Russia: History and Political Culture

Russia History and Political Culture Pisarev, Alexander Tamkang University, Taiwan Abstract Russi.

Russia: History and Political Culture Pisarev, Alexander Tamkang University, Taiwan Abstract Russia: History and Political Culture Pisarev, Alexander One of the most typical features of Russia’s traditional and contemporary culture is the issue of unresolved identity in recent times In this sense Russia is not unique, but what is quite peculiar is the way this issue is articulated in Russian cultural tradition The entire Russian history, including the history of culture, can be presented as a cyclical movement between the two extremes of the human universe – West and East If the initial stage of the formation of the Russian state (Kiev Rus), without a doubt, was the result of the impact of the European civilization during the forthcoming periods of Russian history, as the country was under numerous influences which were the result of the “wind from the East.” The two sources of “orientalization” of Russian culture, and political culture in particular, were the incorporation into the Mongol Empire in the 13th century and inheritance of the Byzantine tradition in the 15th century The first attempt to resolve the contradiction between Western and Eastern sources of Russian cultural tradition was the concept of Moscow as the “Third Rome,” which was destined to unify the fragmented universe on the foundation of the values of the Orthodoxy Hence, the sprouts of the Russian “messianic idea” came into being The efforts to “Westernize” Russia during the two 434 외국학연구 제27집 centuries of existence of the Russian Empire, and seven decades of the Soviet Empire, failed to resolve the issue of identity, but strengthened the collision between Western-oriented culture and Eastern-type political culture After the disintegration of the Soviet Union the issue of identity resurfaced again and nowadays constitutes one of the most debatable problems, both among the political elites, and the common folk Keywords: Political Culture, Cultural Identity, Messianism, “Westernizers,” “Russian Idea” 주제어: 정치 문화, 문화적 정체성, 메시아니즘, 서구주의자, 러시아 사상 Ⅰ Political Culture Approach and Russian Political Culture The roots of the “political culture” (политическая культура) approach in political science can be traced back to the middle of the 20th century when the school of the “culture and personality” emerged The new approach was the outcome of merging the concepts that were typical to psychoanalysis and anthropological studies The purpose of several prominent Western scholars who had implied it (Harold Lasswell, Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, Erich Fromm and others) was to find a scientifically based explanation of such social phenomena as aggression, warfare, authoritarian rule, fascism ect They argued that these phenomena were the outcome of different practices of children’s socialization This school was especially influential during the Second World War when the studies of different types of “national characters” became popular At that time there were published studies on “national characters” of the major powers participating in the war The main hypothesis the scholars relied on was the link between the dominant political culture and patterns of traditional childrearing in a village community in any given country In the aftermath of the Second World War as a reaction to the anthropological and psychological reductionism, in America, political science Russia: History and Political Culture 435 flourished in “rational choice” and “public choice” studies of different patterns of political culture They were focused on research of the voting behavior and based on such quantitative and scientific methods as interview schedules and content analysis of Mass Media and other materials Although they were challenged in the 1960s and early 1970s by the “New Marxist” approach, which stated that political culture of the West was merely the continuation of the “false consciousness” of the bourgeoisie ideology, they still remained the mainstream in political culture based studies One of the most important contributions of this period of time to the problematic political culture was the formulation of the definition of this approach In the classic research of Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba was given the definition which, though it was challenged on numerous occasions, still remains influential: “internalized cognitions, feelings and evaluations” by the political society actors of the political system(Almond and Verba, 1965, pp 13-14) This further step was an attempt to put the political culture approach into a broader cultural-historical context and to extend it to studies of different political-cultural traditions The basis for this new definition of culture and its continuation - political culture, was associated with the research of Clifford Geertz, who tried to observe different cultural traditions from the historical-comparative perspective(Geertz, 1973) Thusly, the definition of culture and its integral part – the political culture – was becoming more sophisticated and included such phenomenon