South Africa''''s role in conflict resolution and peacemaking in Africa docx

Free download from www.hsrcpress.ac.za Free download from www.hsrcpress.ac.za Free download from www.hsrcpress.ac.za Commissioned by the Nelson Mandela Foundation and compiled by the Human Sciences Research Council Published by HSRC Press Private Bag X9182, Cape Town, 8000, South Africa www.hsrcpress.ac.za © 2006 Human Sciences Research Council Free download from www.hsrcpress.ac.za First published 2006 All rights reserved No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers ISBN 0-7969-2129-6 Typeset by Stacey Gibson Cover by Farm Cover photograph by Guy Tillim Print management by comPress Distributed in Africa by Blue Weaver PO Box 30370, Tokai, Cape Town, 7966, South Africa Tel: +27 (0) 21 701 4477 Fax: +27 (0) 21 701 7302 email: orders@blueweaver.co.za www.oneworldbooks.com Distributed in Europe and the United Kingdom by Eurospan Distribution Services (EDS) Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, WC2E 8LU, United Kingdom Tel: +44 (0) 20 7240 0856 Fax: +44 (0) 20 7379 0609 email: orders@edspubs.co.uk www.eurospanonline.com Distributed in North America by Independent Publishers Group (IPG) Order Department, 814 North Franklin Street, Chicago, IL 60610, USA Call toll-free: (800) 888 4741 All other enquiries: +1 (312) 337 0747 Fax: +1 (312) 337 5985 email: frontdesk@ipgbook.com www.ipgbook.com Contents List of tables and figures v Foreword vi Acknowledgements vii Acronyms and abbreviations viii Free download from www.hsrcpress.ac.za Introduction: South Africa, an African peacemaker? Roger Southall Power and peace: South Africa and the refurbishing of Africa’s multilateral capacity for peacemaking 27 Peter Kagwanja Lost between stability and democracy: South Africa and Lesotho’s constitutional crises of the 1990s 59 Nthakeng Selinyane Commodifying oppression: South African foreign policy towards Zimbabwe under Mbeki 85 Dale McKinley A long prelude to peace: South African involvement in ending Burundi’s war 105 Roger Southall Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration during the transition in Burundi: a success story? 135 Henri Boshoff South Africa and the DRC: is a stable and developmental state possible in the Congo? 151 Claude Kabemba South Africa in peacemaking in West Africa Ishola Williams Dealing with Africa’s post-independence past: truth commissions, special courts, war-crimes trials and other methods 191 John Daniel and Marisha Ramdeen 10 Free download from www.hsrcpress.ac.za Ten principles of best practice engagement for Africa and South Africa 219 Hussein Solomon 11 A gendered perspective on principles and the South African practice of peacemaking 237 Alison Lazarus 12 The South African arms industry: redefining the boundaries Sanusha Naidu Contributors 266 173 253 List of tables and figures Tables Table 6.1 Free download from www.hsrcpress.ac.za Table 6.2 Table 6.3 Table 6.4 Table 6.5 Table 6.6 Table 6.7 Table 6.8 Table 10.1 Table 12.1 Figures Figure 6.1 Figure 12.1 Responsibilities for activities in the demobilisation process 143 Steps, observations and actors in the demobilisation process 145 Numbers of ex-combatants of parties other than CNDD-FDD still in the pre-disarmament assembly areas (PDAAs) 146 Numbers of ex-combatants and ex-FAB already demobilised 146 Projected numbers of ex-combatants and ex-FAB still to be demobilised 147 Numbers of ex-combatants currently in the cantonment sites 147 Numbers of ex-combatants and ex-FAB integrated into the BNDF/BNP 147 Numbers of ex-combatants demobilised to date (totals per group, 31 May 2005) 148 Conflict prevention: phases, actions and goals 223 Top ten destinations for South African arms exports, 1996–1998 (R’000) 258 Overview of DDR activities in Burundi 142 Approvals granted for arms sales in 2001, by region 259 vii Foreword Free download from www.hsrcpress.ac.za This collection is a product of a research workshop conducted on behalf of the Nelson Mandela Foundation by the Democracy & Governance (D&G) Research Programme of the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) and the Africa Institute of South Africa, which was held in December 2004 It is a sequel to a previous project that examined the particular contribution made by Former President Nelson Mandela to bringing about the present political settlement in Burundi, a country that had been wracked by civil war since the early 1990s Conducted by Kristina Bentley and Roger Southall, and published as An African peace process: Mandela, South Africa and Burundi (HSRC Press, 2005), this provided the Foundation’s first opportunity to foster its interest in studying the principles and practices that can be pursued by South Africa and other African countries in attempts to resolve conflicts and establish peace on our continent This wide-ranging collection assesses the South African government’s involvement in promoting peace in a number of political conflicts in Lesotho, Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo and West Africa, as well as Burundi, whilst also attempting to analyse its motivations and capacities for doing so Importantly, too, the collection