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5
Public Goodsand Contingent
Valuation
Public GoodsandContingent Valuation
ROBERT SUGDENROBERT SUGDEN
5.1. PUBLIC GOODS
Many applications of the contingentvaluation (CV) method are concerned
with public goods. This chapter considers some of the special problems
involved in eliciting preferences for such goods.
In economic theory, the distinction between publicand private goods is
clear-cut. What is now the standard deWnition of a public good derives from
a classic paper, only three pages long, by Paul Samuelson (1954); this
encapsulates some of the key elements of a tradition of public Wnance
which can be traced back to Lindahl (1919/1958) and Wicksell (1896/1958).
The deWning characteristic of a public good is that the same units of the good
are consumed by, or give utility to, more than one individual.
For example, consider the beneWts that the residents of a suburban area
derive from an expanse of open-access woodland. One way of modelling
these beneWts would be to deWne a go od, `open-access woodland', measured
in hectares. A typical resident, we may assume, prefers more of this good to
less, just as she prefers to have more rather than less of private consumption
goods, such as food and clothing. But there is a crucial di Verence between
food and clothing on the one hand and the woodland on the other. In
relation to food and clothing, individual consumers are rivals: if any given
unit of one of these goods (say, a particular packet of frozen peas or a
particular coat) is consumed by one person then, necessarily, it is not con-
sumed by another person. In contrast, in the case of the woodland, there is
non-rivalry: each hectare of woodland is giving beneWts to many people
simultaneously. Thus, when we specify the utility functions of a set of
individuals, the level of provision of each public good is repres ented by a
single varia ble, which is an argume nt in each individuals' utility function,
while the level of consumption of each private good is represented by a
separate variable for each individual.
This chapter was written as part of a research project supported by the Economic and Social
Research Council, through its Transport and the Environment Programme (Award No. W 119
25 1014). Thanks go to Ian Bateman, Alistair Munro, and Chris Starmer for their help.
At Wrst sight, it may seem odd that the theoretical distinction between
public and private goods should be so categorical. Isn't there a continuum
stretching from almost pure private goods (such as frozen peas) to almost
pure publicgoods (such as national defence)? The answer is that Samuel-
son's distinction between publicand private goods is not so much a classiW-
cation of goods as a classiWcation of ways of modelling them. Indeed it is
often possible to choose whether to model a given source of beneWts as a
private good or as a public one.
Take the case of the woodland. In an informal sense, open-access wood-
land in a suburban area is not a `pure' public good. Beyond a certain point,
the more visitors there are to a wood, the poorer is each visitor's experience.
Thus, one might say, visitors are rivals. But this factor can be incorporated
within a model in which woodland is a public good in Samuelson's sense.
The eVects of congestion come through as properties of individuals' valua-
tions of the public good; one of the reasons why an increase in quantity (i.e.
an increase in the area of woodland) is valued is because this reduces
congestion. However, the same real-world state of aVairs could be modelled,
with equal legitimacy, in private-good terms. We could deWne `visits to
woodland areas' as a good, measured in (say) numbers of visits per year.
Visits to woodland are private goods, even if there is open access: each visit is
made by a particular person. In this framework, an increase in the area of
woodland would appear as an improvement in the quality of the good
`visits', and thus as an outward shift of the demand curve for that good.
Whether a given source of beneWts should be analysed as a public good or
as a private good is a question of modelling strategy. If we wish to elicit
individuals' valuations of some beneWt, we can often choose between alter-
native ways of setting up the problem; some ways of setting it up call for
valuations of private goods, others for valuations of public goods. In the
case of the woodland, for example, we might try to elicit valuations of the
private good `visits', perhaps by asking people about their willingness to pay
diVerent hypothetical entry charges, or (if they travel to the woodland by
car) diVerent charges for parking.
The strategy of valuing visits has some obvious limitations: it fails to pick
up some of the ways in which individuals derive beneWts from woodland.