as symbolic, expressive, behavioral aspects that had been observed in language, rituals and systems of classification(Cruz, 2005, p 28) Generally speaking, this shift signified the retreat from “behavioral” interpretation of the political process to its “interpretevist” explanations(Molchanov, 2003, p 27) In terms of Russian political culture, the author would argue, that the approach closest to the “interpretevist” appeared earlier in Russia studies, than the “behavioral” one It was primarily due to the fact that foreign scholars did not have access to Russian political society, and were therefore unable to use techniques they employed during their studies of political culture in contemporary 436 외국학연구 제27집 Western countries Nonetheless, though there were significant differences between different “interpretivists,” basically they agreed that the Russian political culture, contrary to the West, was based on absolutism, despotism, collectivism and servility Such scholars as Zbigniew Brzezinski, Edward Keenan, Henry Kissinger, Richard Pipes and Stephen White emphasized the continuity of Russian history, associated the roots of authoritarian tradition with the epoch of Mongol domination and saw its continuation during periods of Muscovy, the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union(Pipes, 2001; Tucker, 1990; Billington, 1970) On the other hand, in Western studies of Russian political culture one can find a different approach, the partisans of which draw attention to a liberal stream in Russian political tradition On the contrary, Stephen Cohen criticized the theory of “unbroken continuity” between different stages in Russian history and blamed this approach for its concept of “predestination” and teleological motives(Cohen, 1985, p 51) During the time of Gorbachev’s reforms, some Western scholars had the chance to conduct field research in Russia and as a result of their “behavioral” studies, they came to the conclusion that democratic orientations and the values of freedom were not alien to the broad Russian public(Hahn, 1993, p 318) For them, as for some other scholars, the trajectory of the development of the Russian “political culture” was more associated with such political institutions, as the Novgorod veche (Новгордское вече), Zemskii Sobor(Земский собор) and zemstvo (земство) They even argued that the Russian case was not much different from the Eastern European countries and that Russia was simply lagging one step of historical development behind its European neighbors(Malia, 1994) The studies of the Russian political culture in the Soviet Union started in the 1970s-1980s The definition of “political culture”, which was generally accepted by Soviet scholars, was quite close to the classic formula suggested by their Western colleagues: internalized cognitions, feelings and evaluations, patterns of behavior of social strata and individuals in their relationship with the system of political power(Orlov, 2008, p 52) Soviet political scientists largely utilized this technique as being typical of their Western colleagues, who had accepted the Russia: History and Political Culture 437 “behaviorist” approach to the studies of political culture They managed to arrive at some important results, though they were undermined to a large extent by the ideological constraints of the official Marxist-Leninist ideology After the fall of communism in Russia, and liberation of the political sciences from their ideological control, the study of Russian history and contemporary Russian society from the point of view of the political culture approach became more common Among the themes that were largely discussed, both by political scientists and politicians were the issues of Russian historical-cultural identity, the problematic relations of the state-society, and the continuity and discontinuity of Russian political tradition(Pivovarov, 2006; Orlov, 2008; Malinova, 2009; Glebova, 2006; Surkov, 2007) The main purpose of this paper has not been a study of the Russian style political culture per se, but a reflection of this problem in traditional and contemporary political discourse and its influence on political ideologies and party politics In this respect two major themes have emerged: the issue of cultural identity and the impact of the state in the process of modernization of the country The former topic was articulated in Russian traditional and contemporary political thought as the “Russian idea” (Русская идея) concept, while the latter was represented by the concept of “Russian power” (Русская власть) These two theories, in the authors’ opinion, belong to the domain of the political culture approach and were intimately interrelated with the political process in Russia in the modern world 438 외국학연구 제27집 Ⅱ “Russian Idea” and “Russian Power” Both advocates and opponents of the ideological trend dominant in Russia today characterize it mainly in vocabulary drawn from the West-European experience of the “clash of ideologies,” principally conservatism, liberalism and socialism (Marxism) However, this formulation may be of value in understanding global politics, as it is less helpful in comprehending the salient features of