examines the extent to which the South African model of negotiation and reconciliation can be exported to other countries and, if so, why that should be This latter aspect we regard as particularly important, for while the Nelson Mandela Foundation is proud of sponsoring research, its objective is practical rather than academic: to borrow the HSRC’s own slogan, it is concerned to promote ‘social science that makes a difference’ There can be few more important objectives than helping to end the conflicts that have torn various of Africa’s countries apart It is only upon a basis of lasting peace that the development and growth that is so important to Africa’s people can take place I would like to thank the D&G Research Programme, the Africa Institute of South Africa, the editor and all the authors for contributing to a successful and valuable venture John Samuel Former Chief Executive Officer, Nelson Mandela Foundation viii Free download from www.hsrcpress.ac.za Acknowledgements The Africa Institute of South Africa and the Human Sciences Research Council would like to express thanks for permission to include the following papers, which have been or are going to be published elsewhere A version of John Daniel and Marisha Ramdeen’s paper, ‘Dealing with Africa’s post-independence past: Truth commissions, special courts, war-crimes trials and other methods’, was previously published in South African yearbook of international affairs 2003/04 (SAIIA 2004: 259–80) Dale McKinley’s paper was previously published as ‘South African foreign policy towards Zimbabwe under Mbeki’, Review of African Political Economy 31: 357–364 Roger Southall’s paper, ‘A long prelude to peace: African involvement in ending Burundi’s war’, is to be published in Oliver Furley and Roy May, Ending Africa’s wars (Ashgate 2006) I would also like to thank the Nelson Mandela Foundation for its generosity in funding this project, and for hosting the workshop at its premises in Houghton As ever, the then Chief Executive Officer John Samuel was unfailingly helpful, and has been remarkably patient during the extended editorial period Eddie Maloka and Pierre Hugo of the Africa Institute provided invaluable assistance in the organisation of the workshop, as did Gray van den Bergh and Joan Makalela of the Democracy & Governance Programme of the HSRC A huge debt is also owed to Louise Torr for her thoroughness and intelligence in rendering the diverse papers into a coherent manuscript Roger Southall Human Sciences Research Council ix Acronyms and abbreviations AMIB AMIS ANAD Free download from www.hsrcpress.ac.za ANC APLA APPM APRM Armscor ASF AU BAC BCP BDF BNP CA CIPS CNDRR CNDD Codesa Cosatu CSSDCA DC DDR DRC ECOMOG x African Mission in Burundi African Mission in Sudan L’Accord de Non-agression et de Coopération en Matière de Défense African National Congress Azanian People’s Liberation Army Armed Political Parties and Movements (Burundi) African Peer Review Mechanism Armaments Development and Production Corporation of South Africa African Standby Force African Union Basutoland African Congress Basutoland Congress Party Botswana Defence Force Basotho National Party Constitutive Act (AU) Centre for International Political Studies National Commission for Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration (Burundi) Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie (Burundi) Convention for a Democratic South Africa Congress of South African Trade Unions Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa Demobilisation centre (Burundi) disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (Burundi) Democratic Republic of Congo ECOWAS Monitoring Group References Bellman H (1982) Mediation as an approach to resolving environmental disputes, in Proceedings of the environmental conflict management practitioners’ workshop Colorado: Rocky Mountain Centre on Environment (later ACCORD) Haynes J (1981) Divorce mediation: A practical guide for therapists and counselors New York: Springer Moore C (2003) The mediation process: Practical strategies for resolving conflict San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Free download from www.hsrcpress.ac.za Rehn E & Johnson-Sirleaf E (2003) Women, war and peace: An independent expert’s assessment on the impact of armed conflict on women and women’s role in peacebuilding, in Progress of the world’s women 2002 UNIFEM Rubin J & Brown B (1975) The social psychology of bargaining and negotiation California: Academic Press SAWID (2003) Report of the South African and Congolese women in dialogue, Esselen Park Conference 2–8 March South African Women in Dialogue Susskind L (1981) Environmental mediation and the accountability problem, Vermont Law Review 6: 1–47 UNCHS (2003) Human security now New York: United Nations Commission on Human Security UNDAW (2003) Framework for model agreements: Provisions pre, during and post negotiations Report of the experts’ group meeting, December Ottawa: United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women 252 CHAPTER 12 The South African arms industry: redefining the boundaries Free download from www.hsrcpress.ac.za Sanusha Naidu Introduction The dawn