hegel, georg - the philosophy of history

The Philosophy of History Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel With Prefaces by Charles Hegel and the Translator, J. Sibree, M.A. “The History of the World is not intelligible apart from a Government of the World.” — W. V. Humboldt  Kitchener 2001 Batoche Books 52 Eby Street South Kitchener, Ontario N2G 3L1 Canada email: batoche@gto.net Table of Contents Translator’s Introduction 5 Charles Hegel’s Preface 11 Introduction. 14 Geographical Basis of History. 96 Classification of Historic Data 121 Part I: The Oriental World 128 Section I: China 132 Section II: India 156 Section II. (Continued). India Buddhism. 185 Section II: Persia. 191 Chapter I. The Zend People 194 Chapter II. The Assyrians, Babylonians, Medes, and Persians. 200 Chapter III. The Persian Empire and its Constituent Parts. 206 Persia 207 Syria and the Semitic Western Asia 209 Judaea 213 Egypt 217 Transition to the Greek World 240 Part II: The Greek World 243 Section I: The Elements of the Greek Spirit. 245 Section II: Phases of Individuality Æsthetically Conditioned 258 Chapter I. The Subjective Work of Art 258 Chapter II. The Objective Work of Art 261 Chapter III. The Political Work of Art 268 The Wars with the Persians 274 Athens 277 Sparta 280 The Peloponnesian War 284 The Macedonian Empire 290 Section III: The Fall of the Greek Spirit. 294 Part III: The Roman World 296 Section I: Rome to the Time of the Second Punic War. 301 Chapter I. — The Elements of the Roman Spirit 301 Chapter II. — The History of Rome to the Second Punic War 314 Section II: Rome from the Second Punic War to the Emperors 324 Section III: 332 Chapter I. Rome Under the Emperors. 332 Chapter II. Christianity. 337 Chapter III. The Byzantine Empire. 353 Part IV: The German World. 358 Section I: The Elements of the Christian German World. 364 Chapter I. The Barbarian Migrations. 364 Chapter II Mohametanism. 372 Chapter III. The Empire of Charlemagne. 377 Section II: The Middle Ages 383 Chapter I. The Feudality and the Hierarchy. 383 Chapter II. The Crusades. 407 Chapter III. The Transition from Feudalism to Monarchy. 417 Art and Science as Putting a Period to the Middle Ages 427 Section III: The Modern Time. 430 Chapter I. The Reformation 431 Chapter II. Influence of the Reformation on Political Development. 446 Chapter III. The Éclaircissement and Revolution 458 Notes 477 Translator’s Introduction Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of History are recognized in Germany as a popular introduction to his system; their form is less rigid than the generality of metaphysical treatises, and the illustrations, which occupy a large proportion of the work, are drawn from a field of observation more familiar perhaps, than any other, to those who have not devoted much time to metaphysical studies. One great value of the work is that it presents the leading facts of history from an altogether novel point of view. And when it is considered that the writings of Hegel have exercised a marked influence on the political movements of Germany, it will be admitted that his theory of the universe, especially that part which bears directly upon politics, deserves attention even from those who are the most exclusive advocates of the “practical.” A writer who has established his claim to be regarded as an authority, by the life which he has infused into metaphysical abstractions, has pronounced the work before us, “one of the pleasantest books on the subject he ever read.” 1 And compared with that of most German writers, even the style may claim to be called vigorous and pointed. If therefore in its English dress the “Philosophy of History“ should be found deficient in this respect, the fault must not be attributed to the original. It has been the aim of the translator to present his author to the public in a really English form, even at the cost of a circumlocution which must sometimes do injustice to the merits of the original. A few words however have necessarily been used in a rather unusual sense; and one of them is of very frequent occurrence. The German “Geist,” in Hegel’s nomenclature, includes both intelligence and will, the latter even more expressly than the former. It embraces in fact man’s entire mental and moral being, and a little reflection will make it obvious that no term in our metaphysical vocabulary could have been well substituted for the more theological one, “Spirit,” as a fair equivalent. It is indeed only the impersonal and abstract use of the term that is open to objection; an objection which can be met by an appeal to the best classical usage; viz., the rendering of the Hebrew and Greek in the authorized version of the Scriptures. One indisputable instance may suffice in G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, 6 confirmation: “Their horses [i.e., of the Egyptians] are flesh and not spirit.” (Isaiah xxxi. 3.) It is pertinent to remark here, that the comparative disuse of this term in English metaphysical literature, is one result of that alienation of theology from philosophy with which continental writers of the most opposite schools agree in taxing the speculative genius of Britain — an alienation which mainly accounts for the gulf separating English from German speculation, and which will, it is feared, on other accounts also be the