T AIWAN AND THE O BJECTIVE A SPECTS OF S TATEHOOD
According to Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, the essential characteristics of statehood include a permanent population, a defined territory, a governing body, and the capacity to engage in relations with other states This framework emphasizes the principle of effectivity, focusing on whether an entity functions as an independent political unit under international law, rather than on moral or political considerations that could lead to ongoing disputes.
11 Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec 26, 1933, 49 Stat 3097, 165 L.N.T.S 19, reprinted in 28 A M J I NT ’ L L S UP 52, 75 (1934)
12 The Convention arose in the context of a hemispheric repudiation of prior
As independent criteria for statehood, “permanent population” and
The concept of "defined territory" is often inadequate, as most claims to statehood, regardless of their acceptance in international law, inherently involve specific assertions about a permanent population residing in a defined area In the context of the Montevideo Convention, the emphasis lies on the existence of a "permanent population" within that territory.
The concept of a "defined territory" requires a common and effective governance pattern, distinguishing entities capable of engaging in international relations This excludes regions like federal states and territories with limited external autonomy, such as the Cook Islands' relationship with New Zealand According to the Montevideo criteria, any politically coherent community under the effective control of an independent government may be granted sovereign rights and obligations This framework has influenced the recognition of governments, allowing the United States and its allies to selectively acknowledge a government's authority to claim state sovereignty.
A 1927 State Department memorandum highlighted that Central America has historically perceived that governments recognized and supported by the United States remain in power, while those that lack such recognition and support are likely to fall.
The precise definition of citizenship and territorial boundaries is not a crucial requirement for statehood recognition, as demonstrated by the international acknowledgment of Estonia, despite the ambiguous status of ethnic Russians residing there, and Israel, despite its uncertain borders.
A state possesses the authority within its constitutional framework to engage in international relations with other states It also has the necessary political, technical, and financial resources to effectively conduct these interactions.
U NITED S TATES § 201 cmt e (1987) See also Christopher J Carolan, The “Republic of
Taiwan”: A Legal-Historical Justification for a Taiwanese Declaration of Independence,
75 N.Y.U L R EV 429, 455 (2000) (noting that Texas and Scotland are no longer considered independent states because their “foreign affairs are now carried out by their federal or central governments”)
The international legal order recognizes the political community, rather than the government, as the true bearer of sovereignty This community has the authority to create and dismantle internal laws, including constitutions, through lawful means or even through violence It is a misconception to view a constitution as the foundation of statehood; instead, a constitution assumes the existence of statehood and its inherent characteristics.
If statehood were an “objective” matter and recognition merely
“declaratory,” the case for Taiwan’s statehood would be overwhelming For over half a century, the Taipei government has independently maintained effective control over a “permanent population” within a
The entity in question possesses a defined territory and has consistently demonstrated the ability to engage with other states, having held a U.N seat for the first twenty-two years of its existence Currently, it maintains formal diplomatic relations with over two dozen countries and has informal quasi-diplomatic ties with many more Importantly, its capacity to represent Taiwan, along with the islands of Penghu, Kinmen, and Matzu, is independent and not subject to any other government's authority or claims, particularly since 1993.
It is true that the international system is remarkably slow to in statehood is the authority to overthrow the constitution See, e.g., Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A Res 2625 (XXV), at
123, U.N Doc A/8082 (Oct 24, 1970) [hereinafter Friendly Relations Declaration] (“Every State has an inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social and cultural systems, without interference in any form by another State.”)
Crawford seems to say otherwise in respect of Cypriot independence in 1960 See
Under the 1960 Constitution, Cyprus was considered an independent state, but it lacked true sovereignty due to various limitations imposed by the Constitution These restrictions are largely attributed to the Treaty of Guarantee, which allowed for external armed intervention to ensure compliance with the constitutional terms The Cypriot government argued that this provision of the treaty violated the United Nations Charter, rendering it legally ineffective.
(1986) (explaining the Cypriot government argument that the treaty violated its right to self-determination and interfered in its internal affairs); R St J MacDonald,
The article examines the implications of international law in the context of the Cyprus conflict, specifically questioning the validity of a treaty that may undermine a state's sovereignty It raises critical issues regarding the legality of a state attempting to relinquish its sovereignty while simultaneously retaining it, highlighting the complexities of international agreements in conflict situations.
