CONCEPTS AND ENTITIES That men are ignoran� does not mean that they are ignorant like cows and goats (*m:tl[J1f$�I\.) (Even) these people seek the path way to reality But owing to perversion, they give rise to several kinds of misconstruction (60b) The ignorant pursue names while what they seek is reality {�� *_).9 (T92C) In any case, whether it is the world of the Buddha or of the common man, it is what it is precisely as we make it All things are creations (nirmiit}a) (it) ; among these there are the creations of the Sriivakas, the creations of the pratyekabuddhas, the crea tions of the bodhisattvas, and the creations of the Buddha There are also the creations of affiictions (klda) and of deeds (karma) What ever thing there is (that is subject to birth and death), all that is a nir miit}a.10 (728c) (Although all things are alike nirmiilJa and therefore) devoid of reali ty (still) there holds among them the distinction of one thing from an other even as the things seen in dream, despite their unreality, admit of distinctionsY (729c) In fact all that is created is a creation of deeds ; but there is a difference between the deeds that are undeftled and the deeds that spring from affliction and passion The one is the world of the wise, and the other, the world of the ignorant The creations of the ignorant that arise from impure deeds are prompted by affliction, while the creations of the sages spring from wisdom and compassion The world of convention is called nirmiilJa to indicate that it is a crea tion ; it is called samvrti to indicate that it veils the truth of things ; it is called vyavahiira to say that it has mundane truth, "empirical validity," although devoid of ultimacy ; it is called prapaiica to show that it is an elaboration through concepts and conventional entities The "builder" of the world is vijiiiina or dUa as a self-conscious principle of intellec tion.l And in this building of the world the two, niima and la�at}a names and what they stand for, constitute the warp and woof 73 NAGAR]UNA'S PHILOSOPHY Concepts and conventional entities (nama and lak�ar;a) : A) Nama: name, concept: In analyzing aspects and apprehending their synthesis discern ing the ways of their combination in the unity of the thing the thing is given a name The name designates the object The process of naming which is also the process of ideation or formation of concepts involves abstraction of characters from within the thing The characters so ab stracted may be either essential to the thing or accidental Either way they belong to the content of the concept that designates the thing Each of these aspects :tlso has its own name ; and each of the ways of their combination has also its own name · And "name" itself has its meaning as well as "meaning" has its name In every case the name or concept, in so far as it is significant, conveys a certain meaning (content) for which it stands or which it represents Nama means the word as well �s the concept or notion, while lak�a1;la stands for the content, the charac ter, essential or nonessential, as well as for the "entities" to which these characters belong and which they signify The synthesis of experience worked out by understanding is al together constituted of nama and la�a1;la Nam a which means name or concept, means not simply the pure or formal categories of knQwledge for even the empirical cont,ent has a.' name ; it is also nama Again, the content or lak?a1;la covers not only the empirical content but the modes of their combination also Thus relations are also called lak�a1;la (conven tional entities) with their own names Nama and lak?at.za, c.oncepts and their contents, the words and what they designate, constitute the entire world of experience Thus the Sutra says : "All things are only nama and la�a1;la." Speaking of nama, the Sutra says, "Nama is the means by which one holds the thing (firmly in the mind) (.!;t�I&rni*:!! i�U� ll)."14 Thi ng s ·exist,in an d through the fun ctions they fulfill and "names arise," says the Sastra, "as references to the (characters and) functions of things (IIJ!*Jtg�)."15 · The sixteen n ames o f the indivi.dual, arise, e.g., as specific references to his particular character� and functions The, names of vari ous o fficials, again, for ex ample, arise from the offices they fulfill which vary according to their knowledge and ability Even names like recluse, the obtainer 'of the 'Yay, 74 CONCEPTS AND ENTITIES arise from their references to the nature and function of their respective referents.i6 B) Lak$a/;ta (I) Sign: Says the Sastra: Niima is the word (vart;ta) (*) (that designates) the thing For ex ample, "fIre" is the word that designates the (co mplex) entity the nature of which is heat (and illumination) Lak$at;ta (is the sign by means of which the thing may b e cognized Smoke, e.g., is the sign offue) Seeing the smoke one understands that it indicates the presence of fire (While smoke is the sign of fIre) heat is the essential nature (It) of fire Again, in reference to the complex of the fIve skandhas, "man" or "woman" is the niima (name) ; the bodily features by means of which the person can be distinguished as man or woman, constitute the lak$at;ta (sign) On seeing these signs, the name is given as man or womari (69Ib) Speaking almost in the same terms but referring to ((artha" (�), the meaning, ins�ead of " lak$at;ta J J J mark or sign, we have the Siistra saving : There are iIi all two things, niima (�*) and artha (�*.), the name or the word and its meaning For example, "fIre" is the name and the meaning that it conveys is the complex entity composed of heat and illumination It is the complex of these two elements, that is called "fIre." If there were another "fue" apart from these two, then it sho uld have had a third function apart from them but which is not the case So it should be known that it is the complex of these two elements that is derivedly named "fIre " (;l!