(Luận văn) restructuring soes in line with new generation free trade agreements of vietnam the case of cptpp and evfta

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOREIGN TRADE UNIVERSITY MASTER THESIS lu an n va RESTRUCTURING SOEs IN LINE WITH NEW to gh tn GENERATION FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS OF p ie VIETNAM: THE CASE OF CPTPP AND EVFTA d oa nl w ll u nf va an lu Specialization: International Trade Policy and Law m oi FULL NAME: PHAM THI THANH HONG z at nh z m co l gm @ an Lu Hanoi – 2020 n va ac th si MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOREIGN TRADE UNIVERSITY MASTER THESIS lu an n va RESTRUCTURING SOEs IN LINE WITH NEW VIETNAM: THE CASE OF CPTPP AND EVFTA p ie gh tn to GENERATION FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS OF w oa nl Major: International Economics d Specialization: International Trade Policy and Law ll u nf va an lu Code: 1706060005 oi m z at nh Full name: Pham Thi Thanh Hong Supervisor: Assoc Prof., Dr Nguyen Thi Tuong Anh z m co l gm @ an Lu Hanoi - 2020 n va ac th si STATEMENT OF ORIGINAL AUTHORSHIP I hereby declare that this master thesis is my own scientific research which is made under the guidance of my supervisor, Assoc Prof., Dr Nguyen Thi Tuong Anh The contents and results of this research are completely honest The information, data and documents which are collected from various sources for analysis and evaluation have been fully cited in the main content and in the references list of this master thesis as well Student, lu Pham Thi Thanh Hong an n va p ie gh tn to d oa nl w ll u nf va an lu oi m z at nh z m co l gm @ an Lu n va ac th i si CONTENTS LIST OF BOXES, FIGURES, TABLES i ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS iii ABSTRACT iv INTRODUCTION 1 Research rationale Literature review 2.1 Evaluating implementation of SOEs’ restructuring lu 2.2 Measures of SOEs’ restructuring an 2.3 Restructuring SOEs in line with the NGFTAs va n Research objectives tn to The scope of the research ie gh Research approach and methodology p 5.1 Approach 5.2 Research methodology w oa nl Structure of the thesis d CHAPTER OVERVIEW OF RESTRUCTURING SOEs IN LINE WITH THE NGFTAs an lu u nf va 1.1 Overview of NGFTAs 1.1.1 Definition of NGFTAs ll oi m 1.1.2 Characteristics of NGFTAs z at nh 1.1.3 Roles of NGFTAs 10 1.2 Overview of SOEs 11 z 1.2.1 Definition of SOEs 11 @ 1.2.2 Characteristics of SOEs 12 gm l 1.2.3 Rationales of SOEs’ rule on NGFTAs 12 m co 1.3 Impacts of NGFTA on SOE 14 1.3.1 Positive impacts 14 an Lu 1.3.2 Negative impacts 16 n va 1.4 Restructuring SOEs in line with NGFTAs 17 ac th ii si 1.4.1 Definition of SOEs’ restructuring 17 1.4.2 Goals of SOEs’ restructuring in line with NGFTAs 17 1.4.3 Measures of SOEs’ restructuring in line with NGFTAs 18 1.4.4 Factors affecting SOEs’ restructuring in line with NGFTAs 24 CHAPTER CURRENT SITUATION OF RESTRUCTURING SOEs IN LINE WITH VIETNAM’S NGFTAs: THE CASE OF CPTPP AND EVFTA 26 2.1 Overview of Vietnam’s NGFTAs 26 2.1.1 Overview of CPTPP 26 2.1.2 Overview of EVFTA 27 2.1.3 Obligations under the CPTPP and EVFTA Agreements pertaining to SOEs restructuring in Vietnam 28 lu an 2.2 Overview of SOEs in Vietnam currently 33 n va 2.2.1 Definition of SOEs on Vietnam's legislation 33 2.3 Implementation of SOEs’ restructuring in the period of 2011-2020 39 gh tn to 2.2.2 Performance of SOEs in the period of 2011-2020 34 p ie 2.3.1 Restructuring economic institutions and corporate governance of SOEs 39 w 2.3.2 Restructuring SOEs' ownership structure 44 oa nl 2.3.3 Restructuring the monitoring of owner’s representative agency 47 d 2.4 Evaluating SOEs’ restructuring in line with CPTPP and EVFTA 51 lu va an 2.4.1 Achievements 51 u nf 2.4.2 Limitations and Causes 54 ll 2.5 Some experience from restructuring SOEs in line with CPTPP and EVFTA in the period of 2011-2020 72 oi m z at nh CHAPTER RECOMMENDATION FOR VIETNAM IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESTRUCTURING SOEs IN LINE WITH NGFTAs FOR THE PERIOD OF 2021-2030 74 z @ 3.1 Context, oppotunities and challenges 74 l gm 3.1.1 Context 74 3.1.2 Opportunities and challenges 75 m co 3.2 International experiences in restructuring SOEs in line with NGFTA 77 an Lu 3.2.1 China 77 3.2.2 Singapore 79 n va ac th iii si 3.2.3 Lessons learned for Vietnam 81 3.3 Objectives and task orientations of