Between 1949 and the early 1990s, the Taipei regime engaged in international relations, though its success diminished over time, as it sought to represent the state of "one" China Consequently, Taiwan, viewed as a province of the "Republic of China," which claimed sovereignty over all of China, faced significant challenges in its international standing.
The Taipei regime's renunciation of its claim to represent Taiwan and its pursuit of separate U.N representation in 1993 has shifted the attribution of its external relations to Taiwan itself Traditional doctrine suggests that a new state should gain recognition once the central government's attempts to regain control have ceased, yet state practice often waits for a formal relinquishment of the territory In this case, the situation is clear-cut, as the People's Republic of China (PRC) never had control over Taiwan, and its limited efforts to assert authority over the territory ceased nearly fifty years ago.
Crawford argues that U.S naval interference in the 1950s hindered the PRC's attempts to assimilate Taiwan He effectively refutes the notion that the Republic of China (ROC) has governed Taiwan for over fifty years as a representative of the Allied Powers, highlighting the complexities of Taiwan's political status during this period.
According to Hersch Lauterpacht in "Recognition in International Law," when a struggle for independence achieves significant success and shows a reasonable chance of permanence, international law permits third states to recognize the emerging community, indicating that the sovereignty of the parent state has ended This principle also applies to the recognition of governments.
18 James Crawford, State Practice and International Law in Relation to Unilateral
International recognition of Eritrea was achieved only after Ethiopia formally relinquished its claims, despite the earlier establishment of facts on the ground This highlights the complex nature of secession and recognition in international law.
T HE R OLE OF R ECOGNITION : C ONSTITUTIVE OR D ECLARATORY ?
The ongoing debate over the role of recognition in establishing statehood remains contentious, particularly regarding Taiwan's status Currently, only about two dozen small states officially recognize the Taipei government, acknowledging it as representing the "Republic of China." Crawford argues that Taiwan lacks general recognition as a distinct state from China However, this reliance on recognition complicates the consistency of Crawford's argument, which asserts that recognition serves a "declaratory" rather than a "constitutive" role in determining statehood, suggesting that an entity's statehood is not contingent upon recognition alone.
30 Ko Shu-Ling, Ma Refers to China as ROC Territory in Magazine Interview, T AIPEI
T IMES , Oct 8, 2008, available at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/
Since 1991, states that have established or maintained diplomatic relations with the Republic of China have presumably done so under the understanding that the Republic of China does not assert control over the mainland.
The government in Taiwan maintains its identity as the 'Republic of China,' emphasizing its historical continuity, even as it increasingly embraces a path of discontinuity.
Recognition of an entity as a State is significant, as it can have substantial legal and political implications According to Crawford, recognition serves as a crucial institution in State practice, helping to clarify status and regularize new situations When an entity is recognized as a State, it serves as evidence of its status, and widespread recognition can be nearly definitive In forums like the United Nations, States may declare the status of entities whose legitimacy is uncertain; the degree of consensus among States can lend compelling evidence to such recognitions.
Crawford's declaratory approach suggests that statehood should rely on objective criteria, yet the presence or absence of these criteria can be assessed more accurately without diplomatic distortions Therefore, recognition does not serve as definitive evidence of an entity meeting statehood criteria; instead, it reflects the positions of states and intergovernmental organizations regarding that entity The critical question remains whether recognition holds independent legal significance in determining statehood status.
Part of the confusion that permeates the discourse about
The "declaratory" and "constitutive" theories of recognition in international law arise from a tendency to first define key terms like "state" and "recognition" before exploring their legal implications Traditional literature often associates "recognition" solely with explicit state actions, such as establishing diplomatic relations, issuing recognition certificates for internal courts, or admitting entities to international organizations that require statehood Consequently, the literature typically categorizes these public acts as either "declaratory" or "constitutive," while largely excluding other relevant considerations.
The most simplified interpretation of the latter theory suggests that any state could exempt itself from legal obligations to an entity by unilaterally rejecting that entity's status, leading to a preference for the former theory Additionally, the apparent inconsistency in Crawford's stance on Taiwan—where recognition is seen as merely declaratory, yet the absence of recognition undermines Taiwan's claim to statehood—stems from the restrictive framework imposed by traditional discourse on his analysis.