Expanses of woodland make a suburban area look more attractive, and this
can be a source of beneWt even to residents who never set foot in a wood. But
these beneWts, too, can be valued through private goods. If what people
value is the amenity beneWts of having trees near their homes, then it is
equally true to say that they value homes that are near trees. Here we can
try to Wnd out how much extra people are willing to pay to buy or rent
houses in wel l-wooded areas. This could be investigated either by using a
hedonic pricing method (i.e. identifying diVerences in market prices for
houses in diVerent areas) or by using a CV survey to elicit individuals'
housing preferences.
132
ROBERT S U G DEN
However, the more diVuse the nature of the beneWt, the more diYcult it
becomes to Wnd an appropriate private good. An extreme case is the exist-
ence value that a person may derive merely from the knowledge that some-
thing ± a wildlife habitat, a landscape, an historic monument ± exists. One of
the apparent strengths of the CV method is that it can be used to elicit
preferences both for private and for public goods. This chapter will be
concerned with applications of the CV method to public goods.
5.2. THE THEORY OF PUBLIC GOODS
For the purposes of exposition, it is convenient to start with a very simple
model in which there are just two goods, one private and one public. The
public good is supplied under conditions of constant costs; the cost of
supplying each unit is p. There are n individuals, labelled by i 1; F F F ; n,
each of whom consumes the quantity y
i
of the private good. The quantity of
the public good is x; this quantity is consumed by, or is made available to,
every individual. Thus individuals' preferences can be represented by the
utility functions:
u
i
u
i
x; y
i
i 1; F F F ; n: 5:1
Preferences over combinations of publicand private consumption are
assumed to have the conventional neo-classi cal properties; thus, each per-
son's preferences can be repres ented by a family of smooth, strictly convex,
downward-sloping indiVerence curves in (x; y
i
) space. I shall also make the
very weak assumption that the private good is a normal good.
For any individual i, we may deWne the marginal valuation of the public
good as vx; y
i
, wher e
vx; y
i
@u
i
= @x= @u
i
= @y
i
i 1; F F F ; n: 5:2
Thus, starting from any given bundle (x; y
i
), the value of vx; y
i
represents
the individual's valuation of a marginal increase in the quantity of the public
good, expressed in units of the private good. If the private good is treated as
the nume
Â
raire (i.e. if quantities of the private good are measured in money
units), vx; y
i
can be interpreted as the individual's willingness to pay
(WTP) for a marginal increase in the quantity of the public good. Since
the private good is normal, vx; y
i
is decreasing in x. Since more of each
good is preferred to less, vx; y
i
is strictly positive for all values of x and y
i
.
It is easy to see that Pareto eYciency will be achieved if and only if
i
vx; y
i
p: 5:3
That is, the sum of all individuals' marginal valuations of the public good
must be equal to the marginal cost of that good. If the sum of marginal
PUBLIC G O ODS ANDCONTINGENTVALUATION 133
valuations was greater than marginal cost, it would be possible to make
everyone better oV by increasing the quantity of the public good and divid-
ing the extra cost between individuals in proportion to their marginal
valuations. Conversely, if the sum of marginal valuations was less than
marginal cost, it would be possible to make everyone better oV by reducing
the quantity of the public good and distributing the cost saving between
individuals in prop ortion to marginal values.
Unfortunately, market economies contain no mechanisms which can be
relied on to ensure that (5.3 ) is satisWed. Under conditions of constant costs,
competitive Wrms will sup ply a good at a price e qual to its marginal cost;
thus, p may be interpreted as the competitive market price of units of the
public good. In a market economy, the public good will be supplied only to
the extent that it is bought by individuals. Thus, we need to ask how much of
it would be bought at the price p.
One apparently natural assumption is that each person maximizes utility,
taking as given both the price of the public good and the quantities bought
by all other individuals. I shall call this assumption parametric instrumental
rationality. `Instrumental' signiWes that the individual treats her choices
among goods as means, her ends being given by her preferences over Wnal
outcomes. `Parametric' signiWes that she treats other people's decisions as
given, rather than seeing herself as engaged in strategic interaction with
those other people. Consider the implications of this assumption.
