Introduction
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the agency which approves natural gas pipeline proposals, rejected only two pipelines and approved 400 pipelines from 1997 to
2017 1 The FERC’s record of approving approximately 99% of pipelines including when the necessity for the pipeline is contested has led many landowners to charge it with capture or when
“regulators consistently [favor] the preferred policies of targets of regulation, resulting from an exercise of power by the regulated industry.” 2
While the FERC has certified approximately 99% of pipeline projects over the past two decades, this statistic alone does not definitively indicate regulatory capture Capture is not simply a binary state; it requires the identification of specific mechanisms to demonstrate and address the issue There are two primary types of capture: material capture, where industries leverage their resources to influence regulators, and cultural capture, where the regulator is swayed by the identity of the regulated industry Additionally, corrosive capture occurs when regulators undermine the intent of legislation but often exists alongside other forms of capture Understanding these nuances is essential for accurately assessing regulatory capture.
Susan Tierney's report, "Natural Gas Pipeline Certification Policy Considerations for a Changing Industry," published by Analysis Group, explores the evolving landscape of natural gas pipeline certification The document emphasizes the need for updated policies that reflect current industry dynamics and challenges It discusses the implications of regulatory frameworks on pipeline development and the importance of balancing economic growth with environmental considerations The comprehensive analysis spans 36 pages and provides insights into best practices for certification processes in a changing energy market For further details, the full report is accessible at Analysis Group's website.
2 Rex, Justin, “Anatomy of agency capture: An organizational typology for diagnosing and remedying capture,”
3 Carpenter, Daniel, “Protection without Capture: Product Approval by a Politically Responsive, Learning
Regulator,” American Political Science Association, (2004): 613-631
4 Rex, “Anatomy of agency capture,” 271-294
6 Kwak, James, “Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis,” in Preventing Regulatory Capture, ed Carpenter, Daniel & Moss, David, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 71-98
In their work "Introduction" in *Preventing Regulatory Capture*, Carpenter and Moss discuss the spectrum of regulatory capture, emphasizing that capture cannot solely be inferred from a pro-industry stance They argue that various factors, including executive influence and electorally sanctioned pro-business governance, can lead to an agency's favorable record towards industry, highlighting the complexity of regulatory dynamics.
In 2017, a map illustrating the Mountain Valley Pipeline (MVP) route was created by Oil Change International and BOLD Alliance While the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has approved approximately 99% of natural gas pipelines, this statistic alone does not definitively indicate regulatory capture To explore the validity of claims surrounding FERC's potential capture, this research focuses on the MVP, a 303-mile natural gas pipeline currently under construction in West Virginia and Virginia.
9 Carpenter, Daniel, “Detecting and Measuring Capture,” in Preventing Regulatory Capture, ed Carpenter, Daniel
& Moss, David, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 66
10 Oil Change International and BOLD Alliance, The Mountain Valley Pipeline: Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Briefing, (Washington, D.C: Oil Change International, 2017), 1-4, http://priceofoil.org/content/uploads/2017/02/mountain_valley_pipe_web_final_v1.pdf
The article discusses the complexities surrounding the certification of natural gas pipelines, particularly focusing on the Mountain Valley Pipeline (MVP) and its challenges, including pending federal authorizations and a significant history with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) It highlights the concerns of landowners who perceive the FERC as overly accommodating to industry interests, as indicated by Chairman Glick's dissenting opinions Through a case study approach involving stakeholder interviews, the research concludes that the FERC exhibits a weak level of regulatory capture, influenced by both cultural and corrosive factors.
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) exhibits clear signs of cultural capture, particularly through its disproportionate deference to the Mountain Valley Pipeline (MVP) over public opinion and independent consultant assessments This is evident in the FERC's approval of variance requests, its allowance for the MVP to continue construction without complete permits, and its abandonment of necessary environmental impact analyses Additionally, the FERC's actions undermine foundational laws such as the Natural Gas Act and the Natural Gas Policy Act, as seen in its practice of tolling approximately 96% of rehearing requests, which delays due process until the pipeline nears completion Notably, the FERC's unprecedented interpretation of Environmental Condition 9 for the MVP, which traditionally mandates that pipelines secure all permits before construction, allowed the MVP to proceed with construction without having all necessary permits in place Despite these forms of cultural and corrosive capture, the case study found little evidence of material capture, aside from a weak revolving door phenomenon.
In his dissent regarding the Mountain Valley Pipeline, Commissioner Richard Glick highlights concerns about the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) perceived weakness in regulating natural gas pipelines He argues that while the FERC does engage in valuable environmental mitigation efforts, a lack of stringent oversight could result in overbuilding and the creation of resource sacrifice zones.
This paper explores the capture of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) by tracing its origins back to the Federal Power Commission (FPC), which previously regulated natural gas pipelines The investigation reveals that the FPC faced agency decay due to vague legislation and a detrimental Supreme Court ruling, leading to a natural gas crisis Following this crisis, the FERC demonstrated signs of cultural and corrosive capture by aligning with industry interests, particularly after the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, which allowed it to bypass Congress's intended certificate process for pipelines The research posits that both the FERC and FPC responded to the natural gas crisis by increasingly favoring industry voices, resulting in a gradual capture that has persisted since the FERC's inception over 30 years ago Initially, the FERC may have perceived a harmonious relationship between public and industry interests, which diminished its motivation to balance these competing needs.
“protection without capture.” 15 However, as the public’s interests diverged from the private interest over time, the FERC’s policies remained stagnant and capture became more apparent
13 Bernstein, Marver H., “The Life Cycle of Regulatory Commissions,” in Regulating Business by Independent
Commission, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955), 74-102
14 Raley, David, "The Philips vs Wisconsin Decision and the Decline of Regulatory Effectiveness," Business
History Conference Business and Economic History On-line: Papers Presented at the BHC Annual Meeting, vol
15 Carpenter, Daniel, “Protection without Capture,” 613-631
Analyzing regulatory capture at the FERC is crucial, as addressing this issue is essential for effective governance When regulated industries exert undue influence over regulatory decisions, it undermines the public interest As Senator Whitehouse noted, regulatory capture allows these industries to gain an unfair advantage, effectively taking a "second secret bite at the apple" after their lobbying efforts.
Low public opinion of the FERC has significantly eroded trust in the public participation process, resulting in fewer comments from citizens This creates a dangerous self-reinforcing cycle where landowner concerns are increasingly overlooked, leading the FERC to become more culturally captured Such capture can result in irreversible consequences, as seen with the Mountain Valley Pipeline, which cannot be dismantled, and the environmental damage caused cannot be undone.
To effectively address the issue of regulatory capture at the FERC, it is essential to first diagnose and understand its implications The FERC must enhance public participation and update its outdated 1999 policy on natural gas pipeline approvals Additionally, Congress and the Executive should establish robust oversight of the FERC, create a clear legislative agenda, and minimize the agency's interactions with the industries it regulates Previous efforts to give landowners a voice were insufficient in combating capture, and allowing agencies to remain vulnerable to such influences poses a significant threat to the public interest.
16 U.S Congress, Senate, Committee on Judiciary, Protecting the Public Interest: Understanding the Threat of
Agency Capture, 111th Cong., 2 nd sess., 2010, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-
111shrg64724/html/CHRG-111shrg64724.htm.