Russian culture and their continuation – modern politics In the author’s view, three main principle themes had emerged in the debate on Russian political culture Firstly, the unresolved question of cultural-historical self-identification Secondly, messianism as an ideological response to this unresolved problem, which was defined by Russia’s 19th century thinkers as the “Russian idea” concept.1) Thirdly, it was authoritarianism of the state which was instrumental in shaping Russian identity and the powerful contemporary Russian scholars categorized Russian nation, as the system which some of “Russian power”(Mararenko, 1998, p 171) Though this listing may seem common place, the author would argue that these factors were essential to understanding contemporary Russian politics The issue of cultural-historical identification, as it was well known, was the result of Russia’s complicated history and geography To be precise, it had been Russia’s location between the great civilizations of East and West that determined the historical development of the country Viewed from this angle, the course of Russian history appeared to be constantly shifting between East and West.2) In the initial stage of the history of the Russian state Western influences predominated, while following this Russia was reconstructed on the basis of Eastern political culture during the two centuries of Mongol Empire domination The long-term effect of this “wind from the East” was clearly identifiable during the subsequent period of Muscovite rule in Russia(Yurganov, 1998, pp 197-198) The two centuries of the Russian Empire, despite Peter the Great’s (Петр Велик ий) efforts did not see the issue of cultural ambiguity resolved, as one of the most important outcomes of the reforms was strengthening of samoderzhavie (сам 439 Russia: History and Political Culture одержавие), based on the paradigm of “enslavement” of the society by the state, or system of holopstvo (холопство) (Harhordin, 2011, p 38) They also added a further contradiction, which was of the sharp confrontation of the Western-oriented culture of Russian nobility and the traditional political culture of Russian despotism(Faizova, 1999, p 85) The Russian Empire constituted the historical stage when the Russian state, or the system of “Russian power”, acquired its fullest development The supreme property rights of the state merged with religious and juridical institutions which were intended primarily to protect the state from society and at the same time the state positioned itself as the beneficent patron of its subjects This mode of relations between state and society was obviously quite different from the pre-modern and especially modern European pattern One response to uncertainty of cultural identity – whether Russia belonged to the West, or constituted the forefront of the East in Europe, was Russian messianism, which saw Russia’s mission as that of the unifier of East and West, primarily through the medium of the Russian Orthodox Church (Православная Ц ерковь) These ideas of Russia’s historical role had been apparent, at least since the 15th century, when the “Second Rome” – the Byzantium Empire, fell to the Turks leaving Russia as the only legitimate successor to the Byzantine civilization which had for so long bridged the East and West At this historical point the messianic concept of Russia as the “Third Rome” (Третий Рим) came fully into being.3) In the middle of the 19th century the theory of the messianic role of Russia as unifier of the East and West was revived during the debate between “Slavophiles” (Славянофилы) and “Westernizers” (Западники) The former advocated the unique contribution of Russia to world history – “Russian idea,” while the latter insisted that their country had no other historical option, but to accept the basic values of the Western civilization, or “Western way” (Западный путь)) An important component of this debate was the impact of state institutions in determining the future development of the country For the supporters of the “Russian idea” concept, the messianic role of Russia as unifier 440 외국학연구 제27집 of the East and West was unachievable without a patron state that was powerful enough to drive society in the right direction For “Slavophiles,” state institutions as well were closely associated with the role of the traditional rural commune (o бщина, мир) which underpinned the entire system of social relations They saw the Russian type of rural community as a unique formation which was basically incompatible with such modern Western institutions as private property and individualism For them the community was the source of the unique spiritual unity of Russian people Thinkers, writers and politicians who belonged to the “Westernizers” camp – Pavel Annenkov (Павел Анненков), Timofei Granovskii (Тимофей Грановский), Konstantin Kavelin(Константин Кавелин) strongly believed that Russia had to accept the model of historical development demonstrated by the Western civilization On the other hand, their opponents – Ivan Kirievskii (Иван Кириевск ий), Alexei Homyakov (Алексей Хомяков), Aksakov brothers (братья Аксаковы), later – Fedor Dostoyevsky (Федор Достоевский), Vladimir