After Saddam- Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq pot

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RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND monographs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. ARROYO CENTER After Saddam Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker, Keith Crane, Richard R. Brennan, Jr., Heather S. Gregg, Thomas Sullivan, Andrew Rathmell Prepared for the United States Army Approved for public release; distribution unlimited The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R ® is a registered trademark. © Copyright 2008 RAND Corporation All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from RAND. Published 2008 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: order@rand.org The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Army under Contract No. DASW01-01-C-0003. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data After Saddam : prewar planning and the occupation of Iraq / Nora Bensahel [et al.]. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-0-8330-4458-7 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Iraq War, 2003– 2. Military planning—United States. 3. Postwar reconstruction—Iraq. 4. Coalition Provisional Authority. 5. Insurgency—Iraq. 6. National security—Iraq. I. Bensahel, Nora, 1971– DS79.76A345 2008 956.7044'3—dc22 2008025846 iii Preface Soon after Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) began in March 2003, RAND Ar- royo Center began a research project at the request of the U.S. Army. This project set out to prepare an authoritative account of the planning and execution of combat and stability operations in Iraq and to identify key issues that could affect Army plans and goals, operational concepts, doctrine, and other Title 10 responsibilities. The resulting body of work will interest those involved in organizing, training, and equipping military forces to plan for, deploy to, participate in, and support joint and coalition operations. Although focused primarily on Army forces and activities, the analysis also describes other aspects of joint and combined operations. RAND analysts collected the information in these volumes from many sources, including unit after-action reports, compilations of lessons learned, official databases, media reports, other contemporary records, and interviews with key participants in OIF. The results of this project are documented in multiple volumes, some not avail- able to the general public, as described below: • Decisive War, Elusive Peace: Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, MG-641-A, Richard E. Darilek, Walter L. Perry, Laurinda L. Rohn, and Jerry M. Sollinger, editors. This volume is an overview of the research findings. • After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq, MG-642-A, Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker, Keith Crane, Richard R. Brennan, Jr., Heather S. Gregg, Thomas Sullivan, and Andrew Rathmell. This volume is a treatment of the prewar planning for the postwar situation and of postwar military and re- construction activities. • Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: Executive Summary, MG-643-A, Walter L. Perry, Laurinda L. Rohn, and Jerry M. Sollinger. This volume, not available to the general public, presents an executive summary of the research findings. • Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: Volume I, The Genesis, MG-643/1-A, Jefferson P. Marquis, Walter L. Perry, David E. Mosher, Stephen T. Hosmer, Andrea Mejia, Richard E. Darilek, Jerry M. Sollinger, Vipin Narang, Charles W. Yost, John Halliday, and John R. Bondanella. This volume, not available to the gen- iv After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq eral public, describes the political and military activities leading up to the opera- tion. • Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: Volume II, Defeating Saddam, MG-643/2-A, Bruce R. Pirnie, John Gordon IV, Richard R. Brennan, Jr., Forrest E. Morgan, Alexander C. Hou, and Charles W. Yost. This volume, not available to the gen- eral public, covers major combat operations in Iraq. • Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: Volume III, Managing the War, MG-643/3-A, Walter L. Perry, Edward O’Connell, Miranda Priebe, Forrest E. Morgan, Lowell H. Schwartz, and Alexander C. Hou. This volume, not available to the general public, describes the command and control (C2) of the forces and sup- porting operations. • Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: Volume IV, Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq, MG-643/4-A, Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker, Keith Crane, Richard R. Brennan, Jr., Heather S. Gregg, Thomas Sullivan, and Andrew Rathmell. This volume, not available to the general public, describes the prewar planning for the postwar situation and postwar military and reconstruction activities. • Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: Volume V, Sustaining the Force, MG-643/5-A, Eric Peltz, David Kassing, Jerry M. Sollinger, Marc Robbins, Kenneth J. Girar- dini, Peter Schirmer, Robert Howe, and Brian Nichiporuk. This volume, not available to the general public, covers the mobilization and sustainment of the forces. This report provides an unclassified treatment of the post–major combat mili- tary and stabilization activities. It begins by examining prewar planning for postwar Iraq, in order to establish what U.S. policymakers expected the postwar situation to look like and what their plans were for stabilization. The report then examines the role of U.S. military forces after major combat officially ended on May 1, 2003. Fi- nally, the report examines civilian efforts at reconstruction, focusing on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and its efforts to rebuild structures of governance, security forces, economic policy, and essential services prior to June 28, 2004, the day that CPA dissolved and transferred authority to the Iraqi Interim Gov- ernment. The research for this volume was completed in September 2004 and the final draft was submitted in October 2004. The purpose of this analysis is to find out where problems occurred and to sug- gest possibilities to improve planning and operations in the future. The results of such analysis can seem therefore to be overly focused on the negative. This should not be taken to mean that no good was done. In fact, dedicated U.S. and coalition personnel, both military and civilian, engaged in many positive and constructive ac- tivities, individually and collectively. That this analysis does not highlight all those activities should not in any way detract from their value. Our focus, however, re- mains on finding ways to improve. Preface v This research was co-sponsored by the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, U.S. Army, and the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, U.S. Army. It was conducted in RAND Arroyo Center’s Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program. RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded research and development center spon- sored by the United States Army. The Project Unique Identification Code (PUIC) for the project that produced this document is DAMOAX003. For more information on RAND Arroyo Center, contact the Director of Op- erations (telephone 310-393-0411, extension 6419; FAX 310-451-6952; email Marcy_Agmon@rand.org), or visit Arroyo’s web site at http://www.rand.org/ard/. vii Contents Preface iii Figures xiii Tables xv Summary xvii Acknowledgments xxxi List of Acronyms and Abbreviations xxxiii CHAPTER ONE Introduction 1 CHAPTER TWO Military Planning Efforts 5 CENTCOM Operational Planning 6 Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) Phase IV Planning 10 Planning at V Corps and Subordinate Commands 14 Observations 14 CHAPTER THREE Civilian Planning Efforts 21 Interagency Planning: The ESG and the IPMC 21 The Office of the Secretary of Defense 24 The Office of Special Plans 24 Policy Guidance 26 OSD’s Role in Policymaking 28 State Department Planning 29 The State Department and Interagency Planning 30 The Future of Iraq Project 31 USAID Planning 33 Reconstruction Planning and Contracting 33 Coordination with Other Agencies 34 viii After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq The National Security Council 35 De-Ba’athification 36 Restructuring Iraqi Military and Security Institutions 36 Other Analyses of Postwar Requirements 37 CHAPTER FOUR Task Force IV 41 Establishing Task Force IV 41 Task Force IV Planning 42 Operational Challenges 46 Staffing Issues 46 Relations with CENTCOM and CFLCC 47 Relations with ORHA 50 The Dissolution of Task Force IV 51 CHAPTER FIVE The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance 53 Organization and Staffing 53 ORHA Planning 58 The February Rock Drill 59 ORHA’s Role in Reconstruction 64 Deploying to Kuwait 65 Arriving in Baghdad 68 The Transition to CPA 70 CHAPTER SIX Humanitarian Planning 73 Interagency Humanitarian Planning 73 IO and NGO Frustrations 77 Actual Humanitarian Requirements 78 Assessing Humanitarian Planning 79 CHAPTER SEVEN Combat Operations During Phase IV 81 Phase IVa: Stability Operations 81 Anticipated Security Challenges 81 Security Challenges During the Transition to Phase IVa 82 Initial Response to Civil Unrest 84 Stabilization Efforts, March to June 2003 86 Phase IVb: Recovery Operations 93 Organization for Phase IVb 93 The Growing Insurgency 94 [...]... majority of the Iraqi population identified security and safety as the most urgent issue facing Iraq throughout the occupation period.7 The failure to stabilize and secure Iraq has therefore had the inadvertent effect of strengthening the insurgency, as Iraqis witness many of the negative effects of the U.S military presence without seeing positive progress on the issues that matter to them most The insurgency... of consistent goals and objectives xx After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq Above all, the NSC seems not to have mediated persistent disagreement between the Defense Department and the State Department that existed throughout the planning process Secretary of State Colin Powell influenced a few key diplomatic decisions—notably the decision to take the case for war with Iraq to the. .. issues, including the question of postwar governance, the future of the Iraqi army, and the de-Ba’athification process Because the DoD exercised a great deal of control over planning for OIF, and ultimately took full control of the operation in January 2003, OSP exerted substantial influence over U.S planning for Iraq Two particular sets of assumptions guided U.S prewar planning for the postwar period... would not become the nucleus of a postwar military headquarters, and it was officially disbanded by the end of the month The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) On January 20, 2003, the National Security Council issued NSPD-24, which gave the Department of Defense primary responsibility for postwar Iraq and tasked DoD to form a new office to take charge of planning Retired Army... Governance and Political Reconstruction 159 Prewar Planning for Postwar Governance 159 Postwar Governance: The Iraqi Governing Council 160 The November 15 Agreement and the Transfer of Authority 171 The Transitional Administrative Law 179 Provincial and City Governance 182 x After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq Lessons Learned 187 Security and. .. xxiii and work for CPA Garner left Iraq on June 1, almost two weeks after ORHA had been superseded by CPA The Coalition Provisional Authority In May 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority took over from ORHA, and L Paul Bremer became the administrator of Iraq From then until Bremer handed power over to the Iraqis on June 28, 2004, the United States and the United Kingdom were the legal occupiers of Iraq. .. prepared elsewhere It also developed the concept of Ministerial Advisory Teams to ensure that Iraqi ministries continued to function xxii After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq between the fall of Saddam Hussein and the establishment of a new permanent government These concepts were discussed at a meeting held at the National Defense University on February 21 and 22, 2003, which included... desired outcome of the war—not the outcome of major conflict, but the creation of the desired political circumstances that signal the real end of the war They must do so both because their forces, and especially forces on the ground, will be intimately involved in creating those circumstances, and because the way in which military action unfolds will heavily shape the way the rest of the war unfolds One... senior policymakers throughout the government held to a set of fairly optimistic assumptions about the conditions that would emerge after major combat and what would be required thereafter These assumptions tended to override counterarguments elsewhere xvii xviii After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq in the government Meanwhile, senior military commanders assumed that civilian authorities... (NSC) conducted separate studies of postwar possibilities The problem, therefore, was not that no one in the U.S government thought about the challenges of postSaddam Iraq Rather, it was the failure to coordinate and integrate these various thoughts into a coherent, actionable plan At the center of the interagency planning process lay the NSC, which, starting in the summer of 2002, oversaw several interagency . Observations 14 CHAPTER THREE Civilian Planning Efforts 21 Interagency Planning: The ESG and the IPMC 21 The Office of the Secretary of Defense 24 The Office of Special Plans 24 Policy Guidance. viii After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq The National Security Council 35 De-Ba’athification 36 Restructuring Iraqi Military and Security Institutions 36 Other Analyses of. Provincial and City Governance 182 x After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq Lessons Learned 187 Security and Political Development 187 The Role of Exiles in the New Government