Regulatory Capture’s Invisibility
Industry corruption has been a persistent issue since ancient times, but regulatory capture theory was only introduced in 1952 Samuel Huntington highlighted the capture of the Interstate Commerce Commission, advocating for its abolition due to its loss of independence Marver Bernstein expanded on this by explaining how vague legislative agendas and limited administrative powers contribute to a "subtle relationship" between regulatory agencies and the industries they oversee Over time, the perception shifted from viewing capture as an anomaly to recognizing it as the norm, as illustrated by George Stigler's assertion that regulation primarily serves industry interests This shift fostered public cynicism toward regulatory agencies and political institutions, leading to skepticism even within the courts regarding the agencies' capacity for independent regulation.
As a result of this sentiment and other factors such as a growing dislike of agency incrementalism, the late 1960s and 1970s were a time of political awakening and reeling in the
17 Novak, William J., “A Revisionist History of Regulatory Capture,” in Preventing Regulatory Capture, ed Carpenter, Daniel & Moss, David, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 25-48
18 Huntington, Samuel P., "The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, the Railroads, and the Public Interest,"
19 Bernstein, Marver H., “The Life Cycle of Regulatory Commissions,” 83
20 Sabatier, Paul, "Social movements and regulatory agencies: Toward a more adequate—and less pessimistic— theory of “clientele capture”," Policy Sciences 6, no 3 (1975): 301-342
21 Novak, William J., “A Revisionist History of Regulatory Capture,” 25-48
22 Stigler, George J, "The Theory of Economic Regulation," The Bell Journal of Economics and Management
23 Novak, “A Revisionist History of Regulatory Capture,” 25-48
24 Merill, Thomas W., “Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983,” Chicago-Kent Law Review (1997): 1039-
25 Ibid regulatory state, which shaped the design of American bureaucracy 26 These changes in the environmental domain are evidenced by the subsequent Clean Air Act (1963), National
The Environmental Policy Act (1970), Clean Water Act (1972), and Endangered Species Act (1973) marked significant legislative changes that assigned new responsibilities to agencies, integrating environmental considerations and landowner perspectives into decision-making processes Congress aimed to prevent regulatory capture by establishing clear mandates and promoting diverse viewpoints This shift was further supported by judicial responses, notably a statement from Judge Wright in 1971, highlighting the evolving role of the courts in environmental governance.
“Our duty, in short, is to see that important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls of
Congress, are not lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy.” 29
Despite efforts by Congress and the courts to address agency capture, signs of this phenomenon persist within environmental regulatory bodies In 1999, a notable "slippage" was identified, highlighting a disconnect between the intended goals of environmental regulations and their actual implementation, exemplified by the Clinton administration's approach to the Endangered Species Act More recently, interviews with EPA employees have raised concerns that the agency experienced increased capture under President Trump's administration.
26 Zinn, Matthew D, “Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement: Cooperation, Capture, and Citizen Suits,”
27 Glicksman, Robert L., “A Retreat from Judicial Activism: The Seventh Circuit and the Environment,” Chicago-
28 Zinn, “Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement,” 81-176
29 CALVERT CLIFFS'COORD COM v United States AE Com'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C Cir 1971)
30 Zinn, “Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement,” 81-176
31 Farber, Daniel A, "Taking slippage seriously: noncompliance and creative compliance in environmental law," Harv Envtl L Rev 23 (1999): 297
32 Dillon, L., Sellers, C., Underhill, V., Shapiro, N., Ohayon Liss, J., Sullivan, M., et al., “The Environmental Protection Agency in the Early Trump Administration: Prelude to Regulatory Capture,” American Journal of Public
Agency capture remains challenging to deter due to its elusive nature and the lack of consensus on its definition Scholars have noted that capture occurs when agencies align their goals with the demands of dominant interest groups, leading to regulation that favors the interests of the regulated industry over the public good This phenomenon manifests as a consistent bias in regulatory decisions, driven by the influence of the industry itself Diagnosing agency capture requires a clear understanding of both public and private interests, which is often complex and difficult to ascertain.
Capture can be categorized into two main mechanisms: material capture and cultural capture Material capture involves the industry's strategic use of resources to sway regulators, often seen through campaign donations and the revolving-door phenomenon Additionally, it can manifest in less obvious ways, such as legislators funding regulators with industry support On the other hand, cultural capture is more abstract, where regulators are influenced by factors related to identity and status, as defined by Kwak.
33 Bernstein, “The Life Cycle of Regulatory Commissions,” 92
34 Rex, “Anatomy of agency capture,” 273
36 Rex, “Anatomy of agency capture,” 273
37 Carpenter, “Detecting and Measuring Capture,” 57-68
38 Rex, “Anatomy of agency capture,” 271-294
39 Zinn, “Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement,” 81-176
Cultural capture, as explored by Kwak in "Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis," highlights the vulnerability of regulators to various psychological influences, particularly in their relationships with the industries they oversee Research indicates that regulators inundated with industry information may develop biases favoring that perspective, and those socializing with industry actors may adopt their viewpoints This phenomenon was notably observed during the 2008 financial crisis, particularly with the Securities and Exchange Commission However, cultural capture extends beyond agency-industry dynamics; for instance, Forest Service rangers have been found to align with local communities, illustrating a broader scope of influence Furthermore, cultural capture can coexist with corrosive capture, where regulatory agencies undermine the original legislative intent, often driven by industries seeking reduced oversight contrary to Congressional goals.
Regulatory capture, often difficult to identify and prove, manifests as a subtle influence where agencies may still serve the public while favoring industry voices Unlike corruption, which involves clear impropriety, capture operates in a gray area, making it challenging to gather concrete evidence Weak capture allows agencies to maintain a public service role while being swayed by industry interests, while strong capture indicates a need for policy replacement, yet evidence remains elusive The ambiguity surrounding capture leads to misdiagnoses in the literature, as scholars may hastily attribute administrative failures to capture without sufficient proof.
42 Kaufman, Herbert, The Forest Ranger, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1960), 3-100
44 Hempling, Scott, ““Regulatory Capture:” Sources and Solutions,” Emory Corporate Governance Accountability and Review 1, no 1 (2014): 25
In their introduction, Carpenter and Moss explore the mechanisms of capture, particularly in the context of the 2008 financial crisis and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill They suggest that certain claims may reflect the phenomenon of capture, as defined by Carpenter, highlighting the complexities and implications of regulatory failures in these significant events.
The FDA's prioritization of its own interests during high-stakes drug approvals raises concerns about "protection without capture." Additionally, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issues a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) for natural gas pipelines after evaluating public interest and conducting environmental assessments, as mandated by the Natural Gas Act and Natural Gas Policy Act, in collaboration with various state and federal agencies.
Methods
Given the frequent misdiagnoses of capture, Carpenter & Moss emphasize the below method as the gold standard for diagnosing capture:
1 “Provide a defeasible model of the public interest
2 Show a policy shift away from the public interest and toward industry (special interest)
This research utilized the Carpenter & Moss (2014) criteria to diagnose regulatory capture by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) through the MVP case study It involved interviews with fourteen stakeholders, including officials from Chairman Glick’s office, environmental attorneys, a former energy lobbyist, journalists, leaders from environmental groups like the Sierra Club, a local government pipeline committee member, and a former regulator, many of whom reside near the MVP Additionally, the study reviewed public records from the FERC’s eLibrary, the Federal Register, and archives to support its findings.
