OF CRITICISM CATEGORIES People mostly ding ($- *) to permanence and pleasure while they !;lot cling (::t:4-j (so much) to impermanence and suffering Therefore through (the relative truths of) impermanence and pain the perversion of permanence and pleasure is rej ecte d (29I b) Therefore the teaching that impermanence -and suffering are true is only a remedial teaching which holds good in the everyday world _ But if people would cling even t6 impermanence and s uffering, then the Buddha would te�ch that even these are Junya, not ultimate The same is the case even with having a beginning and being beginningless The notion of beginninglessness can negate the perversion of clinging to beginning But if one clings to the position of beginninglessness itself, then even that is taught to be JUnya (non-ultimate) �8 (29I b) That things have -an absolute Because, beginning is a great perversion (*�) If (the course of life) has an (absolute) beginning then it should be that the �ery first birth o f a being in a good or an evil state was without any conditioning factor of merit or sin But if his birth was due to (his own) merit or sin, then that body ofhis was not his very first body, for one in the later embodiment must have received the results of one's own deeds, good or evil, done in one's previous span of life That the course of life has no (absolute) beginning does not give room to t�s error Therefore the bodhisattva will have already given up this gross per version (tI��H!) (viz., that the course of life has an absolute begin ning) He always cultivates the tho ught of beginninglessness in reference to the course of the life of all beings , and therefore he spe�s of the course of the life of beings as beginningless He always cultivates the comprehension of the causal law , and therefore he speaks of the elements constituting composite things as devoid of (absolute) beginning (29Ib-c) 19 NAGARJUNA'S PHILOSOPHY That the course of existence is not absolutely beginningless is the ' teaching meant to remove the error in regard to the devoidness of beginning Even as the devoidness of beginning can negate the notion of having a beginning, so the notion of beginning can also negate the dcvoidness of beginning Still, there is a difference between them The notion of things having a beginning creates further perversion while the notion of the devoidness of beginning can function as a reason for the right view and the loving attitude (��!f!;&j£Jt/Z,;l�) towards all The thought that beings suffer pain from b �ginningless times gives rise to compassion (1:: �J:.c.,) for all and by the knowledge that from one span of bodily life there arises another span of bodily life, one can further know that deeds good or evil flow in unbroken continuity bearing re sults Thus there arises the right attitude (!£iJ:Jt) in regard to all things So, of beginning case this is a good thing, helpful in his wayfaring (JYJii*�) If one does not cling to the notion then in his of the devoidness But if one seizes the character of devoidness of beginning and clings to it, then it is a perversion ($Jt) (29IC) E Time: Past, Present and Future Time as a substance: The Siistra makes clear that the wrong views about the beginning and end of the course of existenc� owe their being lack of right understanding of the nature of the three times : to a Some give rise to wrong notions about the three times and make (unconditional) statements that the individuals and the constituent ele ments of the-past have an (absolute) beginning or that they not have (absolutely) any beginning (25 5b) Even as the wrong view of the beginning is concerning the past, so the wrong view of the end is concerning the future The one remedy to these wrong views is the right understanding that all things are es19 CRITICISM Of CATEGORIES sentially conditioned and constitute the stream of events, every phase of which has a before and an after relative to it, and that neither the phase itself nor its before or after can be seized as absolute Priority and posteriority are not absolute ; these have significance only relatively to each other, and rel atively to a specific event in its concrete setting Prior and posterior as well as p ast , present and future belong to what have been considered above as relational concepts or concepts of mutual relation &9 There is not anything like past in itself, p resent in i tself or future in itself And yet this is what is found on examination to have been the notion of those who assert that past, present and future always exist, as well as of those who conceive time as an immutable substance or a changeless reality There are som.e who say that all things , heaven and earth, good and bad, arise from time (kala) , and that therefore time is the source of things When time comes beings mature ; when time approaches they hasten (toward extinction) ; time can awaken men ; therefore time is the source of all things (6sb) There are others who say that although things are not made by time, still time is an essential condition (�) for the being of things Time itself is an immutable substance (�I!) ; it is a reality (-;;ff ) (vastusat or dravya sat) J b ut as it is sub tle it cannot be seen (���RJ �) with physical eyes or known (�RJ1;n) in the way in which gross things are known Still , from its effects (*�) like flowers and