occasion of communicating a somewhat uninviting aspect to the following pages. The distinction which the Germans make between “Sittlichkeit” and “Moralität,” has presented another difficulty. The former denotes conventional morality, the latter that of the heart or conscience. Where no ambiguity was likely to arise, both terms have been translated “morality.” In other cases a stricter rendering has been given, modified by the requirements of the context. The word “moment” is, as readers of German philosophy are aware, a veritable crux to the translator. In Mr. J. R. Morell’s very valuable edition of Johnson’s Translation of Tennemann’s “Manual of the History of Philosophy,” the following explanation is given: “This term was borrowed from mechanics by Hegel (see his “Wissenschaft der Logik,” Vol. 3, P. 104, Ed. 1841). He employs it to denote the contending forces which are mutually dependent, and whose contradiction forms an equation. Hence his formula, Esse = Nothing. Here Esse and Nothing are momentums, giving birth to Werden, i.e., Existence. Thus the momentum contributes to the same oneness of operation in contradictory forces that we see in mechanics, amidst contrast and diversity, in weight and distance, in the case of the balance.” But in several parts of the work before us this definition is not strictly adhered to, and the translator believes he has done justice to the original in rendering the word by “successive” or “organic phase.” In the chapter on the Crusades another term occurs which could not be simply rendered into English. The definite, positive, and present embodiment of essential being is there spoken of as “ein Dieses,” “das Dieses,” etc., literally “a This,” “the This,” for which repulsive combination a periphrasis has been substituted, which, it is G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, 7 believed, is not only accurate but expository. Paraphrastic additions, however, have been, in fairness to the reader, enclosed in brackets [ ]; and the philosophical appropriation of ordinary terms is generally indicated by capitals, e.g., “Spirit,” “Freedom,” “State,” “Nature,” etc. The limits of a brief preface preclude an attempt to explain the Hegelian method in its wider applications; and such an undertaking is rendered altogether unnecessary by the facilities which are afforded by works so very accessible as the translation of Tennemann above mentioned, Chalybseus’s “Historical Development of Speculative Philosophy, from Kant to Hegel,” Blakey’s “History of the Philosophy of Mind,” Mr. Lewes’s “Biographical History of Philosophy,” besides treatises devoted more particularly to the Hegelian philosophy. Among these latter may be fairly mentioned the work of a French professor, M. Vera, “Introduction à la Philosophie de Hegel,” a lucid and earnest exposition of the system at large; and the very able summary of Hegel’s “Philosophy of Right,” by T. C. Sandars, late fellow of Oriel College, which forms one of the series of “Oxford Essays” for 1855, and which bears directly on the subject of the present volume. It may, nevertheless, be of some service to the reader to indicate the point of view from which this “Philosophy of History” is composed, and to explain the leading idea. The aim and scope of that civilizing process which all hopeful thinkers recognize in history, is the attainment of Rational Freedom. But the very term freedom supposes a previous bondage; and the question naturally arises: “Bondage to what?” — A superficial inquirer may be satisfied with an answer referring it to the physical power of the ruling body. Such a response was deemed satisfactory by a large number of political speculators in the last century, and even at the beginning of the present; and it is one of the great merits of an influential thinker of our days to have expelled this idolum fori, which had also become an idolum theatri, from its undue position; and to have revived the simple truth that all stable organizations of men, all religious and political communities, are based upon principles which are far beyond the control of the One or the Many. And in G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, 8 these principles or some phase of them every man in every clime and age is born, lives and moves. The only question is: Whence are those principles derived? Whence spring those primary beliefs or superstitions, religious and political, that hold society together? They are no inventions of “priestcraft” or “kingcraft,” for to them priestcraft and kingcraft owe their power. They are no results of a Contrat Social, for with them society originates. Nor are they the mere suggestions of man’s weakness, prompting him to propitiate the powers of nature, in furtherance of his finite, earthborn desires. Some of the phenomena of the religious systems that have prevailed in the world might seem thus explicable; but the Nihilism of more than one Oriental creed, the suicidal strivings of the Hindoo devotee to become absorbed in a divinity recognized as a pure negation, cannot be reduced to so gross a formula; while the political superstition that ascribes a divine right to the feebleness of a woman or an infant is altogether untouched by it. Nothing is left therefore but to recognize them as “fancies,” “delusions,” “dreams,” the results of man’s vain imagination — to