Appendix A Interviews were conducted with Yale University Institutional Review Board review
In this case study, capture was defined as “regulators consistently favoring the preferred policies of targets of regulation, resulting from an exercise of power by the regulated industry.” 49
The private interest in regulatory projects is often characterized by the desire to complete initiatives while minimizing stringent regulations Conversely, the public interest, as perceived by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), should prioritize the availability of natural gas supplies However, a more accurate definition of the public interest aligns with the themes of actions delegated to the FERC by Congress.
49 Rex, “Anatomy of agency capture,” 273
50 Sidney A Shapiro, "The Complexity of Regulatory Capture: Diagnosis, Causality, and Remediation," Roger
Williams University Law Review 17, no 1 (2012): 221-257
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) emphasizes that the certification of new interstate natural gas pipeline facilities should prioritize ensuring a reliable energy supply, safeguarding public health, preserving the environment, and upholding the public's democratic rights This interpretation of public interest is further reinforced by FERC's inquiries into the 1999 policy regarding the certification of natural gas pipelines.
The analysis applied a process-tracing methodology and was supplemented by the
The Institutional Analysis and Design (IAD) Framework is a valuable tool for examining the factors that affect decision-making processes By employing process-tracing, researchers can create detailed descriptions of events, using these occurrences as tests to validate their hypotheses and draw causal inferences.
Causal Puzzle: To explain the influence of industry on the FERC’s actions on the MVP
• Sister agencies including USFWS, USACE, EPA,
• State actors including WVDEP & VDEQ
H1) If the FERC is captured, the public and private interests diverge
H2) If the FERC is captured, it consistently favors the industry’s interests over the public’s interest
H3) If the FERC is captured, the industry exercises some influence over the FERC
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) risks being materially captured if it accepts significant contributions from the energy industry Additionally, if the FERC prioritizes the perspectives of the energy sector over others, it becomes culturally captured Furthermore, any erosion of the Natural Gas Policy Act or the Natural Gas Act by the FERC indicates a corrosive capture of its regulatory integrity.
“Electorally sanctioned pro- business governance” 56
Fig 2 - Causal puzzle of FERC’s regulatory capture Original figure based on Collier (2011) 57
(Notice of Inquiry, Washington, DC, 2018)
52 King, Stephen M., Chilton, Bradley S., and Roberts, Gary E., “Reflections on Defining the Public Interest,”
53 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Facilities,”
(Notice of Inquiry, Washington, DC, 2018)
54 Collier, David, “Understanding Process Tracing,” PS: Political Science & Politics 44, no 4 (2011): 823-30
55 Polski, Margaret M., & Ostrom, Elinor, “An Institutional Framework for Analysis and Design,” Indiana
56 Carpenter, “Detecting and Measuring Capture”, 66
Fig 3 - Collier’s tests for process-tracing Figure source: Table 1, Collier (2011) 58
Collier’s tests assess the adequacy of evidence for accepting a hypothesis A straw-in-the-wind test is neither necessary nor sufficient for confirmation, merely indicating relevance without proving capture In contrast, a hoop test is necessary but insufficient, exemplified by evaluating whether the FERC’s original certification of MVP serves the public interest A smoking-gun test, while not necessary, is sufficient for demonstrating capture, evidenced by material contributions or agency representatives acknowledging industry influence Lastly, the rare doubly decisive test is both necessary and sufficient, illustrated by a direct admission of repeated capture from an agency executive, supported by tangible evidence.
59 Ibid paper applies these tests to the case study of the MVP then analyzes the history of natural gas pipeline regulation.
Mountain Valley Pipeline – Cultural & Corrosive Capture
This chapter outlines the journey of the MVP from 2014 to the present, focusing on significant FERC rulings and assessments through various testing methods like hoop tests, straw-in-the-wind tests, and smoking-gun tests for capture The regulatory landscape is complex, influenced by multiple agencies; however, the FERC remains the primary authority overseeing the MVP's approval process, specifically regarding the natural gas pipeline's Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN).
The Interstate Natural Gas Association of America breaks the process for pipeline approval generally into five phases that this chapter will explore in greater detail:
3 File a formal application with the FERC
4 Analysis is conducted, receive CPCN
5 Receive permits, get final approval to begin construction 60
Fig 4 - Timeline of the MVP’s approval process
60 Interstate Natural Gas Association of America, Pipeline Permitting, (Washington D.C: Interstate Natural Gas Association of America)
Hoop Tests: The Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity
The FERC's analysis from 2014 to the issuance of the CPCN in October 2017 reveals significant issues regarding public and private interests The findings support three key hypotheses: the divergence of interests (H1), the FERC's consistent favoring of industry interests (H2), and the influence of the industry over the FERC (H3) This is evident in two main areas: the lack of necessity for the pipeline and the potential harm to the public and the environment These concerns are intensified by the FERC's inadequate analyses and insufficient public comment process.
The FERC's analysis indicates that private interests are overshadowing public interests, particularly regarding the Mountain Valley Pipeline (MVP), which spans 303 miles from Wetzel County, West Virginia, to Pittsylvania County, Virginia, facilitating gas transport from West Virginia to a compressor station in Virginia This strategic route is aimed at harnessing the growing production from the Appalachian region's Marcellus and Utica shales, which saw an increase of 13 Bcf/d between 2010 and 2014, contributing to approximately 40% of the nation's natural gas supply As the U.S seeks energy independence, the MVP is driven by rising natural gas demand, coal-switching trends, dwindling Gulf supplies, and the necessity for additional gas along the pipeline's path.
61 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Draft Environmental Impact Statement,” (Environmental Impact Statement, Washington, D.C, 2016)
62 Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC., “Application for Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity,”
(Application, Washington, D.C: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2015)
63 Lu, Hongfang; Ma, Xin; Azimi, Mohammadamin, “US natural gas consumption prediction using an improved kernel-based nonlinear extension of the Arps decline model,” Energy 194 (2020): 116905
64 Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC., “Application for Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity,”
(Application, Washington, D.C: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2015)
Fig 5 - U.S dry shale gas production per day Figure Source: Energy Information
Though the MVP contends the pipeline is necessary and will have local benefits such as
Construction spending brings various benefits, including operational and direct-use advantages However, skepticism remains among some stakeholders The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) deemed the Mountain Valley Pipeline (MVP) necessary based on existing agreements with shippers, which they consider strong evidence of future gas demand Critics argue that these shippers, being affiliates with ownership stakes in the MVP, may have conflicts of interest that could affect the validity of the FERC's conclusions.
65 Energy Information Administration, “Natural gas explained: where our natural gas comes from,” (Webpage, Washington, D.C., 2020), https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/natural-gas/where-our-natural-gas-comes-from.php
The Mountain Valley Pipeline Project in West Virginia, as detailed by Ditzel, Fisher, and Chakrabarti in their 2015 report, outlines significant economic benefits for the region This project is expected to enhance local infrastructure, create job opportunities, and stimulate economic growth The comprehensive analysis emphasizes the positive impact of the pipeline on West Virginia's economy, highlighting its potential to attract investment and improve energy access For more information, visit the Mountain Valley Pipeline's official website.
The Mountain Valley Pipeline Project in Virginia presents significant economic benefits, as outlined in the report by Ditzel, Fisher, and Chakrabarti (2015) This comprehensive analysis highlights the potential for job creation, increased tax revenues, and enhanced energy infrastructure in the region The findings underscore the project's role in stimulating local economies and supporting sustainable energy development For more detailed insights, the full report can be accessed at the Mountain Valley Pipeline website.
