The Moral Self potx

[...]... how we should conceive of the moral self Some crucial differences between the account of morality I present and that of a number of modern moral theories have their source in the way in which the moral self is conceived Many modern theories take it that there is a theoretical, articulable conception of what a moral self is, from which the limits of action arise The moral self is conceived of in terms... and the development of the moral self are one and the same development These could not be seen as the same development by Rousseau, since he conceives of the self in the state of nature as an isolated self, while the self of virtue and vice is fundamentally social When the self enters into a social contract and follows the general will it is transformed from an isolated self into one that sees itself... is, in essence, the forerunner of Kant’s rational beings who are members of a kingdom of ends And we will see that for Hume the development of the pre -moral self and of the moral self could not be the same development Further, where Hume sees the self as being constructed from something given (the reflected impressions originating in the social environment), Hegel sees the self as the product of a... rational demands on agents In theory, at least, morality has been, in the struggle between morality and self, the overwhelmingly favoured rational option This is reflected in the fact that a focal point of much moral theorising has been the task of justifying morality to the rational egoist Theorists have sought to provide a rationally compelling answer to the question of what the self has most reason to... to be the context in which the moral self is constituted I conceive of these limits as being constitutive of the moral self These limits ensure, not merely that right acts will be done, but they can ensure that we will have a world of people who will not be content to not be good So I believe that the kind of moral limits that I conceive of as being constitutive of the moral self fit better with the. .. at the moment of action, has become My account of the moral life has as its focal point the self s own interests, concerns and values, and so preserves the ancients’ connection between morality and the goodness of a human life, between what is good for the agent and what is morally good My claim will be that the state of a person’s self and the moral status of her actions are interdependent: to the. .. happiness Rather, they tell us that happiness, meaningfulness, and the achievement of virtue cannot be separated from each other Their ethics have no room for the rigid division into the moral and the self- interested’ of which contemporary moral philosophy is so fond The account in this book is compatible with the Greek view: the moral agent I will describe acts virtuously because she is the kind of 4... require the self to ignore the emotional-affective or personal aspects of its own agency in the way that the traditional understanding of achieving an impersonal perspective does A second conclusion to be drawn from The Moral Self is that a moral theory does not need to make a conceptual distinction between morality and self- interest in order to be coherent This is to say that the self can act morally... account of morality is not justified when directed at my account I argue that Hegel’s thesis regarding the constitutive relation between the self and the state must be rejected, and that the moral self is not constituted in terms of some ‘other’, but that it is rather a self for which each individual person is solely responsible This chapter defends the view that the development of love of self should... makes a self moral, they would agree that the self must esteem itself as an entity capable of acting in accordance with what it deems to be important and worthwhile if it is to be constituted in the world as a moral self While each of these philosophers would agree that some degree of self- consciousness and unified agency is required for self- constitution, self- valuing and the achievement of virtue, they . self- valuing and moral selfhood 13 II Rousseau: the generators of self- valuing and the constitution of the moral self 31 III Hegel: ethical self- valuing and the constitution. of the moral self 50 IV Aristotle and Kohut: converging perspectives 63 V Significant action and the self 88 VI Valuing the self and moral life 111 VII The