For each person i, let z
i
be the value of i's endowments, and let w
i
be the
total quantity of the public good bought by people other than i (i.e.,
w
i
jTi
z
j
À y
j
=p). Then i faces two budget constraints:
px À w
i
y
i
z
i
5:4
and
x 5 w
i
: 5:5
The market is in equilibrium (analogous with a market-clearing equilibrium
in a private-good economy) if x and y
1
; F F F ; y
n
are such that, for each person
i, the combination x; y
i
maximizes i's utility subject to the constraints (5.4)
and (5.5 ).
In such an equilibrium, the following must be true for each person i:
either vx; y
i
p and x 5 w
i
5:6a
or vx; y
i
< p and x w
i
: 5:6b
Condition (5.6a) is the case in which i buys just enough of the public good to
ensure that marginal valuation is equal to price. Condition (5.6b) is the case
in which, even if she buys none of the good, marginal valuation is less than
price; in this case, the utility-ma ximizing solution is to buy nothing.
It is immediately obvious that, if the Pareto-eYcient solution requires any
positive quantity of the public good to be supplied, Pareto eYciency cannot
134 ROBERT S U G DEN
be achieved consistently with (5.6a) or (5.6b) being true for all persons i.
Since vx; y
i
p for any person i who chooses to buy any of the public
good, and since vx; y
i
> 0 for all i, the sum of vx; y
i
across all i must be
greater than p; and this is incompatible with the Pareto-eYciency condition
(5.3). If in equilibrium the publ ic good is supp lied at all, the sum of indivi-
duals' marginal valuations of the public good will be greater than the good's
marginal cost.
Thus, the implication of this model is that if the supply of publicgoods is
left to the market, there will be undersupply. Intuitively, the source of the
problem is easy to see: each individual buys the good (if at all) with a view to
the beneWts to herself; but each unit that any individual buys supplies
beneWts to all individuals.
5.3. INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY: THE THEORETICAL PROBLEM
Welfare economists have generally argued that public policy should aim at
achieving Pareto eYciency in the supply of public goods. The problem, then,
is to Wnd a procedure for discovering enough about individuals' preferences
to allow us to identify Pareto-eYcient levels of provision for public goods.
Samuelson was pessimistic about the prospects; in a section of his classic
paper with the title `Impossibility of Decentralized Solution', he argued that
no decentralized pricing system could identify Pareto-eYcient solutions
because `it is in the selWsh interest of each person to give false signals, to
pretend to have less interest in a given collective consumption acti vity than
he really has' (1954: 338±9).
Subsequent theoretical work has shown that this problem is slightly
less intractable than Samuelson thought. Clarke (1971), Groves (1973),
and Groves and Ledyard (1977) have proposed a demand-revealing mechan-
ism for publicgoods which tailors each individual's tax payment to his
preferences as reported by him. The essential idea is that each person is
invited to `vote' by reporting his WTP for a public good; the supply of
that good is then set at a Pareto-eYcient level, relative to the reported
preferences of all voters; Wnally, each voter is required to pay a tax equal
to the marginal net cost that he has imposed on other individuals by voting
rather than abstaining. Under reasonable assumptions about preferences,
this mechanism can be shown to be incentive-compatible ± that is, no indi-
vidual can beneWt by misrepresenting his preferences if no one else is
misrepresenting theirs. Unfortunately, however, the demand-revealing
mechanism is very vulnerable to strategic behaviour by small coalitions of
voters, and for this reason probably cannot be regarded as a practical
proposal.
In any case, it is clear that Samuelson's claim about the `impossibility of
decentralized solutions' applies to CV: if the CV method is used to elicit
PUBLIC G O ODS ANDCONTINGENTVALUATION 135
individuals' preferences for a public good, and if the Wndings are then used to
determine the supply of that good, then each individual typically has a selWsh
interest in giving a false signal. To see why, consider a simple case in which a
collective decision has to be made between two options ± either not to supply
a particular public good (option A) or to supply it (option B). If the good is
supplied, it will be paid for from taxes; each individual's share of the increase
in tax will be independent of how he or she responds to the CV survey.