Understanding statehood as a specific set of legal attributes—rights, powers, obligations, and immunities—implies that other states must adopt a legal stance on whether an entity possesses these attributes The actions and positions of states, whether coordinated or not, primarily determine the recognition and enforcement of an entity’s legal properties, as states are typically the ones with the authority to grant or deny these rights The critical question is whether the collective stance of states can be seen as creating the entity's entitlements or if these entitlements are so objective that a widespread misapplication of legal criteria by the international community would suggest that many states are violating their legal obligations While both perspectives are theoretically valid, the latter is unlikely in practical terms.
To whatever extent the international legal system rises to the level of a coherent standard of global order, statehood is a normative and not an
36 By rejecting “constitutive” declaration, Crawford responds to the question of
The denial of recognition to an entity that qualifies as a State raises questions about the rights of the non-recognizing State, such as whether it can disregard the entity's nationality or intervene in its affairs Crawford discusses this issue in the context of unilateral recognition, emphasizing that his views do not extend to the legal implications of widespread acknowledgment of an entity's status Notably, he suggests that Taiwan's situation relies on the acknowledgment of its status Importantly, a State does not lose its status merely due to foreign invasion or internal chaos; its legal standing in the international community is influenced by the reactions of other States, rather than by the events themselves Ultimately, it is the international community's response—whether acquiescent or resistant—that shapes a State's legal status amid such challenges.
The widespread express or implied affirmation of an entity’s legal status is evident in the international community's coordinated responses to various factual developments This community has consistently denied recognition to unlawful acts, such as interstate aggression and colonial settler secession, while still recognizing unitary states despite contested control Once an entity is defined and granted legal personality within the international system, that status remains intact even amid internal divisions and crises.
To prevent confusion, it may be more appropriate to refer to this concept as "acknowledgment." Traditionally, what is known as "recognition" is usually a sufficient condition but not an essential one In earlier research, the author has endeavored to define this distinction further.
“legal recognition” the overt or tacit acknowledgment of a putative state or government as a bearer of the legal attributes in question See B RAD R R OTH , G OVERNMENTAL
I LLEGITIMACY IN I NTERNATIONAL L AW 124-32 (1999) (some of which discussion has been adapted for inclusion herein) This effort at persuasive redefinition of the term
“recognition” has, however, proved prone to serious misunderstanding
38 See Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 15, at 123 (proclaiming that states may not recognize “a territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force”)
The United Nations Security Council resolutions 216 and 217, issued in November 1965, condemned the unilateral declaration of independence in Southern Rhodesia and denied recognition to the region, urging the United Kingdom to suppress the rebellion led by the racist minority Additionally, General Assembly Resolution 31/6 A, adopted on October 26, 1976, further addressed the situation in Southern Rhodesia.
(denying recognition to Transkei, in part because it was established to perpetuate apartheid)
Throughout history, nations have intervened to restore governance and territorial integrity in failing states, as seen in Congo-Leopoldville in 1960 and Somalia in 1993 However, the international community often continues to recognize countries as unitary states even when significant insurgent control exists, such as in Angola from 1975 to 1995 and Cambodia from 1970 to 1975 Additionally, secessionist movements have gained control over large territories, exemplified by Biafra in Nigeria from 1967 to 1970 and Eritrea in Ethiopia from the late 1970s to the early 1990s, while central governments have weakened, as observed in Lebanon from 1975 to the early 1990s.
Continued recognition of states aligns with international law principles, which view "premature" changes in recognition status as unlawful interference in internal affairs This perspective underscores the importance of respecting established boundaries and sovereignty.
“internal” are independent of the boundaries of effective control, until and unless the latter somehow “mature.” Historically, assessments of such “maturation” have been transparently independent of any
“objective” application of fixed criteria 41
A state is a defined political community that is recognized by existing states as deserving self-governance, rooted in historical or anticipated governance practices When independent governance is currently absent in a territory, consensus on the need for self-governance is more likely to emerge.
40 See, e.g., L ORI F D AMROSCH , ET AL , I NTERNATIONAL L AW : C ASES AND M ATERIALS
264 (4th ed 2001) (quoting H YDE , I NTERNATIONAL L AW 152 − 53 (2d rev ed 1945) on premature recognition of secession)
T ACIT A CKNOWLEDGMENTS OF T AIWAN ’ S L EGAL S TATUS
While only twenty-three mostly small states officially recognize Taipei, many others engage in interactions that do not constitute full diplomatic relations The Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan faces significant diplomatic isolation, as most of the international community does not recognize its statehood Nevertheless, Taipei has established "substantive" relations with numerous countries on a semi-official or unofficial level In many instances, formal diplomatic ties have been replaced by a network of alternative missions or ersatz embassies Countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, and Greece maintain offices in Taipei, typically staffed by officials on leave from their foreign ministries, fostering continued engagement.
