AN ASYMMETRIC THREAT INVOKES STRATEGIC LEADER INITIATIVE THE JOINT IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT ORGANIZATION

AY 2006-2007 AN ASYMMETRIC THREAT INVOKES STRATEGIC LEADER INITIATIVE: THE JOINT IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT ORGANIZATION RESEARCH PAPER DR JOHN BOKEL WILLIAM G ADAMSON, COL, USA SEMINAR (DR GREG FOSTER, PRIMARY FACULTY ADVISOR) The Industrial College of the Armed Forces National Defense University Fort McNair, Washington, D.C 20319-5062 Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO AN ASYMMETRIC THREAT INVOKES STRATEGIC LEADER INITIATIVE: THE JOINT IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT ORGANIZATION Abstract This study evaluates the effect of an asymmetric threat, the Improvised Explosive Device (IED), on strategic leader initiative during the “Long War” The Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) was established by the Department of Defense (DOD) to “defeat (IED) as weapons of strategic influence” DOD’s military response, by itself, lacks sufficiency and JIEDDO’s success remains elusive The hostile use of IEDs worldwide persists, and will likely continue, without a national mandate dictating greater interagency (IA) involvement This paper suggests a more committed IA constituency will lead to better collective performance, potentially resulting in success The observations of the former operations officer of JIEDDO offers a portfolio of lessons to enable organizational effectiveness when responding to anomalous conditions COL W G Adamson, USA Industrial College of the Armed Forces National Defense University Dr John Bokel 2007 Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO An Asymmetric, Strategic Form of Fires “Explosives are the safest weapon for the Mujahideen Using explosives allows us to escape enemy personnel and to avoid being arrested In addition, explosives strike the enemy with sheer terror and fright.” - (Al Qaeda statement quoted from “Encyclopedia Jihad, Version 4”) The United States (US) currently engages an adversary cloaked in an ancient ideology in a war it failed to fully envision The prevalent global threat comes from autonomously networked, non-state actors, like Al Qaeda, motivated by ideology, mistrust of the West, and disapproval of international governance The strategy of hostile forces presents evolving asymmetries confronting the will of the American public as the “center of gravity” to democratic ideology Assassinations, kidnappings, beheadings, suicide attacks, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) represent the tactics employed in a “global insurgency” (Barno, 2006) This paper relates a chronological account of the DOD response to one of these tactics, the IED, by recounting the formation of the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) DOD’s military response to the IED threat, by itself, is inadequate, and JIEDDO’s mission “to defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence” remains elusive because of insufficient interagency (IA) support National tunnel-vision with the war in Iraq restricts JIEDDO’s capacity to broaden the national effort on the Global War on Terror (GWOT) The terrorist and insurgent use of IEDs worldwide persists, and will likely continue, absent a national mandate dictating greater IA involvement A more committed IA constituency will greatly benefit the IED effort Greater IA contributions to a national IED effort, particularly among the intelligence community (IC) and law enforcement agencies could result in better collective performance, Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO potentially achieving success Current IA participation in the IED effort is a testimony to the entrepreneurial leadership at JIEDDO Organizational theory addresses the difficulties of synchronizing complex organizational endeavors when functions are not viewed as essential Organizational theory suggests that organizations are created in order to accomplish certain missions….Organizations favor policies that will increase the importance of their organization, fight for capabilities that they view as essential to their essence, seek to protect those capabilities viewed as essential, and demonstrate comparative indifference to functions not viewed as essential (Nagl, 2002, pp 4-5) Because DOD’s preoccupation with Iraq and Afghanistan centralizes JIEDDO support properly on the Combatant Commander the IED effort reflects an imbalanced military-centric approach As a result of counterinsurgency experience, military commanders learned and the DOD adapted its institutional response to the hostile use of the IED The military’s learning curve outpaces other government agencies in regards to the IED response Meanwhile, the hierarchical, ad hoc IA process lacks a comprehensive strategy for defeating the global IED threat because it is not viewed as essential to their collective or unilateral missions Lieutenant Colonel Tucker Mansager’s experience in Afghanistan led him to state of the IA, “…coordination has been haphazard and ad hoc, particularly at lower levels Action is required; the