SOEs' restructuring in line with CPTPP and EVFTA for the period of 2021-2030 82 3.3.1 Objectives to 2030 82 3.3.2 Task orientations of SOEs' restructuring to 2030 83 3.4 Solutions to restructure SOEs in line with CPTPP and EVFTA for the period of 2021-2030 85 3.4.1 Solutions to restructure economic institutions and corporate governance of SOEs 85 3.4.2 Solutions to restructure SOEs' ownership structure 90 lu 3.4.3 Solutions to restructure the monitoring of owner’s representative agency 91 an CONCLUSION 93 n va LIST OF REFERENCES 94 tn to ANNEX 100 ie gh Annex EVFTA and CPTPP: SOEs’ Application and Exemptions 100 p Annex List of legal documment on restructuring SOEs 2011 - 2020 103 d oa nl w Annex Preliminary comparison of the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of SOEs (2015) and situation of Corporate Governance of SOEs in Vietnam 109 ll u nf va an lu Annex Performance of SOEs in the period of 2011-2020 123 oi m z at nh z m co l gm @ an Lu n va ac th iv si LIST OF BOXES, FIGURES, TABLES BOXES Box 2.1 Impact of maintaining state ownership in investment attraction results: Compare equitization cases under the Ministry of Construction Box 3.1 European Commission report on SOEs in 2016 Page 61 74 lu an n va 19 23 45 49 52 68 gh tn to FIGURES Figure 1.1 Measures of SOEs’ restructuring Figure 1.2 Monitoring of SOEs’ performance Figure 2.1 Number of equitized SOEs Figure 2.2 SOEs’ supervision subjects Figure 2.3 Adjustment to reduce number of industries, sectors that the State holds 100% authorized capital or dominant stock Figure 2.4 The compliance status of regulation on SOEs’ information disclosure p ie TABLES Table 1.1 Methods and objectives of SOEs’ privatization Table 2.1 Financial development index of enterprises in 2010-2017 period Table 2.2 IPO results of equitized enterprises in the period of 2011-2016 oa nl w 22 37 d 46 nf va an lu z at nh oi lm ul z m co l gm @ an Lu n va ac th i si ACKNOWLEDGMENTS In order to complete this master thesis, I have been received enthusiastic guidance and support from my lectures, family and friends From the bottom of my heart, I would like to express my thanks to them Firstly, I would like to express the sincerest thanks to my supervisor, Assoc Prof., Dr Nguyen Thi Tuong Anh who has supported, guided and encouraged me during the completion of this master thesis from choosing the topic, outlining the main ideas, turning those ideas into this thesis to editing this paper Without his enthusiastic and excellent guidance and support, I could not have completed this lu an master thesis n va Also, I would like to express my special thanks to all lectures of the Master of tn to International Policy and Law program, Foreign Trade University as well as World gh Trade Institute who gave me the chance to broaden my humble horizon in the field p ie of economics and laws Last but not least, I would like to express my warm thanks to my family, my w oa nl colleagues and my friends who never stop supporting, encouraging and giving me the d favorable conditions to complete this master thesis nf va an lu z at nh oi lm ul z m co l gm @ an Lu n va ac th ii si LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS BCC Business Cooperation Contracts CMSC Committee for Management of State Capital at Enterprises Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership CPTPP lu an n va European Union EVFTA EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade IMF International Monetary Fund NCA Non-commercial assistance NGFTAs New generation free trade agreements POE Privately Owned Enterprise tn to EU Return on equity SASAC State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission p ie gh ROE SCIC State Capital and Investment Corporation nl w State-owned banks oa SOBs State-owned enterprises WTO World Trade Organization d SOEs nf va an lu z at nh oi lm ul z m co l gm @ an Lu n va ac th iii si ABSTRACT New generation free trade agreement (NGFTA) is an inevitable tendency for members to deeply cooperate in a variety of areas, including SOEs Joining NGFTAs, Vietnam is not out of that tendency, therefore, Vietnam has to fully comply with commitments regulated in NGFTAs With the topic “Restructuring SOEs in line with the new generation Free Trade Agreements of Vietnam: the case of CPTPP and EVFTA”, the thesis focuses on Vietnam's