68 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Order Issuing Certificates and Granting Abandonment Authority,” (Order, Washington, D.C, 2017), 17
The FERC maintains a policy of not examining precedent agreements in depth, asserting that changes in affiliation do not alter market need perceptions Additionally, the agreements in question were deemed incomplete; for instance, Commissioner LaFleur noted that while the ACP had clearly defined gas distribution percentages, the MVP left 13% of its gas destinations unspecified for future determination Furthermore, these agreements were not made available to commenters.
The necessity for the pipeline is questioned due to trends in natural gas usage, as previous evaluations by FERC considered the potential for overbuilding The MVP's own market study, criticized by Appalachian Mountain Advocates for relying on data from a "cold winter," suggested an anticipated growth in natural gas demand over the next two decades However, this same report indicated that the pipeline's supply might eventually surpass demand Additionally, another analysis highlighted that the growth of demand in international markets could be lower than the MVP's projections.
Administration data also demonstrates that natural gas consumption has dipped recently, dropping by 1.89 bcf/d from 2019 to 2020 75 These data points suggest that the MVP is both not
69 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Facilities,”
70 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Order Issuing Certificates and Granting Abandonment Authority,” (Order, Washington D.C, 2017)
72 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Order Issuing Certificates and Granting Abandonment Authority,” (Order, Washington D.C, 2017), 16
In their 2016 report, "Are the Atlantic Coast Pipeline and the Mountain Valley Pipeline Necessary?", authors Rachel Wilson, Spencer Fields, Patrick Knight, Ed McGee, Wendy Ong, Nidhi Santen, Thomas Vitolo, and Elizabeth Stanton critically assess the necessity of the Atlantic Coast and Mountain Valley pipelines Published by Synapse Energy Economics, the study spans pages 1-26 and provides a comprehensive analysis of the economic and environmental implications associated with these significant infrastructure projects.
74 Kunkel, Cathy, Williams-Derry, Clark, and Mattei, Suzanne, Mountain Valley Pipeline Faces Uphill Struggle to
Financial Viability, (Lakewood: Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, 2021), http://ieefa.org/wp- content/uploads/2021/03/Mountain-Valley-Pipeline-Faces-Uphill-Struggle-to-Financial-Viability_March-
2021.pdf?fbclid=IwAR3Q-iheaKWe7MAqQ-YfvCUCauNCm038DKxYRC8YvwXMd0LB_2OQdNpqIvA
75 Energy Information Administration, “Short-Term Energy Outlook,” (Report: Washington, D.C: Energy
The Energy Information Administration emphasizes the importance of maintaining a sufficient national energy supply, highlighting that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission based its approval of the Mountain Valley Pipeline on industry data.
The issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) highlights the detrimental effects of the Mountain Valley Pipeline (MVP) and reveals the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) inadequate assessment of these harms The FERC's evaluation included factors such as air quality, water quality, forest impacts, erosion, and threats to endangered species Notably, the MVP's health impacts are most significant for communities near its three compressor stations A 2017 report indicated that over a seven-year period, 18 compressor station sites in New York released pollutants comprising 70 chemicals associated with 19 of 20 major disease categories.
Compressor stations are usually located on 15-22 acres of rural land, but the MVP compressor stations will use around 5.6-7 acres in fairly populous areas 78,79
The MVP poses a significant threat to water quality due to its route through steep terrain, where saturated soil increases the risk of runoff Notably, it is located just 1.1 miles from the drinking water intake for the Western Virginia Water Authority, which supplies water to 60,000 residents in Virginia and West Virginia.
In Virginia, landowner and non-profit leader Maury Johnson reported that the construction of the Mountain Valley Pipeline (MVP) on his farm has resulted in water that is too turbid for drinking This issue raises significant concerns regarding the environmental impact of the MVP project.
76 Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC., “Application for Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity,”
(Application, Washington, D.C: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2015)
77 Russo, P.N, and D.O Carpenter, Health Effects Associated with Stack Chemical Emissions from NYS Natural
Gas Compressor Stations: 2008-2014, (Rensselaer: Institute for Health and the Environment, 2017)
78 Folga, S M, "Natural gas pipeline technology overview," (Technical Report, Washington, D.C, 2007), 1-56
79 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Final Environmental Impact Statement,” (Environmental Impact Statement, Washington, D.C, 2017)
80 Folga, "Natural gas pipeline technology overview,” 1-56
81 Hansen, Evan, Clingerman, Jason, and Betcher, Meghan, Threats to Water Quality from Mountain Valley
Pipeline and Atlantic Coast Pipeline Water Crossings in Virginia, (Morgantown: Downstream Strategies, 2018)
In February 2021, Maury Johnson discussed the influence of industry voices on the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) regarding water concerns related to the Mountain Valley Pipeline (MVP) Initially, the MVP was requested to maintain a 75-feet right-of-way in wetlands, adhering to standard FERC policy during the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) phase However, by the time the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) was released, the MVP was granted a larger right-of-way, deviating from the original FERC recommendations.
The MVP's location in karst terrain and a seismically active area significantly heightens public health risks due to the susceptibility of such terrain to landslides, sinkholes, and caves Joan Walker, a Senior Campaign Representative for the Sierra Club’s Beyond Dirty Fuels, asserts that the pipeline's proposed route makes it illegal to construct Additionally, a geology professor has labeled the karst terrain as a "no build" zone in a report concerning the MVP, further emphasizing the concerns surrounding this project.
Natural Gas Pipeline Regulatory History
This study identifies instances of cultural and corrosive capture in the MVP case, aligning with Carpenter & Moss' suggestion to investigate the timing and location of policy shifts towards the industry.
Natural gas pipeline regulation was initiated by the Federal Power Commission (FPC) during the New Deal Era, following the enactment of The Natural Gas Act (NGA) in 1938, which mandated that companies obtain a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) to construct interstate pipelines However, the FPC faced significant challenges due to recent changes from the Federal Power Act and existing administrative inadequacies Additionally, Congress provided the FPC with limited authority and a vague legislative agenda, which contributed to its decline, as noted by Bernstein These administrative and jurisdictional issues, combined with the pressing need for natural gas regulation, led to the FPC's gradual cultural capture.
Congress provided limited guidance to the Federal Power Commission (FPC) regarding the issuance of Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCNs), which were already in use by other utilities and interstate railroads This lack of direction may have led Congress to expect the FPC to establish its own criteria for defining CPCNs Additionally, the FPC faced jurisdictional limitations, particularly in assessing the end-use of gas In 1939, the FPC acknowledged that Congress likely did not intend for the Commission to evaluate the broader social and economic impacts of different fuel usages, a sentiment echoed in the FPC’s Twentieth Annual Report.
194 Wheat, Carl I., “Administration by the Federal Power Commission of the Certificate Provisions of the Natural Gas Act,” Wash L REV (1945): 194-216
195 Bernstein, “The Life Cycle of Regulatory Commissions,” 74-102
197 DeVane, Dozier A., “Highlights of Legislative History of the Federal Power Act of 1935 and the Natural Gas Act of 1938,” Wash L REV (1945): 30-41
The Federal Power Commission (FPC) recognized the need to broaden the Natural Gas Act (NGA) to empower the Commission to act in the public interest regarding natural gas conservation By 1944, influenced by the coal industry's arguments, the FPC began to consider the end-use of gas, concluding that it should prioritize superior uses over inferior ones, such as boiler fuel This shift in policy led to a significant reduction in natural gas consumption, with approximately 55% being used for boiler fuel during the 1960s The FPC applied this perspective when rejecting applications for certificates, citing the rapid depletion of natural gas resources, and acknowledged the coal industry's active role in these regulatory decisions.