class them with the other absurdities with which the abortive past of humanity is by some thought to be only too replete; or, on the other hand, to regard them as the rudimentary teachings of that essential intelligence in which man’s intellectual and moral life originates. With Hegel they are the objective manifestation of infinite reason — the first promptings of Him who having “made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on the face of the earth, hath determined the times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation, if haply they might feel after and find him” — . And it is these , these determined and organic epochs in the history of the world that Hegel proposes to distinguish and develop in the following treatise. Whatever view may be entertained as to the origin or importance of those elementary principles, and by whatever general name they may be called — Spontaneous, Primary, or Objective Intelligence — it seems demonstrable that it is in some sense or other to its own belief, its own reason or essential being, that imperfect humanity is in bondage; while the perfection of social existence is commonly regarded as a deliverance from that G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, 9 bondage. In the Hegelian system, this paradoxical condition is regarded as one phase of that antithesis which is presented in all spheres of existence, between the subjective and the objective, but which it is the result of the natural and intellectual processes that constitute the life of the universe, to annul by merging into one absolute existence. And however startling this theory may be as applied to other departments of nature and intelligence, it appears to be no unreasonable formula for the course of civilization, and which is substantially as follows: In less cultivated nations, political and moral restrictions are looked upon as objectively posited; the constitution of society, like the world of natural objects, is regarded as something into which a man is inevitably born; and the individual feels himself bound to comply with requirements of whose justice or propriety he is not allowed to judge, though they often severely test his endurance, and even demand the sacrifice of his life. In a state of high civilization, on the contrary, though an equal self-sacrifice be called for, it is in respect of laws and institutions which are felt to be just and desirable. This change of relation may, without any very extraordinary use of terms, or extravagance of speculative conceit, be designated the harmonization or reconciliation of objective and subjective intelligence. The successive phases which humanity has assumed in passing from that primitive state of bondage to this condition of rational freedom form the chief subject of the following lectures. The mental and moral condition of individuals and their social and religious conditions (the subjective and objective manifestations of reason) exhibit a strict correspondence with each other in every grade of progress. “They that make them are like unto them,” is as true of religious and political ideas as of religious and political idols. Where man sets no value on that part of his mental and moral life which makes him superior to the brutes, brute life will be an object of worship and bestial sensuality will be the genius of the ritual. Where mere inaction is the finis bonorum, absorption in nothingness will be the aim of the devotee. Where, on the contrary, active and vigorous virtue is recognized as constituting the real value of man — where subjective spirit has learned to assert its own freedom, both G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, 10 against irrational and unjust requirements from without, and caprice, passion, and sensuality, from within, it will demand a living, acting, just, and holy, embodiment of Deity as the only possible object of its adoration. In the same degree, political principles also will be affected. Where mere nature predominates, no legal relations will be acknowledged but those based on natural distinction; rights will be inexorably associated with “caste.” Where, on the other hand, spirit has attained its freedom, it will require a code of laws and political constitution, in which the rational subordination of nature to reason that prevails in its own being, and the strength it feels to resist sensual seductions shall be distinctly mirrored. Between the lowest and highest grades of intelligence and will, there are several intervening stages, around which a complex of derivative ideas, and of institutions, arts, and sciences, in harmony with them, are aggregated. Each of these aggregates has acquired a name in history as a distinct nationality. Where the distinctive principle is losing its vigor, as the result of the expansive force of mind of which it was only the temporary embodiment, the national life declines, and we have the transition to a higher grade, in which a comparatively abstract and limited phase of subjective intelligence and will — to which corresponds an equally imperfect phase of objective reason — is exchanged for one more concrete, and vigorous — one which develops human capabilities more freely and fully, and in which right is more adequately comprehended. The goal of this contention is, as already indicated, the self- realization, the complete development of spirit, whose proper nature is freedom — freedom in both senses of the term, i.e. liberation from outward control — inasmuch as the law to which it submits has its own explicit sanction — and emancipation from the inward slavery of lust and passion. The above remarks are not designed to afford anything like a complete or systematic analysis of Hegel’s “Philosophy of History,” but simply to indicate its leading conception, and if possible to contribute something towards removing a prejudice against it on the score of its resolving facts into mystical paradoxes, or attempting to construe them à priori. In applying [...]