Former U.S Secretary of State Henry A Kissinger emphasized that nearly all countries, including major powers, acknowledge China's claim over Taiwan, a stance supported by seven U.S presidents from both political parties, notably George W Bush.
In 2005, it was noted that China recognizes the United States' need for a peaceful resolution, demonstrating its commitment to uphold this principle despite the existing paradox.
48 G ELDENHUYS , supra note 47, at 148 (noting that by 1987, 22 countries had established unofficial offices in Taipei, and that the ROC has established 76 offices in 40 other countries)
49 See Cheri L Attix, Comment, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Are privileges and immunities characteristic of those accorded to official diplomatic missions 50
A renegade province can achieve de facto recognition as insurgent forces often seize significant territory while seeking secession or aiming to replace the central government In such cases, foreign states may find it necessary to engage with these insurgent authorities to safeguard their national interests, facilitate political and commercial interactions, and promote humane conduct during hostilities This need arises from the understanding that when a central government loses control over a territory, it may be relieved of legal responsibility for actions carried out by insurgents in that area.
Foreign states engaging with a renegade province must ensure their actions do not undermine the central government's sovereignty claims over that territory It is essential for these states to navigate their relations carefully, respecting the authority of the central government while managing de facto recognition of the province.
Taiwan’s Trading Partners Implying Recognition of Taiwanese Statehood?, 25 C AL W.
I NT ’ L L.J 357, 364 (1995) (describing how various countries set up unofficial consulates general “staffed by government officials on leave from their usual agencies”)
The conclusion of bilateral treaties, previously viewed as an implicit acknowledgment of statehood, is now seen as aligning with mere de facto recognition This shift in perspective highlights the evolving understanding of international relations and the complexities surrounding state recognition.
Taiwan’s Informal Diplomacy, in T HE I NTERNATIONAL S TATUS OF T AIWAN IN THE N EW
W ORLD O RDER : L EGAL AND P OLITICAL C ONSIDERATIONS 35, 38 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts ed.,1996) (citing Article 8 of the Draft Code on the Law of Treaties)
52 See Joseph H Beale, Jr., The Recognition of Cuban Insurgency, 9 H ARV L R EV
406, 407 & n.3 (1895-96), cited in P.K M ENON , T HE L AW OF R ECOGNITION IN
I NTERNATIONAL L AW : B ASIC P RINCIPLES 114 & n.23 (1994) (discussing the utility of recognizing “belligerency” in international law) See also H EATHER A W ILSON ,
I NTERNATIONAL L AW AND THE U SE OF F ORCE BY N ATIONAL L IBERATION M OVEMENTS 25
In 1988, it was asserted that a state is accountable solely for the actions of insurgents that it could have prevented through reasonable diligence, as referenced in "The Law of Nations: Cases, Documents and Notes" (Herbert W Briggs ed., 2d ed 1953).
The Inter-American Convention on Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife highlights a crucial principle regarding the relationship between a province and a central government According to Article 1(3), if a province cannot reconcile its position with the central government’s assertion of sovereign authority, it may either be unlawfully intervening in the internal affairs of the unitary state or implicitly suggesting that the central government's claim to sovereignty is no longer legitimate.
The Taiwan Relations Act serves as the foundational legislation for U.S relations with Taipei since the 1979 recognition of the People's Republic of China (PRC) This act establishes a framework for engaging with Taiwan that fundamentally contradicts the PRC's claims to sovereignty over the island Specifically, Section 2(b) outlines key policies that guide these interactions.
The United States' decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China is based on the expectation that Taiwan's future will be resolved through peaceful means.
Any attempt to shape Taiwan's future through non-peaceful methods, such as boycotts and embargoes, is viewed as a significant threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific region and raises serious concerns for the United States.
(5) to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and
The United States aims to uphold its ability to counter any threats of force or coercion that could endanger the security, social stability, or economic framework of the people in Taiwan.
In 1928, it was established that states are obligated to prohibit the trade of arms and war materials unless intended for government use, particularly when the belligerency of rebels remains unrecognized; in such cases, neutrality rules should be enforced This principle is further supported by the Friendly Relations Declaration, which emphasizes the importance of maintaining peace and stability in international relations.
