THE ARTS This PDF document was made available CHILD POLICY from www.rand.org as a public service of CIVIL JUSTICE the RAND Corporation EDUCATION ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT Jump down to document6 HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS NATIONAL SECURITY POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SUBSTANCE ABUSE TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world Support RAND Purchase this document Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore RAND National Defense Research Institute View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors All RAND monographs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity Sustaining U.S Nuclear Submarine Design Capabilities Executive Summary John F Schank, Mark V Arena, Paul DeLuca, Jessie Riposo Kimberly Curry, Todd Weeks, James Chiesa Prepared for the United States Navy Approved for public release; distribution unlimited NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE The research described in this report was prepared for the United States Navy The research was conducted in the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community under Contract W74V8H-06-C-0002 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Sustaining U.S nuclear submarine design capabilities : executive summary / John F Schank [et al.] p cm ISBN 978-0-8330-4161-6 (pbk.) Nuclear submarines—United States—Design and construction—21st century Shipbuilding industry—Employees—United States—21st century Navy-yards and naval stations—United States I Schank, John F (John Frederic), 1946– V858.S8712 2007 359.9'3—dc22 2007013350 Photo Courtesy of General Dynamics Electric Boat The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world R AND’s publications not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors R® is a registered trademark Cover Design by Stephen Bloodsworth © Copyright 2007 RAND Corporation All rights reserved No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from RAND Published 2007 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org/ To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: order@rand.org Preface For the first time, the U.S Navy faces a period that could last a number of years in which there will be no design program under way for a new class of nuclear-powered submarine The resulting lack of demand for the services of submarine designers and engineers raises concerns that this highly specialized capability could atrophy, burdening the next submarine design effort with extra costs, delays, and risks In 2005, the Program Executive Office (PEO) for Submarines asked the RAND Corporation to evaluate the cost and schedule impacts of various strategies for managing submarine design resources Of concern were the design resources at Electric Boat and at Northrop Grumman Newport News, the two shipyards that have previously designed classes of nuclear submarines, as well as design resources at the key vendors that provide components for nuclear submarines Also of concern were the technical resources of the various Navy organizations that oversee and participate in nuclear submarine design programs RAND’s analysis built on similar research RAND conducted for the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence This document summarizes the methods and findings of the research that RAND carried out for PEO Submarines.1 For full documentation of this research, see John R Schank, Mark V Arena, Paul DeLuca, Jessie Riposo, Kimberly Curry, Todd Weeks, and James Chiesa, Sustaining U.S Nuclear Submarine Design Capabilities, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-608-NAVY, 2007 Available online at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG608/ iii iv Sustaining U.S Nuclear Submarine Design Capabilities: Executive Summary This research was sponsored by the U.S Navy and conducted within the Acquisition and Technology Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community The lead author of this report, John F Schank, can be reached at schank@rand.org For more information on RAND’s Acquisition and Technology Policy Center, contact the Director, Philip Antón He can be reached by email at atpc-director@rand.org; by phone at 310-3930411, extension 7798; or by mail at the RAND Corporation, 1776 Main Street, Santa Monica, California 90407-2138 More information about RAND is available at www.rand.org Contents Preface iii Figures vii Tables ix Acknowledgments xi Abbreviations xiii CHAPTER ONE Introduction What Should Be Done About the Current Gap Between Submarine Design Efforts? Motivators of New Submarine Design Have Evolved CHAPTER TWO Framing the Shipyard Analysis Step 1: Predict Design Demand Step 2: Formulate Supply Options Step 3: Estimate Costs of Supply Options The Results of the Analysis Should Be Interpreted with Caution 10 CHAPTER THREE Workforce Levels and Costs for the Shipyards 11 What Size Design Workforce Is Least Costly for Different Yards and Workloads? 11 Stretching the Work Results in Further Savings; Splitting the Work Does Not 13 v vi Sustaining U.S Nuclear Submarine Design Capabilities: Executive Summary How Sensitive Are the Results to Variations in Assumed Parameters? 15 Sustaining the Skills of a Workforce in Excess of Demand Is Problematic 16 CHAPTER FOUR Critical Skills at the Shipyards 17 Hundreds of Technical Skills Are Required to Design a Submarine 17 The Skills of a Sustained Workforce Might Follow Their Distribution for the Virginia-Class Design 18 But a Variety of Factors Should Be Taken into Account 18 CHAPTER FIVE Suppliers 21 How Will Suppliers to the Shipyards Weather the Design Gap? 21 Some Suppliers Might Not Be Able to Offer Continued Support 23 Options Addressing Supplier Risk Need to Be Tailored to the Vendor 24 CHAPTER SIX Effect of a Design Gap on Navy Resources 25 The Navy Holds Key Design Roles 25 Navy Design Activities Are Carried Out Mainly by the Naval Sea Systems Command and the Warfare Centers 26 NAVSEA Would Not Lose Personnel but Could Lose Some Expertise 27 The Warfare Centers Need at Least $30 Million per Year to Keep from Losing Skilled Design Professionals 27 CHAPTER SEVEN Conclusions and Recommendations 31 Figures 1.