hegel, georg - philosophy of right

Philosophy of Right G.W.F. Hegel Translated by S.W Dyde Batoche Books Kitchener 2001 Batoche Books Limited 52 Eby Street South Kitchener, Ontario N2G 3L1 Canada email: batoche@gto.net Contents Translator’s Preface. 7 Author’s Preface. 10 Introduction 21 First Part: Abstract Right. 51 First Section. Property. 55 A. The Act of Possession. 63 B. Use of the Object 67 C. Relinquishment of Property. 71 Second Section: Contract. 77 Third Section: Wrong 83 A. Unpremeditated Wrong. 85 B. Fraud. 86 C. Violence and Crime. 86 Transition from Right to Morality 95 Second Part: Morality. 96 First Section: Purpose and Responsibility 101 Second Section: Intention and Well-being. 104 Third Section: The Good and Conscience. 110 Transition from Morality to Ethical System. 130 Third Part: The Ethical System 132 First Section: The Family 138 A. Marriage. 140 B. The Family Means. 146 C. Education of the Children and Dissolution of the Family 147 Transition of the Family into the Civic Community. 153 Second Section: The Civic Community 154 4/G. W. F. Hegel A. The System of Wants. 159 B. Administration of Justice 169 C. Police and Corporation 183 Third Section: The State. 194 A. Internal Polity 198 B. International Law. 262 C. World-History 266 Notes 272 With the Name of Professor Watson, Who Gave Me My First Lessons, Not in Hegel Only, but in Philosophy, it Gives Me Pleasure to Connect this Translation. Translator’s Preface. In his preface, Hegel’s editor, Professor Eduard Gans, makes some in- teresting remarks upon the “Philosophy of Right,” and informs us as to the way in which the matter of the book had been put together. He dates his preface May 29th, 1833, thirteen years, lacking one month, later than Hegel’s date for the completion of his own preface, and eighteen months after the philosopher’s death. Hegel had, it would appear, lived to see the outbreak of unusual opposition to his political conceptions, and so Dr. Gans begins: “The wide-spread misunderstanding, which prevents the recognition of the real value of the present work, and stands in the way of its general acceptance, urges me, now that an enlarged edition of it has been prepared, to touch upon some things, which I would rather have left simply to increasing philosophic insight.” He goes on to give three reasons for placing great value upon this work of Hegel’s. 1. He thinks that the highest praise is due to the author for the way in which he does justice to every side of the subject, even investigating questions which have only a slight bearing upon the matter in hand, and thus erecting a marvellously complete structure. This fact is more strik- ing, thinks Dr. Gans, than the foundation of the work, which had been already in a measure laid by Kant and Rousseau. 2. A second achievement of the “Philosophy of Right” is the aboli- tion of the distinction, so prominent in the seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, between law and politics. Even in our own time, remarks the editor, many think of law as the skeleton, as it were, of the different forms of the state, as an abstract thing devoid of life and movement. Politics, again, they conceive to be more mobile and a function of a living thing. Law is thus said to stand to politics as anatomy to physiol- 8/G. W. F. Hegel ogy. This divergence, which was unknown to Plato and Aristotle, had its origin in the separatist character of the Middle Ages, and was brought to completion in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Hegel, gath- ering up the experience of centuries, returns to the form of the ancient state, and counts law and politics as organic phases of one single whole. 3. The “Philosophy of Right” suggests a two-fold place for the prin- ciple of natural right. In its scientific treatment this principle precedes the philosophy of right, and it also comes at the close. That part of the “Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences,” which precedes the dis- cussion there given of right, morality, and the ethical system, is desig- nated the subjective mind or spirit, and from that ground natural right proceeds. Skipping over the region occupied by the “Philosophy of Right,” dealing with the objective spirit, natural right reappears in world- history. Dr. Grans means that the right of the world-spirit, transcending, as it does, the individual and the nation, is a return at a higher level to natural right. Nations are, as he says, so many streams discharging them- selves into the world-ocean of history. The three points of Professor Grans may be summarized thus: (1) Hegel is thorough and systematic; (2) He has so clear and penetrating a conception of his main idea that he is able to unify sciences, which had seemed to be mutually exclusive; (3.) A right of nature may be viewed as a phase of any stage of an expanding idea, and can be understood only by reference to the exact stage which the exposition has reached. Hence a right of nature, like sub-iectivity or objectivity, may mean quite different things at different points in the unfolding of the system. The single word here added is meant to accent what is implied in the third of these remarks. The “Philosophy of Right” is really only one part of a system. In the third part of his “Encyclopaedia,” when he reaches the subject of Right, Hegel says (note