Assume that each individual has preferences of the kind described in Section
5.2. After taking account of taxes, each individual must either prefer A to B,
or prefer B to A, or be indiVerent between the two. Now consider what
response it would be rational for a self-interested individual to make to a CV
survey. Subject to her response being credible, the larger the WTP a person
reports, the more likely it is that B will be chosen. Thus if she prefers B to A,
her best strategy is to report the highest WTP that would be credible.
Conversely, if she prefers A to B, her best strategy is to report the lowest
WTP that would be credible.
Some commentators have suggested that CV respondents believe that the
responses they make as individuals may determine the tax payments they
make as individuals, and that this discourages the overstating of WTP
(Hoehn and Randall, 1987; Mitchell and Carson, 1989: 153±70). It is possi-
ble that some respondents do believe this; but since the belief is false, it
would be unwise for CV researchers to count on it and unethical for them to
try to induce respondents to hold it. I know of no CV survey in which
individual responses have been used to determine individual tax payments.
Furthermore, it is standard practice in surveys to assure respondents that the
information they give will be treated anonymously. Any respondent who
understands and believes this assurance must realize that she cannot be
taxed according to her reported willingness to pay.
It is sometimes implied that the CV method can be made incentive-
compatible by using a referendum format, in which each respondent is
presented with just two options and asked to report which she prefers. For
example, the `Blue Ribbon' Panel on ContingentValuation argues that the
referendum format is preferable to the use of open-ended WTP questions,
because the latter encourage the overstatement of true valuations as `a
costless way to make a point' (Arrow et al., 1993: 29; see also Mitc hell and
Carson, 1989: 148±9). The truth, however, is that any CV study which elicits
preferences for a public good oVers respondents a costless way to make a
point.
It is important to distinguish between a real referendum and a CV survey
which uses a referendum format. It is easy to see that if there are only two
options A and B, and if a collective decision is to be made between them by
majority voting, then no voter has any incentive to misrepresent her prefer-
ences. But such a referendum will not elicit the distribution of WTP in the
population, which is the whole point of the CV method. A CV study which
136
ROBERT S U G DEN
uses a referendum format presents diVerent respondents with diVerent pairs
of options, and uses the resulting data to estimate the distribution of WTP in
the population. Thus, a respondent who understands what is going on has
exactly the same incentive to misrepresent her preferences as if she had
answered an open-ended question. For example, if she really prefers B (the
public good's being supplied at its true cost) to A (its not being supplied), she
should `vote' for the public good in a CV survey, whatever hypothetical cost
she is asked to consider.
I can see no escape from the conclusion that, if survey respondents are
motivated solely by rational self-interest, the CV method is fatally Xawed.
Like other forms of social-survey research, CV studies cannot work unless
the vast majority of respondents can be relied on to give honest answers to
well-formulated questions. But whether surveys elicit honest responses or
strategic ones is ultimately an empirical question; it cannot be settled by a
priori de duction from the axioms of rational choice theory.
5.4. INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY: IS IT A PROBLEM FOR SURVEY RESEARCH?
The possibility that responses may be self-interested rather than honest is
not a problem that is peculiar to CV studies. Almost all social surveys oVer
some incentives for strategic behaviour. Consider, for example, a survey of
voting intentions before an election. A respondent who was motivated solely
by rational self-interest might choose his answer by thinking about the
eVects of the publication of the survey on other voters; thus, a suppo rter
of party X might pretend to be intending to vote for party Y so as to induce
complacency among the supporters of Y. Or consider a survey of the extent
of unreported crime. If someone would like to see more public spending on
the police, it might be in her interest to pretend to have been the victim of
non-existent crimes. In these examples, of course, the self-interested beneWts
to be gained by answering dishonestly are tiny. But the same is true of CV
surveys, provided the sample size is suYciently large.
In many social surveys, self-interest provides no obvious incentive to
respondents to answer in one way rather than another. For example, this
is typically the case in the censuses and panel surveys on which econome-
tricians rely for their data. If respondents are motivated solely by rational
self-interest, we have no reason to expect honest answers to such questions.