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 3.1 3.2 4.1 5.1 5.2 6.1 Overlapping U.S Submarine Design Efforts Are Giving Way to a Gap in Demand SSBN Class Start Date Affects Design Demand Peaks and Gaps The “Do Nothing” Option Leads to Long-Term Growth in Schedule and Workload The “Do Something” Option Trades Higher Near-Term Costs Against Long-Term Costs and Delays Base Case: At EB, Net Cost Is Lowest if 800 Workers Are Sustained 12 Stretching the Design Duration Can Fill the Gap 14 Categorization of Nuclear Submarine Design Skills by Electric Boat 17 At Most Firms, Most of the Design Staff Is Over 45 22 Distribution of Vendors Across Risk Categories 23 Most Prominent Design Facilities at NSWC’s Carderock Division Are Underused 28 vii 20 Sustaining U.S Nuclear Submarine Design Capabilities: Executive Summary and structural engineers specializing in shock If these skills are lost, reconstituting them will be more challenging than for other types of skills • Time to gain proficiency Skills that take a particularly long time to develop, because they require either a great deal of formal education or occupational training time, are also more challenging to reconstitute than skills that take less time to develop Approximately 10 percent of technical skills, for example, require 10 years of on-the-job experience to develop—in some cases, following a Ph.D (e.g., turbulence modeling, computational hull design and analysis, and nuclear containment analysis) • Supply and demand factors These may affect the availability of certain skills or the ease with which individuals with particular skills can be attracted to the industry The number of nuclear engineering programs in U.S universities, for example, has fallen by about half over the past 30 years Partly as a result, the supply of workers is decreasing in certain key areas At the same time, the U.S Department of Energy forecasts that new nuclear power plants will be needed by 2025, which suggests a competing demand for nuclear engineers CHAPTER FIVE Suppliers Submarines, like other large, complex systems, are not designed by a single firm A single firm cannot productively sustain all the special skills required The submarine design base thus includes a large number of subcontractors that contribute design expertise or engineered components to plug into the system How Will Suppliers to the Shipyards Weather the Design Gap? To find out, we surveyed suppliers identified by the shipbuilders as having significant activities associated with submarine design We received responses from 38 of the 58 firms the shipbuilders identified; 32 felt that they had significant activities associated with submarine design We analyzed these 32 responses according to a set of indicators of potential risk in the design industrial base: • Percentage of revenue generated by design work Only one firm got most of its revenue from design Considered alone, this suggests that most firms could weather a design gap • Percentage of revenue from submarine business Over three-quarters of the firms got half or less—usually much less—of their revenue from the submarine business—another indicator that a design gap would not have a large impact 21 22 Sustaining U.S Nuclear Submarine Design Capabilities: Executive Summary • Absence of competitors Only five firms believed that they had no competitors, suggesting that in the event that some suppliers fail, the shipbuilder will typically have alternatives • Insufficient design workforce supply Over a third of the suppliers indicated that they foresee a problem maintaining a technical workforce within the next 10 years—a period that extends through the expected SSBN design start date About half foresee trouble beyond that • Percentage of workforce in upper age range The average age of the design staff at over half of the firms is more than 45 years (see Figure 5.1) This is problematic because it suggests that many workers could approach retirement over the course of a submarine design gap Such workers will not only be unavailable to meet workforce demand, they will not be there to mentor younger workers • Extent to which employment falls short of demand peak for design Eighty percent or more of firms indicated that they already had sufficient staff to meet the peak design demand from a new submarine program Figure 5.1 At Most Firms, Most of the Design Staff Is Over 45 Low risk Medium High risk Number of firms 1–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 51–60 61–70 71–80 81–90 91–100 Percentage of design staff over 45 years old in 2005 RAND MG608/1-5.1 Suppliers 23 • Time required to ramp up a design staff Two-thirds of the firms thought that it would take a year or less to ramp up for a new submarine design effort There should be sufficient notice to allow for that • Time required before a new hire is productive Most respondents judged that it would take over six months for new hires to become adapted to the firm and proficient in their roles Some Suppliers Might Not Be Able to Offer Continued Support The survey results suggest some reason for concern While we cite favorable majorities for most individual risks, when we take them all together, over half of the responding firms (19 of the 32) show a degree of risk (see Figure 5.2) We judged eight of those firms to be at high