legislation, implementation of SOEs’ restructuring and Vietnam's NGFTAs in order to point out the dispositions on restructuring SOEs Not limited to this, the thesis analyzes Vietnam’s policy on restructuring SOEs compared to SOEs' obligation stated in NGFTAs lu an n va p ie gh tn to Following that, the thesis mainly focuses on several issues and gains some achievements as below Firstly, the thesis comprehensively analyzes regulations on restructuring SOEs in Vietnam and NGFTAs of Vietnam As a result, the similarities and differences between them are stated Based on that, the thesis reveals that there is an incompatibility of the SOEs' definition and disclosure obligations for SOEs under the CPTPP, but not SOEs under Vietnamese law, some information relating to the subsidies for SOEs is still missing (such as the total value of the subsidy, the impact assessment of the subsidy on trade) This is a "gap" that Vietnam must complete to ensure the obligation to enforce regulations on SOEs in the CPTPP and EVFTA nl w d oa Secondly, the thesis details measures of SOEs’ restructuring that Vietnam implemented from 2011 to 2020, including: (i) Restructuring economic institutions and corporate governance of SOEs; (ii) Restructuring SOEs' ownership structure; (iii) Restructuring the monitoring of owner’s representative agency nf va an lu z at nh oi lm ul Thirdly, based on the analysis above, the thesis recommends solutions for SOEs’ restructuring in line with CPTPP and EVFTA in the coming period, contributing to perfecting the market economy institution, improving the performance of businesses, the efficiency of using social resources, efficiency and competitiveness of the economy, avoiding risks of violating commitments in NGFTAs z m co l gm @ an Lu n va ac th iv si lu an va n OECD GUIDE to TT VIETNAM'S SITUATION ASSESSMENT Explanation actually account for a very small proportion compared to the number of SOEs that need to be dissolved or go bankrupt 16 F SOEs’ economic activities should face market Not fully consistent conditions regarding access to debt and implemented equity finance Especially: 1) SOEs’ relations with all financial institutions, as well as non-financial SOEs, should be based on purely commercial grounds; 2) SOEs’ economic activities should not benefit from any indirect financial support that confers an advantage over private competitors, such as preferential financing, tax arrears or preferential trade credits from other SOEs SOEs’ economic activities should not receive inputs (such as energy, water or land) at prices or conditions more favorable than those available to private competitors; 3) SOEs’ economic activities should be required to earn rates of return that are, taking into account their operational conditions, consistent with those obtained by competing private enterprises The law on credit, access to finance and production resources (land, labor, capital ) does not distinguish SOEs and other enterprises However, in practice, there are still supports for SOEs which need to be bankrupted (rescheduling, postponing tax debts, etc.) Many assets formed from public investment and intended to serve the common good of the economy become assets owned by SOEs in various forms State investment in many cases is still intertwined with SOE investment, etc 17 G When SOEs engage in public procurement, Not p ie gh tn Content of the instructions Evaluation: Laws and regulations should not unduly discriminate between SOEs and their market competitors SOEs’ legal form should allow creditors to press their claims and to initiate insolvency procedures d oa nl w ll fu an nv a lu oi m z at nh z m o l.c gm @ an Lu n va fully The law has full provisions, but weak enforcement, in some ac th 114 si lu an va n OECD GUIDE to Content of the instructions Evaluation: whether as bidder or procurer, the procedures implemented involved should be competitive, non-discriminatory and safeguarded by appropriate standards of transparency Explanation cases SOEs are appointed, assigned to perform without competition fully IV Equitable treatment of shareholders and other Not investors: Where SOEs are listed or otherwise implemented include non-state investors among their owners, the state and the enterprises should recognize the rights of all shareholders and ensure shareholders’ equitable treatment and equal access