system will not improve by itself.” (Mansager, p 80) A modest prototype effort expanding the scope of IA involvement on the IED problem could validate integration concepts and processes for a subsequent broader IA reform effort Divergent IA authority, tribal-like organizational cultures, and bureaucratic reluctance inhibits full or comprehensive participation in the IED effort The same could Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO be said of the four military Services during the formative stages of DOD’s IED response However, existing law, the Goldwater-Nichols Act, dictating a Joint Service organizational structure and joint warfare concept enabled the military to overcome inadvertent friction and Service biases The release of the Iraq Study Group report November 2006, recommended a Goldwater-Nichols model for training and conducting joint operations across IA boundaries (Iraq Study Group [ISG], 2006) The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) recommended government reform of the IA process along the line of Goldwater-Nichols The notion of building operational capacity within the IA that approaches the capability of DOD’s joint organizational concept underpins the recommendations in the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols study by CSIS (Murdock, C & Flournoy, M, 2005, p 8) The IED threat required a rapid response, invoking initiative on the part of strategic leaders and organizational adaptation An account of the strategic adjustments, organizational initiatives, and processes enacted during the creation of JIEDDO illustrates senior leader initiative Highlighting organizational “best practices” allows development of a portfolio of lessons observed A review of the scope of the IED problem provides operational context for the subsequent development of lessons observed Scope of the IED Problem The havoc caused by the use of IEDs began in the first few months following the end of major combat in Iraq Initially, IEDs did not concern military forces Following the end of major combat, loosely coordinated direct fire engagements constituted the major form of enemy attack in Iraq The overwhelming firepower and accuracy of US and Coalition military forces in direct fire engagements caused rapid adjustment of Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO enemy tactics Indirect fire attacks, primarily from mortars and rockets, quickly became the enemy’s desired form of contact, targeting forward operating bases (FOBs) and Iraqi government facilities As US counter-battery fires became more effective, a new tactic emerged as the preferred enemy form of fire, the Improvised Explosive Device, or IED The term, IED, entered the popular lexicon of the US military during what was originally planned as the stabilization and reconstruction phase of the Iraq War Numerous definitions exist for the IED Simply stated, a bomb-maker modifies the characteristics of munitions, explosives, or substances with explosive properties in a homemade fashion, creating an IED (Global Security.Org/military/intro/ied.html) IEDs can be constructed and delivered to their targets in many different ways Used for hundreds of years, recent examples of IED attacks range from the truck bombing of the Marine Corps barracks in Beirut in 1983, to the ship-borne attack against the USS Cole in 1999 The successful aerial IED attacks on September 11, 2001 produced a Presidential response with an intense focus on homeland security resulting in the reorganization of 22 federal agencies under the Department of Homeland Security However, as the US opted to expand the GWOT into Iraq the most pervasive form of IED became the roadside bomb and car bomb Few experiences compare with the helplessness felt by those involved in an IED attack The experience is searing An IED attack has many of the attributes of a sniper ambush There’s no emotional build-up prior to an attack, such as: the anxiety prior to an assault, the sound of preparatory artillery fire, or the rumble of a tank formation en route to a meeting engagement with enemy armor IEDs are weapons of surprise An IED victim vaults from relative calm to chaos in the blink of an eye The IED strikes Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO unexpectedly like the piercing crack of a sniper rifle The blast from an IED has indiscriminate, constituent effect No attacker is readily apparent This relative anonymity offers advantage to hostile forces The combination of these ingredients: helplessness, surprise, calm before chaos, indiscriminate effect, collateral damage, and anonymity of the attacker contribute to tactical anxiety Personal involvement with IED attacks begins with the response to a scene of a suspected IED and often moves onto casualty evacuation Later, personal involvement extends to discussions with victims, patients convalescing and coping with daily rehabilitation from wounds The sense of urgency felt on the battlefield or in the amputee wards enters living rooms via nightly news coverage Images of IED attacks invoke strategic influence over the public, a public otherwise physically dislocated