of democracy in South Africa was a defining moment in the country’s political and economic transition Not only did it signal an end to the country’s longstanding international isolation, it also underscored a moral precedence that was clearly informed by former President Nelson Mandela’s iconic image as a human right’s champion and the contradictory nature of apartheid The adoption of a human rights approach became, at least in the early days of the post-apartheid regime, a guiding principle in domestic and foreign policy considerations At one level, it aimed to create a congruence between ‘human rights norms, solidarity politics and … development needs’ (Alden & Le Pere 2004: 283) At another level, it displayed the desire to promote the interests of developing countries with regard to poverty reduction, debt relief and the democratisation of international relations through high-level interactions with developed countries At the beginning of the transition, the logic behind this rhetoric occupied the minds of most analysts and commentators Of particular concern was whether the newly elected post-apartheid government could sustain such a spirited moral code of ethics in a contradictory global environment characterised by both interdependence and unilateralism Moreover, and linked to the latter, the crucial question was whether Pretoria, by virtue of its honourable intentions, could remain insulated from engaging with rogue states and/or leaders with gross human rights violation records, especially considering Mandela’s philosophy of retaining ties with those friends (some of whom were known human rights violators or were accused thereof) who supported the liberation struggle In addition, given South Africa’s contrition about the past, it seemed even more compelling that the new democratic regime should 253 S O U T H A F R I C A’ S R O L E I N C O N F L I C T R E S O L U T I O N A N D P E A C E M A K I N G I N A F R I C A be steadfast in upholding its own moral victory against apartheid as a shining example of never repeating its past indiscretions against, or being involved, directly or indirectly, in the suffering of other nations Free download from www.hsrcpress.ac.za The issue of Pretoria’s moral dilemma came to the fore soon after the democratic elections in 1994 Given the way the arms industry was fashioned during the apartheid era, questions began to surface about the nature of the arms industry in a post-apartheid South Africa What would its purpose be? How would it be managed? What interventions should be made to ensure that post-apartheid South Africa did not end up being an irresponsible arms dealer and a moral embarrassment? Considering these questions, this chapter offers an overview of the arms industry in post-apartheid South Africa The first part sketches the role the arms industry played in the apartheid era Thereafter, it proceeds to discuss the impact the transition has had on the arms industry The third part examines the current role that the arms industry plays in South Africa’s international relations The conclusion returns to the question of the moral dilemma, and whether the restructuring of the arms industry has helped to assuage some of Pretoria’s anxieties around whether it is achieving its moral objective of being a responsible government The pre-1994 arms industry South Africa’s arms industry has its origins in World War II, during which various weapons were manufactured in significant quantities Following the war, the industry was dismantled and was re-established only in the 1960s when the imposition of apartheid policies became more stringent and, by extension, South Africa faced progressive isolation by the international community During the period 1961–1989, the arms industry underwent rapid growth, fuelled mainly by the government’s perception of an imminent external communist threat to its power base Seemingly, the apartheid regime adopted an offensive defence policy, which also shaped its aggressive foreign policy of destabilisation of the frontline states in the southern African region to counteract the threat of attack from these states The impact of the United Nations (UN) arms embargo of 1964 (which was voluntary) and that of 1977 254 THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMS INDUSTRY Free download from www.hsrcpress.ac.za (which was mandatory for UN member states) forced the apartheid state to develop its own independent arms industry The outcome was a ‘surge in the country’s general industrial capacity, much of it motivated by strategic considerations, such as substituting goods that could no longer be imported’ (Botha 2003: 1) As a result, the Armaments Development and Production Corporation of South Africa (Armscor) was set up as a statutory corporation of the state in terms of the Armaments Development and Production Act of 1968 According to the Act, the role and tasks of Armscor were to ‘promote and co-ordinate the development, manufacture, standardisation, maintenance, acquisition, or supply of armaments [by] utilising the services of any person, body or institution or any body of the state’ (Botha 2003: 1) In short, what this meant was