risk because of risky scores in multiple dimensions Figure 5.2 Distribution of Vendors Across Risk Categories High risk Low risk Medium risk Medium to low risk RAND MG608/1-5.2 24 Sustaining U.S Nuclear Submarine Design Capabilities: Executive Summary Options Addressing Supplier Risk Need to Be Tailored to the Vendor There are several possible options available for addressing supplier risk Three of the options forgo the need for a new component design and two try to help vendors sustain and build a design staff during the gap • Seek a competitive solution If the component or technology is not unique to a specific supplier, an alternative source could be sought This option is feasible only if competitors exist and are able to maintain their design resources during the current design gap • Replace the technology The next submarine class may not need a specific component that a vendor at risk provides For example, it is possible that a new technology may replace an existing one • Reuse the current component design A component may not need to be redesigned for the next submarine class if it can meet the needed performance attributes Thus, design work could be avoided • Stretch the next new submarine design period As with the shipbuilders, it might be possible to extend component design over a longer period of time to reduce the peak in the design workload • Use spiral development for the Virginia class In an attempt to maintain design staffs, the Navy could initiate modernization design work with an at-risk supplier This would work best for components in systems, such as combat or communication, that not require significant layout or structural changes Most of these options are not applicable to all suppliers, as the situations of the different firms vary In particular, stretching the design duration, a promising option for addressing the design gap at the shipyard, will not work for most of the vendors The choice of intervention, or mix of interventions, will have to be tailored to each at-risk vendor CHAPTER SIX Effect of a Design Gap on Navy Resources The Navy retains ultimate responsibility for a safe, effective, and affordable submarine design This responsibility has not changed despite significant changes in the division of labor between the Navy and private industry and in design tools and practices The Navy Holds Key Design Roles In carrying out its responsibility, the Navy fulfills three roles: providing technical infrastructure and expertise, designing and developing certain critical components, and supporting submarine-related science and technology In providing technical infrastructure and expertise, the Navy plays the role of smart buyer That is, it must ensure that the design efficiently meets Navy program requirements In this capacity, for example, the Navy implemented integrated process and product development in the design of the Virginia class, an innovation intended to save time and money by making Navy design reviews a part of the ongoing effort, rather than a milestone occurrence Another aspect of the infrastructure and expertise provided by the Navy is its role as a technical authority This role is taken on specifically by an array of technical warrant holders, each of whom certifies within his or her area of expertise that the design is safe, technically feasible, and affordable Finally, the Navy is responsible for design-phase testing and evaluation The Navy retains sole responsibility for designing and developing components that are associated with the nuclear propulsion plant, criti- 25 26 Sustaining U.S Nuclear Submarine Design Capabilities: Executive Summary cal to submarine safety, critical to the integration and interoperability of the command-and-communication and combat-control systems, or not commercially viable for private industry to design Submarinerelated science and technology is integrated through the SUBTECH program, which consists of integrated product teams focusing on communications, weapon systems, self-defense, and hull and propulsion issues One of the strengths of the Navy’s acquisition process is the separation of the responsibility for managing acquisition programs from the technical approval process Program managers are responsible for program performance in cost and schedule terms The Navy’s technical establishment is responsible for the technical acceptability of the product design In this way, safety issues are not subject to trade-offs against costs or schedule concerns Navy Design Activities Are Carried Out Mainly by the Naval Sea Systems Command and the Warfare Centers The Navy’s design resources are physically and organizationally dispersed between the headquarters of the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) and its naval warfare centers NAVSEA engineers oversee the design, construction, and support of the Navy’s fleet of ships, submarines, and combat systems The Naval Warfare Centers are charged with carrying out many of the specific activities supporting the Navy’s design responsibilities The Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) is responsible for hull, mechanical, and electrical (HM&E) systems and propulsors for both surface and undersea vessels The Naval Undersea Warfare Center is responsible for the bulk of submarine design issues The current division of responsibilities between NAVSEA and the warfare centers reflects a transition from a state in which more people were housed within NAVSEA A major purpose of that transition was to move staffing from mission-funded positions, billable to Navy overhead, to program-funded positions, billable to a program executive office The warfare centers operate somewhat like private contractors, billing their time to specific accounts and moving personnel to wher- Effect