... will of that conductor, is and has been the director of the events of the World’s History To become acquainted with Spirit in this its office of guidance, is the object of our present undertaking This brings us to III The third kind of history — the Philosophical No explanation was needed of the two previous classes; their nature G.W.F Hegel, The Philosophy of History, 22 was self-evident It is otherwise... propose to correct the innumerable special misrepresentations, trite or novel, that are current respecting the aims, the interests, and the modes of treating history, and its relation to Philosophy The only Thought which Philosophy brings with it to the contemplation of History, is the simple conception of Reason; that Reason is the Sovereign of the World; that the history of the world, therefore, presents... of view These certainly have their value; but for the most part they offer only material for history We Germans are content with such The French, on the other hand, display great genius in reanimating bygone times, and in bringing the past to bear upon the present condition of things 3 The third form of Reflective History is the Critical This deserves mention as pre-eminently the mode of treating history. .. contravene the best established facts of history 4 The last species of Reflective History announces its fragmentary character on the very face of it It adopts an abstract position; yet, since it takes general points of view (e.g., as the History of Art, of Law, of Religion), it forms a transition to the Philosophical History of the World In our time this form of the history of ideas has been more developed... J Sibree Charles Hegel’s Preface The changed form in which Hegel’s lectures on the Philosophy of History are re-issued, suggests the necessity of some explanation respecting the relation of this second edition both to the original materials from which the work was compiled, and to their first publication The lamented Professor Gans, the editor of the Philosophy of History, ” displayed a talented ingenuity... that they were not foreign to the character of the speaker In the orations in question, these men proclaim the maxims adopted by their countrymen, and which formed their own character; they record their views of their political relations, and of their moral and spiritual nature; and the principles of their designs and conduct What the historian puts into their mouths is no supposititious system of ideas,... whose demonstration awaits the sequel of the Science of History itself We have therefore to mention here: (1) The abstract characteristics of the nature of Spirit (2) What means Spirit uses in order to realize its Idea G.W.F Hegel, The Philosophy of History, 31 (3) Lastly, we must consider the shape which the perfect embodiment of Spirit assumes — the State, (1) The nature of Spirit may be understood... To him who looks upon the G.W.F Hegel, The Philosophy of History, 25 world rationally, the world in its turn presents a rational aspect The relation is mutual But the various exercises of reflection — the different points of view — the modes of deciding the simple question of the relative importance of events (the first category that occupies the attention of the historian), do not belong to this place... and G.W.F Hegel, The Philosophy of History, 12 showing how this constitutes the real kernel of history, and the impelling soul of world-historical peoples In proceeding to treat of China and India, he wished, as he said himself, only to show by example how philosophy ought to comprehend the character of a nation; and this could be done more easily in the case of the stationary nations of the East,... generally The History of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness of Freedom; a progress whose development according to the necessity of its nature, it is our business to investigate The general statement given above, of the various grades in the consciousness of Freedom — and which we applied in the first instance to the fact that the Eastern nations knew only that one is free; the . works did me the honor to intrust me with the re-editing of my father’s Philosophy of History, ” it also named as advocates of the claims of the first edition, and as representatives of Professor Gans,. beyond the control of the One or the Many. And in G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, 8 these principles or some phase of them every man in every clime and age is born, lives and moves. The. a share in editing the works of my beloved father. Charles Hegel. Philosophy of History. Introduction. The subject of this course of Lectures is the Philosophical History of the World. And by