The Spanish savings banks and the competitive cooperation model (1928-2002) pptx

UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID Working Papers in Economic History UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID c/ Madrid 126 28903 Getafe (Spain)Tel: (34) 91 624 96 37 Site: http://www.uc3m.es/uc3m/dpto/HISEC/working_papers/working_papers_general.html DEPARTAMENTO DE HISTORIA ECONÓMICA E INSTITUCIONES April 2007 WP 07-09 The Spanish savings banks and the competitive cooperation model (1928-2002) Francisco Comín Abstract This paper explores the relationship between the nature of Spanish Savings banks and the extent of their market success during the twentieth century. It deals with the key factors that have made so good a performance possible, such as: their ability to promote private saving, to cooperate with government economic policy, to adapt to changing circumstances, to operate in particular geographical areas, and to cooperate with one another. Finally, the paper deals with this last factor in depth. The competitive cooperation model is used to explain the outstanding role of the Spanish Confederation of Savings Banks in making the strategic alliance among the Spanish savings banks possible. Keywords: Savings banks, commercial banks, competitive cooperation, economic policy, savings banks association, Spain, Europe JEL Classification: G21, N24 Francisco Comín: Dpto. de Fundamentos de Economía e Historia Económica, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad de Alcalá, Pza. de la Victoria 3, 28802 Alcalá de Henares (Madrid) Spain Email: francisco.comin@uah.es 1 The Spanish savings banks and the competitive cooperation model (1928-2002). Francisco Comín (Universidad de Alcalá, Spain) 1 From the standpoint of banking history, the success story of savings banks in Spain is virtually unique, not only in Europe, but in the world 2 . The fact is that the savings banks are winning market share from the Spanish banks and are just as efficient as the latter 3 . The performance of Spanish savings banks is all the more remarkable in that Spanish commercial banks are among the most efficient in the world, as witness their international growth, not only in Latin America but also in the USA and the EU. This article attempts to explain the role of cooperation among the savings banks in Spain and the outstanding influence of the Spanish Confederation of Savings Banks (Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorros –CECA) on the expansion of the market share of savings banks in Spain as from the foundation of the CECA in 1928. The article has three sections. The first section describes the historical performance of the savings banks, examining the market share records for deposits and borrowed capital 1 This Working Paper is an advance on the main conclusions of a book I am currently writing to be published in 2008 with the title Historia de la cooperación entre las Cajas de Ahorros. La Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorros, 1928-2003 [History of cooperation among Savings Banks. The Spanish Confederation of Savings Banks, 1928-2003]. 2 Only the Norwegian savings banks have as successful a record asthe Spanish. See Pampillón (1994), Pampillón (2003), pp. 62-78. 3 See Pérez (2003), pp. 60-198, Pérez and Doménech (1990), Cals Güell (2005). 2 since 1850. The second section looks at the characteristics of the savings banks that have made their good performance possible, focusing on their ability to foster private saving, to cooperate with government economic policy, to adapt to changing political, economic and financial circumstances, to specialise in certain geographical areas and to cooperate with other savings banks. This last aspect is analysed in more depth in the third section since it is a fundamental factor in the success of the savings banks, which channelled their cooperation through the CECA 4 . I The market share of the savings banks. To assess the progress of the savings banks in the Spanish financial system, we need to look at the historical series of their share of the markets in deposits and borrowed capital. The benchmarks referred to by the savings banks in their growth strategy were always the private banks (which possessed the largest market share) and to a lesser extent credit cooperatives. Especially from the 1960s on, ordinary meetings of the Board of Directors of the Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorros (CECA) analysed the ‘statistical data’ reflecting the evolution of deposits, borrowed capital, loans and securities portfolios for the savings banks as a group and for their banking competitors. The managers of the savings banks (who were members of the Board of Directors of the CECA) attached more importance to out-performing the banks than to 4 For the history of the CECA, see Forniés (1978), pp. 163-177, Comín (2004), pp. 339-57, Comín (2005), pp. 27-47, Comín (2006), Comín (2007), Comín and Torres (2003), pp. 246-84, Comín and Torres (2005), pp. 48-64, Torres (2005), pp. 16-25. 