Soloviev (Владимир Соловьев) and others, emphasized the uniqueness of Russian civilization and its messianic nature Whereas for the “Westernizers” there were no theoretical difficulties in defining their approach (which later laid the groundwork for Russian liberalism), the supporters of the “Slavophile’s” concept had to specify the features of the “unique Russian culture,” the essence of Russian messianism and the main principles of the “Russian idea.”4) Theoretically, the starting point of this discussion looked different from the theories developed centuries ago Beforehand, Russia was considered to be, in fact, the representative of the “true West,” by the middle of the 19th century, when partisans of the “Russian idea” reformulated the problem This new approach was based on the conception of initial separation between the East and West and Russia, which in turn placed both historically and culturally between these two extremes In other words, this theory stressed the issue of cultural-historical identity, as Russia had to identify itself with the West, the East, or neither An influential Russian thinker and philosopher in the middle of the 19th century Petr Chaadaev (Петр Чаадаев) was the first who presented the Russia: History and Political Culture 441 problem in this light He wrote: “And yet placed between the two great divisions of the world, between East and West, resting one elbow on China and the other on Germany, we ought to combine in ourselves the two great principles of human intelligence, imagination and reason, and fuse in one civilization the history of all parts of the globe”(Chaadaev, 2004, p 36) Probably, it was Dostoyevsky who suggested the clearest response to the theoretical challenge, whether Russia belongs to the East or to the West His argument was: Russia belongs both to the Western and Eastern worlds, hence to the mankind as a whole, and in this sense is capable to demonstrate something critically valuable for both parts of the divided universe Specifically, argued Dostoyevsky, certain moral values, which did not exist as part of the Oriental cultural tradition and could not be found any longer in contemporary Western societies.5) The adoption, by Russian intelligentsia in the second part of the 19th century, of a revolutionary strategy of reconstruction of semi-traditional society did not signify an end to the feud between the proponents of “Western way” and “Russian idea.” The Russian populists-narodniks (народники) were inspired by the messianic ideal of establishment of a socialist society not only in Russia, but all over the world, on the foundation of communitarian institutions close to the Russian type.6) The example of another faction of Russian revolutionary movement looked quite different, as Russian social-democrats initially declared that the “Western way” was the only historical option for Russian society (встат ь на дорожку Запада – Ленин) On the eve of the 1917 October revolution (О ктябрьская революция), however, the familiar messianic impulse became more and more obvious For Bolsheviks (большевики), the center of the world-wide revolution shifted from Western Europe to Russia and this important break with the central point of the Marxist teaching can be considered as an adoption of the basic principles of “Russian idea.” In this sense, the Soviet Russia (Советская Р оссия) represented more continuity than the break with the previous cultural tradition Both “Russian idea,” reinterpreted by Russia’s leadership of the world communist revolution and the system of “Russian power,” represented by the almighty communist state, reached their most developed forms.7) 442 외국학연구 제27집 And even more: the Soviet Union (Советский Союз) portrayed itself as a unifier and leader of the East in its struggle against the capitalist West(Malinova, 2009, p 38) In the USSR, as in the traditional Russian Empire, a simultaneously paternal and oppressive state merged with property and law which was designed to protect its interests and specific ideology-religion or the system of “quasi-religious congregations,” as some scholars put it, in the form of Marxism-Leninism(Harhordin, 2011, p 95; E Pain, 2012, p 44) Last but not least, collectivism gained victory over the concept of individualism the roots of which became evident after the Great Reform (Великая реформа) of the second half of the 19th century and especially during Prime Minister Petr Stolypin’s (Пе тр Столыпин) agrarian reforms at the dawn of the 20th century It must be admitted that the system of communism in Russia bore some features that were commonly associated with Western modernity – in particular, rationality as the solution to social and political problems But this rationality was negated by its subjugation to the irrational goal, of constructing a paradise on Earth in the shape of the communist society.8) It is not surprising that after the Bolsheviks’ takeover, theoretically, the most comprehensive alternative to the Russian communist’s conception of Russia’s role in world history was also based on a modification of Russian messianic dreams It was represented by the “Eurasian” (евразийцы) school, which was founded in immigration and