to §487) that he may deal briefly with this topic, since he has already gone exhaustively into it in his “Philosophy of Right.” Hence as this work treats of an essential stage in the evolution of spirit, whose whole nature is unfolded scene by scene in the “Encyclopaedia,” it is not accurate to speak of Hegel’s ethical principles as based upon his logic. The more concrete categories of the “Philosophy of Right” are related each to the next in the same way as are the more abstract categories treated of in the logic. But the relation of the ethics to the logic is not that of superstructure to founda- tion or of application to principle, but of the more concrete to the less concrete stage of evolution. One single life runs through the whole or- The Philosophy of Right/9 ganism of the work. Hence, Dr. Grans is not wrong in stating that this work is an essential part of Hegel’s philosophy, and adding that with the entire system it must stand or fall. Eather, correcting the dramatic tone of the remark, he says in effect that standing and falling are not the only possibilities in the case of a great philosophy. Nor, again, can the differ- ent works of a genuine philosopher be separated into those that are gold and those that are alloy. His work as a whole becomes a common pos- session, and in that way makes ready, as Dr. Grans say, for a higher thought. The unqualified rejection of any part of a philosopher’s work is a challenge to his claim to rank as a great thinker. But the only chal- lenge which he could himself accept as genuine, is the one which is prepared to call in question the basis of his entire system. Perhaps in the “Philosophy of Right” the average philosophical worker comes more quickly to understand something of Hegel than in his other writings. At least Hegel in this book is more likely to collide directly with the reader’s prepossessions, and therefore more speedily stimulates him to form his own view. No genuine philosopher will hesi- tate to show what form his principles assume in relation to tangible human interests. Hegel exhibits philosophic breadth by dressing up his ideas for the thoroughfare, w-here the every-day thinker finds it pos- sible to hob and nob with the master. Yet the student must be again cautioned not to fancy that, because he “feels sure” that Hegel’s concep- tion of the family, of the monarch, or of war is defective, he has left his author behind. Such a feeling is at best only a first step, and the student must go on to know how these practical ideas of Hegel are necessitated by his general conception of the process of spirit. And the sure feeling can survive only if it is transformed into a consistent criticism of this fundamental process. The stronghold of Hegel may not be impregnable, but it will not fall on a mere summons to surrender. The object of the translator is to let Hegel speak at large for himself. What liberties have been taken with the Hegelian vocabulary are illus- trated by the index of words to be found at the close of this volume. It has been considered quite within the province of a translator to amelio- rate Hegel’s rigid phraseology. Even as it is the English would read more smoothly, had the words “the individual,” “the subject,” etc., been more frequently used instead of “particularity” and “subjectivity,” but the substitution casts a different shade over Hegel’s thought. Apart from the words, the reader of German will miss also Hegel’s brackets and italics. 10/G. W. F. Hegel As Dr. Gans has pointed out, the present work is in form made up of three elements, the paragraphs proper, the notes and the additions. The paragraphs comprised the entire book as it was originally issued. Then Hegel added what he in all his references to them calls Notes, although they are not expressly so designated in the German text. For the sake of simplicity this term has been used throughout the book. After these notes by Hegel are frequently found Additions made by students of Hegel from his oral lectures and comments. It is but bare justice to the editors to say that these additions usually cast a welcome light upon the text. Yet as they are mere additions, not even supervised by Hegel, it is no matter of surprise that the student, in beginning a new paragraph must, in order to get the direct connection, revert to the closing sentences not of the addition or mote but of the preceding paragraph. It ought to be some comfort to the earnest reader to have in his hand all that Hegel on this subject thought to be worth saying. Mistakes the translator has no doubt made, and it would be for him fortunate if workers in this depart- ment were sufficiently interested in this translation to point them out. S. W. Dyde. Queen’s University, Kingston, Canada, March 23rd, 1896. Author’s Preface. The immediate occasion for publishing these outlines is the need of plac- ing in the hands of my hearers a guide to my professional lectures upon the Philosophy of Right. Hitherto I have used as lectures that portion of the “Encyclopaedia of the Philosophic Sciences” (Heidelberg, 1817,) which deals with this subject. The present work covers the same ground in a more detailed and systematic way. But now that these outlines are to be printed and given to the gen- eral public, there is an opportunity of explaining points which in lectur- ing would be commented on orally. Thus the notes are enlarged in order to include cognate or conflicting ideas, further consequences of the theory advocated, and the like. These expanded notes will, it is hoped, throw light upon the more abstract substance of the text, and present a more complete view of some of the ideas current in our own time. Moreover, there is also subjoined, as far as was compatible with the purpose of a compendium, a number of notes, ranging over a still greater latitude. A compendium proper, like a science, has its subject-matter accurately laid out. With the exception, possibly, of one or two slight additions, its [...]