of a Design Gap on Navy Resources 27 ever the work is needed This has implications for the conservation of submarine design expertise in the Navy As with the shipyards, a design gap could affect the Navy through personnel termination, consequent skill loss, impediments to the development of managers, and eventual hiring and training or rehiring and retraining, with all the costs those involve There is also the possibility that some skills, once lost, could be difficult to reconstitute NAVSEA Would Not Lose Personnel but Could Lose Some Expertise The specific effects of a gap would vary by organization As a missionfunded organization, NAVSEA’s technical infrastructure would likely survive a submarine design gap However, the lack of ongoing design programs could degrade NAVSEA’s ability to properly develop ship design managers In particular, the lack of an ongoing new submarine design effort will mean that these engineers will not have an opportunity to exercise their whole-ship integration skills The gap will also retard the development of senior managers capable of providing leadership during subsequent design efforts Finally, proficiency in creating detailed technical specifications will decrease in the absence of a design program The Warfare Centers Need at Least $30 Million per Year to Keep from Losing Skilled Design Professionals The impact of a design gap on the naval warfare centers depends on the technical areas involved Non-HM&E areas are relatively insensitive to the gap because work in these areas is performed at the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, where in-service modernization programs make up the bulk of program funding and provide a healthy technical basis for new submarine design However, at the NSWC’s Carderock Division, ongoing in-service submarine support, technical assistance to the Virginia-class production program, and science and technology 28 Sustaining U.S Nuclear Submarine Design Capabilities: Executive Summary programs will not sustain the skills required for a full submarine design effort As a result, engineers and designers who have been working on the Virginia design will shift to funded programs, i.e., those unrelated to submarines, or leave Meanwhile, underused facilities (see Figure 6.1) might have to be laid up or placed on overhead accounts Carderock estimates the minimum workforce for sustaining design capability at 170, or about half that required for a full design effort (see Table 6.1) Carderock has received an average of $113 million per year in support of its submarine technology programs since the end of the Cold War It would thus take about $55 million per year to support half the workforce and an equivalent proportion of the facilities In-service support and technology development programs have averaged $23 million per year in funding This leaves Carderock facing a $30 million to 35 million per year shortfall in the funding required to support its core technical group of personnel and facilities Figure 6.1 Most Prominent Design Facilities at NSWC’s Carderock Division Are Underused Large cavitation channel David Taylor model basins Rotating arm Deep submergence pressure test facility Maneuvering and seakeeping basin Acoustic research department Large-scale underwater explosions test complex 20 40 60 Percentage utilization RAND MG608/1-6.1 80 100 Effect of a Design Gap on Navy Resources 29 This shortfall would be made up if the design duration were stretched to 20 years, essentially level-loading the Carderock division at the 170person core design complement Table 6.1 Manning Levels to Sustain Design Capability and to Support a Full Submarine Design Effort at NSWC’s Carderock Division Technical Capability Minimum Personnel Requiremed to Sustain Design Capability Personnel Required to Support Full Submarine Design Ship design and integration 14 Ship acquisition engineering 48 73 Mechanical power and propulsion systems 14 Electrical power and propulsion systems 10 Auxiliary machinery 22 Undersea vehicle sail and deployed systems Surface, undersea, and weapon vehicle materials 10 15 Surface and undersea vehicle structures 11 15 Alternate energy and power sources research and development Vehicle vulnerability, survivability, and force protection 14 20 Active and passive acoustic signatures and silencing systems 22 60 17 36 79 170 349 Hull forms, propulsors, and fluid mechanics Nonacoustic signatures and silencing Facility operations Totals CHAPTER SEVEN Conclusions and Recommendations The motivating concern for this research has been the potential for the loss of U.S submarine design capability, given the gap in design demand inherent in the Navy’s current shipbuilding plans There are two aspects to this loss in capability—the loss of workforce capacity and the loss of critical skills We have assessed the potential of both to erode capability at the shipyards, at the suppliers, and within the Navy itself We evaluated two basic workforce management strategies: (1) let the workforce erode and then rebuild it to design the next class of submarines and (2) sustain some number of workers in excess of those needed to meet the residual design demand during the gap We found the latter to be less expensive The number of workers to sustain depends on various assumptions Consider a design duration similar to those for preceding classes (15 years), a workload similar to that for the Virginia class, and a start date for designing the next class that is consistent with current Navy ship replacement plans (2014) In that case, EB would accomplish the next design least expensively if, during the gap, it sustained a minimum of 800 designers and engineers, and NGNN if it sustained 1,050 (including those needed to meet the residual demand) These