The Supreme Court case regarding predatory pricing empowered the Federal Power Commission (FPC) to regulate natural gas prices at the wellhead However, following this decision, the FPC struggled with a significant administrative backlog, resulting in a series of unsuccessful attempts to manage wellhead price regulation Consequently, the FPC anticipated that it would not resolve cases dating back to 1960 for an extended period.
2043 207 Congress attempted to pass a deregulation bill under President Eisenhower, but the bill
199 Wheat, “Administration by the Federal Power Commission,” 208
200 Wheat, “Administration by the Federal Power Commission,” 197
201 Koplin, H.T., “Conservation and Regulation: The Natural Gas Allocation Policy of the Federal Power
Commission,” The Yale Law Journal, 1955: 840-862
202 MacAvoy, Paul Webster, & Pindyck, Robert S., The Economics of the Natural Gas Shortage (1960-1980), (Cambridge: MIT Energy Laboratory, 1974)
203 Wheat, “Administration by the Federal Power Commission,” 194-216
205 Federal Power Commission, “United States Federal Power Commission Opinions and Decisions of the Federal Power Commission: Volume 3,” (Archive, Washington, D.C, 1944)
206 Raley, David, "The Philips vs Wisconsin Decision and the Decline of Regulatory Effectiveness," Business
History Conference Business and Economic History On-line: Papers Presented at the BHC Annual Meeting, vol
The natural gas shortage from 1960 to 1980 was significantly impacted by political actions, including a senator's allegation that an attorney from Superior Oil Company offered him $2,500 for campaign support in favor of deregulation, which ultimately led President Eisenhower to veto the bill in 1956 due to corruption concerns The Federal Power Commission (FPC) attempted to implement wellhead price controls; however, some measures backfired, resulting in higher prices for natural gas producers than prior to the regulations In contrast, other pricing regulations, such as regional ceilings, proved to be more effective in managing prices.
In the 1960s, the Federal Power Commission (FPC) opted to maintain stable prices, which ultimately led to a significant natural gas shortage lasting nearly two decades This shortage stemmed from a lack of new natural gas discoveries compared to the reserves allocated by pipeline companies to their customers Although reserves were still available, the shortage went unnoticed for some time As new reserves failed to emerge, pipelines reduced their delivery commitments and continued to acquire new customers, supplying them solely from existing reserves This resulted in price increases for new customers, while long-standing customers enjoyed lower rates, ultimately leading to service losses in entire market areas where consumers were advised to switch from gas to oil.
In 1974, the Federal Power Commission (F
208 Raley, "The Philips vs Wisconsin Decision,” 1-11
209 MacAvoy, Paul Webster, & Pindyck, Robert S., The Economics of the Natural Gas Shortage (1960-1980), (Cambridge: MIT Energy Laboratory, 1974)
210 Raley, "The Philips vs Wisconsin Decision,” 9
211 MacAvoy, Paul W., “The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978,” Natural Resources Journal, 1979: 811-828
The natural gas shortage in the early 1970s significantly impacted Congress, compelling lawmakers to consider regulating intrastate prices or increasing interstate market prices By 1973, soaring residential gas prices intensified consumer pressure on Congress, highlighting the urgency of the crisis This situation raises a hypothesis about the Federal Power Commission's (FPC) potential shift in policy; facing criticism for its earlier anti-industry stance and immense pressure to address the gas crisis, the FPC may have adopted a more pro-industry approach to mitigate the situation.
Fig 8 – Natural gas prices from 1947 to 1977 Figure Source: U.S Department of Energy
213 MacAvoy, Paul Webster, & Pindyck, Robert S., The Economics of the Natural Gas Shortage (1960-1980), (Cambridge: MIT Energy Laboratory, 1974)
214 MacAvoy, “The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978,” 811-828
215 U.S Department of Energy - Energy Information Administration, Annual Report to Congress: Statistics and
Trends of Energy Supply, Demand, and Prices, (Annual Report, Washington, D.C, 1977)
216 U.S Department of Energy - Energy Information Administration, Annual Report to Congress: Statistics and
Trends of Energy Supply, Demand, and Prices, (Annual Report, Washington, D.C, 1977)
In 1977, the Federal Power Commission (FPC) was merged into the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), which retained many of the FPC's authorities but lost regulatory power over natural gas imports and exports The following year, the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA) was enacted, marking a significant shift in pricing regulations for new gas at the wellhead and leading to the deregulation of existing gas prices by 1985 The NGPA prioritized natural gas supply distribution, ensuring residential consumers received gas before industrial consumers A key aspect of the NGPA was the classification of natural gas into thirty categories, facilitating the determination of pricing regulations and phased deregulation The act is credited with alleviating the gas shortage, partly due to rising OPEC prices that prompted producers to explore new gas sources While Congress aimed to resolve the gas shortage through deregulation, predictions varied; the Department of Energy warned of a 5% excess demand by 1985, while the American Gas Association anticipated a fourfold excess demand.
1977 as compared to the Department of Energy prediction and the Association also predicted that supply would not meet demand with the NGPA 220
217 Lees, Frank, Lees’ Loss Prevention in the Process Industries: Hazard Identification, Assessment, and Control (Amsterdam, Elsevier, 2012)
218 MacAvoy, “The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978,” 811-828
In his article, Steven M Spaeth discusses the implications of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 and its significance to the subsequent Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989, highlighting the evolution of natural gas regulations Published in the University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review, the piece examines the experiences and challenges faced under the earlier legislation, providing insights into how these historical frameworks influenced the regulatory landscape of the natural gas industry Spaeth's analysis underscores the importance of understanding past policies to navigate current and future energy regulations effectively.
220 MacAvoy, “The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978,” 811-828
Congress had the opportunity to address the gas shortage by exploring alternatives, such as regulating intrastate pipelines similarly to interstate ones or overseeing fuel oil prices, which are closely linked to natural gas pricing However, these options were not pursued.
Congress prioritized residential consumers over industrial interests, influenced by industry data and public opinion, which may pressure the new FERC to prevent future natural gas shortages This shift indicates a trend of "electorally sanctioned pro-business governance," where Congress and the public urge the FERC to adopt a pro-industry approach.
Following the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA), new high-cost gas producers were able to charge elevated rates, while older gas remained undervalued and largely untapped Pipelines, bound by long-term contracts from the natural gas crisis, were compelled to purchase this expensive gas, which coincided with a decline in oil prices and a subsequent drop in gas demand during the 1980s recession Consequently, pipelines found themselves with an oversupply of costly gas that they could not sell at high prices, and they were unable to transport cheaper natural gas due to their existing contracts In response, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) lifted the price ceiling on older gas, established a uniform price ceiling for all gas produced after 1974, and permitted pipelines and producers to renegotiate their contracts.
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) encountered its initial significant regulatory challenge as the bubble prompted natural gas customers, who relied on pipeline purchases for gas and transportation, to advocate for their rights.