from combat The strategic power of the IED comes from a non-kinetic source, information America’s adversaries operate in and exploit the information environment Blast effects from IEDs are sensational on film, indiscriminate in the collateral damage they cause, create a climate of fear in the public, and have a psychological impact on military forces IEDs present a new and asymmetric form of fires with a tactical effect much like artillery; however, the kinetic effect produces psychological anxiety as well as strategic influence IEDs become “weapons of strategic influence” because images of IED attacks impact the psyche of the American public through daily news broadcasts Hostile forces count on “sound bite” deep analysis from the media and the American electorate, seeking to overcome the US technological and military advantage with this asymmetric form of fires The resultant draining effect exhausts national will and commitment Oscar Wilde once said, “In America the President reigns for four years, and journalism governs for Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO ever and ever (Wilde 1881/Torricelli 2001, p 177) The adversaries of the US in the GWOT exploit this reality well Curtailing the informational power exploited by global insurgents through images of IED attacks calls for a wider application of all elements of national power, not exclusively military force In operational terms, IEDs presents an asymmetric threat to Coalition Forces for two reasons: first, they represent a new method of attack that conventional capabilities were unprepared to address, and second, the IED was something not fully understood (Skelton, 2004) Hostile forces not develop innovative technologies through conventional research and development (R&D) programs Attackers employ decades old insurgent techniques with available Industrial Age weapons In short, terrorist and insurgents modify commercially available equipment and adapt tactics at a rate that bureaucratic, hierarchical organizations cannot keep pace with Are IEDs, as some suggest, just a symptom of the general problem of insurgency and or terrorism? One cannot consider terrorism and insurgency without considering the IED The following quote from an Al-Qaeda document highlights this terrorist organization’s reliance on the IED “Al-Qaeda doctrine acknowledges ‘that the production of different types of bombs and explosives must be mastered,’ but adds this is not difficult because ‘the ways to this are available and explained in many places … people with experience …[are] many in number in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere’." (http://www.jamestown.org/news_details.php?news_id=169) Commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as leaders in the Pentagon, confronted by the rising insurgency which challenged security and stability in the region adjusted operational tactics GEN Richard Cody, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, recognized “the IED is the poor man’s cruise missile.” (Lovelace & Votel, 2005, p 34) Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO IED components are readily available, inexpensive, have relatively simple construction, and offer easy delivery to a target area Proliferation in the use of IEDs by hostile forces continue Given the widespread, de-centralized nature, and asymmetry of the IED problem, US forces have had difficulty progressing from a reactive operational mode Moreover, the malignancy carried by the IED spans all levels of war The terrorist and insurgent use of IEDs resulted in a response from the tactical to strategic level of war The initial response in theater followed a technically oriented approach rather than a holistic strategy Initially, commanders categorized the IEDs as a problem for either an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Team, or Engineers, vice a new form of fires for ground commanders to address (Votel, personal communication, October 7, 2006) 360 Degree Warfare and the IED Phenomenon Gaining an appreciation of the early tactical and operational impact of the IED provides greater awareness of the scope of change required by the IED Terms common to maneuver warfare such as: meeting engagement, screen, delay, and movement-tocontact, pale in significance to a new lexicon associated with “360 Degree Warfare” The concept of a front, or line of battle, vanished Currently, the primary offensive component of terrorism and insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan manifests itself through the use of the IED IED attacks target convoys just as frequently as “front line” units These logistics convoys become combat formations known as Combat Logistics Patrols (CLPs) A prevalent tactic once known as the “presence patrol” from the US experience in Bosnia and Kosovo become Combat Reconnaissance Patrols (CRP) Reconnaissance missions increasingly focused on route Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 10 clearance Assessing routes for out-of-place garbage bags, animal carcasses, piles of rocks, and broken concrete curbing indicative of IED camouflage techniques becomes daily