3 whether the statistics were performing well or badly 5 . Market share was therefore their chief strategic indicator, against which the success or failure of savings banks was measured. Figure 1 {please place Figure 1 near here}. Figure 1 shows the market share of the savings banks as assessed on two bases: data from before the Spanish civil war (which commenced in 1936) showing the savings banks’ deposits as a percentage of all deposits in the banking system 6 ; the post- civil war series shows the savings banks’ borrowed capital as a percentage of the total for the banking system 7 . The evolution of both series was very similar until the 1960s, when the savings banks began to expand their current accounts. But both series show some divergences (in the period for which data are available on both) for which there are a number of explanations. The first is that the two series are based upon different primary sources. Another is that the deposits series does not include among the savings banks either the Caja Postal (State-owned) or other non-federated savings banks – in 5 The main sources for the strategies of the savings banks and the CECA have been the collections: ‘Actas de las Sesiones de la Comisión Permanente’, in Libro(s) de Actas de la Comisión Permanente de la Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorros, 1928- 2002, Madrid, Archive Secretaría General de la CECA [hereafter ASG], and ‘Actas de las Asambleas Generales de la Confederación Española de Ahorros, 1928-2002, ASG. 6 The source is Martínez Soto and Cuevas, Estadísticas de las Cajas de Ahorros españolas (1840-1935) (unpublished). 7 The source of this series is F. Hernangómez, Estadísticas de las Cajas de Ahorros y de la Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorros (unpublished). 4 other words, it only takes into account savings banks which were members of the CECA. Moreover, this series treats the Banco de España (which was the bank of issue but was a private bank like the rest and the largest of them) as part of the banking system, and therefore its deposits are included in the divider. Before 1935 it was logical to include the Banco de España among the private banks since it was precisely that (it was nationalised in 1962), albeit its deposits possessed particular weight in the banking system overall. During the nineteenth century, the deposits of the Banco de España generally accounted for more than half of the total; in the early twentieth century its importance began to decline, but as late as 1917 the deposits held by the Banco de España still accounted for 32 per cent; by 1921, when Cambó’s Banking Act was promulgated, it was only 19 per cent, declining constantly thereafter until the years of the Second Republic (1931-1936) when it was between 7 and 10 %. The decline in the importance of the Banco de España up to 1922 was a consequence of growth of private bank deposits; thereafter, however, the cause was an ostensible increase in savings bank deposits following a downturn during the First World War. This evolution of the share of the savings banks is depicted in the two series in graph 1. The evolution of the two series is similar in the medium term, and the real figure for the savings banks’ market share is probably somewhere between the two. The problem with the deposits market share series is that no figures are available for after the civil war. Post-1918, I therefore opted to analyse the series based on borrowed capital, which is homogeneous. In this borrowed capital series we find strong growth of the market share of the savings banks following a decline between 1918 and 1922. The gain in market share by the savings banks post-1922 accounts for the concern evinced by the private banks at savings bank expansion. The bank employers’ association (Consejo Superior Bancario) sought to put a brake on competition from the savings banks by persuading the dictator 5 Primo de Rivera to approve a Decree in 1926 which was designed to hamper the latter’s operations. In 1928 the savings banks’ market share grew from 16.5 to 25.1 per cent; that same year the Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorros was set up as an association for the purpose of lobbying on behalf of the sector and trying to counter the pressure from the banks. In fact the CECA succeeded in having the 1926 decree reformed and a Savings Statute more favourable to the savings banks approved in 1929. The savings banks’ market share dropped in 1929, but from 1930 to 1933 it recovered, rising to 26.7 per cent. That year saw the approval of a new Savings Statute, and also the creation of the Instituto de Crédito de las Cajas de Ahorros [Savings Bank Credit Institute], which was intended to serve as a coordinating body for the financial activity of the savings banks 8 . At the end of 1935, the market share of the savings banks stood at 26.9 per cent. The 1920s, then, were good years for the savings banks, as were the early 1930s albeit to a lesser extent; in the space of ten years, their market share grew by ten points. In fact before the start of the Civil War, the savings banks handled more than a quarter of the market in deposits 9 . As figure 1 shows, all the inter-war gains were lost after the Civil War and the advent of the Franco dictatorship. Indeed, by 1942, the market share of the savings banks had fallen to 16.7 per cent, the same level as they had attained in 1922 10 . The 8 See Fernández Ramos (2006). 9 Based on the other series from Martínez Soto y Cuevas, ‘Estadísticas…’, the market share of the savings banks would have been a fifth of the total. 10 Compared with the Martínez Soto y Cuevas series ‘Estadísticas ’, the decline in the Hernangómez series (‘Estadísticas…’) is smaller. Be it remembered, however, that these are two unlike series and that had the first continued after the civil war it would have given even lower post-war percentages. 