223 Carpenter, “Detecting and Measuring Capture”, 66
224 Spaeth, “Our Experience Under the Natural Gas Policy,” 265-282
225 Ibid unbundle gas and buy gas directly from the producers and buy the transport from the pipelines
Discussion
Establishing that regulatory capture is the primary cause of outcomes at the FERC is complex While this paper argues that the FERC is significantly influenced by capture, it also identifies various confounding factors and alternative sources of influence, indicating that the FERC's decision on the MVP was not made in isolation.
Agencies like the FERC, USACE, and BLM are increasingly susceptible to industry capture, as evidenced by court criticisms of their permitting errors and insufficient analyses State agencies, such as the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection and Virginia Department of Environmental Quality, also face risks of capture due to pro-industry ideologies The potential for "electorally sanctioned pro-business governance" makes these agencies particularly vulnerable, as the financial benefits and job creation from large projects can influence elected officials to sway regulatory decisions.
Furthermore, the FERC’s agenda can stem from Congress or the Executive The FERC is intended to be an independent agency, but the FERC derives its power and funding from
The Trump administration notably pressured agencies to adopt a pro-energy stance regarding the Atlantic Coast Pipeline, marking a departure from the operational norms of previous administrations, as highlighted by former USFWS regulator John Schmidt Additionally, the interplay between Congress, the Executive, and bureaucratic agencies is significantly shaped by public opinion, which can influence decision-making within various constituencies.
251 Carpenter, “Detecting and Measuring Capture”, 66
252 Soraghan, Mike, “How Trump’s energy dominance backfired on an $8B pipeline,” E&E News Reporter,
(2020), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1063518775
253 John Schmidt in discussion with the author, February 2021 supports pipelines, the FERC can conduct “electorally sanctioned pro-business governance” where it favors the industry because the constituency desires that 254
Carpenter & Moss establish a rigorous standard for diagnosing regulatory capture, stating that a solid diagnosis must demonstrate clear action and intent from the industry that plausibly contributes to significant policy shifts While the study identifies instances where the Mountain Valley Pipeline (MVP) may have influenced the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), it does not disclose the informal communications between the two entities Typically, studies on capture do not uncover definitive evidence linking regulators and industries Future analysis, particularly through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, may uncover additional evidence of capture, helping to fulfill the criteria outlined by Carpenter & Moss.
This study reveals that the findings are complicated by procedural errors and concerns regarding institutional justice within the FERC Notably, certain aspects highlight mistakes in the FERC’s processes, including tolling orders, which indicate potential industry capture as these errors tend to benefit the industry.
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) may struggle with effective public participation, as highlighted by an investigation from the Office of the Inspector General, which found that the FERC failed to post Notices of Schedule for Environmental Review for nine years, including during the Mountain Valley Pipeline (MVP) consideration Participants in interviews expressed concerns over this lack of communication, with a journalist noting that many individuals lacked internet access and consequently missed significant updates that were not widely reported in the news.
254 Carpenter, “Detecting and Measuring Capture”, 66
256 Office of Inspector General, U.S Department of Energy, The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s
Natural Gas Certification Process, (Report, Washington, D.C, 2018)
257 Journalist in discussion with the author, January 2021
Club also explained that in her experience at the Sierra Club, “Of all agencies, FERC is the absolute worst in terms of public participation.” 258
The findings of this study may not fully reflect the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) actions in other pipeline cases, as the Mountain Valley Pipeline (MVP) and Atlantic Coast Pipeline (ACP) are distinct due to the significant opposition they faced The unprecedented level of permitting errors noted in this research, confirmed by Chairman Glick’s office, highlights that such strong opposition to pipelines has not been seen before While the MVP may not completely represent FERC's overall experiences with pipelines, it does suggest potential trends in pipeline permitting for upcoming projects.
This paper argues that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is culturally and corrosively captured, as evidenced by its consistent decisions that often contradict public interest Despite the presence of confounding variables, the FERC's pattern of favoring the Mountain Valley Pipeline (MVP) raises concerns about its independence from congressional and executive influence The findings suggest a significant degree of capture within the FERC, warranting further investigation to substantiate these claims.
258 Joan Walker in discussion with the author, February 2021
259 Tezak, Christine, "A Policy Analyst's View on Litigation Risk Facing Natural Gas Pipelines," Energy LJ 40 (2019): 209-241
260 Chairman Glick’s office in discussion with the author, April 2021.
Conclusions
In Alleghany Defense Project v FERC, Judge Griffith wrote,
The procedural history of this case raises significant concerns, as landowners witness their properties being transferred to pipeline companies and permanently altered This process occurs without any judicial review of a fundamental question: Is the existence of the pipeline justified?
Reviewing the MVP’s regulatory history, a similar sentiment pervades the case –
Since its approval by the FERC, the MVP has faced ongoing litigation and controversy, prompting widespread allegations of regulatory capture against the agency Critics argue that the FERC should never have granted a certificate for the MVP This research aims to investigate these claims and determine the validity of the capture allegations.
This research traces the path of the Mountain Valley Pipeline (MVP) and reveals that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) exhibited signs of cultural and corrosive capture Initially, the FERC granted a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) for the MVP without conclusive evidence of its necessity, despite significant indications of potential harm to the public Throughout the environmental analysis, the FERC made concessions to the MVP, further suggesting this capture Additionally, the FERC undermined Congressional intent by issuing six-month tolling orders and interpreting Environmental Condition 9 to imply that permits were only required at the start of construction, not throughout the process, highlighting corrosive capture However, the research argues that the cultural and corrosive capture is limited, as the FERC still engages in meaningful environmental mitigation, and unchecked natural gas pipeline projects could result in overbuilding and the creation of resource sacrifice zones.
261 Allegheny Defense Project v FERC, 964 F.3d 1 (D.C Cir 2020).
262 Ibid the hypothesis of capture, the FERC demonstrates an undeniable record of favoring the MVP and energy industry on the MVP case and over the past twenty years 263
This paper explores the origins of regulatory capture in the natural gas industry, tracing it back to the Federal Power Commission (FPC) and its initial weak authority, which contributed to the natural gas crisis The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), emerging from this crisis, adopted a reactive regulatory approach, attempting to correct the pricing issues left by the FPC while increasingly aligning with industry practices, such as the unbundling of gas and transportation services The study concludes that cultural capture began with the FPC in 1938 but intensified after the natural gas crisis and the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA) of 1978, as the FERC increasingly prioritized industry interests over environmental regulations and landowner rights.
Research indicates that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has adhered to its outdated 1999 policy for two decades without adequate justification This antiquated approach has led to several misjudgments regarding the Mountain Valley Pipeline (MVP), including the reliance on questionable affiliate contracts to assert economic necessity and prioritizing economic need over potential public harm However, it is encouraging that the FERC is now contemplating revisions to this policy.
In 1999, a policy was established that has since faced scrutiny, with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) initiating inquiries in 2018 and 2021 to potentially revise it, taking into account climate change and environmental justice Chairman Glick also aims to establish an Office of Public Participation, aligning with the intentions of the Federal Power Act.
I don't know!