Any action that threatens the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign states is prohibited No state or coalition of states has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another state for any reason Furthermore, states must not organize, support, or tolerate subversive or terrorist activities aimed at overthrowing another state's regime or interfering in its internal conflicts.
54 Taiwan Relations Act, Pub L No 96-8, 93 Stat 14 (1979) (codified at 22 U.S.C §§ 3301 − 3316 (2006))
Section 4(b)(1) of the Act explicitly states that any references to foreign countries, nations, or governments in U.S laws shall also encompass Taiwan, ensuring that these laws apply to the island as well.
56 Id The PRC Anti-Secession Law of 2005 thus directly provokes a crisis by using the words “non-peaceful means,” as if to deliberately challenge the Taiwan Relation Act’s
S ELF -D ETERMINATION OF P EOPLES AS A R ELEVANT B ACKGROUND
The U.N Charter establishes an international law focused on peace and security, grounded in the principle of sovereign equality among its members This equality is explicitly granted to all "peace-loving states" that accept the Charter's obligations and demonstrate the capability and willingness to uphold them Notably, the Preamble attributes the authorship of the Charter to "We the Peoples of the United Nations," emphasizing collective ownership and responsibility.
The U.S Government's stance indicates that Taiwan is not obligated to adhere to the PRC's commitment to the Warsaw Convention regarding international air transportation This perspective aligns with the constitutional principle that foreign relations are managed by the political branches of the Federal Government, which are not subject to judicial review, as established in Mingtai Fire & Marine Ins Co v UPS and referenced in United States v Pink.
The United Nations Charter is not just an agreement among governing bodies; it aims to establish a framework for the interaction of states as political communities, grounded in the principles of equal rights and the self-determination of peoples.
The decolonization process significantly clarified the connection between self-determination and sovereignty In 1960, the U.N General Assembly unanimously recognized self-determination as a fundamental right, stating that all peoples have the right to determine their political status and pursue their economic, social, and cultural development This acknowledgment by the international community initiated a major de-legitimization of colonial and quasi-colonial systems, marking a crucial transformation in sovereignty norms While the impact of this shift on Western European colonialism was evident, the broader implications remain ambiguous.
The definition of "peoples" is inherently ambiguous, as it is tied to the entitlement to self-determination This means that a group can only be recognized as a "people" once it is determined that they possess this entitlement Various factors such as religion, race, ethnicity, culture, kinship, territorial separateness, or historical conquest may influence this classification Ultimately, a "people" is defined as a political community, and its recognition is granted under specific conditions.
The 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (G.A Res 1514) emphasizes the right to self-determination for all nations This principle was reaffirmed by the Security Council in Resolution 183 in 1963 and is echoed in various international declarations and instruments Notably, it forms the basis of Article 1(1) in both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, both opened for signature on December 16, 1966.
Timothy William Waters examines the complexities of self-determination in the Balkans, particularly in Bosnia, highlighting the potential risks of secessionism if not approached carefully His analysis, presented in the Yale Journal of International Law, explores various perspectives on the principle of self-determination and the implications for democracy and the diverse peoples of the region.
An accompanying resolution interpreted Article 73(e) of the Charter, which mandates the transmission of information regarding economic, social, and educational conditions in Non-Self-Governing Territories This resolution effectively identified specific territories where populations were granted an immediate right to freely determine their political status, including the option for sovereign independence.
A territory that is geographically isolated and ethnically or culturally distinct from the administering country is influenced by various factors, including administrative, political, legal, economic, or historical elements.
“arbitrarily place[ it] in a position or status of subordination.” 72 The
“territory and its peoples” realize self-determination in one of three ways:
The options for political status include (a) emergence as a sovereign independent State, (b) free association with an independent State, and (c) integration with an independent State The first option is presented as an inherent right and the expected outcome, while the latter two choices come with specific conditions designed to ensure they reflect a true expression of the people's will.
Resolution 1541, in interpreting Article 73(e), emphasized that the authors of the Charter intended its application specifically for "colonial type" territories While the resolution aimed to limit its scope, the principles outlined may extend beyond this context Although the colonial backdrop necessitated unique implementation methods, the right to self-determination is broadly recognized as applicable in general, though its effects in non-colonial situations remain debated and conditional.