to corporate information The current regulations not discriminate between state shareholders and other shareholders in multi-ownership SOEs In practice, the interests of small shareholders are violated in many forms, but this is a common problem of joint stock companies, not only SOEs p ie gh tn TT VIETNAM'S SITUATION ASSESSMENT d oa nl w ll fu an nv a lu oi m A The state should strive toward full implementation Not fully of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance implemented when it is not the sole owner of SOEs, and of all relevant sections when it is the sole owner of SOEs Concerning shareholder protection this includes: 1) The state and SOEs should ensure that all shareholders are treated equitably; 2) SOEs should observe a high degree of transparency, including as a general rule equal and simultaneous disclosure of information, towards all shareholders; 3) SOEs should develop an active policy of communication and consultation with z at nh 18 z m o l.c gm @ Having complied on the legal aspect, but in fact, in many SOEs that are controlled by the State, enterprises have not actively exchanged information to consult with small shareholders; Some businesses have conflicts between state shareholders and other shareholders due to lack of transparency in finance and assets before and during equitization (e.g Transport Hospital ) an Lu n va ac th 115 si lu an va n OECD GUIDE to Content of the instructions Evaluation: all shareholders; 4) The participation of minority shareholders in shareholder meetings should be facilitated so they can take part in fundamental corporate decisions such as board election; 5) Transactions between the state and SOEs, and between SOEs, should take place on market consistent terms Explanation p ie gh tn TT VIETNAM'S SITUATION ASSESSMENT d oa nl w nv a lu B National corporate governance codes should be Fully adhered to by all listed and, where practical, unlisted implemented SOEs Enterprise Law, Securities Law, Decree 71/2017 (on public corporate governance) not discriminate between SOEs and other enterprises 20 C Where SOEs are required to pursue public policy Fully objectives, adequate information about these should implemented be available to non-state shareholders at all times Fully implemented in the legal aspect 21 D When SOEs engage in co-operative projects such Fully as joint ventures and public private partnerships, the implemented contracting party should ensure that contractual rights are upheld and that disputes are addressed in a timely and objective manner Fully implemented in the legal aspect ll fu an 19 oi m z at nh z m o l.c gm @ an Lu fully Existing laws stipulate responsibilities of SOEs to V Stakeholder relations and responsible business: Not stakeholders, but they are still general, unclear, lacking in The state ownership policy should fully recognize implemented detail and dispersed in many different documents SOEs’ responsibilities towards stakeholders and n va ac th 116 si lu an va n OECD GUIDE to TT VIETNAM'S SITUATION ASSESSMENT Explanation 22 A Governments, the state ownership entities and Not fully SOEs themselves should recognize and respect implemented stakeholders’ rights established by law or through mutual agreements The SOE's legal documents and regulations all affirm respect for relevant stakeholders (creditors, workers, customers), but enforcement is weak in practice, especially for exclusive SOEs, public utility SOEs rarely actively implement specific measures to ensure the participation of people and customers in corporate governance 23 B Listed or large SOEs should report on stakeholder relations, including where relevant and feasible with regard to labour, creditors and affected communities 24 C The boards of SOEs should develop, implement, Not monitor and communicate internal controls, ethics and implemented compliance programs or measures, including those which contribute to preventing fraud and corruption They should be based on country norms, in conformity with international commitments and apply to the SOE and its subsidiaries p ie gh tn Content of the instructions Evaluation: request that SOEs report on their relations with stakeholders It should make clear any expectations the state has in respect of responsible business conduct by SOEs d oa nl w ll fu an nv a lu oi m z at nh Not fully Decree 