that Armscor could operate without restraint and develop the arms industry with considerable freedom.1 By the late 1980s, South Africa’s arms production was effectively self-sufficient The products it offered were specifically developed to operate in the difficult terrain of the region and were of the highest proficiency Ranging from most calibres of arms and ammunitions, army vehicles, communications and electronic warfare equipment (such as early-warning and self-protection systems) to air-to-air and anti-tank missiles, this cache of arms not only met the requirements of the South African Defence Force (SADF), but also was looked upon favourably by international arms dealers The attraction of the latter was underscored by the reality that the requirements of the SADF had been met fully, and the only way of meeting the cost-recovery measures of the many facilities that were created to service the industry was to begin exporting armaments to willing buyers This also served to maintain capacity and capability, which otherwise would have become inoperative.2 Impact of the transition on the arms industry However, by 1989, with the global system undergoing a dramatic ideological shift and its snowballing effect in southern Africa, together with the impending regime change in South Africa, the arms industry was forced to restructure The South African government’s need to maintain a strong military within its regional backyard dissipated with the end of the superpower rivalry and the threat of a communist attack The profligacy of the apartheid era 255 S O U T H A F R I C A’ S R O L E I N C O N F L I C T R E S O L U T I O N A N D P E A C E M A K I N G I N A F R I C A Free download from www.hsrcpress.ac.za defence budget was cut by 40 per cent between 1989 and 1994, while arms procurement was drastically reduced by 60 per cent ‘from R5.5 billion to R 2.2 billion at 1990 prices’ (Botha 2003: 2) Moreover, many of the arms industry’s facilities like the Dorbyl shipyards in Durban were closed down, while others that remained in operation underwent downsizing and rationalisation At the same time, the export of South African-made arms was inexorably pursued, albeit with limited success, as the UN embargoes were still in force Seemingly, then, during the period 1989 to 1994, arms sales were mainly to countries like Iraq, Chile and Taiwan, rising from R236 million in 1989 to R600 million in 1994 (Botha 2003: 2) The democratic elections in 1994 and the ushering in of a new government resulted in a closer inspection of the arms industry At one level, the newly elected regime had to confront how to integrate the SADF with the armed wings of the liberation movements At another level, there was the issue of confronting and dealing with a previous nemesis For the arms industry, these were trying times of uncertainty Not wanting to become obsolete, many of the arms companies redefined their strategy, improving their marketing skills and attempting to find commercial applications for their technology Others became part of the global arms trade, facilitated by the posture of the market economy that came to characterise the post-Cold War period and based on the simple economic equation of ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ The proliferation of South African arms in the global, continental and regional environments was also facilitated by the post-apartheid government’s macroeconomic policy, which favoured export-driven growth.3 This in part also aided the arms industry to make profits, and not lose their capability or capacity Yet with this marketisation of the arms industry, the new regime found itself at odds with what it saw as its commitment to being a responsible government and advancing the human rights element in its policies and interactions To address this situation, the government formed the National Conventional Armaments Control Committee (NCACC) in 1995 The main thrust of the NCACC was (and still is) to ensure transparency in the procurement process, compliance with the policy of the government on arms control and adherence to international treaties and agreements It was the NCACC’s guidelines and rationale for transfers and trade in weapons that clearly set forth the new regime’s arms control measures In this regard, the NCACC noted that transfers and weapon sales would be avoided if they were likely to: 256 THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMS INDUSTRY • • • Free download from www.hsrcpress.ac.za • • • • • be used in the violation or suppression of human rights and fundamental freedoms; contravene South Africa’s international obligations, in particular its obligations under arms embargoes adopted by the UN Security Council and other arms control agreements or responsibilities in terms of internationally accepted custom; endanger peace by introducing destabilising military capabilities into a region, or otherwise contribute to regional instability and negatively influence the balance of power; be diverted within the recipient country or re-exported for purposes contrary to the aims of this document; have a negative impact on South Africa’s diplomatic and trade relations with