Paper 061 - Provost 2012 - Antitrust Law and Distributive Politics in the American States

1 Antitrust Law and Distributive Politics in the American States Colin Provost Department of Political Science/School of Public Policy University College London 29/30 Tavistock Square London, WC1H 9QU United Kingdom Email: c.provost@ucl.ac.uk Phone: +44 (0)20 7679 4903 Abstract: State enforcement by state attorneys general has become a major component of American antitrust law Much has been written about state antitrust enforcement, but existing accounts of AG incentives and behavior are incomplete As elected officials in 43 states, AGs must represent their constituents and therefore will be drawn to cases that maximize the level of settlement reward These will be cases with large, wealthy defendants and where clear wrongdoing has been established Settlement rewards are likely to be higher when there are clear violations of the law, as in price-fixing cases, rather than in merger cases, where no wrongdoing has necessarily been established Finally, in an important area such as antitrust, state AGs also represent their constituents along ideological lines, but this relationship is also conditioned by case characteristics that involve the potential settlement reward Thus, this study has implications for how distributive politics shapes political responsiveness to the electorate Keywords: antitrust law, competition law, state attorneys general, multi-state litigation, regulation, distributive politics State enforcement of antitrust law has long been an important part of antitrust law enforcement in the American federal system States, through their attorneys general, have the power to enforce both state and federal antitrust laws and a wealth of research has been published describing this role of state AGs in antitrust federalism (Calkins 2003; First 2001; Lemos 2011) Some scholars have been highly critical of state antitrust enforcement, arguing that state AGs are too driven by electoral concerns rather than by considerations of economic efficiency, and that their standards diverge from federal standards, creating a messy, overlapping process (Flexner and Racanelli 1994; Gelhorn 1989; Greve 2005; Posner 2004; Zimmerman 1999) Other research defends the role of state AGs, claiming that they supply additional regulation not provided by federal enforcers and that they have better knowledge of local markets (Calkins 2003; First 2001; Hubbard and Yoon 2005) Valuable as these studies are, little research has demonstrated what drives AG behavior in antitrust enforcement As elected officials in 43 states, state AGs know they must be responsive to their state constituents, as the large majority of them face reelection and many later run for higher office (Mahtesian 1996; Provost 2010a) However, the level of responsiveness AGs display towards constituents will vary according to the characteristics of particular cases they pursue Previous research on state antitrust enforcement has not systematically captured this dynamic of AG accountability towards the electorate (Feinberg and Reynolds 2010; Lemos 2011) In this paper, I argue that AG responsiveness to the electorate is conditional on case salience and salience in turn is represented by defendant characteristics in antitrust cases AGs will strive to be ideologically responsive to their constituents, partly by bringing home pork in the form of lawsuit settlements In antitrust regulation, they will this in two primary ways First, they will target wealthier, larger companies, who have the ability to pay larger settlements As defendants grow in wealth, differences in ideological responsiveness to the electorate ought to gradually disappear, as a majority of the AGs rush to claim their share of the settlement This builds on previous work which demonstrates that in consumer protection cases, AGs only exhibit responsiveness to the electorate when defendants are large and wealthy (Provost 2010b) However, in this case, the high probability of a reward from an antitrust case, particularly against a large, wealthy defendant, means that AGs from conservative states are more likely to temporarily put aside conservative principles in order to claim a share of the reward Second, they will focus on cases in which significant wrongdoing has occurred, and therefore where there is also potential for a larger payoff For state AGs, these cases provide strong incentives to participate Examining the types of antitrust infractions AGs are most likely to pursue has been done in previous research, but also without systematic explanation (Feinberg and Reynolds 2010) To test these propositions, I examine all multi-state antitrust cases between 1989 and 2008 I begin by briefly describing the arrangements of American antitrust federalism, as well as describe precisely how multi-state lawsuits function I then discuss the incentives and motivations of state AGs, which is followed by the presentation of testable hypotheses Finally, I present an empirical model designed to evaluate the relationships between AG multi-state participation, responsiveness to the electorate and case characteristics Antitrust Federalism in Context State