81/2015/ND-CP on disclosure of information by implemented SOEs, in requirements of reporting on the performance of public duties and social responsibilities However, the rate of submission of this report is very low z m o l.c gm @ an Lu n va ac th 117 si lu an va n OECD GUIDE to 25 Content of the instructions Evaluation: Explanation gh tn TT VIETNAM'S SITUATION ASSESSMENT p ie D SOEs should observe high standards of responsible Not fully The law has not mandated the application of responsible business conduct Expectations established by the implemented business standards (eg ISO 26000 ) government in this regard should be publicly disclosed and mechanisms for their implementation be clearly established d oa nl w E SOEs should not be used as vehicles for financing Not political activities SOEs themselves should not make implemented political campaign contributions There are no regulations on this an nv a lu 26 ll fu fully VI Disclosure and transparency: SOEs should Not observe high standards of transparency and be implemented subject to the same high quality accounting, disclosure, compliance and auditing standards as listed companies oi m z at nh z A SOEs should report material financial and non- Not fully financial information on the enterprise in line with implemented high quality internationally recognized standards of corporate disclosure, and including areas of significant concern for the state as an owner and the general public This includes in particular SOE activities that are carried out in the public interest m o l.c gm @ 27 The law specifically regulates SOEs' information disclosure responsibilities But law enforcement has not yet met the requirements The information has not been verified to a high standard an Lu Decree 81/2015/ND-CP stipulates that enterprises with 100% capital owned by the State must publish types of reports The content of these types of reports is similar to the content of listed businesses Listed SOEs comply with separate regulations on information disclosure of listed enterprises, public companies, etc n va ac th 118 si lu an va n OECD GUIDE to Content of the instructions Evaluation: Explanation gh tn TT VIETNAM'S SITUATION ASSESSMENT p ie However, information is often published slowly, the content is sketchy with inconsistent information, etc B SOEs’ annual financial statements should be Not fully subject to an independent external audit based on implemented high-quality standards Specific state control procedures not substitute for an independent external audit 29 C The ownership entity should develop consistent Not fully reporting on SOEs and publish annually an aggregate implemented report on SOEs Good practice calls for the use of web-based communications to facilitate access by the general public d oa nl w 28 ll fu an nv a lu Law 69 requires SOEs to audit annual financial statements Before and after the audit, the annual financial statements must be sent to the owner representative agencies, finance agencies of the same level and state management agencies in accordance with law However, the law does not require all SOEs to be independently audited for annual financial statements oi m z at nh The Government has an annual report submitted to the National Assembly, posted on the Ministry of Finance's Website However, most of the owner's representative agencies have not implemented this z @ m o l.c gm fully VII The responsibilities of the boards of SOEs: Not The boards of SOEs should have the necessary implemented authority, competencies and objectivity to carry out their functions of strategic guidance and monitoring of management They should act with integrity and be held accountable for their actions an Lu Board of Members of 100% state-owned enterprise not have the authority, capability and objectivity needed to carry out their functions, namely strategic direction and supervision of SOE executives; The accountability is unclear because the law stipulates that external agencies decide on some issues of SOEs n va ac th 119 si lu an va n OECD GUIDE to 30 Content of the instructions Evaluation: Explanation gh tn TT VIETNAM'S SITUATION ASSESSMENT p ie A The boards of SOEs should be assigned a clear Not fully mandate and ultimate responsibility for the implemented enterprise’s performance The role of SOE boards should be clearly defined in