... Plato, are the principles of the Sophists, according to which the basis of right is subjective aims and opinions, subjective feeling and private conviction The result of such principles is quite as much the destruction of the ethical system, of the upright conscience, of love and right, in private persons, as of public order and the institutions of the state The significance of these facts for the authorities... the knowledge of right Hence we have the positive science of right (b) On the side of content this right receives a positive element (a) through the particular character of a nation, the stage of its historical development, and the interconnection of all the relations which are necessitated by nature: (b) through the necessity that a system of legalized right must contain the application of the universal... constitutes its so- called proof Hence the origin of the conception of right falls outside of the science of right The deduction of the conception is presupposed in this treatise, and is to be considered as already given Addition. Philosophy forms a circle It has, since it must somehow make a beginning, a primary, directly given matter, which is not proved and is not a result But this starting-point is simply... unreasonable and void of right This is the cape in Roman law with many aspects of private right, which were the logical results of its interpretation of paternal power and of marriage Further, if the aspects of right are really right and reasonable, it is one thing to point out what with regard to them can truly take place through the conception, and quite another thing, to portray the manner of their appearance... accustomed to hear of Roman or German conceptions of right, and of conceptions of right as they are laid down in this or that statute-book, when indeed nothing about conceptions can be found in them, but only general phases of right, propositions derived from the understanding, general maxims, and laws.—By neglect of the distinction, just alluded to, the true standpoint is obscured and the question of a valid... maintains that ideas, as, e.g., the idea of right in all its aspects, are to be directly apprehended as mere facts of consciousness, and that natural feeling, or that heightened form of it which is known as the inspiration of one’s own breast, is the source of right This method may be the most convenient of all, but it is also the most unphilosophic Other fea-tures of this view, referring not merely to... causes, which is the occupation of pragmatic history, is frequently called exposition, or preferably conception, under the opinion that in such an indication of the historic elements is found all that is essential to a conception of law and institutions of right In point of fact that which is truly essential, the conception of the matter has not been so The Philosophy of Right/ 25 much as mentioned.—So... supervision of passports to such a point as to demand of all suspects that not only a description of them but also their The Philosophy of Right/ 19 photograph, should be inserted in the pass Philosophy now exhibits no trace of such details These superfine concerns it may neglect all the more safely, since it shows itself of the most liberal spirit in its attitude towards the endless mass of objects... Kant.” This form of logical reasoning, 28/G W F Hegel extolled by Leibnitz, is certainly an essential feature of the science of right, as it is of mathematics and every other intelligible science; but the logical procedure of the mere understanding, spoken of by Mr Hugo, has nothing to do with the satisfaction of the claims of reason and with philosophic science Moreover, the very lack of logical procedure,... Philosophy of Right Introduction 1 The philosophic science of right has as its object the idea of right, i.e., the conception of right and the realization of the conception Note. Philosophy has to do with ideas or realized thoughts, and hence not with what we have been accustomed to call mere conceptions It has indeed to exhibit the onesidedness and untruth of these mere conceptions, and to show that, while . the need of plac- ing in the hands of my hearers a guide to my professional lectures upon the Philosophy of Right. Hitherto I have used as lectures that portion of the “Encyclopaedia of the Philosophic. suggests a two-fold place for the prin- ciple of natural right. In its scientific treatment this principle precedes the philosophy of right, and it also comes at the close. That part of the “Encyclopaedia. natural right proceeds. Skipping over the region occupied by the Philosophy of Right, ” dealing with the objective spirit, natural right reappears in world- history. Dr. Grans means that the right of