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is re-evaluating its policy on interstate natural gas pipeline proposals to address issues of cultural capture Commissioner Glick emphasizes the challenges landowners face in navigating FERC proceedings, often hindered by technicalities that prevent them from asserting their interests The current approach, which limits public comment, exacerbates cultural capture by amplifying industry voices, although the Office of Public Participation may help mitigate this issue Additionally, Congress is considering changes through the Energy Act of 2020 to prevent FERC from advancing large projects like the Mountain Valley Pipeline (MVP) With the new Congress, President Biden is expected to support a green energy agenda, signaling potential shifts in energy policy.
Recent changes in regulatory practices have opened the door for capture to influence outcomes, prompting a need for reform Previous Congressional efforts to address capture involved incorporating public comments and enabling legal action, but these measures have proven ineffective and confusing for landowners The resulting court decisions have led to inconsistent construction timelines, significantly driving up project costs To combat capture effectively, regulators should be distanced from the industries they oversee, given clearer mandates, and provided with enhanced public engagement and oversight Achieving these goals may involve extending comment periods, improving accessibility of public meetings, increasing agency representation, revising the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, and introducing intermediaries between the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and companies.
265 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Workshop Regarding the Creation of the Office of Public
Participation”, (Press Release, Washington, D.C, 2021), https://www.ferc.gov/news-events/events/workshop- regarding-creation-office-public-participation-04162021
266 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Order Granting Requests for Extension of Time,” (Order,
267 Zinn, “Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement,” 81-176
As Samuel Huntington noted in 1952, successful adaptation to changing environments is crucial for the health and longevity of both administrative and biological entities It is essential for government agencies to address the 'felt needs' of their time Future research is necessary to confirm the diagnosis of capture and to understand its mechanisms within the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) The FERC stands at a critical juncture between private and public interests, and it is imperative that capture no longer influences its decision-making.
268 Huntington, "The Marasmus of the ICC," 407
6 Joan Walker: Senior Campaign Representative, Beyond Dirty Fuels Campaign, Sierra Club
7 David Sligh: Conservation Director, Wild Virginia
8 Jennifer Fordham: Former Senior Vice President of Government Affairs for the Natural Gas Supply Association (NGSA)
9 Colin Rees: Senior Campaigner at Oil Change International
10 John Schmidt: Former regulator with the USFWS
11 David Perry: Executive Director, Blue Ridge Land Conservancy & member of the
12 Maury Johnson: Affected landowner, Executive Committee Member of Protect Our Water, Heritage, Rights, and Executive Committee Member at Preserve Monroe
13 Ken Ward: Journalist with ProPublica
14 Chairman Glick’s Office (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission)
*Repetition is intentional, multiple interviewees asked to be referred to by this title
1 The MVP begins at an interconnection with an Equitrans’ pipeline in Wetzel County, West Virginia
2 From there, the pipeline heads southeast to Wallace in Harrison County, West Virginia and then Salem in Harrison County, West Virginia
3 The pipeline then moves south between the towns of Webster Springs and Tigoa in
Webster County and Nicholas County, West Virginia respectively
4 From there, the pipeline turns southwest and past Pence in Summers County, West
Virginia and Greenville in Monroe County, West Virginia
The pipeline spans 1.6 miles through Jefferson National Forest, including a crossing of the Appalachian National Scenic Trail This section is located just northwest of Goldbond in Giles County, Virginia.
6 From there, the pipeline meets an Appalachian Power Company (AEP) transmission line west of Kimbleton in Giles County, Virginia
7 After that, the pipeline moves northeast of Newport in Giles County, Virginia
8 Next, the pipeline heads southeast and covers Jefferson National Forest again
9 Following, the pipeline moves south and colocates with the AEP transmission line again and then crosses Interstate 81
10 Subsequently, the pipeline continues south and passes the Spring Hollow Reservoir
11 Then, the pipeline moves southeast and passes west of the town Bent Mountain in
12 The pipeline next moves east, where it passes the Blue Ridge Parkway
13 From there, the pipeline moves east to the towns of Boones Mill and Rocky Mount in Franklin County, Virginia
14 Lastly, the pipeline moves southeast until it terminates at Transco’s Zone 5 Compressor Station 165 close to Transco Village in Pittsylvania County, Virginia
269 Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC., “Application for Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity,”
(Application, Washington, D.C: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2015)
Adams, Duncan “State, feds call for improved pipeline environmental impact statement.” The
Roanoke Times, ( 2016) https://roanoke.com/news/local/state-feds-call-for-improved- pipeline-environmental-impact-statement/article_be89bea6-4a36-5734-8d54- cbb5d03a634e.html
Allegheny Defense Project v FERC, 964 F.3d 1 (D.C Cir 2020)
American Gas Association to Federal Energy Regulatory Commission May 27, 1999 Federal
Army Corps of Engineers, et al v N Plains Res Council, et al., Supreme Court of the United
States, Order in Pending Case, July 6, 2020, https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/070620zr_2d83.pdf
Bernstein, Marver H “The Life Cycle of Regulatory Commissions.” In Regulating Business by
Independent Commission, 74-102 Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955
Bureau of Economic Analysis Personal Income by County, Metro, and Other Area (2019) https://www.bea.gov/data/income-saving/personal-income-county-metro-and-other-areas
CALVERT CLIFFS'COORD COM v United States AE Com'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C Cir 1971)
The report by Cantu and Galbraith (2017) highlights the overwhelming influence of the oil and gas industry on the federal agency tasked with pipeline approvals This dominance raises concerns about regulatory impartiality and the potential prioritization of industry interests over public safety and environmental protection The findings suggest a need for greater accountability and transparency within the agency to ensure that pipeline approvals serve the public good rather than corporate interests For more details, visit the Public Accountability Initiative's report.
Carpenter, Daniel & Moss, David “Introduction.” In Preventing Regulatory Capture, edited by
Carpenter, Daniel & Moss, David, 1-22 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014
Carpenter, Daniel “Detecting and Measuring Capture.” In Preventing Regulatory Capture, edited by Carpenter, Daniel & Moss, David, 57-68 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014
Carpenter, Daniel “Protection without Capture: Product Approval by a Politically Responsive,
Learning Regulator.” American Political Science Association, (2004): 613-631
Coalition for the Expansion of Pipeline Infrastructure “Poll: Widespread Support for Natural
Gas Pipelines in West Virginia.” Coalition for the Expansion of Pipeline Infrastructure,
(2016) https://expandpipelineinfrastructure.org/widespread-support-for-natural-gas- pipelines-in-west-virginia/
Collier, David “Understanding Process Tracing.” PS: Political Science & Politics 44, no 4
Commissioner Richard Glick “Commissioner Richard Glick Concurrence in Part and Dissent in
Part Regarding Alleghany Defense Project Final Rule.” Opinion, Washington, D.C, June
9, 2020 https://www.ferc.gov/news-events/news/commissioner-richard-glick- concurrence-part-and-dissent-part-regarding-allegheny
Cox, Natalie “MVP Total Project Work 90% Complete by Year-End.” Business Wire, (2019) https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20191022005281/en/MVP-Total-Project- Work-90-Complete-by-Year-End
Defenders of Wildlife, National Audubon Society, and National Wildlife Refuge to Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission 1999 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Delaware River Keeper Network People's Dossier of FERC Abuses: Public Participation
Undermined Bristol: Delaware River Keeper Network, n.d https://www.delawareriverkeeper.org/ongoing-issues/peoples-dossier-ferc-abuses-public- participation-undermined
DeVane, Dozier A “Highlights of Legislative History of the Federal Power Act of 1935 and the
Natural Gas Act of 1938.” Wash L REV (1945): 30-41
Dillon, L., Sellers, C., Underhill, V., Shapiro, N., Ohayon Liss, J., Sullivan, M., et al “The
Environmental Protection Agency in the Early Trump Administration: Prelude to
Regulatory Capture.” American Journal of Public Health, 108 (2018): 89-94
Equitrans has announced that the Mountain Valley natural gas pipeline is set to begin operations in early 2021, as reported by Scott DiSavino in Reuters This development marks a significant milestone for the project, which is aimed at enhancing natural gas transportation in the region The confirmation of the startup date is crucial for stakeholders and highlights the ongoing commitment to advancing energy infrastructure.