legislation, preferably according to company law The board should be fully accountable to the owners, act in the best interest of the enterprise and treat all shareholders equitably d oa nl w The Law on Enterprises and Law No.69/2014/QH13 clearly stipulate the role of the Board of Directors, but the Board of Members is not ultimate responsible for the performance of SOEs nv a lu SOE boards should effectively carry out their Not fully functions of setting strategy and supervising implemented management, based on broad mandates and objectives set by the government They should have the power to appoint and remove the CEO They should set executive remuneration levels that are in the long term interest of the enterprise 32 SOE board composition should allow the exercise of Not objective and independent judgement All board implemented members, including any public officials, should be nominated based on qualifications and have equivalent legal responsibilities 33 D Independent board members, where applicable, should be free of any material interests or ll fu an 31 oi m z at nh Board of Members also decides a number of issues in the field of business administration (investment, procurement, etc) The Board of Members of the Economic Group does not have full authority to appoint and dismiss the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Salary has not been linked to long-term goals of SOEs z @ m o l.c gm Board of Members does not have an independent member, it is still linked to the regime of state officials and is subject to maximum salary control an Lu n va ac th 120 si lu an va n OECD GUIDE to Content of the instructions Evaluation: relationships with the enterprise, its management, other major shareholders and the ownership entity that could jeopardize their exercise of objective judgement Explanation p ie gh tn TT VIETNAM'S SITUATION ASSESSMENT oa nl w E Mechanisms should be implemented to avoid Not fully conflicts of interest preventing board members from implemented There have been regulations on standards and conditions for objectively carrying out their board duties and to limit members of the Board of Directors, the Board of Members, political interference in board processes on the prevention of conflicts of interest, etc but the enforcement is still weak, there are still cases where the owner representative agency appoints people with related interests To participate in Board of Members, Board of Directors of SOEs 35 F The Chair should assume responsibility for Not fully Many SOEs apply the model of Chairman of BOD not being boardroom efficiency and, when necessary in co- implemented CEO ordination with other board members, act as the liaison for communications with the state ownership entity Good practice calls for the Chair to be separate from the CEO 36 G If employee representation on the board is mandated, mechanisms should be developed to guarantee that this representation is exercised d 34 ll fu an nv a lu oi m z at nh z m o l.c gm @ an Lu Not applicable yet n va ac th 121 si lu an va n OECD GUIDE to Content of the instructions Evaluation: effectively and contributes to the enhancement of the board skills, information and independence Explanation p ie gh tn TT VIETNAM'S SITUATION ASSESSMENT SOE boards should consider setting up specialized Not committees, composed of independent and qualified implemented members, to support the full board in performing its functions, particularly in respect to audit, risk management and remuneration The establishment of specialized committees should improve boardroom efficiency and should not detract from the responsibility of the full board 38 I SOE boards should, under the Chair’s oversight, Not fully There are annual assessments but conducted formally, there carry out an annual, well-structured evaluation to implemented is no basis for verification appraise their performance and efficiency 39 J SOEs should develop efficient internal audit Not fully Internal control is not effective procedures and establish an internal audit function implemented that is monitored by and reports directly to the board and to the audit committee or the equivalent corporate organ d oa nl w 37 ll fu an nv a lu oi m z at nh z m o l.c gm @ an Lu n va ac th 122 si Annex Performance of SOEs in the period of 2011-2020 Table Some indicators of enterprises