routine Soldiers and Marines developed skilled vehicle-mounted scanning techniques as they looked for the tell-tale lone wire crossing a street linked to an IED initiator The appearance of new graffiti in a neighborhood becomes an important indicator of potential IED activity The dominant form of maneuver for US forces operating outside of FOBs become CLPs, CRPs, and route clearance patrols Primarily for force protection, US forces implemented a policy of living and operating out of FOBs Initially viewed as liberators and then occupiers by the Iraqi people, US forces adopted an “unsuccessful counterinsurgency operational practice” by moving into FOBs As noted in the final draft of a jointly issued Marine Corps and Army manual, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, separation and isolation from the population involved in an insurgency historically leads to poor rapport and ineffective results (FM 3-24/FMFM 3-24, 2006) US forces looked more like foreign occupiers than liberators The shared terrain linking the populace, insurgents, and US forces became the roads and access points to US facilities By choosing the time and place for employing IEDs against troop movements, insurgents seized the initiative on these common routes The vast majority of IED attacks occurred within a short distance of the FOBs Regaining the initiative became the logical next step for US forces Regaining the initiative optimally comes from precise, preemptive targeting of the human activities that enable IED manufacture However, identification of an enemy capable of blending into the environment, one that can hide in plain sight, complicated the problem Doctrine, Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 70 communication, October 24, 2006) Personnel in the operations lab refined CONOPs, developed ideas for employment with Figure 5, Capability transition from temporary JIEDDTF to permanent JIEDDO (Discussion Mr Maxie McFarland & COL Bill Adamson, 24 OCT 2006) units in theater and in pre-deployment training at the JCOE A dedicated Red Team portrayed the enemy perspective on likely action or reaction to new initiatives and informed developers of potential gaps and seams in the initiative for future modifications or spiral development Once an integrated and interoperable system was tested and Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 71 refined in the Sims Lab, key performance parameters (KPP), measures of effectiveness (MOE), and measures of performance (MOP) could be written The initiative could be deployed and then assessed under operational conditions Assessments by personnel in theater would be analyzed by Operations, Research and Systems, Analysis (ORSA) personnel to provide a coherent way to assess progress Staying Ahead of Emerging Threats JIEDDO’s strategic relevance will increase if it can predict emergent threats and exploit solutions which permit preemption As the COIC Red Team matures, it may serve the purpose of preemption However, the scope of JIEDDO’s current charter restricts its mission to improvised explosive threats Broadening JIEDDO’s effort may prove prudent in the near future “Just as our adversaries will continuously change tactics and approaches to seek our weaknesses, so must we be able to counter them through continuous adaptation If we not, we risk the mistakes of the past.” (Skelton, 2004, p.128) However, the rate of technological change makes prediction even harder in the future Had predictive intelligence analysis forecast the prevalent use of IEDs as a tactic in the GWOT, military forces would not be in the predicament experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan If the IED effort had started as a truly preemptive response, the lead agency would properly belong within the intelligence community (IC) Internal reform and mission overload in the IC cripples its capacity for additional effort Michelle Flournoy, an analyst at the CSIS, claimed that, “The US operational capacity rests almost entirely in the Department of Defense.” (Flournoy and Murdock, p.8) Evolution of the IED threat Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 72 compels DOD to seek greater support from the IA Unfortunately, military forces engaged in combat not have the luxury of waiting for a perfect approach In retrospect, the conditions which led to the formation of the JIEDDO reveal a strategic flaw in pursuing a military-centric approach Much of the international constituency the US must rely on in future conflicts has grown weary of US dominated military responses Additionally, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 2006 concedes that the US military does not conceive of future military operations without assistance from international and IA partners The consequences of the IA resisting a broader role against emerging IED threats reflects a continuation of unsatisfactory performance and an incomplete strategy capable of delivering only military-centric solutions The hostile use of IEDs by global insurgents necessitates a response properly cultivated by intelligence and law enforcement agencies These agencies require strong