included some of the most prominent Russian thinkers of the time, all of whom were forced to leave the country after the communist’s take over Among them one can find such figures as the specialist in comparative cultures Eugenii Trubetskoi (Евгений Трубетской); historians Petr Savitskii (Петр Савитский) and Alexei Shahmatov (Алексей Шахматов) A group of widely known philosophers–Nikolai Berdyaev (Николай Бердяев), Georgii Florovskii (Гер гий Флоровский), Lev Karsavin (Лев Карсавин), Fedor Stepun (Федор Степун) and Boris Shiryaev (Борис Ширяев) had also to leave the country A famous scholar and an outstanding specialist in comparative law Nikolai Alekseev (Никол ай Алексеев) and others were forced to go into exile as well It is quite natural that there were different positions advocated by the 446 외국학연구 제27집 broad public support, but by the middle of the last decade of the 20th century it became apparent that they were losing their momentum, as the “Russian idea” political forces became more influential.10) On the eve of the second Parliamentary elections after the fall of the USSR, which were held in 1995, it was quite clear that there was not only an uncompromising ideological split in the country, but the whole system of government was divided in to two conflicting parts The executive branch of power headed by the Russian President Yeltsin, was eager to fulfill the agenda of reforms suggested by the “Westernizers,” while the “patriots-nationalists” dominated in the Russian parliament The reasons for the fast decline of the influence of “democrats-reformers” were numerous and represented a combination of internal and external factors The general direction of Yeltsin’s initiated reforms was the transformation of Russia into a “normal” European country, which was hardly achievable without the acceptance of the European values, and in fact, meant distancing from the main essence of the “Russian idea.” In terms of the system of the “Russian power” the “democrats” proclaimed a broad program of economic and political reforms aimed at its total deconstruction They foresaw the dissociation between state and property (privatization), state and ideology (establishment of multi-ideology and multi-party system) and between state and law on the basis of separation of powers The newly adopted Russian Constitution of 1993 was founded on the concept of strict separation between the executive power represented by the Russian President, and the Russian Parliament, in which the key role belonged to the lower chamber – the State Duma (Государственная Ду ма) The judicial branch of power was proclaimed to be independent from both the executive and legislative powers, as well as the Mass Media which was given a guarantee from interference on behalf of the state In terms of the new political system, it was a decisive break with previous political tradition, as for the first time in Russian history, if not democracy, but democratic-type structures and institutions were being built.11) The most controversial part of the initiated changes was the economic reform, Russia: History and Political Culture 447 which started with the “shock therapy” that turned the Russian economy into turmoil and impoverished the majority of the population On the other hand, the policy of privatization of Russian industry, activated in the second half of the 1900s, was rightly criticized by the opposition for the forming of an undemocratic system of “oligarchic capitalism.” The Russian “oligarchs” were given access to large portions of the former state property on the condition of loyalty to the presidential office By the end of 1990s a new tendency became obvious: merging between the ruling political clan of Yeltsin’s family (Семья) and the dominant “oligarchic clans,” which clearly demonstrated an inclination to place Russian politics under their control As of several years ago, when the failure of perestroika and the disintegration of the USSR provoked disillusionment in Communism and provided an impulse for public support of the “Western way,” the hardships of the economic reconstruction initiated by the “democrats,” in three years turned large sectors of public opinion away from the “Westernizers” and strengthened the “Russian idea” camp(McDaniel, 1996, p 173) Despite these internal reasons, there were numerous external factors which also provoked growing disappointment with the agenda of the “Western way.” The obvious intension of the West to utilize Russia’s weakness in order to develop some gains in the international arena at Russia’s expense, and especially NATO’s expansion to the East also served as a catalyst for the growing anti-Western sentiment The political crisis over Yugoslavia, during the spring of 1999, initiated a new round of discussions concerning the prospects for future development of the country and the nature of reforms that Russia needed For some of the scholars and political analysts who took part in this debate, which resulted in the publication of hundreds of articles in the Russian press, it was obvious that NATO’s attack against Yugoslavia was in fact a “conflict of civilizations” and the major target was not the Balkan country per se, but