wholly owned by the State lu an n va 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 - 846 796 781 652 583 526 2235407 2569433 2869120 3105453 3043687 3053547 3015478 754487 1019578 1145564 1233723 1376236 1398183 1371561 1635677 1709171 1709134 1709780 1588326 1515821 1605050 146908 166941 181530 187699 161431 139658 167579 206155 221673 276063 278212 246038 251845 219469 48988 17023 21086 24451 6165 12504 12074 6.6 6.5 6.3 6.0 5.3 4.6 5.6 19.5 16.4 15.8 15.2 11.7 10.0 12.2 tn to Year Number of businesses Assets (VND billion) Equity (VND billion) Revenue (VND billion) Profit (VND billion) Budget contribution (VND billion) Accumulated losses (VND billion) ie gh ROA (%) p ROE (%) nl w Source: The Government’s annual reports to the National Assembly d oa Table Allocation of capital and assets of enterprises with 100% of charter capital held by the State lu Assets (VND billion) Groups, Independent Total controlling enterprise companies Equity (VND billion) Groups, Independent Total controlling enterprise companies ll u nf va an January of the year 653166 - - - 754487 - - 2392374 177059 1019578 921638 97940 2869120 2639916 229204 1145564 1042365 103199 2015 3105453 2791967 313486 gm - 2012 2235407 - 2013 2569433 2014 - 1233723 1112445 121278 2016 3043687 2821006 222681 1376236 1254899 121337 2017 3053547 2822131 231416 1398183 2018 3015478 2776384 239094 1371561 oi 1799317 m 2011 z at nh z @ m co l 1267007 131176 an Lu 1227124 144437 Source: The Government’s annual reports to the National Assembly n va ac th 123 si Table The structure of operating enterprise with production and business results 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Est 626.1 lu an n va p ie gh tn to Number of 324.7 346.8 373.2 402.3 442.5 505.1 560.4 businesses (1000 enterprises) 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% Proportion %: SOEs 1.01 0.93 0.86 0.76 0.64 0.53 0.44 0.38 Enterprises with 100% state capital 0.37 0.47 0.43 0.37 0.30 0.25 0.21 0.18 Non-state enterprises 96.22 96.48 96.40 96.50 96.66 96.70 96.67 96.77 FDI enterprises 2.59 2.77 2.59 2.74 2.75 2.70 2.77 2.89 Labor 10816 11005 11465 12049 12857 14012 14512 15260 (1000 people) 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% Proportion %: SOEs 14.7 13.9 13.6 12.0 10.7 9.2 8.3 7.6 Enterprises with 100% state 9.7 8.4 8.6 7.3 6.1 5.3 4.9 4.3 capital Non-state 61.8 61.4 59.8 59.3 60.0 61.2 60.6 59.5 enterprises FDI enterprises 23.6 24.7 26.6 28.6 29.3 29.6 31.1 32.9 Assets 14863 16101 18786 20755 23620 28093 33010 35403 (VND 1000 billion) 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% Proportion %: SOEs 33.5 32.5 32.6 31.8 31.3 29.2 29.6 28.6 Enterprises with 100% state 25.0 21.1 24.4 20.3 16.8 14.9 15.7 12.9 capital Non-state 50.5 50.6 48.6 48.8 49.8 52.6 52.5 53.0 enterprises FDI enterprises 16.0 16.9 18.8 19.4 18.9 18.2 17.9 18.4 Equity 4785.9 4967.9 5958.4 6523.3 7399.8 8479.0 9379.2 (VND 1000 billion) Proportion %: 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 SOEs 23.8 27.6 27.5 25.8 23.2 21.8 19.4 Non-state enterprises 56.3 50.9 50.2 50.8 54.2 54.5 56.5 FDI enterprises 19.9 21.4 22.3 23.4 22.6 23.7 24.1 - d oa nl w ll u nf va an lu oi m z at nh z m co l gm @ Source: GSO, Annual statistical yearbook, 2011-2018 an Lu n va ac th 124 si Table Turnover and profit of operating enterprises having business results 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Net revenue from production and 10301.9 11167.8 12201.7 13516 14949.1 17436.4 20664.3 business (VND 1,000 billion) Total (%), of which: lu 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% SOEs 26.2 26.3 24.1 21.9 18.2 16.4 15.1 Non-state enterprises 54.1 51.9 50.8 52.1 54.0 56.0 56.8 FDI enterprises Profit before tax (VND 1,000 billion) Total (%), of which: 19.7 21.8 25.0 26.0 27.8 27.6 28.1 334.4 358.8 488.3 556.7 552.8 712.0 876.7 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% SOEs 43.3 47.6 41.3 33.3 28.4 27.7 22.9 Non-state enterprises 25.2 19.0 16.1 22.0 27.2 26.4 33.3 FDI enterprises 31.5 33.5 42.6 44.7 44.4 45.9 43.8 an 100% n va tn to p ie gh Source: GSO, Annual statistical yearbook, 2011-2018 General SOEs Enterprises with 100% state capital 2.4 2.8 2.5 1.1 5.4 2.7 2.9 2.6 2.2 2.9 2.6 1.4 1.8 6.9 7.0 8.2 12.1 10.1 3.4 15.1 9.0 10.0 z at nh 9.8 10.6 4.4 6.0 17.5 18.1 5.6 1.5 6.1 6.3 6.1 1.9 2.5 6.8 6.6 Non-state FDI d