antitrust enforcement has become a prominent part of antitrust federalism for multiple key reasons.1 First, in 1976, Congress enabled states to collect treble damages for antitrust violations through the Hart Scott Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 The Act allowed state AGs to collect damages to be distributed back to the states, its consumers or injured businesses This gave state AGs a strong incentive to enforce the law, as monetary rewards could serve as a form of regulatory pork-barreling, a dynamic I discuss in more detail in the next section Additionally, many state AGs serving in the 1980s and 90s believed that federal enforcement of both consumer protection and antitrust laws weakened considerably during the 1980s (Clayton 1994; Lynch 2001; Ross 1990; Zimmerman 1998) In antitrust, this shift has been well documented, as the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice moved from the “Structure Conduct Paradigm” (SCP School) to the Chicago School philosophy of antitrust The SCP School dictated that big was bad and that all mergers of large companies ought to be viewed suspiciously, while the Chicago School condoned mergers and large market players, as long as they did not diminish consumer welfare (Eisner and Meier 1990) Many AGs believed the shift was an excuse to pursue a regime of weak enforcement and thus, they banded together to pursue multi-state cases (Greenblatt 2003; Lynch 2001) Multi-state cases begin because one or more state AGs suspect that state or federal antitrust laws are being broken on a large enough scale to affect the public at large State AGs have the authority to issue civil investigative demands (CIDs) “to obtain both documentary and testamentary evidence from anyone who may have information relevant to the investigation” (Ross 1990: 208) CIDs allow AGs to investigate and gather information before deciding whether a lawsuit should be filed or not In most multi-state cases, one state or a small group of states does much of the early investigative work and then once a lawsuit is filed, other states will also file, provide assistance on the case and share the settlement money (Lynch 2001; Tierney 2002).3 Most defendants prefer to settle cases quickly and it is not uncommon for some businesses to ask that all or most states be included in the settlement to preempt the possibility of future litigation (Greenblatt 2003: 56) Final settlements usually include a cash settlement for the states or for state consumers, along with mandates that the defendant(s) will not repeat the forbidden activity, yet they rarely include an admission of guilt from the defendant(s) Antitrust Enforcement and the Motivations of State AGs To explain AG behavior in multi-state litigation, it is necessary to evaluate the institutional arrangements, incentives and motivations of state AGs As chief state law enforcement officer, the office of state AG is a very powerful one State AGs are charged with representing the state’s legal interests, as well as the governor, state legislators and other members of state government, but they are also responsible for representing the public interest, a broad claim that gives them much discretion in their policy pursuits (Davids 2005; Ross 1990) Two institutional factors ensure that state AGs are able to pursue their own policy goals with a minimum of interference from other state actors First, they are elected in 43 states, which makes the large majority of them accountable to the electorate first.4 Second, in all 50 states, AGs have either common law authority or parens patriae authority to enforce the law in the public interest as they see fit.5 In the case of antitrust law, states have parens patriae authority under Hart Scott Rodino to sue companies in federal court to recover monetary damages Thus, state AGs are executive, elected officials who are responsible to a large extent for judicial policy-making, who are accountable to the electorate and simultaneously charged with representing the interests of state government This lengthy list of responsibilities ultimately helps to make state AG one of the most powerful offices in American state government Because AGs are elected in 43 states, electoral factors are a major motive for state AGs, as the office is frequently used as a springboard into governorships and U.S Senate seats (Clayton 1994; Mahtesian 1996; Provost 2010a) Thus, state AGs must be mindful of the concerns of voters, businesses and interest groups when they pursue their policy goals Many scholars have tried to systematically demonstrate what drives AG antitrust enforcement, but much of this research lacks a systematic accounting of responsiveness to AG constituents Lemos (2011) provides an excellent discussion of how state AGs can influence the law more broadly, but accountability to the electorate is more incidental to the discussion Feinberg and Reynolds (2010) tell us more about state economic factors and AG characteristics, and not as much about AG constituents and the responsiveness relationship Finally, other scholars have been critical of the role of state antitrust enforcement and their goal is not necessarily to provide a thorough