other countries; support or encourage terrorism; be used for purposes other than the legitimate defence and security needs of the recipient country; or contribute to the escalation of regional conflicts In spite of the new regime’s commitment to an arms control policy, the arms trade has been fraught with controversy Moreover, the rules and guidelines that the NCACC has adopted appear to be theoretical Of the 83 countries to which South Africa acknowledges having sold arms and military equipment between 1996 and 1999, 57 did not comply with the NCACC’s own criteria because of human rights violations or internal and external conflicts (Crawford-Brown 2000) These included Rwanda, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Algeria, Colombia, Syria, Turkey and Saudi Arabia Further, it has been estimated that the value of South Africa’s arms exports grew from R918 million in 1994 to R1 166 million in 1997 – an increase of nearly 30 per cent (Batchelor 1999: 1) Between 1996 and 1998, the Indian market was the top destination for South African arms This was especially unnerving considering the tensions on the sub-continent with Pakistan (see Table 12.1) Clearly, the alarm amongst arms dealers that the NCACC would block most arms sales and so eventually lead to a collapse in the defence industry was purely academic In fact, the ‘the NCACC did not prove to be a serious impediment to South African merchants’ (Shelton 1999: 3) Undoubtedly, the ‘merchants of death’, as Kader Asmal labelled industry leaders, had 257 S O U T H A F R I C A’ S R O L E I N C O N F L I C T R E S O L U T I O N A N D P E A C E M A K I N G I N A F R I C A Table 12.1 Top ten destinations for South African arms exports, 1996–1998 (R’000) Country Value 1996 Value 1997 Value 1998 13 639 600 518 13 302 Switzerland 18 217 108 106 66 210 192 533 Colombia 28 746 71 223 44 633 144 602 Singapore 18 163 87 970 15 425 121 558 401 36 477 67 094 104 972 10 048 95 221 India Thailand 51 457 33 716 Congo-Brazzaville Free download from www.hsrcpress.ac.za Pakistan 61 266 31 920 38 686 14 639 Algeria Peru United Arab Emirates Total Total value 627 459 93 186 84 933 84 933 30 154 83 479 814 17 045 37 221 62 080 517 026 324 904 646 490 488 420 Source: (Batchelor 1999:1) won the battle with their arguments ‘that employment, domestic defence capacity and technological capabilities had to be protected’ (Shelton 1999: 3) Even President Mandela was convinced of these arguments and became an important salesperson for the industry During a visit to Asia, he made the suggestion that the sale of Rooivalk helicopters to Malaysia would create 500 jobs in South Africa (Shelton 1999: 3) But South African arms sales did not stop there Even though the NCACC tried to inject some checks and balances into the industry, it seems that the NCACC was ratifying sales to troubled hot-spots like the Middle East and to countries where human rights violations were of concern These included: • Algeria: In 1998, South Africa exported armaments worth R85 million to Algeria In March of that year, Minister Asmal told Parliament that Algeria had a democratically elected, internationally recognised government and that weapons sold to Algeria would only be used for external self-defence In 1999, Algeria became South Africa’s largest export market, with sales of R290 million, reportedly large quantities of small arms Furthermore, since 1999, the ties between Algeria and South Africa have been growing stronger Algeria has become an increasingly important African trading partner for South Africa in terms of arms sales Bilateral figures increased seventeen-fold between 1994 and 2000, reaching R230 million a year (Cornish 2003) 258 THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMS INDUSTRY • Free download from www.hsrcpress.ac.za • Colombia: Another country that has experienced massive human rights abuses over several decades is Colombia; 1.5 million Colombians have been displaced by political violence in the country since 1985, yet South African exports of armaments to the Colombian government, as reported by the NCACC during 1996–1999, totalled R161 million (CrawfordBrown 2000) India and Pakistan: Both countries have been involved in several wars since they became independent in 1947, and both have developed nuclear weapons in defiance of international prescriptions Despite this, South Africa continues to market its arms aggressively to the region Denel hopes to conclude a contract with India for G6 artillery to the value of R8 billion.4 India was by far the largest export market for South African armaments in 1997, the sales being almost entirely artillery shells, which were used by India against Pakistan during the 1999 war The NCACC reported South African exports of armaments to India during 1996–1999 as amounting to R831 million Exports to Pakistan during the period totalled R139 million (Crawford-Brown 2000) According to the Directorate of Conventional Arms Control, export approvals worth R1 348 million were granted in 2000, rising to R1 736 million in 2001 (for the regional distribution of the approvals, see Figure 12.1) Figure 12.1 Approvals granted for arms sales in 