MIND AND SOUL reluctance to accept that our actions are necessitated, he believes, arises from a confusion between necessity and constraint: Few are capable of distinguishing betwixt the liberty of spontaneity, as it is call’d in the schools, and the liberty of indiVerence; betwixt that which is oppos’d to violence, and that which means a negation of necessity and causes The Wrst is even the most common sense of the word; and as ’tis only that species of liberty, which it concerns us to preserve, our thoughts have been principally turn’d towards it, and have almost universally confounded it (T, 408) Experience exhibits our liberty of spontaneity: we often do, unconstrained, what we want to But experience cannot provide genuine evidence for liberty of indiVerence, that is, the ability to otherwise than we in fact We may imagine we feel such a liberty within ourselves, ‘but a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our motives and character; and even when he cannot, he concludes in general, that he might, were he perfectly acquainted with every circumstance of our situation and temper, and the most secret springs of our complexion and disposition’ (T, 408) Such talk of ‘secret springs’ of action is one indication that in discussing this issue Hume has forgotten his oYcial theory of mind and his oYcial theory of causation Indeed, his very deWnition of the human will seems incompatible with them ‘By the will I mean nothing but the internal impression we feel and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind ’ (T, 399) Given his view of causation, we must wonder what right Hume has to talk of our ‘giving rise’ to motions and perceptions But if we replace ‘we knowingly give rise to any new motion’ with ‘any new motion is observed to arise’, the deWnition no longer looks at all appropriate Kant’s Anatomy of the Mind The anatomy of the mind, as described by Kant, contains many traditional elements He made a distinction between the intellect and the senses, and between inner sense and the Wve outer senses These distinctions, although rejected by some philosophers, had remained commonplaces since the Middle Ages Kant’s only innovation so far was to give novel epistemological functions to traditional faculties But he went on to draw new distinctions, and to bring new insights to bear on the philosophy of mind 240