Conversely, if there are forces at work whi ch can generate systematic hon-
esty in the absence of positive incentives to be honest, the same forces might
be expected to have some inXuence even when there are weak incentives to be
dishonest. For example, it might be hypothesized that, other things being
equal, honesty involves less cognitive strain than dishonesty, or that the
social setting of interviewer and interviewee evokes norms of honesty.
These hypotheses might explain honesty in the absence of incent ives; but
PUBLIC G O ODS ANDCONTINGENTVALUATION 137
they would also imply a tendency for respondents to give honest answers
rather than strategic ones when the incentives for strategic behaviour are
suYciently weak.
Thus, when assessing the validity of the assumption that CV surveys elicit
honest responses, it is legitimate to draw on evidence from social-survey
research in general. Social psychologists have done a great deal of research
into the relationships between attitudes (as reported in surveys) and actual
behaviour. The balance of evidence, drawn from many studies, is that
behaviour and attitudes are positively correlated (Schuman and Johnson,
1976; Hill, 1981). Of course, the mere demonstration of such a correlation is
a relatively weak result, but attitudes are more remote from behaviour than
the intentions into which CV surveys enquire. For example, compare the
attitude `I agree strongly that the Government should spend more money on
national parks' with the intention `If there were a referendum on the issue, I
would vote for more spending on national parks.'
Experimental psychology and experimental economics oVer another
source of evidence. Many investigations of decision-making behaviour
were Wrst carried out by asking subjects to make hypothetical choices, and
have subsequently been replicated in settings with Wnancial incentives. In
most cases, the same patterns of behaviourÐoften patterns that are incon-
sistent with received economic theoryÐare found in both types of experi-
ment. For example, this is the case for the preference-reversal experiments
discussed in Chapter 6 (Grether and Plott, 1979; Slovic and Lichtenstein,
1983). Notice, however, that such similarities in patterns of behaviour across
experiments does not imply that incentives do not aVect behaviour at all. For
example, psychological eVects such as response compatibility and anchoring
might come into play irrespective of incentives, and these might generate
preference reversals (see Chapter 6), but subjects might still be more risk-
averse in the presence of incentives.
Further evidence comes from experiments which compare responses to
hypothetical questions about willingness to trade with real trading behav-
iour. Bishop, Heberlein, and their associates have carried out a series of
investigations of individuals' valuations of hunting permits in cases in which
these are strictly rationed (Bishop and Heberlein, 1979, 1986; Bishop et al.,
1983; Heberlein and Bishop, 1986). A typical experiment is conducted with
two random samples drawn from a population of applicants for hunting
permits. Subjects in one sample are treated as in a normal CV survey: WTP
or willingness to accept (WTA) is elicited by using hypothetical questions.
Subjects in the other sample are oVered genuine opportunities to buy or sell
permits. The results are mixed, but the general picture seems to be that
hypothetical responses overstate real WTP and WTA. In one typical case,
mean hypothetical WTA was $101 and mean real WTA was $63 (Bishop and
Heberlein, 1979). In another, mean hypothetical WTP was $32 and mean
real WTP was $24 (Bishop and Heberlein, 1986).
138
ROBERT S U G DEN
Thus, it seems that there may be a systematic discrepancy between
hypothetical responses and real behaviour. If such a discrepancy exists, it
undoubtedly poses a problem for CV research; but it need not be interpreted
as evidence that responses are casual or insincere. People may be honestly
reporting their beliefs about how they would respond to trading opportun-
ities, were these to arise; but those beliefs may be systematically biased (for
example, in a hypothetical context people may underestimate their aversion
to giving up money). I suggest that observed diVerences between hypothe-
tical responses and real behaviour are more plausibly explained by such
eVects than by assuming that survey respondents act strategically. It seems
reasonable to proceed on the working assumption that respondents in CV
surveys make honest attempts to answer the questions they are confronted
with.
5.5. THE LINK BETWEEN PREFERENCE AND CHOICE
Respondents in CV surveys are typically presented with hypothetical scenar-
ios within which they are asked to make choices. Even if we can assume that
responses are honest, two diYculties must be overcome if we are to make
inferences about individuals' preferences from the data generated by CV
surveys. (A further problem, that preferences with the properties postulated
by economic theory might not exist at all, will be considered in Chapter 6.)