2001, by region Americas 5% Middle East 15% Asia 15% Europe 16% United Nations 1% Africa 32% South Asia 16% Source: Botha (2003) 259 S O U T H A F R I C A’ S R O L E I N C O N F L I C T R E S O L U T I O N A N D P E A C E M A K I N G I N A F R I C A Free download from www.hsrcpress.ac.za According to Batchelor (1999) this ambivalence in arms control has meant that the ANC-led government has not found the right balance as a restrained and responsible arms trader Instead, it has been seen as fuelling conflicts in many parts of the developing world, which tends to contradict the twin pillars of its foreign policy – the advancement of human rights and the promotion of democracy In part, the national interest of maintaining jobs in the defence industry could explain this contradiction, which is underscored by the issue of marketisation and retaining capacity and capability Paradoxically, the NCACC, which was set up to provide transparency to the industry, has also become enshrouded in secrecy with regard to its activities and the contents of its arm sales ratifications Reforming the arms industry The values projected by the arms industry distort the kind of image that post-apartheid South Africa would like to convey This has led to the industry restructuring and diversifying its production Part of the new image associated with the arms industry is to recast it within the context of engaging in efforts to support peacekeeping and peace-building initiatives, and the spin-offs have proved worthwhile South Africa is emerging as a leader in the field of mine clearance equipment Mechem, a division of Denel, has been conducting commercial operations in Africa since 1991, as well as in the Balkans and the Middle East Over the period 1991–2003, Mechem conducted 42 mine-clearing operations in ten different countries Of these operations, 25 were in Africa, with 17 in Mozambique alone and others in the DRC (3), Angola (2), Eritrea, Uganda and South Africa In Europe, nine operations were carried out in Croatia and one in Bosnia, while in Asia, six clearances were conducted in Iraq and one in Afghanistan A total area of 228 km2 was cleared in these operations, which ranged in duration from five days to three years and covered a total contract period of 19 years.5 Moreover, developed countries have also been seeking the expertise of South African equipment and technology experts to assist with humanitarian projects in the rest of the world These interventions include: • In February 1999, a US team of de-mining experts, including representatives of the Office of the Secretary of Defence, State Department and the US 260 THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMS INDUSTRY • Free download from www.hsrcpress.ac.za • • European Command visited South Africa to acquaint themselves with de-mining operations and research and developments taking place in the country, as well as to explore possible areas of co-operation between Washington and Pretoria In 1998, Sweden acquired four South African Mamba mine-protected armoured personnel carriers for use in its peacekeeping duties as part of the United Nations initiative in the Western Sahara In March 1999, the US Defence Department awarded Mechem a $494 000 contract to field test a mine-sniffing electronic dog’s nose, which is being developed by the Pentagon’s research agency Also in 1999, the South African government exported mine protected vehicles to a private mining company for the protection of personnel in Angola.6 Other key South African research and development companies include: • RSD, a division of Dorbyl Ltd, which has produced, amongst other items, the Chubby Mobile Mine Detection and Clearing System; • Reutech Defence Industries (RDI) manufacturers of, for example, the MIDAS handheld Mine Detector (PIMD) and the Vehicle Mounted Mine Detector (VMMD2000); • Vickers OMC, which has produced a range of mine-protected vehicles, including the RG-31 Nyala, the Mamba, the Kobra and the Casspir; • Armscor (marketing, sales as well as being the competent authority, which conducts independent testing of all South African mine-protected vehicles); and • The Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, which is currently researching the possibility of a multi-sensor mine-detecting suite consisting of ground-penetrating radar, infrared and metal detector sensors Focusing on the Southern African region, and in particular countries like Angola and Mozambique, the project aims to develop technology to detect landmines, in particular antipersonnel mines with minimum or no metal content.7 However, the question that remains is whether post-apartheid South Africa has become a responsible arms dealer 261 S O U T H A F R I C A’ S R O L E I N C O N F L I C T R E S O L U T I O N A N D P E A C E M A K I N G I N A F R I C A Conclusion: back to the future Free download from www.hsrcpress.ac.za With the post-apartheid government already celebrating a decade of democracy, the issue at hand is whether the arms industry has been transformed sufficiently to reflect the foreign policy ideals of mutual coexistence, peace and respect for human rights that underpinned, at least in the