linkages into international partners aligned under DOD for specific operations like, OIF and OEF The following line of reasoning develops a proposal for enhancing the IED effort, improving operational performance against the IED threat As previously described, DOD responded to the IED threat initially in a reactive, defensive mode relying primarily on technology to decrease casualties in Iraq By establishing JIEDDO, DOD entrusted the organization as a “change agent” for the IED effort The necessity for greater intelligence support for offensive operations resulted in a recalibration of the JIEDDO main effort Intelligence driven operations attacking IED support networks in CENTCOM became the main effort Concurrently, the internal realignment of the IC under the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 73 consolidation of 22 federal agencies under DHS resulted in significant agency turbulence preventing optimal support Understandably, agency reform and organizational turbulence curbed willingness by the IA to provide support combating IEDs By default, the predominant response to the IED threat comes from the military institution Other government agencies participated cautiously in the IED effort launched by DOD Because the IFF paid for the IED effort and CENTCOM casualties rose because of IEDs, JIEDDO pursued a CENTCOM-centric strategy The US government must underwrite entrepreneurial risk and institute a coherent IA process that supports the operational need resulting from the hostile use of IEDs The dynamic Joint IED Defeat strategy requires even greater IC involvement However, decision by committee or taking a team vote rarely optimizes organizational performance Teams build franchises around key players The US government needs an IA team of players with long-term focus and commitment, not sporadic involvement The team needs 100% commitment from everyone for optimal performance Preferably, an Executive Branch decision selecting a lead agency fosters agency-wide, laser-like concentration on the hostile use of IEDs This lead agency must more than coordinate meetings and forums for information exchange The lead agency requires regulatory authority over a consolidated IA team JIEDDO’s mission for DOD affords a unique position as coordinator of the strategic IED effort DOD invested the resources, developed business processes, identified key leadership, and allocated the personnel in JIEDDO for a broad mission JIEDDO established linkages into the IA and across the COCOMs The geographic COCOMs execute the global IED strategy for DOD with JIEDDO in support Regional Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 74 COCOM areas of responsibility (AOR) preclude a global focus for the geographic COCOMs Special Operations Command (SOCOM) becomes the global partner for all geographic COCOM’s DOD’s planned expansion of SOF affords an opportunity for greater collaboration on the IED threat SOCOM’s current counterterrorist mission as part of the GWOT compels stronger links between the JIEDDO and SOCOM SOCOM’s worldwide mission fosters global operational continuity and offers adequate military force for preemptive offensive missions against insurgent sanctuaries SOF missions of this type require approval in consultation with the geographic COCOMs In combat operations like OIF and OEF, DOD through its COCOMs, leads the operational response The COCOMs, along with the Department of State (DOS), should persuade like-minded global partners for support, using an international element of power to deny global insurgents sanctuary in the relatively ungoverned areas of sovereign territory Taking preventive and preemptive offensive measures developed in concert with international partners supports the global main effort Much of the work on counterterrorism accomplished by other agencies and countries complements JIEDDO’s existing effort, easing concerns about greater collaboration Developing intelligence on terrorist networks proved difficult because of a lack of human intelligence assets Technical and biometric forensics from IEDs proved a force multiplier that enabled precise targeting of insurgent networks and provided valuable evidence, increasing the probability of convictions in criminal courts Threat specific IED intelligence developed by IA teams in the COIC represents a preliminary step in what should become an on-going, robust collaborative effort The DNI, linked to DOD through JIEDDO, SOCOM, and the geographic COCOMs, properly continues the Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 75 intelligence focus against IED networks abroad Domestically, DHS and the Department of Justice (DOJ) assume the main effort in an enforcement role detaining suspects based on intelligence from overseas sources fostered by DNI as well as their own domestically obtained intelligence Collectively, an interconnected IA team engages in a more enduring offensive approach against the global IED threat in the Long War than accomplished solely by JIEDDO In the Long War, the IED threat constantly evolves, and JIEDDO must first finish the task at hand in CENTCOM JIEDDO’s wartime