numbers vary up or down by a few hundred if workload and start date are varied over their likely ranges The design workload could also be varied both spatially and temporally It could be split between the two shipyards, in an effort to maintain two capabilities This does not convey an advantage in cost or in workforce sustained, even if it is assumed that division of the work- 31 32 Sustaining U.S Nuclear Submarine Design Capabilities: Executive Summary load would cause no inefficiencies, which seems unlikely The workload could also be stretched out over time For example, the 15-year effort could be stretched to 20 years and, importantly, started early, in 2009, thus preempting most of the workforce drawdown In that event, no extra workforce need be sustained to minimize cost (assuming that all the work is done by one yard), and the cost minimum would be lower than that achievable with a 15-year design There are some drawbacks to stretching out the design, e.g., the greater possibility of design obsolescence by the time the first of class is launched, and these must be considered in any decision regarding this option However, there is also an important drawback to sustaining workers in excess of demand: the need to find them something to that will allow them to maintain those skills Several options are available, but even in combination, these may not be sufficient for skill retention equivalent to that achievable by work on a new submarine class EB is addressing the specifics of the critical-skills problem, so we not repeat that effort However, we break out the recommended sustained workforces by general skill categories, based on information from the shipyards regarding the breakdown of the entire design workforce We also offer some aggregate-level observations regarding the effect of the evolution of such skills on decisions as to which to support We identify workforce demographics, time required to gain proficiency, and supply and demand as among the factors that should be considered The potential problems arising from a design gap extend beyond the shipyards Numerous submarine components are provided by vendors that must design their products We conducted a survey that asked firms about some of the issues common to critical shipyard skills (demographics, time to proficiency), as well as issues more specific to vendors (presence of competitors, percentage of work devoted to design) We found that, while in any one dimension most firms appeared likely not to encounter problems that would hinder their contribution to submarine design after a gap, some appeared to be potentially at risk in more than one dimension The Navy’s roles in submarine design include exercising responsibility for ensuring that various aspects of design are consistent with Conclusions and Recommendations 33 safety and performance standards and designing certain components We reviewed these roles, along with workforce structure and trends in pertinent Navy organizations, and came to the following conclusion: Sufficient design expertise in the various major skill categories was unlikely to be sustained to support HM&E submarine design functions at the NSWC’s Carderock Division Between $30 and 35 million per year would be required to sustain sufficient staff in submarine design in excess of those needed during the design gap For both the Navy and for some vendors, avoiding the greater part of the design gap (e.g., by stretching out the design of the next class and starting it early) would obviate the need for concern over skill loss From the preceding analysis, we reach the following recommendations: • Seriously consider starting the design of the next submarine class by 2009, to run 20 years, taking into account the substantial advantages and disadvantages involved If the 20-year-design alternative survives further evaluation, the issue of a gap in submarine design is resolved, and no further actions need be taken If that alternative is judged too risky, we recommend the following: • Thoroughly and critically evaluate the degree to which options such as the spiral development of the Virginia class or design without construction will be able to substitute for new-submarine design in allowing design professionals to retain their skills If options to sustain design personnel in excess of demand are judged on balance to offer clear advantages over letting the workforce erode, then the Navy should take the following actions: • Request sufficient funding to sustain excess shipyard design workforces large enough to permit substantial savings in time and money later 34 Sustaining U.S Nuclear Submarine Design Capabilities: Executive Summary • Taking into account trends affecting the evolution of critical skills, continue efforts to determine which shipyard skills need action to preserve them within the sustained design core • Conduct a comprehensive analysis of vendors at high risk to determine the interventions required to preserve critical skills • Invest $30 million to 35 million annually in the NSWC’s Carderock Division submarine-design workforce in excess of reimbursable demand to sustain skills that might otherwise be lost ... W74V8H-06-C-0002 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Sustaining U.S nuclear submarine design capabilities : executive summary / John F Schank [et al.] p cm ISBN 97 8-0 -8 33 0-4 16 1-6 ... 20 0 19 19 19 85 19 80 19 19 19 Los Angeles Sustaining U.S Nuclear Submarine Design Capabilities: Executive Summary nuclear power, no new submarine design is on the drawing board, and, according... components that are associated with the nuclear propulsion plant, criti- 25 26 Sustaining U.S Nuclear Submarine Design Capabilities: Executive Summary cal to submarine safety, critical to the integration