beginning, the moral integrity of how an ANC-led government would conduct its international relations Unfortunately, judgment in this regard wavers between those accepting the logic of the market economy of ‘willing buyer and willing seller’ and those who see this as an inexplicable contradiction of post-apartheid’s moral aspirations Nowhere is this ambiguity more apparent and stark than in Pretoria’s relations with the African continent From early in the transition era, the ANC articulated a very different position from the past Early ANC policy documents spoke of the ‘fate of democratic South Africa being inextricably bound up with what happens in the rest of the continent’ (Mbeki 1991), specifying that ‘our foreign policy should reflect the interests of the continent of Africa’ (Mbeki 1994) and that ‘if we not devote our energies to this continent, we too could fall victim to the forces that have brought ruin to its various parts’(ANC 1993) Such sentiments became part of Pretoria’s policy stance towards the continent following the ANC’s electoral victory in 1994 This remains the constant approach today Moreover, it became the express policy of the post-apartheid government to conduct its international relations only within the context of international frameworks and agreements approved by Parliament and in terms of the obligations imposed on South Africa by virtue of its membership of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the African Union (AU), the Non-Aligned Movement, the Commonwealth and the UN The overarching obligation towards Africa was to ensure stability, peace and overall development across the continent, and these have become the themes that underpin the notion of an African Renaissance, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad) and the AU policy frameworks As such, post-apartheid South Africa’s peace-mediating role became a key indication of the ANC-led government’s commitment to underwriting peace and stability on the continent This was reflected in Mandela’s mediation and facilitative role in the peace initiative in Burundi, and Mbeki’s resolve to stabilise the situation in the Ivory Coast Yet the virtue of these gestures seems 262 THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMS INDUSTRY Free download from www.hsrcpress.ac.za to be overshadowed by reports that South African arms continue to be sold to conflict-ridden societies or to governments engaged in civil strife or crossborder disputes The Mail & Guardian (24.03.05) reported that arms exports increased by 20 per cent to R3.1 billion in 2003 The same article also noted that sales were concluded with countries that were considered to have poor human rights records or were engaged in some form of conflict These included: • Swaziland, which bought R3 million worth of ‘communication equipment and public order vehicles’; • Colombia, which purchased R71.1 million worth of equipment including tanks and artillery Colombia is also considered to be the fastest growing market for South African arms and it is a country with which Pretoria has a bilateral agreement; • Algeria, which bought R230.5 million worth of sensitive support equipment such as missile-guidance systems and gun-sights; • Nepal, which acquired R19 million of military communication equipment; • The Republic of Guinea, which bought R12.5 million worth of heavy weapons; • India, which acquired R550 million worth of defence equipment, including R445.8 million for heavy weapons; • Pakistan, which purchased R8 million worth of heavy weapons; • The People’s Republic of China, which acquired R17 million worth of equipment, including missile-guidance technology, gun-sights and about R12 million worth of military services Undoubtedly the above list raises critical questions about the integrity of the post-apartheid government’s engagement with Africa Moreover, it draws into focus the obscurity of what the new democratic regime in Pretoria would like to project as its role on the continent, and how this could easily be associated with behaviour aligned to its apartheid predecessor While the apartheid regime was more explicit in its aggressive interventionism when it came to advancing its policy of destabilisation, the current regime’s culpability seems to be driven and shaped by the marketisation of the arms industry Economics aside, the current trajectory of South Africa’s arms industry has exposed the contradictions of Pretoria’s foreign policy postures Perhaps this is because trying to take the moral high ground in the foreign policy arena is 263 S O U T H A F R I C A’ S R O L E I N C O N F L I C T R E S O L U T I O N A N D P E A C E M A K I N G I N A F R I C A fraught with internal contradictions that place states in invidious positions, particularly when engaging in an international system that is underscored by economic liberalisation and political unilateralism Free download from www.hsrcpress.ac.za This moral quagmire clearly suggests that the post-apartheid state raised the bar too high, and could not reach these levels itself Such high standards have undoubtedly ensnared the new democratic state in an uncomfortable position where it is caught