=�fll.g.�jS* ) (3 8a) When it is said that smoke is the laksana of fIre, laksana is taken as a m�rk, a sign Niima and lak$a/;ta a�e m�t�al1y depende�t : and t1�e per ception of the lak$a/}a is the condition for the naming of the thing First there is the perception of the fe:atures 'of man or wo �an and then the name is given as man or woman Lak$a1;Ja is the root and niima is the branch.Is (69I.b) 75 NAGARJUNA'S PHILOSOPHY La�a1Ja is called nimitta or occasion with regard to its functioning as the occasion for the rise of ideas and emotions When one sees with one's eyes the (bodily) form one seizes with a bias (.1&) (only) such characters that one likes and clings to them (ffii 1: :t:) ; the others not have the same interest in regard to these charac ters As these (characters) are capable of giving rise to passion and cling ing they are called nimitta (fll ) , i.e., occasions (for the rise of passion) 19 (69Ib) La�a1Ja (II) : Essential Character, Nature: L a�a1J a meaning the sign or mark (accidental character) is distinguished from la�at}a meaning the essential character or nature (prakrti) In answer to a question regarding the distinction between lak�at;Ul (character, m) and prakrti (natute, M:) the Siistra observes : Some say, in their meaning (� ) there is no difference, the difference i� only in name To speak of prakrti is itself to speak of lak�a1J a and to speak of lak�a1Ja is itself to speak of prakrti For example, to speak of the nature of fire is itself to speak of its la�a1Ja of heat, and to speak of its lak�a1Ja of heat is itself to speak of its prakrti Some say, there is a little difference between prakrti and lak�a1Ja Prakrti refers to the e3sential nature (lit) of the thing, while la�a1Ja refers to (the mark which is) the means to cognize it ("ilJall ) For ex ample, of the Siikya-putra, prakrti is the acceptance and the leadmg of moral life while the lak�a1Jas are the shav�d head and the coloured cloth Of the fire, heat is prakrti while smoke is lak�alJa The proximate is the prakrt; while the distant is the lak�a1Ja There is no necessity about the mark that it should arise from the very nature of the thing, while prakrti is the very essential nature of the thing Thus, a metal may bear the mark of gold in appearing yellow in colour, while in essence it may he just brass When the metal is burnt in fire or rubbed on stone, then it is known that it has not the nature of gold Again, for example, when a person is respecting and worshipping he may appear to be a good man 76 CONCEPTS AND ENTITIES But when he becomes wild, scolding (people) without any sense of shame, becomes angry and frightful, then his true nature would come to light Between prakrti and lak$aIJa there are these distinctions of being internal and external, proximate and distant, the first appearance and later revelation.20 (293 b) In another context speaking of the ten powers (bala) the Sastra draws the distinction between dhatu (nature) of the Buddha and lak$alJa (�) (mark) and says : Dhiitu is (the essence that is deepened by) cumulative cultivation (ftfi ) and lak$alJa is (the sign or mark that is) born from dhatu.2J (23 9b) Again, Lak$alJa becomes prak{ti (/1JG�) by cumulative cultivation Take anger, for example In the case of a person who gets angry constandy, eveLY day without a break, anger itself would become his nature and so he would become ill-natured In some cases prak{ti and Jak$atJa are different For example, seeing the smoke one would recognize the fire ; smoke is the mark offire, it is not itself fire; In other cases there is no difference between the two For example, heat is the nature offire and it is also the mark of fire 22 ( b) La k$a lJa (III) Determinate Entity : Lak$alJa also means determinate ex istent entity This is understandable because the entity being determinate derives its being and maintains its uniqueness only through determina tion (specification by abstraction) , which consists in dividing and setting apart the rest Thus the Sutra says : All that is lak$alJa is dual, divided (-Wmw�=) ; all that is divided is a particular existent entity All that is an existent entity is subject to birth and death.22' (66IC) 77 ... within the thing The characters so ab stracted may be either essential to the thing or accidental Either way they belong to the content of the concept that designates the thing Each of these aspects... :tlso has its own name ; and each of the ways of their combination has also its own name · And "name" itself has its meaning as well as "meaning" has its name In every case the name or concept, in. .. is the means by which one holds the thing (firmly in the mind) (.!;t�I&rni*:!! i�U� ll)."14 Thi ng s ·exist ,in an d through the fun ctions they fulfill and "names arise," says the Sastra, "as