support to CENTCOM remains unwavering, but as discussed, realizing success against hostile IED use depends on the IA and SOCOM accepting greater roles The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 2006 concedes that the US military does not conceive of future military operations without assistance from international and IA partners (Flournoy, 2006, pp.77-79) DOD’s strategy must permit iterative recalibrations as JIEDDO welcomes focused IA involvement into a more extensive Joint IED Defeat enterprise Assigning focused responsibilities, milestones, and objectives to every collaborating agency enables concurrent multi-agency discovery of global terrorists and insurgents reliant on IEDs The JIEDDO is well structured eventually to assume an even broader role in the Long War The tunnel-vision the military has with Iraq and Afghanistan restricts the current focus of JIEDDO’s effort Hostile elements in those theaters of war remain elusive, adaptive, and committed to the use of IEDs Achieving success against the global IED threat depends on greater assistance from SOCOM and the IA Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 76 What Have We Learned? “It is through change that we find purpose.” - Heraclitus The IED persists as a weapon of indiscriminate destruction with constituent effect The enemy proved to be quick learning and innovative, changing TTPs in response to the success of DOD efforts to counter and defeat the hostile use of IEDs The enemy campaign evolved from employment of individual, simply constructed IEDs to multiple IEDs in combined-arms ambushes Hostile elements use increasingly more sophisticated devices, killing first-responders, and indiscriminately targeting civilians using suicide VBIEDs The JIEDDO priority remains CENTCOM-centric, focused predominately on the nation’s malaise on Iraq In CENTCOM, the combined efforts of JIEDDO and the COCOM are not producing the effects desired The definition of success in the CENTCOM Counter-IED Campaign remains as elusive as victory in Iraq Violence in all of its dimensions increased during the formation of JIEDDO evidenced by the rising sectarian-based insurgency in Iraq The early technology-centric IED effort produced limited benefits for war-fighting commanders but did force the enemy to double the number of attacks to produce the same amount of casualties (Allyn, personnel communication, January 25, 2007) Even with all the investments in detection technology, an observant human eye detects the vast majority of IEDs (Kirin, personal communication, November 17, 2006) IED casualties remain about the same in spite of a four-fold increase in IED use in Iraq Casualty rates per IED attack are down indicating that the cumulative effort of training, better protective equipment, and improved intelligence had a positive effect Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 77 Initially viewed as a tactical challenge for combat units, the terrorist and insurgent use of the IED demanded institutional change Commanders in the combat zone reconsidered the nature of 360 Degree Warfare and the impact of the IED to their operations The early focus of the Army IED Task Force, formed in 2003, reduced combat casualties through the dissemination of effective tactics and promising technical solutions The TAT, along with the partnership JIEDDO nurtured with the AWG, provided relevant, current lessons learned through advisors possessing recent regional operational experience The initial OSD response, dominated by the quest for a technological solution to save lives, evolved into a more comprehensive approach The military institution repeatedly demonstrated its resilience, learning and adapting to the IED threat Some suggest that updates to doctrine or writing new doctrine serves as an organizational metric of learning and adaptation (Nagl, 2002) One must conclude that the work of JIEDDO with JFCOM, the JCOE, and TRADOC captured the doctrinal essence of the IED threat explaining concepts and training approaches to prevail Important modifications to standard bureaucratic decision systems in the Pentagon, CENTCOM, and at war-fighting headquarters enhanced the DOD’s institutional response to the asymmetric challenge brought by the IED DOD established the JIEDDO to “defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence” During the establishment of JIEDDO, institutional decisions resulted in adjustments to DOD business processes ranging from: acquisition, test, R&D, training, intelligence, and operations While evidence of both, institutional friction and some Service prejudice surfaced during the establishment of JIEDDO, there was also cooperation due to operational need The Joint Service consensus approving the expansion and permanency of JIEDDO along Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 78 with the creation of its subordinate joint training center, the JCOE, signaled long-term institutional adjustments were expected Allocating JIEDDO an organizational budget coupled with Joint Service manning mitigated inter-service rivalries, biases, and prejudice This paper gathered emerging lessons from