Immediate actions must be implemented in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories, as well as other territories yet to achieve independence, to transfer all powers to their peoples unconditionally This transfer is essential to ensure that these territories can fully enjoy their independence and freedom.
72 G.A Res 1541 (XV), princ IV, V, U.N Doc A/4684 (Dec 15, 1960)
74 Id., princ VII, VIII, IX
76 See James Crawford, The Right of Self-Determination in International Law: Its
The 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration “squares the circle” in an instructive way It follows its elaboration of the right to self- determination with the following “safeguard clause”:
This article emphasizes that no part of the preceding text should be interpreted as permitting or promoting actions that could undermine the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign states It highlights the importance of these states adhering to the principles of equal rights and self-determination for all peoples, ensuring that their governments represent the entire population without discrimination based on race, creed, or color.
Subsequent iterations have broadened the last clause of the qualifier to speak of “a [g]overnment representing the whole people without distinction of any kind.” 78
In 1970, a time when only a few states embraced liberal-democratic principles, this nuanced provision should be understood within that historical context It embodies the core ideals of a global legal framework characterized by significant ideological diversity and a strong respect for the choices made by individual states.
The concept of "political, economic, social, and cultural systems" emphasizes the importance of sovereign equality, even in one-party regimes that suppress organized opposition This qualification serves not as a continuous exception to the sovereignty of states, but rather as a moral justification for identifying specific cases—such as colonial domination, foreign occupation, and apartheid regimes—as exceptions to the strict principles of territorial integrity and political unity.
T AIWAN AND S TATEHOOD : A P ROVISIONAL C ONCLUSION
Taiwan's legal status is characterized as indeterminate and fluid, reflecting the complex dynamics of its external relations Despite the official stance of non-recognition of Taiwan's independence, the behavior of the international community often contradicts this rhetoric The argument for recognizing Taiwan's full statehood rights strengthens as Taipei successfully establishes external relationships that extend beyond mere de facto recognition, challenging the PRC's claims of sovereignty over Taiwan's external affairs.
Efforts to navigate cross-Strait relations often result in political tensions, causing embarrassment for Taiwan's key ally, the United States While the U.S actions may contradict the legal stance of the People's Republic of China (PRC), it has consistently worked to obscure this inconsistency through diplomatic channels.
The relationship between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic from 1972 to 1990 exemplifies how an entity can be denied political status as a separate nation while still being recognized for its unique legal prerogatives This concept is relevant to the situation between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan, where treaty frameworks could facilitate exchanges and bridge differences President Clinton's 1998 "Three Noes" statement highlighted the U.S stance against supporting Taiwan's independence or its membership in organizations requiring statehood, aiming to avoid escalating tensions Consequently, efforts to enhance legal arguments may incur significant political costs, as their practical importance largely hinges on the ability to secure political backing.
Recognition can often be a Pyrrhic victory, as seen in the case of Bosnia, where international acknowledgment of its boundaries did not prevent their violation Despite the affirmation of Bosnia's legal borders, the international community largely remained passive while Serbian forces inflicted severe violence on Bosnian civilians The Security Council's arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia, which did not differentiate between aggressors and victims, further disadvantaged the defenders of Bosnia, undermining the very state it aimed to protect.
“inherent” right under Article 51 of the U.N Charter to receive aid from its allies for its self-defense 92
The legal opinions from the Badinter Commission during the Yugoslav conflict empowered the Bosnian Government to unilaterally declare independence, despite resistance from the militant Bosnian Serb minority and the military support of the Yugoslav army This decision, however, led to a significant miscalculation.
90 William J Clinton, Remarks in a Roundtable Discussion on Shaping China for the 21st Century in Shanghai, China (June 30, 1998), in 34 W EEKLY C OMPILATION OF
Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien-loong has asserted that if Taiwan pursues independence, Singapore, along with other Asian nations, will not recognize it, emphasizing that such a move would provoke a strong response from China, potentially leading to devastating consequences for Taiwan.
92 See, e.g., Paul C Szasz, Peacekeeping in Operation: A Conflict Study of Bosnia,
28 C ORNELL I NT ’ L L.J 685, 697 (1995) (citing three arguments against the application of the embargo to Bosnia and Herzegovina)
93 Id at 693 (“to the extent that these opinions encouraged the Bosnian Government to seek early independence, that step provoked the disaster”).