Russia, which was still considered by the West to be an eminent and alien entity(Dugin, 1999.04.10.) “Westernizers,” on the other hand, emphasized that bombardment of Yugoslavia had nothing to with an attempt to encircle Russia but rather it 448 외국학연구 제27집 was a must to maintain stable relations with the West, because it was the only way to secure Russian democracy and continuing reformation of the country(Rogov, 1999.06.16.) During Yeltsin’s decade, Russia took its first steps in the direction of abandonment of the utopian “Russian idea” and deconstruction of the system of the “Russian power.” Achievements were important, as political institutions generally associated with the democratic rule were established and the reforms of the social-economic structures were started People could enjoy basic human rights that included freedom of speech, organization and participation in different political movements, freedom to stay in Russia, or to leave the country The first decade of the democratic reforms revealed, on the other hand, their limits: the “Russian idea” was still alive and gaining in momentum and the system of the “Russian power” in a miraculous way managed to survive in a form of the “oligarchic capitalism.” The most important outcome of the Yeltsin’s epoch, somehow, was the continuing sharp ideological split, initiated by the unresolved issue of cultural-historical identity Ⅳ President Putin: From Compromise between The “Western Way” and “Russian Idea” to “Sovereign Democracy” The essence of the ideas of Yeltsin’s successor, Vladimir Putin (Владимир Пу тин), shortly after his coming to power, can be categorized as “initial putinism” (ранний путинизм) and, in the author’s opinion, it was an attempt to pacify contradictions between the two main camps in Russian social and political thought According to Putin, Russia was destined to accept basic Western values, but those values were unlikely to be achieved without the guiding role of a patronizing state, which was seen as the major instrument in leading society to modernization Probably, in the most explicit way Putin presented his views on Russia: History and Political Culture 449 the burning problems of Russia’s past, and the perspective of the future development of the country, in a lengthy article published on the eve of the 2000 presidential elections Strange though it may seem, and for some reason up until now, this major “theoretical” publication had been generally overlooked by his foes, supporters and political analysts Putin was quite strait forward when he characterized the results of the seventy years of the Communist experiment as a “movement to a dead end that brought (Russia) far away from the main direction of the development of the world civilization”(Putin, 1999.12.30.) He clearly associated himself with the basic values typical to Russian “Westernizers” when he wrote: “We can have a decent future only if we can organically unify the universal principles of a market economy and a democracy with the realities of Russia…”(Putin, 1999.12.30.) If what he said really represented his views at that time, one could come to a conclusion that for him the “Western way,” as the universal direction of the world civilization, was the only historical road that Russia should have followed In his understanding, the market economy and democratic political institutions were the most characteristic features of this historical experience and Russia had no other choice, but to accept them Thus, he clearly dissociated himself from the basic principles of the “Russian idea.” On the other hand, quite contradictory, he appealed to the “Russian idea” in a way that would arouse sympathy among the partisans of the Russian uniqueness and provoke apprehension among those who believed in principles of freedom and democracy From his point of view, “a strong state for Russian people is not an anomaly, but on the contrary, it is a source and guarantor of order, the initiating and driving force of all the innovations…Russia needs a strong state power and must have it”(Putin, 1999.12.30.) He specifically emphasized traditional and positive roles of the concept of the strong state in Russia –госуда рственничество - as a guiding force of the renovation of the society He argued: It is unlikely that Russia will become soon, if it ever happens, the second edition of the USA or England, where liberal values are rooted deeply in historical 450 외국학연구 제27집 tradition In our country state institutions always played a critically important role in the life of the country and people The strong state for a Russian man is not an anomaly, something that should be fought against, but on the contrary, it is the source and guarantor of order, initiating and guiding force of all the changes… Our society needs restoration of the guiding and regulating role of the state to a degree that is necessary in terms of our traditions and the current situation in the country(Putin, 1999.12.30.) During Putin’s second presidential term, formulation by the Kremlin’s ideologues of the concept of “Sovereign democracy” (суверенная демократия) reflected the transition from early “putinism” to its mature version (зрелый путин