explanation of what drives AG behavior (Greve 2005; Posner 2004; Zimmerman 1999) Here, I attempt to present a model of AG responsiveness to the electorate in multi-state antitrust enforcement The degree to which AGs will be ideologically responsive to their constituents in their policy making depends to a large extent on the salience of the policy to those constituents A great deal of research has found that state politicians are ideologically responsive to the electorate when making policy (Brace et al 2002; Erikson, Wright and McIver 1993; Gray et al 2004; Jacoby and Schneider 2001) However, this relationship is conditional according to the level of salience placed on the issue by the electorate If a particular issue escapes public attention, then policy makers may be able to follow their own policy preferences (to the extent that they diverge from voter preferences) or be quietly responsive to elites or organized interests The conventional cases of regulatory capture in which regulators the bidding of regulated firms occur, in part, because the issue in question is important only to the regulated interests, but not to consumers, voters or watchdog organized interests (Bernstein 1955; Peltzman 1976; Stigler 1971) However, for issues that are salient to voters, politicians exhibit higher levels of responsiveness to the electorate (Burstein 2003; Gormley 1986; Jones 1994; Wlezien 2004) That is to say, politicians from liberal areas will produce liberal policies and politicians from conservative areas will produce conservative policies Consumer protection has traditionally been classified as a salient issue (Gerber and Teske 2000; Gormley 1986; Ringquist, Worsham and Eisner 2003), as everybody in society is a consumer and can fall victim to market failures, such as poor information (fraudulent or deceptive advertising) or market power (price fixing, bid rigging or supply restrictions) This salience is apparent in previous studies which demonstrate political responsiveness to the electorate in issues of consumer protection, as liberal states are more likely to pass consumer protection statutes and spend money on consumer protection programs (Bernacchi 1976; Ford 1977; Sigelman and Smith 1980) Additionally, state AGs from liberal states are likely to participate more frequently in multi-state consumer protection cases than those from conservative states (Provost 2006) Salience in consumer protection can vary, however, with defendant characteristics Some defendants are small and will generate neither attention nor the probability of a high settlement reward However, a case against a large, wealthy defendant increases the probability of a high reward, as well as case attention, thereby raising the overall level of salience Indeed, Provost (2010b) has found that in consumer protection cases against small defendants, the relationship between AG behavior and citizen ideology does not hold up, as too few AGs join these suits However, in salient cases, (those with Fortune 500 defendants), the relationship does bear out, as participation increases across the spectrum of AGs, but particularly so for AGs from liberal states We should expect a different dynamic from antitrust cases Antitrust policy has traditionally been considered a less salient issue than consumer protection, due to its greater complexity and its focus on assessing the merits of mergers (Gerber and Teske 2000; Gormley 1986; Ringquist, Worsham and Eisner 2003) However, this characterization is based largely on federal antitrust enforcement Multi-state antitrust cases can bring monetary rewards to state government, to the electorate and to injured businesses, thereby raising its level of issue salience considerably Under federal law, state AGs can pursue violators of antitrust statutes and recoup treble damages, which can then be paid back to the states or to affected consumers Thus, the potential promise of large payouts make antitrust cases among the most salient ones that state AGs pursue and 10 thus, we ought to see responsiveness on the part of state AGs to their constituents However, as defendants become large and wealthy, the political cost of not participating increases for AGs in conservative states, as the potential rewards of the case become too great to ignore These AGs then become more likely to participate, and the responsive relationship actually breaks down as a majority of the AGs rush in to claim their share of the spoils Thus, as case salience increases in consumer protection cases, the conditioning effect is one of strengthening the relationship between citizen ideology and AG behavior (Provost 2010b), but in antitrust cases, increases in salience have the effect of weakening the relationship, as a majority of AGs are lured in by the potential rewards of the case Finally, the motivation to bring home large rewards will also influence the type of cases in which state AGs participate Price fixing and supply restriction cases are cases in which market power has clearly been abused and consumers have been made worse off as a result of firms artificially raising prices or decreasing supply For state AGs, the opportunity is perceived not only as a chance to