oa nl w Table Financial performance (Profitability ratios) oi 11.0 11.4 z 6.9 6.4 Source: Vietnam Business White Paper 2019 m co 4.1 4.2 l 6.0 gm 3.7 @ Return on sales (ROS) m Return on equity (ROE) ll u nf va Return on assets (ROA) an lu Average of 2011-2015 period 2016 2017 Average of 2011-2015 period 2016 2017 Average of 2011-2015 period 2016 2017 an Lu n va ac th 125 si Table Labor use efficiency of businesses Labor use productivity (times) 20112016 2017 2015 15.1 14.4 14.7 Nationwide Average income (million VND/ month) 2011-2015 2016 2017 5.8 7.5 8.3 SOEs Enterprises with 100% state capital 17.8 16.2 18.0 8.9 11411 11.9 17.2 17.9 21.1 9.3 11260 11.3 Non-state enterprises 15.7 15.6 15.5 4.9 6405 7.3 FDI enterprises 12.4 11.8 12.3 6.6 8504 9.0 Source: Vietnam Business White Paper 2019 Table 27 Debt-to-equity ratio (times) lu Average of 20112015 period 2.2 3.0 2.8 an n va tn to NATIONWIDE SOEs Enterprises with 100% state capital Non-state enterprises gh ie FDI enterprises 2016 2017 2.3 3.3 2.3 2.5 4.1 3.1 2.0 2.2 2.3 1.6 1.5 1.6 2016 2017 0.67 0.38 0.47 0.71 1.02 0.67 0.34 0.42 0.73 1.06 p Source: Vietnam Business White Paper 2019 nl w Table Capital turnover ratio d oa Average of 20112015 period 0.66 0.47 0.45 0.70 0.88 ll u nf va an lu NATIONWIDE SOEs Enterprises with 100% state capital Non-state enterprises FDI enterprises oi m Source: Vietnam Business White Paper 2019 z at nh Table Percentage of enterprises making losses (%) z 39.9 FDI enterprises 46.7 49.1 15.6 15.0 48.0 15.2 15.4 49.3 48.3 42.3 47.9 an Lu Source: Vietnam Business White Paper 2019 2017 m co Non-state enterprises 2016 l gm @ NATIONWIDE SOEs Enterprises with 100% state capital Average in 20112015 period 39.9 17.9 17.2 n va ac th 126 si Table 30 Annual GDP contribution by economic sector 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 GDP at current prices (VND 2779.9 3245.4 3584.3 3937.9 4192.9 4502.7 5006.0 5542.3 1,000 billion) lu an n va Share of GDP (%) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 State economy 29.0 29.4 29.0 28.7 28.7 28.8 28.6 27.7 Non-state economy 43.9 44.6 43.5 43.3 43.2 42.6 41.7 42.1 FDI 15.7 16.0 17.4 17.9 18.1 18.6 19.6 20.3 Products taxes less subsidies on production 11.5 10.0 10.1 10.1 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 tn to Source: Annual statistical yearbook ie gh Table 11 Investment capital structure of entire society Ư2018 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 p 2017 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 d oa Total (%) nl w 2011 lu State budget 19.3 18.9 17.0 17.1 18.2 17.3 17.5 6.2 5.1 5.1 4.2 2.6 1.7 2.2 4.0 4.3 4.6 4.5 4.4 3.5 1.9 3.0 oi m z at nh 8.6 8.6 10.0 11.5 10.8 11.3 12.2 10.1 38.5 38.1 37.7 38.4 38.7 38.9 40.6 43.3 24.5 21.6 21.9 23.3 23.6 23.7 23.4 1.2 1.2 2.1 0.9 1.0 1.6 @ 21.7 1.5 m co 1.7 l gm an Lu Source: Annual statistical yearbook z Other mobilized capital ll State's development investment credit Investment capital of SOEs Investment capital of non-state enterprises Foreign direct investment 4.9 u nf Government bonds va an 20.3 n va ac th 127 si Table 42 System of Vietnam’s credit institutions Owner’s equity capital Total asset Billions dong % State-owned commercial banks Banks for Social Policies Joint stock commercial bank Joint-venture banks and foreign banks Finance and leasing companies Cooperative Bank The whole system Charter capital Mobiliza tion market share Market share in lending lu an n va 851795 582379 - - 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 44.0 % 33.1% 25.6% 48.5% 50.9% 1.8 % - 2.4% 41.3 % 41.4% 46.2% 10.0 % 20.8% 20.0% 1.6 % 4.3% 4.5% 51.5% 49.1% 0.3 % 0.5% 0.5% 1.1 % - 0.8% tn to 11214678 gh People's Credit Fund p ie Source: The 2018 Annual Report of the State Bank w v oa nl Table 53 SOE's output of some major industrial products 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 96.5 96.3 96.6 96.8 96.8 97.9 97.5 96.6 97.4 96.9 97.3 97.2 95.1 94.9 64.4 61.9 61.9 58.3 55.2 54.6 46.9 47.3 46.1 46.0 42.8 41.6 22.0 18.1 13.4 21.1 17.4 14.7 19.8 16.5 15.2 13.9 13.2 12.8 75.7 89.6 89.3 87.3 Source: Website of GSO (2018), gso.gov.vn, Unit (%) 84.3 84.3 86.4 d 2011 u nf NPK fertilizer va Chemical fertilizers an lu Clean coal 68.9 ll Crude iron and steel 17.9 Rolled steel 20.7 oi z Generated electricity z at nh 43.3 m Cement m co l gm @ an Lu n va ac th 128 si