6 savings banks did not begin to recover market share until 1946; from then until 1952 it rose to 21.3 per cent, where it remained stable until 1956. Thereafter they saw renewed growth, from 22.4 per cent in 1957 to 24.7 per cent in 1962. Note that at this point they had not yet recovered their pre-Civil War level – in other words, the autarchy phase of the Franco regime was a poor one for the savings banks. Between 1939 and 1957, it was all the CECA could do to fend off the threats assailing the savings banks; indeed, the Ministry of Labour (under whose supervision they operated as charitable institutions) tried on several occasions to exert control over the savings banks’ investments and all their social works 11 . The savings banks’ deposits did not regain their pre-war level until 1966; in other words, they took thirty years to recover from the economic disaster of the Civil War and post-war. Whatever the level of savings, the savings banks clearly fared much worse than the private banks during the period of autarchy. The savings banks did not therefore break through their pre-war market share ceiling until the 1960s. Their growth in those years was influenced by a number of factors. The first was the economic policy of the new Franco government, which was more intent on economic growth and hence saw it as essential to raise the rate of saving. For that purpose Franco’s governments used the savings banks. And thus things began to change for them in 1957 when they exchanged the oversight of the Ministry of Labour for that of the Ministry of Finance. Thereafter, they were treated more as financial institutions than as charitable organisations 12 . The Ministry of Finance was 11 ‘Acta de la Sesión de la Comisión Permanente [hereafter ASCP], 7/4/1960’, Libro de Actas de la Comisión Permanente de la CECA [hereafter LACP], 6, 143-51, Madrid, CECA, Archivo de la Secretaría General [hereafter ASG]. 12 ASCP, 11/12/1957, LACP, 6, 99-103, ASG. 7 interested in enhancing the power of the savings banks to attract savings, which it then forced them to invest in the financing of whatever public and private enterprises the government determined, through mandatory investment coefficients 13 . The second factor in the development of the savings banks was economic growth in the 1960s; this drove growth in the income of wage-earners and the middle classes with nation-wide industrialisation and urbanisation, and these were natural customers for the savings banks 14 . This development was good for the latter, which in 1971 achieved a market share of 32.7 per cent, another milestone in their historical progress. A third factor accounting for their growth was that the CECA began to provide them with certain financial and other services that had hitherto been provided by the ICCA only less efficiently 15 . Between 1972 and 1981 the market share of the savings banks remained practically stable at between 30 and 33 per cent. In other words, the economic and banking crisis prevented the savings banks from advancing positions. However, they did not lose either, at a time when international banks began to operate in Spain, growing to absorb the ground lost by the bankruptcies of Spanish commercial banks in the economic crisis. The savings banks weathered the crisis better than the private banks, as witness the fact that no savings banks folded and there was hardly any call on the Savings Bank Deposit Guarantee Fund to bail out savings banks, unlike the Bank Deposit Guarantee Fund 16 . 13 ASCP, 29/1/1964, LACP, 7, 185-97, ASG; ASCP, 24/10/1964, LACP, 7, 227-39, ASG. 14 ASCP, 4/2/1960, LACP, 6, 134-43; ASCP, 17/2/1972, 8, 159-75, ASG. 15 ASCP, 1/12/1971, 8, 149-59, ASG. 16 Quintás (2003), pp. 1-26. 8 Subsequently, the savings banks achieved very strong growth between 1981 and 1988, when their market share reached 44.5 per cent. With the recovery from the economic crisis and liberalisation of the financial system starting in 1977, the savings banks were able to win market share from the commercial banks. One particularly important government measure was Decree 2290 of 1977, which introduced organisational changes in the savings banks (democratisation of their Corporate Governance boards) and allowed them to undertake the same financial transactions as the banks 17 . In 1977 savings bank operation began to be assimilated to that of banks, so that they were able to compete in the market on equal terms. Between 1988 and 1991, on the other hand, the market share of the savings banks stagnated. There were a number of reasons for this. The first was the application in 1985 of the Savings Bank Governance Boards Act (Spanish acronym LORCA, Ley de Órganos Rectores de las Cajas de Ahorros), whereby savings banks were forced to replace most of their senior managerial staff. The second was the abolition of the territorial principle, which intensified conflict amongst savings banks as they were allowed to compete in all regions of Spain 18 . The third was that during those years competition among savings banks sidelined cooperation; and in fact in that time there was some disarray in the CECA (which underwent a severe crisis) and numerous disputes between savings banks. This explains why it was not until 1992, once a new equilibrium had been established among the savings banks and the Confederation organised to continue the strategy of cooperation among savings banks in a new context, that their market share saw significant new growth, reaching 50.2 per cent in 1994. Having arrived at this 17 ASCP, 19/10/1977, ASG. 18 ‘Acta de la Sesión Ordinaria del Consejo de Administración de la Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorros’ [hereafter ASOCA], 28/4/1986, ASG. 9 position, the challenge was now to retain it. Nevertheless, after 1996 they continued to expand, if at a slower rate, peaking at 53.6 per cent in the year 2001. In other words, today the savings banks have a larger share of the Spanish banking market than the private banks. Over the long term, between 1965 and 2001 the savings banks doubled their market