изм) The difference between the two can be formulated in the following way: what before was an instrument – the powerful state – became the ultimate value, while the former main motivation of reforms – unity with the European civilization on the basis of building modern democratic institutions – was played down In the most explicit way, the essence of the concept of “Sovereign democracy” was explained by the Kremlin’s chief ideologue at the time Vladislav Surkov (Владислав Сурков) in his publications on the nature of Russian political culture He stressed the three main distinctive features: “centralization,” “personification” and “idealism.” The first conception, as one can guess, indicated the leading role of the state in state-society relations, the second one emphasized the importance of personal-charismatic representation of the state and the last one, probably, pointed at a certain kind of “messianic” background of state-society interrelation in Russian historical context(Surkov, 2007, pp 8-9) Quite paradoxically, Surkov concluded that this type of political culture (which, in fact, was very close to the concepts of “Oriental despotism” and “Russian power”) brought democracy to Russia Furthermore, he emphasized that his own understanding of “Sovereign democracy” was founded of these fundamentals(Surkov, 2007, p 14) For the theoreticians and practitioners of “Sovereign democracy,” as it seems, Russia’s peculiarity inevitably brings the country to a state where there is one leader, one ideology, one party, and the Russia: History and Political Culture 451 basis of this structure is bureaucratic capitalism It would be unfair not to admit that during Putin’s rule Russia had certainly progressed in economic development, reduction of poverty and reappearance in the international arena as one of the important players Somehow, it was also evident that under Putin the “sovereign” Russian state was not only strengthened, but obviously reinforced against the society Large segments of the property of the former “oligarchs” were returned under the control of the government, which established several gigantic state-owned conglomerates in different sectors of Russia’s economy, primarily in the most profitable one – the energy sector After the terrorist’s attack of 2004, the provincial governor’s elections were submitted to nomination of governors of Russian provinces directly by the president, and in party politics, serious amendments were made to the legislation In order to meet the necessary conditions for registration, the number of party members had to be no less than fifty thousand in at least in half of the country’s regions, and the creation of party blocks was forbidden, so each party had to clear a seven percent threshold to enter parliament Besides, according to Putin’s proposal, the whole Assembly had to be elected only according to proportional representation, thus representation from the single-mandate districts was abolished Needless to say, that all these changes made it almost impossible for the smaller parties, especially in opposition to the ruling regime, to have their representatives in the legislative body As a result, Russian liberals lost representation in the legislature and were pushed to the periphery of the electorate field Last, but not least, it became common knowledge that the independence of the Mass Media was seriously jeopardized in Putin’s Russia, as the majority of the electronic media resources suffered from heavy administrative pressure.12) 452 외국학연구 제27집 Ⅴ Conclusion This shift of political elites and society at large in the direction of Russia’s uniqueness was linked by obvious changes in party politics During Putin’s second term the “Western way” political forces almost disappeared from the Russian political arena, by at least losing their representation in the State Duma Nowadays, both in the sphere of political discourse and representative institutions, the political process is almost entirely monopolized by the political parties representing different modifications of the “Russian idea” concept In this light, the author would rather argue that the most common among political scientists is the interpretation of the political process in Russia, based on the triad derived from the Western political vocabulary, namely “conservative-liberal- socialist,” does not completely fit Russian realities The experience of evolution of the Russian polity during the last decade convincingly demonstrated that the “Russian idea,” contrary to predictions in the early 1990s, was not in a state of agony It is even more vibrant with all its typical features: the issue of historical-cultural identity, messianic incentives and desire for a strong patron state able to accept the role of the guiding force and beneficiary of the society The electorate field is monopolized by different factions of the “Russian idea” camp, while Putin’s version of Russian style conservatism in the form of the “Sovereign democracy” concept seems to be appealing to the Russian voter In some way, powerful anti-Putin demonstrations in Moscow and other Russian cities after parliamentary elections in 2012 indicated that Russian liberalism was