The Wrst diYculty is that the scenario has to represent a conceivable
situation in which the respondent chooses between alternative combinations
of money and the relevant good. In the case of a private good, the scenario
can be based on the market. For example, a respondent may be asked to
imagine that hunting permits are on sale at a price of $30, and to say whether
or not he would buy one at that price. Most people have a vast amount of
experience of buying private goods, and at least some experience of selling
them; thus, they will Wnd a market scenario quite familiar. But the design of
scenarios for publicgoods is less straightforward. The problem is to Wnd a
context in which people make decisions as individuals about the supply of
public goods. There seem to be two obvious candidates: voluntary contribu-
tions to public goods, and voting on issues concerned with the supply and
Wnance of such goods.
The second diYculty is to Wnd a theory which connects preferences to
choices of the kind described by the scenario . For private goodsand market
settings, economics oVers a simple theoryÐthat each individual maximizes
utility, taking prices as given. Using this theory, we can infer preferences
from choices made in markets, or from hypothetical choices made in market
scenarios. If we are to elicit valuations of public goods, we need a corres-
ponding theory of how individuals' decisions about voluntary contributions
to public goods, or about how to vote, connect with their preferences.
PUBLIC G O ODS ANDCONTINGENTVALUATION 139
5.6. VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO PUBLIC GOODS
Some signiWcant goods are Wnanced by the voluntary contributions of many
individuals: think of the activities of humanitarian, educational, medical and
environmental charities and pressure groups. Donors to such organizations
make decisions which involve giving up private consumption in order to
increase the supply of public goods. Decision contexts of this kind might
seem to oVer suitable scenarios for eliciting preferences for public goods.
However, it is surprisingly di Ycult to explain such voluntary contributions
in terms of conventional economic theories of decision-m aking. In this
section I shall examine these diYculties and the problems they create for
CV research.
A numb er of economists have tried to explain voluntary contributions to
public goods by using variants of the model presented in Section 5.2. Each
individual is assumed to have preferences over combinations of private and
public goods; each individual chooses how much to contribute to public
goods, maximizing her utility while taking prices and other individuals'
contributions as given. The equilibrium state of the model is taken to be a
representation of the real world (e.g. Schwartz, 1970; Becker, 1974; Arrow,
1981).
More recent work, however, has shown that this type of theory yields
implications which are clearly inconsistent with the facts of volunta ry giving.
These implications are generat ed because, in the model, each individual
regards other people's contributions to a public good as perfec t substitutes
for her own. Thus, each individual's contribution is highly sensitive to
changes in other people's contributions. Under reasonable assumptions
about preferences, we should expect to Wnd that each individual reduces
her own contribution by almost one dollar for every extra dollar contri buted
by others; but we do not Wnd anything like this degree of responsiveness in
reality (Sugden, 1982; Warr, 1982; Roberts, 1984). If real people behaved
like the individuals of the model, virtually no one would contribute anything
to publicgoods in a large economy (Andreoni, 1988). And if individuals
became aware of the extent to which their contributions were interdepend-
ent, the prospects for the voluntary supply of publicgoods would be still
worse. Since each would know that a reduction in her own contributions
would be almost wholly made up by increases in others' contributions,
rational self-interest would lead each to try to take a free ride (Sugden,
1985).