share in terms of family and business deposits, certainly a historic achievement. In fact this was one of the most important structural changes in the financial market in the last third of the twentieth century. Also, the expansion of the savings banks occurred largely in the wake of the advent of democracy and the Fuentes Quintana (Vice-Premier for Economic Affairs) decrees of 1977 which liberalised the financial system. What this means is that the savings banks also performed better in competitive financial markets than when their activity was hampered by the financial constraints imposed by the Franco regime. During that period of growth the savings banks lacked any kind of legal advantage and received neither assistance nor subsidies from public bodies. The explanation for this gain in market share lies in the fact that savings banks enjoyed clear competitive advantages over Spanish and foreign commercial banks and credit cooperatives. II Characteristics of the savings banks The nature of the savings banks is at the root of some of the characteristics of their operation that have enabled them to compete with the private banks and lay the foundations for their successful gain of market share in the last few decades. These [...]... business that the banks had initially tried to wrest from the savings banks, then later in expanding the range of their activities as financial institutions At the outset the CECA concerned itself mainly with lobbying to defend the savings banks traditional sphere of activity against the aggressive inroads of the banks in popular savings, and with the efforts of the CSB to prevent the savings banks from... leading rapidly to the establishment of an aggressive corporate strategy against the savings banks; these were proving highly competitive, particularly in the wake of the bank crashes of the 1920s, which handed the banks customers to the savings banks on a plate The response of the latter was naturally to imitate the banks and organise corporatively But in this sector of savings, the movement for association... among them On occasions this meant that all the savings banks had to give up some of their objectives, but such solidarity made it possible to keep them together and improve the situation of one and all This union was the key to the strength with which they gradually achieved institutional, legal and operational equality with the banks And it was through 25 competitive cooperation that the savings banks. .. improve the image of the savings banks among customers and has been one of the keys to their success In the sixth place, the most important factor in the success of the savings banks has been cooperation among them Since the CECA was founded in 1928, through 21 ASOCA, 18/3/1985, ASG 16 cooperation they have managed to lobby effectively to influence government legislation Moreover, since the creation of the. .. share from them The tendency in the CECA has always been to act defensively, and that has contributed to the success of cooperation among the savings banks They have never adopted an aggressive policy towards external elements unless they have felt threatened The CECA – with the legal and judicial means at its disposal – defended itself and the savings banks against pressure from the State and public... for the sector through the services it supplied Firstly, thanks to their unity and their organisation around the CECA, they succeeded in augmenting their power to lobby the government Secondly, the association of savings banks made it possible to organise production in the savings sector This consisted on the one hand in defending the sector of activity operated by the charity (or popular) savings banks. .. economic and financial circumstances; 4) their strong territorial roots in the various parts of the country; 5) their contribution to economic growth and social well-being, which strengthened the esteem and loyalty of their customers; and 6) cooperation and solidarity among the savings banks, which enabled them to achieve economies of scale (political, technical, financial and mercantile) without the need... As for asset operations, the investments made by the savings banks were regulated by the State From the time of the Decree of 1835 until 1880, Spanish governments obliged the savings banks savings banks, see Revell (1989) 20 See Comín and Torres (2003) 12 to invest their funds in the financing of the public pawnbroking establishments known as Montes de Piedad Thereafter, they were allowed more freedom... their customers and the areas in which they operate The CECA acted as intermediary between the savings banks and the government, smoothing over whatever problems arose although always on the side of the former This last observation is of course a tautology, given that the CECA has always been exactly what the savings banks wished it to be The CECA has never imposed anything on the savings banks, basically... control over the savings banks However, the ICCA disappeared in 1971 Any time that an attempt has been made to impose something on a savings banks through the CECA, it has been because the majority of the savings banks represented in the association have so decided Persuasion has always been the CECA’s only weapon in dealing with the savings banks and the government The function of political and institutional . the savings banks either the Caja Postal (State-owned) or other non-federated savings banks – in 5 The main sources for the strategies of the savings banks. francisco.comin@uah.es 1 The Spanish savings banks and the competitive cooperation model (1928-2002). Francisco Comín (Universidad de Alcalá, Spain) 1 From the standpoint