bring justice to those consumers, but simultaneously as a method to bring funds to the state Merger cases not necessarily share this trait, as potential wrongdoing is under consideration, rather than actual wrongdoing Thus, the larger potential payoffs associated with price fixing and supply restriction cases ought to bring greater AG participation in those cases Hypotheses The salient nature of antitrust cases should ensure that AGs are responsive to their electorates Therefore, we should expect those AGs from liberal states to participate in 20 field may come from a particular company or group of companies and thus, may not represent a systematic phenomenon The pattern of AG participation across types of cases also clearly illustrates the distributive nature of antitrust enforcement AGs are much more likely to join pricefixing cases-cases in which wrongdoing has been committed and in which much larger settlements are likely to be generated-than they are to join merger cases, the baseline category They are also significantly more likely to join supply restriction cases than merger cases Supply restriction cases have similar effects as price-fixing cases, as they typically involve manufacturers selling their product to only one retailer, or putting strict conditions on the supply of their goods to retailers In price-fixing and supply restriction cases, the end result is higher prices and decreased supply for consumers, respectively There are only four supply restriction cases in the dataset, but the average participation rate of 32 states illustrates how AGs are drawn to cases where wrongdoing has been established and where there is significant potential for a large settlement Finally, state AGs are also significantly more likely to join monopoly cases than they are to join merger cases, indicating that state AGs take monopoly cases as seriously as they take price-fixing and supply restriction cases State AGs participate in monopoly cases for two primary reasons First, as with price-fixing and supply restriction cases, monopoly cases often involve significant damage being done to consumer welfare For example, producers of pharmaceuticals may pay other companies not to produce generic drugs, leaving consumers to pay the higher charges for longer than necessary Second, eight of the nine monopoly cases in the dataset deal with pharmaceuticals, an issue with a high degree of salience because of its relationship to health care, as well as political 21 sensitivity because of the way it affects that well-organized voting bloc, known as senior citizens TABLE HERE In Table 3, I present predicted probabilities to better illustrate the effects of the coefficients on the probability of state AG participation in an antitrust lawsuit The values in the table illustrate the marginal effects of citizen ideology at its highest, lowest and mean values that appear in the dataset The additional conditioning factors are the type of case (bid rigging is excluded as its effect is insignificant), as well as whether the defendant is a Fortune 500 company Consumer groups and median income are held at their mean values in the calculations Across the board, we can see that the probabilities of joining price fixing, supply restriction and monopoly cases are substantially higher than the probability of joining merger cases Additionally, in most cases, the probability of joining a given case when the defendant is a Fortune 500 company is higher than when the defendant is not a Fortune 500 company This finding serves to highlight the nature of distributive politics in multi-state litigation as states pursue wealthier targets The relationship becomes more nuanced when we consider the effects of citizen ideology In both Fortune 500 and non-Fortune 500 cases, the probability of joining a given case increases as state citizenries become more liberal However, for AGs from the most conservative states, the probability of participation in price-fixing or supply restriction cases jumps more than 20 percent, as we move to cases with Fortune 500 defendants Interestingly, at the most liberal values of citizen ideology, AGs are actually 22 more likely to join cases against non-Fortune 500 defendants These two effects illustrate how the relationship between citizen ideology and lawsuit participation becomes weaker as we move towards cases involving wealthy, high-profile defendants When potential rewards from cases are small, AGs from conservative states can afford not to participate, but as these potential rewards increase, the cost of not participating rises significantly Discussion Theodore Lowi once wrote that public policies can generally be classified as either distributive, redistributive or regulatory (1964) However, when regulatory violations are punished with civil lawsuits, regulatory policy can overlap with the distributive policy arena Distributive politics plays a role in two important ways in antitrust multi-state litigation First, when a business has clearly abused its market power at the expense of market innovation and consumer welfare, potential settlement figures are likely to be high, making the case attractive to state AGs This means that merger