GOD individual things which constitute the world, we must conclude that it must have been imposed by one or more sublime wise causes, operating not blindly as nature does, but freely as humans Kant raises various diYculties about the analogies that the argument draws beteween the operation of nature and the artiWce of human skill; but his real criticism of the proof is not to deny its authority but to limit its scope The most the argument can prove is the existence of ‘an architect of the world who is always very much hampered by the adaptability of the material in which he works, not a creator of the world to whose idea everything is subject’ Many religious believers would be very content to have established beyond reasonable doubt the existence of such a grand architect However, Kant did not say his last word about God in the Critique of Pure Reason In his second critique he sets out a number of postulates of practical reason; assumptions that must be made if obedience to the moral law is to be made a rational activity The postulates turn out to be the same as the traditional topics of natural metaphysics: God, freedom, and immortality We have an obligation to pursue perfect goodness, which includes both virtue and happiness We can only have an obligation to pursue something if it is possible of achievement: ‘Ought’, Kant said memorably, ‘implies can.’ But only an all-powerful, omniscient God could ensure that virtue and happiness can coincide—and even such a God can so only if there is a life after the present one Hence, it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God Kant insists that there is no inconsistency between this claim and his denial in the Wrst critique that speculative reason could prove the existence and attributes of God The postulation of God’s existence demanded by the moral life is an act of faith Already in a preface to the Wrst Critique Kant had marked out the diVerence between the two approaches to theology, and claimed that his critical approach to metaphysics was actually a necessary condition of a morally valuable belief in God’s existence: I cannot even assume God, freedom and immortality for the sake of the necessary practical use of my reason unless I simultaneously deprive speculative reason of its pretension to extravagant insights Thus I have to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith The dogmatism of metaphysics—the idea that it is possible to make progress in the subject without criticizing pure reason—is the true source of that dogmatic unbelief which is at odds with morality (B) 327