somehow more alive than dead The most remarkable in the recent history of Russian political society is not even the devaluation of the “universal values of the Western civilization,” but the phenomenon of “Putinism” and the trajectory of its evolution The initial “Putinism” was a liberal version of the “Russian idea,” when in fact, a “new centrism,” was a compromise between the two most important conflicting ideologies in Russian politics It managed to occupy a vacant position of ideological cluster at that time and successfully provided the second Russian Russia: History and Political Culture 453 president with an instrument of consolidation of his power During Putin’s second term “putinism” eventually evolved into its mature or conservative form, the process that resulted in the invention of the most recent modification of the “Russian idea” conservatism If his competitors appealed to imperial and communist traditions, mature “Putinism” addresses directly to Putin’s legacy, or itself Words and deeds of the second and after his return to power the forth Russian President are becoming the construction material of this new tradition, while “idealization and personalization” appear to be its important instruments Thusly, the self-image of the present day Russia is definitely not the West, but East, which is also imagined, as this image does not correspond completely to the changing realities of the Eastern world 1) For the first time this concept was used by a famous Russian Christian philosopher Vladimir Soloviev in 1888 in his lecture given in Paris and later published in French In Russian this article was published for the first time only in 1909(Russkaya Ideya (Russian Idea), 1992, p 7) 2) The “West-East opposition” approach, though often criticized for a two loose definition of the course of human history, still looks attractive to those scholars who are trying to construct a unified field theory of historical development(Morris, 2011) 3) American historian of Russian culture wrote: “Moscow was the site of the ‘Third Rome’ for the apocalyptical monks of the sixteenth century, and for the ‘Third International’ apocalyptical revolutionaries in the twentieth”(Billington, 1970, p 48) 4) M Malia(1994), a prominent scholar of Russian modern history and a critic of the idea of “Russian uniqueness” wrote: “Russia in this early modern Europe, therefore, is best understood not in terms of the antithesis Russia and the West, but as apart of a continent wide West-East continuum…” (p 55) 5) He stated: “The assignment of a Russian man, with no doubt, is all-European and universal To become a real Russian probably means only to be a brother of everyone (in this world), to become a universal man” (F Dostoevskii, “Pushkin,” Russkaya Ideya, p 145) 6) For instance, Engels criticized messianic illusions of one of the most outstanding representatives of Russian populists Petr Tkachev From his point, Tkachev was defining Russian people as, so to speak, “chosen people of socialism” (Wada, 1983, p 51) 454 외국학연구 제27집 7) Some of the critics of “Bolshevism” convincingly argued that this interpretation of the traditional Russian messianic idea was one of the major reasons of their triumph It became as well one of the most powerful sources of the legitimization of Bolshevik’s power (Berdyev, 1955, p 88) 8) R Pipes(2003) wrote that in communist countries in fact were revived certain elements of political institutions typical to traditional oriental societies, where the leader “who concentrates in his hands all the power of which his citizens have been deprived and is elevated to the status of Oriental divinity” (p 144) 9) Contemporary Russian scholars pay a close attention to the ideas presented by the members of the “Euro-Asian” school of thought See: Evraziya Istoricheskie Vzglyadi Russkih Emigrantov(1992); V Poiskah Svoego Puti: Rossya Mezhdu Evropoi I Asieii, parts 1-2(1994); Global’nie Problemi I Perspectivi Tsivilizatsii [Fenomen Evraziistva](1993); Rossiya Mezhdu Vostokom I Zapadom: Evraziiskii Soblazn(1993) 10) Only 30% of Russian public in early 1990s agreed that Russia should go along a special from the West path of historical development(Dubin, 2012, p 36) 11) Though, some Russian political scientists convincingly argued that the prerogatives of the president, given to him by the constitution, were so broad that in a certain sense his powers could be compared with role of the Russian Tsar after the constitutional reforms of 1905.(Medushevskii, 2007, p 41) 12) There are 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2014.03.16 게재일자 : 2014.03.30 459 ... reductionism, in America, political science Russia: History and Political Culture 435 flourished in “rational choice” and “public choice” studies of different patterns of political culture They were... 문화적 정체성, 메시아니즘, 서구주의자, 러시아 사상 Ⅰ Political Culture Approach and Russian Political Culture The roots of the ? ?political culture? ?? (политическая культура) approach in political science can be traced... of their Western colleagues, who had accepted the Russia: History and Political Culture 437 “behaviorist” approach to the studies of political culture They managed to arrive at some important