cases, where wrongdoing has not yet been established, are less attractive to AGs Pricefixing, supply restriction cases, on the other hand, will tend to attract a large number of AGs Monopoly cases, despite being traditionally classified as ones in which wrongdoing has not necessarily occurred (Eisner and Meier 1990), also attract a large number of AGs, partly because many of them deal with the politically sensitive issue of pharmaceuticals Second, cases also promise large potential payoffs when the defendant is a large and wealthy company Cases involving such defendants are not only likely to generate larger rewards, but also attract higher levels of attention from voters This has 23 implications for AG responsiveness to the electorate as well The evidence demonstrates that AGs are responsive to the electorate ideologically in non-Fortune 500 cases In these cases, AGs from conservative states adhere to their principles of free markets and minimal government intervention However, when the case involves a large and wealthy defendant, the potential payoff is too large to ignore and AGs from conservative states are likely to join these lawsuits as well Thus, in these cases, the ideological responsiveness is still present, but the relationship weakens, as a majority of states rush to claim their share of the rewards As long as state AGs play a key role in antitrust enforcement, regulatory politics will continue to overlap with distributive politics Acknowledgements: The research for this paper was supported, in part, by a grant from the British Academy A previous version of this paper was presented at the Nordic Political Science Association Meeting, Tromso, Norway, August, 2008 24 25 References Bernacchi, Michael 1976 “A Regional Analysis of State Consumer Protection Budgets,” Journal of Consumer Affairs, 10 (Winter): 239-244 Bernstein, Marver 1955 Regulating Business by Independent Commission Princeton: Princeton University Press Berry, William D., Evan J Ringquist, Richard C Fording and Russell L Hanson 1998 “Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the American States, 1960-1993,” American Journal of Political Science, 42 (January): 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Vivek and Joseph Gallo 2001 “The Cyclical Behavior of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Enforcement Activity,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 19: 27-54 Greenblatt, Alan 2003 “The Avengers General,” Governing: The Magazine of States and Localities, 16 (May): 52-56 Gormley Jr., William T 1986 “Regulatory Issue Networks in A Federal System,” Polity, 18 (Summer): 595-620 Gray, Virginia, David Lowery, Matthew Fellowes and Andrea McAtee 2004 “Public Opinion, Public Policy, and Organized Interests in the American States,” Political Research Quarterly, 57 (September): 411-420 Greve, Michael S 2005 “Cartel Federalism-Antitrust Enforcement by State Attorneys General,” University of Chicago Law Review, 72: 99-123 Hubbard, Robert and James Yoon 2005 “How the Antitrust Modernization Commission Should View State Antitrust Enforcement,” Loyola Consumer Law Review, 17: 497-530 Jacoby, William J and Saundra K Schneider 2001 “Variabilities in State Policy Priorities: An Empirical 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Attorneys General,” Georgetown Journal of Law and Public Policy, (5): 5-15 Provost, Colin 2006 “The Politics of Consumer Protection: Explaining State Attorney General Participation in Multi-State Lawsuits,” Political Research Quarterly, 59 (December): 609-618 Provost, Colin 2010a “When is AG Short for Aspiring Governor? Ambition and Policy Making Dynamics in the Office of State Attorney General,” Publius: the Journal of Federalism, 40 (Autumn): 597-616 Provost, Colin 2010b “An Integrated Model of State Attorney General Behavior in Multi-State Litigation,” State Politics and Policy Quarterly, 10 (Spring): 1-24 Ringquist, Evan J., Jeff Worsham and Marc Allen Eisner “Salience, Complexity and Legislation Direction of Regulatory Bureaucracies,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 13 (April): 141-164 Ross, Lynne, ed 1990 State Attorneys General: Powers and Responsibilities Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs, Inc Sigelman, Lee and Roland Smith 1980 “Consumer Legislation in the American States: An Attempt at Explanation,” Social Science Quarterly, 61 (June): 58-70 Stigler, George 1971 “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, (Spring): 3-21 Tierney, James (Former Maine Attorney General, 1981-1991) 2002 Phone Interview with Author, November Wlezien, Christopher 2004 “Patterns of Representation: Dynamics of Public Preferences and Policy,” Journal of Politics, 66 (February): 1-24 Zimmerman, David 1999 “Why State Attorneys General Should Have a Limited Role in Enforcing the Federal Antitrust Law of Mergers,” Emory Law Journal, 48: 337-366 28 Zimmerman, Joseph 1998 “Interstate Cooperation: The Roles of State Attorneys General,” Publius: the Journal of Federalism, 28: 71-89 29 Endnotes State attorneys general enforce state antitrust laws on their own, but they are also empowered by various federal antitrust acts to enforce federal antitrust law, either