between a rock and a hard place Nevertheless, the price the new regime is paying for such ambiguity is, on the one hand, being labelled as an irresponsible arms dealer, while, on the other hand, suffering the humiliation of being seen as behaving like its apartheid predecessor Notes South Africa’s entry into the arms export industry with Armscor’s participation was at an armaments exhibition in Greece 1984 However in 1984, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 558 requesting all nations to refrain from purchasing South African armaments See Daniel, Naidoo & Naidu (2003) for an outline of the factors that are responsible for the expansion of South African corporates into Africa Denel is a state-owned company that came into existence in 1992 when Armscor was split into two entities While Armscor retained its acquisition function, Denel inherited most of Armscor’s subsidiaries and research facilities The core function of Denel is to manufacture military and civilian products See www.mechemdemining.com See www.icbl.org/lm/2000/intro/hma.html 264 In this regard, Amscor was given the liberty to enter contracts in its own name, to own shares in companies and to arrange for manufacture either by its own subsidiaries or by third-party contractors See www.icbl.org/lm/2000/intro/hma.html THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMS INDUSTRY References ANC (1993) Foreign policy in a new democratic South Africa: A discussion paper Johannesburg: African National Congress, Department of International Affairs Alden C & Le Pere G (2004) South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy: From reconciliation to ambiguity, Review of African Political Economy 31: 343–348 Batchelor P (1999) South Africa: An irresponsible arms trader? Global Dialogue 4(2) Free download from www.hsrcpress.ac.za Botha D (2003) South Africa’s defence industry: Charting a new course? Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper 78 Cornish J (2003) North Africa: A review, in South African Yearbook 2002/2003 Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs Crawford-Brown T (2000) Export controls on firearms and ammunition Oral submission to the public hearings on the Firearms Control Bill conducted by the Parliamentary Safety and Security Committee, 15 August Daniel J, Naidoo V & Naidu S (2003) The South Africans have arrived: Post-apartheid economic expansion into Africa, in Daniel J, Habib A & Southall R (eds.) State of the nation: South Africa 2003/2004 Cape Town: HSRC Press Mbeki T (1991) South Africa’s international relations: Today and tomorrow, South Africa International 29: 231–235 Mbeki T (1994) Foreign policy in a new democratic South Africa, in International perspectives: Extracts from addresses by Thabo Mbeki, Salim Ahmed Salim, JD Barroso, Lord Carrington Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs Shelton G (1999) South Africa’s arms industry will determine the future, Global Dialogue 4(2) 265 Contributors Henri Boshoff is Military Analyst for the Institute for Security Studies John Daniel was a member of the Publishing Department of the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) and chaired the Editorial Board of the HSRC Press at the time of writing Claude Kabemba is the Chief Research Manager in the Society, Culture and Identity Research Programme at the HSRC Free download from www.hsrcpress.ac.za Peter Kagwanja is Director of the Southern Africa Project of the International Crisis Group, based in Pretoria Alison Lazarus was until recently Senior Trainer and Mediator leading the Senior Government Project at the Centre for Conflict Resolution, University of Cape Town, and is currently an independent senior trainer, mediator and gender activist Dale McKinley is an independent writer, lecturer and researcher based in Johannesburg Sanusha Naidu is a research specialist in the Integrated Rural and Regional Development Programme based at the HSRC Marisha Ramdeen is a research intern at the HSRC Nthakeng Selinyane is a Doctoral Fellow in the Centre for Civil Society, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban Hussein Solomon is a Professor in the Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria and is Director of the Centre for International Political Studies Roger Southall is Distinguished Research Fellow, Democracy and Governance, at the HSRC Ishola Williams, formerly a major-general in the Nigerian Defence Force, is currently Executive Secretary of the Pan African Strategic and Policy Research Group (PANAFSTRAG) 266 ... and greater gender sensitivity Are peacemaking and arms-making compatible? South Africa, increasingly engaged in conflict resolution and peacemaking since 1994, inherited a substantial arms industry... wholly ineffective in promoting dialogue between Kabila and rebels based in Uganda and Rwanda, and in preventing Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe from sending in troops to prop up his shaky regime South. .. Angola to South African investment, especially in diamond mining SADC: regional power rivalry in the 1990s Mandela declared in 1993 that South Africa was ‘inextricably part of southern Africa? ?? and