A further challenge to the conventional theory of publicgoods has come
from experimental research. In a classic series of experiments, Marwell and
Ames (1979, 1980, 1981) investigated the extent to which individuals are
willing to contribute to public goods. In a typical experiment, subjects were
assigned to groups, within which interaction was anonymous (groups did
not meet; all interactions were via the experimenters). Each subject was
140
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[...]... Else? Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods, IV', Journal of Public Economics, 15: 295±310 Mitchell, R C., and Carson, R T (1989), Using Surveys to Value Public Goods: The ContingentValuation Method, Resources for the Future, Washington Mueller, D C (1989), Public Choice II, Cambridge University Press Roberts, R D (1984), `A Positive Model of Private Charity and Public Transfers', Journal of Political... Agricultural Economics, 61: 926±30 ÐÐ and Ð (1986), `Does ContingentValuation Work?' in R G Cummings, D S Brookshire, and W D Schulze (eds.), Valuing Environmental Goods, Rowman and Allanheld, Totowa, NJ ÐÐ Heberlein, T A., and Kealy, M J (1983), `Hypothetical Bias in Contingent Valuation: Results from a Simulated Market', Natural Resources Journal, 23: 619±33 Brennan, G., and Buchanan, J M (1984), `Voter... 99±107 Hill, R J (1981), `Attitudes and Behavior', in M Rosenberg and R H Turner (eds.), Social Psychology: Sociological Perspectives, Basic Books, New York Hoehn, J P and Randall, A (1987), `A Satisfactory BeneWt±Cost Indicator from ContingentValuation' , Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 14: 226±47 Kahneman, D., and Knetsch, J L (1992), `Valuing Public Goods: the Purchase of Moral Satisfaction',... ÐÐ and Lomasky, L (1985), `The Impartial Spectator Goes to Washington: Toward a Smithian Theory of Electoral Politics', Economics and Philosophy, 1: 189±211 Clarke, E H (1971), `Multipart Pricing of PublicGoods' , Public Choice, 11: 19±33 Collard, D (1978), Altruism and Economy, Martin Robertson, Oxford Douglas, M., and Isherwood, I (1979), The World of Goods, Basic Books, New York Grether, D M and. .. `Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods, I Resources, Interest, Group Size, and the Free Rider Problem', American Journal of Sociology, 84: 1335±60 ÐÐ and Ð (1980), `Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods, II Provision Points, Stakes, Experience, and the Free Rider Problem', American Journal of Sociology, 85: 926±37 PUB LIC G OODS AN D C ONT ING EN T V AL UAT ION 151 ÐÐ and Ð (1981), `Economists... for Public Good Decisions', American Economic Review, 70: 584±99 Sugden, R (1982), `On the Economics of Philanthropy', Economic Journal, 92: 341± 50 ÐÐ (1984), `Reciprocity: the Supply of PublicGoods through Voluntary Contributions', Economic Journal, 94: 772±87 ÐÐ (1985), `Consistent Conjectures and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods: Why the Conventional Theory Does Not Work', Journal of Public. .. Bargaining', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3: 367±88 Hargreaves Heap, S P (1989), Rationality in Economics, Blackwell, Oxford Harsanyi, J C (1982), `Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour', in A Sen and B Williams (eds.), Utilitarianism and Beyond, Cambridge University Press Heberlein, T A., and Bishop, R C (1986), `Assessing the Validity of Contingent Valuation: Three Field Experiments',... Brennan, Buchanan, and Lomasky, is that voters may be inXuenced by norms of fairness and reciprocity When people make voluntary contributions to public goods, they may be motivated by moral rules which prescribe, for each individual, a fair share of the total cost of providing a public good (see Section 5.6) Thus, when comparing two alternative options A and B, where A is the status quo and B is some mix... Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: a Theory of WarmGlow Giving', Economic Journal, 100: 464±77 Arrow, K (1981), `Optimal and Voluntary Income Distribution', in S RosenWelde (ed.), Economic Welfare and the Economics of Soviet Socialism: Essays in Honor of Abram Bergson, Cambridge University Press ÐÐ Solow, R., Portney, P., Leamer, E., Radner, R., and Schuman, H (1993), Report of the NOAA Panel on Contingent. .. (Sugden, 1984) In these theories, private contributions to publicgoods are motivated by people's moral commitment to rules which they see as fair Thus, contributions to publicgoods do not reveal the donors' preferences in the same direct way that decisions to buy private goods do What is revealed is the combined eVect of the donor's own preferences, her beliefs about fair rules for costsharing, and . 5
Public Goods and Contingent
Valuation
Public Goods and Contingent Valuation
ROBERT SUGDEN ROBERT SUGDEN
5.1. PUBLIC GOODS
Many applications of the contingent. the public goods
problem. For example, consider a presidential election with two candidates,
PUBLIC G O ODS AND CONTINGENT VALUATION 145
X and Y, and an