fruits , it can lYe known that there is time as their condition Again, we see also the features (ffi) of time like past and present, slow and fast e tc and through its features we can know that there is time Seeing the effect we know that its necess a ry condi tion is there (J!Af��ff�) Therefore time is there as a reality (ff� $) Time has no decay (�.) and so time is eternal.61 But then, the sa�'tra observes that if time is eternal, its features should be eternal too ; this means th a t the past does not make the future Again, if time is one and integral, there can be no ques tion of the past pro ducing the present or the future And furthe r , within the p as t there can19 S NAGARJUNA'S PHILOSOPHY not be the future as this would lead to a confusion of times So, if this view were right, then there would be no past or future and similarly there would be no present.62 The holders of the view that time is a reali ty would justify the reality of the past as the necessary condition of the p r�sent Thus, e.g , the subtle par ticles of earth are the necessary condi tion of the birth of a pot Granted the reality of the past, p resent and future must be real also Thus, time should be accepted as a reality.83 Now, granting that the pot is future and the subtle particles of earth are past, still the past call1lo\ make the future For, on this view both the past and the future should have to be eternal Again, if the past could make th e future or if the future could arise from the past, then the past would be within the future But then , how could it be called the past? So, even the past would then hav� to be denied U Do past, present and future always exist? An objector like the Abhid rmika might argue : How can it ·be that there is no time? Time must be accepted (as a reality) The present has the character of presentness the past has the character of pastness and the future has the character of futurity.u , (6 C) To this, the Sam-a replies: But if it is held that all the three time-divisions have (already, even now) their resp ective characters, then all of them must be equally just present (".:i:�:(£tIt) Then there woUld not be any past or future If the future is here even now (liA,:ff * *) then it is just present and not future (It should not be the not yet co me It should be the alrea dy come) (65c) But can it not be that while the past and the future not function in the present, the past functioned in the past and the future will func tion in the future, that although all these have their respective charac ters even now, still every element has its own time of functioning? 66 The Siistra replies: 96 CRITI CISM OF CATEGORIES Now, either the past is past or it is not If the past is past (:f!flJi*itH�), then it is already extinct, and if it ii not past (lilJi*;r:;lJis), the� it has not the characte r of pastness But why? Because it has given up its own character (of pastness) The same is the' case with the future (None of these can be said to have any own nature or self-being.) Therefore timc itselfis not a s ubstance, not a reality (�?M\li.) And how can it bring to birth all things, the beautiful and the ugly, Bower and fruit? (65c) Time as a derived notion : The, denial of time as a substance is not a total denial of time but is a revelation of time as a derived notion As a means of referring to the course of events time is essential in the everyday world The Sastra says, If there were absolutely no past or future, if there were only the pres ent lasting for a moment, then even the Buddha could not have striven in the path and achieved the immeasurable merits (which He did indecd achieve) So it must be known that the past and the future arc there indeed (254C) But the statement that the past and the future are there does not mean that all the three times are just present To those who hold that view, the objection may be raised that if past, present and future ale all ex utent what is non-existent? Has not the Buddha taught that there are the four Noble "I:tJJths ? 15 not the truth of suffering (dt4�tklta) the foremost among them? And u not the cultivation of the truth of imper manence the foremost factor in the cultivation of the ftrst Noble Truth? If the past, which is truly the not any more existent is also existent as well as the present then, surely, the past cannot any more be said to be ' impermanent, lost, impossible to obtain? o Again, to hold th�t a thing is existent in all the three times, and that in passing from one state to another it h as ever remained as it was, and is not lost, would be to £,11 into the wrong notion of eternalism Then, This thing' which is there really in the future would p ass from there and enter the present and pass from there and enter the past even as a 19 ... negate the notion of having a beginning, so the notion of beginning can also negate the dcvoidness of beginning Still, there is a difference between them The notion of things having a beginning... Even as the wrong view of the beginning is concerning the past, so the wrong view of the end is concerning the future The one remedy to these wrong views is the right understanding that all things... th a t the past does not make the future Again, if time is one and integral, there can be no ques tion of the past pro ducing the present or the future And furthe r , within the p as t there