the evolution of the Joint IED Defeat effort as it expanded during the Long War Table 1, JIEDDO Lessons Observed • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Strengths Strategic-level leader initiative & commitment Senior leaders underwrite risk High threshhold funding authority Investment Banking strategy providing venture capital for technology development Coalition embeds and collaboration Adaptive joint testing process Technology review & assessment Joint Service and IA LNOs representation Entrepreneurial acquisition & fielding process CREW development and fielding US Navy assistance with EWOs JFCOM collaboration and doctrinal updates Contractor manning for JIEDDO growth Targeting support to combat units Weapons Intel Teams at brigade level Rapid “best practice” dissemination and TRADOC doctrinal FM Formation of JCOE for IED Defeat Strategic-to-tactical linkages TAT and ATAT program with multiservice reach into both the active and reserve component Field Teams that embed with tactical units as advisors Challenges • Personnel regulations for manning a JTF • Maintaining continuity and expertise midst personnel rotations • Building a technology path or roadmap • Institutional biases • Innovation and speed affected by bureaucratic time constants • Joint Service consensus building • IA autonomy degraded unity of effort • Responsive CONOP development and new equipment training for forward deployed units • Creating counterpart organizations at various levels of command • Institutionalizing change in structure, equipment, and the training base • Synchronizing DOTLMPF midst rapid change • Sustaining organizational agility midst a large bureaucracy Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 79 Military leaders often must translate lessons learned from past conflicts into applications for innovative training, tactics, and technology (Meigs, 1990) [See Table 1] Prudence compels institutions to learn from the past in order to better prepare for the future The Services created new organizations, mobilized and realigned units, and developed a joint training center specifically for the IED threat Updates to the curricula of military schools and training institutions occurred, an indication of organizational learning and adaptation (Nagl, 2002) JIEDDO support to the MNF-I Counterinsurgency Academy helped prepare newly deployed commanders for the intellectual rigors of counterinsurgency Incorporating embedded international members and IA liaisons laid the foundation for closer collaboration with these vital partners A holistic strategy reliant on intelligence driven targeting support was offered to maneuver units This strategy enabled attacks against the entire IED network through a new facility, the COIC, serving in Direct Support of deployed commanders The JIEDDO marshaled limited IA support through its entrepreneurial leadership and personal relationships built with counterpart leaders in the IC While integration of IA liaisons occurred at the COIC, the IED response developed by DOD lacked comprehensive IA commitment The inclusion of contracted, experienced law enforcement professionals on brigade and division staffs improved the ability of units to target the nexus criminal, corrupt former regime intelligence services, and paramilitary forces that constitute the operational capacity of IED networks Even with changes to the military, the time horizons of the DOD procurement and acquisition cycle were not agile or responsive enough to stay ahead of asymmetric threats with materiel or technical solutions alone Venture capital provided Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 80 by JIEDDO for R&D investments on promising materiel solutions became the “bread and butter” of the JIEDDO technological effort By their nature, asymmetric challenges require entrepreneurial freedom and a degree of independence from cyclic DOD programming and budget norms By underwriting entrepreneurial risk, senior DOD leaders, such as: the Deputy Secretary, the Vice Chairman JCS, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, the CENTCOM commander, and the commanding generals of MNF-I, MNC-I, and CJTF-76, all instilled the JIEDDO leadership with the drive needed for implementing change while JIEDDO built trusted relationships among senior leaders in government Personal involvement of strategiclevel leaders enabled JIEDDO’s rapid impact on the use of IEDs A stronger partnership between JIEDDO, SOCOM, and the geographic COCOMs advances the effort against the IED threat However, the IED problem, like the insurgency in Iraq, requires more than simply a military solution Because of the military’s deep involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan with counterinsurgency, DOD quickly adapted institutionally, outpacing the rest of the IA A permanent IA constituency would greatly benefit the Joint IED Defeat effort Differing priorities and mission focus among the various IA partners reconfirms that agencies’ divergent core missions contribute to lack of cohesion against a complex threat DOD’s ability to learn quickly and create solutions to the IED threat