As Corrigan (1996: 106) notes, on and ousia are generally coterminous In a private conversation Donald Morrison once expressed the opinion concerning Aristotle that ousia was merely an honorific word for being, on I suspect there is something to his view, also with respect to Plotinus Hence, I capitalize... [the One] constitutes Being, its gaze upon it, Intellect. ¹ (V.2.1, 7–12) These lines from Ennead V.2.1 are an account by Plotinus himself of the generation of Intellect and being from the One Even if this is a quite concise account, many of the central ideas are present Let me begin by giving a somewhat fuller outline Intellect, we see here, is derived from the One, as is everything else To the One... thought We may go along with Plotinus in holding that any object of thought must be diversified Still, there may seem to be room for a kind of ‘mental’ relationship to something simple which is not thought These questions lead us to consider the nature of the inchoate intellect s apprehension of the One in its conversion and to compare this with some 12 introduction passages where Plotinus seems to suggest . common, everyday conceptions. We say, for instance, that something stands to Reason or that Reason forbids this or that. Reason is in such locutions conceived of as one impersonal and common thing. x0 y0 w0 h1" alt="" Plotinus on Intellect This page intentionally left blank Plotinus on Intellect Eyj ´ olfur Kjalar Emilsson CLARENDON PRESS · OXF ORD 1 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford ox2. previous publications. Thus, the two first chapters are in some sense descendants of ‘Remarks on the Relation between the One and Intellect in Plotinus , my contribution to John Dillon’s Festschrift, Traditions