on their own or jointly through multi-state lawsuits For an in-depth summary of multi-state litigation, see Provost (2006) Multi-state antitrust cases tend to involve violations of federal law, and are thus filed as one joint lawsuit in federal court In consumer protection cases or violations of state antitrust law, states may still join forces, but will file separately in their own courts State AGs are appointed in the other seven states: Alaska, Hawaii, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Tennessee and Wyoming In Maine, the AG is selected by the state legislature and in Tennessee, by the state supreme court In the other five states, the AG is appointed by the governor In State of Florida ex rel Shevin vs Exxon Corp (1976), the Fifth Circuit affirmed state AG common law authority to act in the public interest Also, the U.S Supreme Court maintains that states may invoke parens patriae authority to act on behalf of the state when “a state has a quasi-sovereign interest in the health and well-being-both physical and economic-of its residents in general” (Alfred L Snapp & Son, Inc vs Puerto Rico 1982) States that initiate and participate in lawsuits are treated similarly, ie, as participating in the lawsuit Data are available to analyze which states initiated lawsuits, but I not this for two reasons: first, such an analysis would require the inclusion of more specific information about how each state was affected by the regulatory infraction, and these data are not readily available Second, such an analysis would be difficult because of our inability to observe decisions not to initiate cases The substantive effect of a supply restriction case is similar to that of a monopoly case, except that it is not necessarily a monopoly that is committing the infraction There is a sixth type of case in antitrust law, known as product-tying cases These are cases in which a company effectively makes the purchase of one product conditional on the purchase of another, the most famous case occurring when Microsoft’s bundling of Windows (its operating system) with Internet Explorer (its web browser) was considered anti-competitive practice in the web browser market Coding of the variables for the Microsoft case is made more challenging by the fact that it took place over four years Additionally, it is one of only two product-tying cases that appear over the whole period, thus I have excluded product-tying cases This measure contains annual interest groups ratings of ideology for each state’s congressional delegation, which are then weighted to reflect the electoral support each member receives To account for the ideology of citizens voting for losing candidates, 30 the authors also estimate ideology scores for the challengers the incumbents face in their elections and weight these by electoral support, as well Finally, the measure is conveniently scaled between and 100, with 100 representing the most liberal scores 10 This measure draws on the state lobbying data from Gray and Lowery Because data are only available from 1990, 1997, 1998 and 1999, 1990 data cover 1989 through 1994 in this study 1997 data cover 1995-1997, 1998 covers 1998 data and 1999 data covers all cases from 1999 onwards This is an imperfect measure, since 1999 data is used for cases initiated in 2008, but unfortunately, no more recent data are currently available 31 32 Table 1: Descriptive Statistics State and Case-Level Variables Predictor Variable Mean Standard Deviation Range 49.998 15.605 0-100, Conservative to Liberal 2.434 0-9 Business Group Density 570 063 0-1 Median Income (in 10000s) 4.033 902 1.948-6.806 Population Density 180.146 245.162 959-1170.689 Annual Average Unemployment t-1 4.982 1.338 2.2-11.2 AG Method of Selection 136 343 1= AG Appointed 0=AG Elected AG Party 644 479 1=AG Democrat 0=AG Republican AG Antitrust Bureau 32 467 1=State Has Bureau 0=No Bureau Monopoly Case 191 394 1=Monopoly Case 0=Other Merger Case 362 481 1=Merger Case 0=Other Price Fixing Case 298 457 1=Price Fixing Case 0=Other Bid Rigging Case 043 202 1=Bid Rigging Case 0=Other Supply Restriction Case 085 279 1=Supply Restriction Case 0=Other Fortune 500 Defendant 638 481 1=Defendant is Fortune 500 Company 0=Defendant is Not Fortune 500 Company State Level Factors State Citizen Ideology Consumer Groups Case Level Factors 33 Table 2: GEE Estimates of AG Decision to Join Multi-State Antitrust Cases, 19892008 Predictor Variable Coefficients and Standard Errors Constant -1.872 (.969)* State Level Factors State Citizen Ideology 028 (.008)** Consumer Groups 177 (.044)*** Business Group Density -1.029 (1.175) Median Income (in 10000s) -.263 (.009)*** Population Density -.000 (.001) Annual Average Unemployment t-1 046 (.052) AG Method of Selection -.092 (.229) AG Party 035 (.133) AG Antitrust Bureau 234 (.224) Interactive Effects Citizen Ideology*Fortune 500 Defendant -.014 (.005)*** Case Level Factors Monopoly Case 3.731 (.179)*** Price Fixing Case 2.519 (.117)*** Bid Rigging Case 030 (.293) Supply Restriction Case 1.933 (.215)*** Fortune 500 Defendant 1.059 (.252)*** N States Cases Wald Chi Square Coefficients are logit coefficients and standard errors are in parentheses ***p