Ditzel, Ken, Fisher, Rob, and Chakrabarti, Kaustav Economic Benefits of the Mountain Valley
Pipeline Project in Virginia Pittsburgh: FTI Consulting/Mountain Valley Pipeline, 2015 http://www.mountainvalleypipeline.info/wp- content/uploads/2019/03/Mountain_Valley_Pipeline_Virginia_Report_02Oct2015.pdf
Ditzel, Ken, Fisher, Rob, and Chakrabarti, Kaustav Economic Benefits of the Mountain Valley
Pipeline Project in West Virginia Pittsburgh: FTI Consulting/Mountain Valley Pipeline,
2015 http://www.mountainvalleypipeline.info/wp- content/uploads/2019/03/Mountain_Valley_Pipeline_West-
Duncan, Adams “Mountainous karst landscape should be a ‘no build zone for pipeline.’” The
Energy Information Administration “FERC Order 436.” Order, Washington D.C, 1985 https://www.eia.gov/oil_gas/natural_gas/analysis_publications/ngmajorleg/ferc436.html
Energy Information Administration “Natural gas explained: where our natural gas comes from.”
Webpage, Washington, D.C., 2020 https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/natural- gas/where-our-natural-gas-comes-from.php
Energy Information Administration “Short-Term Energy Outlook.” Report: Washington, D.C:
Energy Information Administration https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/marketreview/natgas.php
Equitrans Midstream Corp Q2 2020 Earnings Call Transcript The Motley Fool, (2020) https://www.fool.com/earnings/call-transcripts/2020/08/04/equitrans-midstream-corp- etrn-q2-2020-earnings-cal.aspx
Farber, Daniel A "Taking slippage seriously: noncompliance and creative compliance in environmental law." Harv Envtl L Rev 23 (1999): 297
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission “Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline
Facilities.” Notice of Inquiry, Washington, DC, 2018
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission “Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission “Cessation of Certain Activities.” Order, Washington,
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Draft Environmental Impact Statement,”
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission “FERC Order No 636 – Restructuring of Pipeline
Services.” Order, Washington, D.C, 2020 https://www.ferc.gov/order-no-636- restructuring-pipeline-services
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission “FERC Provides Additional Landowner Protections in
Project Rehearing Cases.” News Release, Washington, D.C, 2020 https://www.ferc.gov/news-events/news/ferc-provides-additional-landowner-protections- project-rehearing-cases
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission “FERC Revisits Review of Policy Statement on
Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Proposals.” Press Release, Washington, D.C, 2021 https://www.ferc.gov/news-events/news/ferc-revisits-review-policy-statement-interstate- natural-gas-pipeline-proposals
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission “Final Environmental Impact Statement.”
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission “Item C-2: Order Partially Lifting Stop Work Orders and Allowing Certain Construction to Resume.” Commissioner Statement, Washington, D.C, December 17, 2020
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission “Mountain Valley Pipeline Project Eastern
Montgomery High School.” Scoping Meeting Transcript, Washington D.C, 2015
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission “Mountain Valley Pipeline Project Nicholas County
High School.” Scoping Meeting Transcript, Washington D.C, 2015
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission “Mountain Valley Pipeline Project James Monroe
High School.” Scoping Meeting Transcript, Washington D.C, 2015
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission issued a notice regarding Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, requesting an extension of time This notice was published in the Federal Register on September 2, 2020 For more details, you can access the official document at [Federal Register](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/09/02/2020-19376/mountain-valley-pipeline-llc-notice-of-request-for-extension-of-time).
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission “Order Addressing Arguments Raised on Rehearing and Denying Stay.” Order, Washington, D.C, March 24, 2021
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission “Order Granting Requests for Extension of Time.”
Docket Nos CP16-10-006, CP16-13-000 Order, Washington, D.C, October 9, 2020
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission “Order Issuing Certificates and Granting Abandonment
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission “Order Partially Lifting Stop Work Order and Allowing
Certain Construction to Proceed.” Order, Washington, D.C, October 9, 2020
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission “Partial Authorization to Resume Construction.” Order,
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission “Recent Changes in Commission Rehearing Practice –
Item – A -3.” Staff Presentation, Washington, D.C, 2020 https://www.ferc.gov/news- events/news/recent-changes-commission-rehearing-practice-item-3
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission “Workshop Regarding the Creation of the Office of
Public Participation.” Press Release, Washington, D.C, 2021 https://www.ferc.gov/news-events/events/workshop-regarding-creation-office-public- participation-04162021
Federal Power Commission “United States Federal Power Commission Opinions and Decisions of the Federal Power Commission: Volume.” Archive, Washington, D.C, 1944
Folga, S M "Natural gas pipeline technology overview." Technical Report, Washington, D.C,
Fox, Julia “Mountaintop Removal In West Virginia: An Environmental Sacrifice Zone.”
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has rejected claims from clean energy advocates regarding the Midcontinent Independent System Operator's (MISO) plan, asserting that it will not negatively impact competition or grid access Concerns among utility regulators persist about escalating costs and potential supply chain issues that could hinder development Felisa Sanchez from K&L Gates noted the ongoing developments and the challenges posed by limited information Additionally, a White House memo clarified that the funding pause applies only to specific elements outlined in Section 2 of the executive order.
Gilmer, Ellen M “Judge Retains Freeze on Streamlined Pipeline Permitting.” Bloomberg Law,
(2020) https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-and-energy/federal-judge-retains- freeze-on-streamlined-pipeline-permitting
Glick, Richard “Commissioner Richard Glick Dissent Regarding Mountain Valley Pipeline,
LLC.” Dissent, Washington, DC: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, December 17,
Glicksman, Robert L “A Retreat from Judicial Activism: The Seventh Circuit and the
Environment.” Chicago-Kent Law Review, (1987): 209-254
Graham, Ridge “It's high time to abandon ship on the Atlantic Coast Pipeline.” Appalachian
Voices, (2020) https://appvoices.org/2020/05/05/its-high-time-to-abandon-ship-on-the- atlantic-coast-pipeline/
Hammack, Laurence “Another lawsuit filed against bogged-down Mountain Valley Pipeline.”
The Roanoke Times, (2020) https://roanoke.com/news/local/another-lawsuit-filed- against-bogged-down-mountain-valley-pipeline/article_9bbb5f30-189b-11eb-bab1-
Hammack, Laurence “Forest Service grants pipeline’s request to pass through Jefferson
National Forest.” The Roanoke Times, (2021) https://roanoke.com/business/local/forest- service-grants-pipelines-request-to-pass-through-jefferson-national- forest/article_0768b8ce-5418-11eb-ba8c-6f0b6b8dd399.html