will assist IA partners when participating in “nation building” or stability and reconstruction operations with DOD During these kinds of operations, IED use will likely proliferate Effective attack of IED networks requires coordinated IA approaches with clear, common objectives adopted in collaboration with IA partners Victory over the prolific Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 81 threat posed by the hostile use of IEDs will take the combined synergy of international and interagency partnering It is paramount for agencies to inculcate DOD’s lessons and develop a joint IA doctrine, modeled after the Goldwater-Nichols Act that enforces consensus approaches and subordinates IA autonomy to operational need (Meigs, 2003, p 18) Greater agency participation working collaboratively with DOD as the lead agency constitutes the IA team needed for accomplishing the global aspect of the JIEDDO mission Congressional legislation mandating IA reform may be uncomfortable for some agencies, but there couldn’t be anything more central for success against the global IED threat Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 82 References Barno, D (2006 Summer) Challenges in Fighting a Global Insurgency, Parameters, p 15 Ibid, p.24 Boston Globe, (June 25, 2006) Panel on Iraq Bombings grows to $3B Effort, retrieved on October 24,2006, from 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The Washington Quarterly, The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, pp 67-84 FM3-24/FMFM 3-24 Final Draft (2006 June) Figure 1-3, p 1-24 Global Security Organization, Retrieved on October 4, 2006 from (GlobalSecurity.Org /military/intro/ied.html) Heraclitus, from Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers Retrieved from http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/h/heraclitus.html Iraq Study Group (2006, November) The Iraq Study Group Report, Vintage Books, NewYork, p 93 Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organizational, and Nongovernmental Organizational Coordination during Joint Operations, Volume and 2, 17 March 2006, p I-7 & II-2 Knowles, E (2202) The Oxford Dictionary of Modern Quotations, Oxford University Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 83 Press, New York, p 67 Lovelace, J and Votel, J (2005, March) The Asymmetric Warfare Group: Closing the Capability Gaps, Army, Association of the United States Army, Washington D C., pp 29-34 Mansager, T (2006, 1st Quarter) Interagency Lessons Learned in Afghanistan, Joint Force Quarterly Issue 40, National Defense University Press, Washington DC, p 80 McFarland, M (2005 March-April) Military Cultural Education, Military Review, pp 6269 McFate, M (2005 May-June) Iraq: The Social Context of IEDs, Military Review, pp 3740 Meigs, M (1990) Slide Rules and Submarines, (Forward by VADM Baldwin), University Press of the Pacific, Hawaii Meigs, M (2003) Unorthodox Thoughts on Asymmetric Warfare, Parameters, Summer 2003, U.S Army War College, Carlisle, PA pp 4-19 Meigs, M (September 8, 2006) interview on National Public Radio Meigs, M (2006) JIEDDO Brainstorming Session at DIAC, April 2006 Mendelsohn, B (2005) Review of International Studies 2005, Sovereignty Under Attack: the International Society meets the Al Qaeda Network, pp 45-68 Murdock, C and Flournoy, M (2005 July) Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S Government And Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era Phase Report, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC Nagl, J (2002) Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, University of Chicago Press, Chicago National Security Strategy, 2006, p 43 Rumsfeld, D (3 January 06) DOD Press Release Schoomaker, P (2005) Foreword: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, University of Chicago Press, Chicago Skelton, I (2004) Whispers of Warriors, National Defense University Press, Washington D C., pp 122-125) Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO 84 The Project on Government Oversight (POGO) Blog: Contractors Hijack Counter IED Effort Say Counter-Insurgency Experts, Retrieved from http://www.poboblog.typepad.com/2006/06/contractors_hij.html Tzu, Sun (450BC) The Art of War, (1963) translated by S B Griffin, London, Oxford University Press Votel, J (2006) JIEDDO Brainstorming Session at DIAC, April 7, 2006 Wilde, O (1881), “The Soul of Man under Socialism”, Quotations for Public Speakers, edited by Torricelli, R (2001), Rutgers University Press, New Jersey, p.177 .. .Asymmetric Threat? ??JIEDDO AN ASYMMETRIC THREAT INVOKES STRATEGIC LEADER INITIATIVE: THE JOINT IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT ORGANIZATION Abstract This study evaluates the effect of an asymmetric. .. an asymmetric threat, the Improvised Explosive Device (IED), on strategic leader initiative during the “Long War” The Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) was established by the Department... IED threat required a rapid response, invoking initiative on the part of strategic leaders and organizational adaptation An account of the strategic adjustments, organizational initiatives, and