U.S.-Russian Relations Implications for the Caspian Region

HARVARD UNIVERSITY JOHN F KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT Caspian Studies Program A Report from the Caspian Studies Program’s Conference Held on October 22-23,2000 U.S.-Russian Relations: Implications for the Caspian Region With an Executive Memorandum by Brenda Shaffer Summarizing Key Findings and Policy Recommendations Caspian Studies Program, Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts June 2001 i ii PREFACE Dear Colleague, On the eve of the U.S Presidential elections, Harvard University’s Caspian Studies Program held a conference in Cambridge titled “U.S.-Russian Relations: Implications for the Caspian Region” (October 22-23, 2000) Security studies specialists, experts on the Caspian region, and past and present U.S and Russian policymakers attended the conference There was lively and candid debate about the respective policies of the U.S and Russia toward the region; there were also discussions about the impact of great and regional power rivalry on the state of conflict, stability, and development Recent changes in the area make the current period an especially opportune one for exploring how U.S and Russian relations affect the Caspian region Under President Putin, Russia has articulated and initiated a more coherent policy toward the Caspian region, significantly increasing its activities there Moscow’s recent change in policy suggests that Russian policymakers now believe that Russia can achieve more influence in the region by demonstrating flexibility on key issues One the one hand, an assertive, coordinated Russian policy toward the Caspian will likely increase the challenges to U.S.-led initiatives in the area On the other, Russia’s more centralized and coherent policy should facilitate the negotiating of cooperative arrangements with Moscow A number of policy recommendations emerged from the conference that should help the new U.S Administration promote U.S interests without contributing to the destabilization of the region or to worsening relations with Russia (outcomes which are clearly in conflict with overall U.S interests) The Executive Memorandum of this report summarizes these policy recommendations as well as the main findings of the conference The report also includes summaries of the five conference panels and an appendix containing a transcript of a press conference held on the sidelines of the conference with Ambassadors Carey Cavanaugh and Anatoly Adamishin This report has been compiled and edited by Emily Van Buskirk, Patrick McCrann, and Robert Krikorian, with proofreading assistance from Seth Jaffe Please feel free to direct any comments or questions about the report or its recommendations to Brenda Shaffer, Research Director of the Caspian Studies Program, 79 JFK Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, or Brenda_Shaffer@harvard.edu The Caspian Studies Program is made possible by a generous grant from the U.S.Azerbaijan Chamber of Commerce and a consortium of companies led by ExxonMobil, Chevron, Aker-Maritime, CCC, and ETPM This conference was also made possible by a donation from the Amerada Hess Corporation In the months to come, all of us at the Caspian Studies Program will continue to explore the issues of vital interest to the Caspian basin region, including the many ways in which the U.S.-Russian relationship impacts the peoples and situations on the ground We will continue to engage governments, the press, NGOs, companies, and academic experts in the in the hopes that the answers to these questions can positively inform U.S policy iii toward the region We hope that you will find this report useful as you contemplate U.S.Russian relations, the strategic Caspian region, and United States policy overall We look forward to hearing your suggestions and comments on this report and to collaborating with you in future exploration of these critical issues Sincerely, Brenda Shaffer, Ph.D Research Director, Caspian Studies Program iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface……………………………………………………………………………… iii Executive Memorandum by Brenda Shaffer……………………………… Panel One: Introduction and History………………………………………… Introducers: Graham Allison, Melissa Carr, Brenda Shaffer; Panelists: Carol Saivetz, Mark Kramer, Gerard Libaridian Panel Two: U.S Policy and Activity in the Caspian Region………………… 12 Chair: John Reppert; Panelists: Ambassador Carey Cavanaugh, Anthony Richter, John Elkind Panel Three: Russian Policy and Activity in the Caspian Region, Additional Rivalries in the Caspian Region………………………………… 16 Chair: Timothy Colton; Panelists: Ambassador Anatoly Adamishin, Fiona Hill, Brenda Shaffer Panel Four: Lessons about the Nature of Power in the Caspian Region…… 20 Chair: Paul Goble; Panelists: Steven Walt, Arman Grigorian Panel Five: Models for U.S.-Russian Interaction in the Caspian Region: Impact on Stability and Conflict……………………………………………… 24 Chair: Monica Toft; Panelists: Stuart Kaufman, Peter Rutland Appendix: Transcript of the Press Conference with Ambassadors Anatoly Adamishin and Carey Cavanaugh ………………………………………… 29 Conference Participants list………………………………………………… 40 v EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM U.S.–RUSSIAN RELATIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CASPIAN REGION Executive Memorandum By Brenda Shaffer2, Research Director of the Caspian Studies Program, Harvard University On October 22-23, 2000, security studies specialists, researchers specializing in the Caspian region, and policymakers from both Washington, D.C and Moscow convened at Harvard University’s John F Kennedy School of Government to discuss U.S.-Russian relations in the Caspian region, and to devise policy recommendations for the United States government The conference, held on the eve of the U.S presidential elections, anticipated that a new administration would likely reevaluate its policies toward the Caspian region Under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, Russia’s policy toward the region has changed significantly; while the overall relationship between the U.S and Russia is in a period of flux and redefinition This environment provides an ideal opportunity for a reshaping of U.S.-Russian relations in the Caspian region The following points represent the author’s interpretation of the main elements of consensus emerging from the conference (Individual participants may not agree with each and every point contained herein.) MAIN FINDING AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION: Articulated U.S policy and its present implementation in the Caspian region reflect a nominally cooperative attitude toward Russia Though the U.S does not want to exclude Russia from the region, nor intensify a U.S.-Russian rivalry there, the United States is committed to strengthening the independence of the states that emerged from the Soviet Union and weakening their vulnerability to outside influences Accordingly, Moscow perceives some U.S actions as attempts to exclude Russia from the Caspian region, or marginalize its influence there In parallel, Russia has sought to expand its presence and influence in the region At times, these competing attempts for regional influence have had destabilizing effects on the region itself This instability is clearly at odds with U.S policy objectives To correct this situation, the U.S needs to clearly articulate to Russia its objectives in the region, explaining the rationale behind specific policies— such as those targeting Iran, for example—while clarifying that the exclusion of Russia is not the ultimate goal of American policy In areas where U.S and Russian interests converge, the articulation and coordination of joint, complimentary policies will better serve the interests of both countries than uncoordinated action aimed at common problems: dealing with the threat of Afghanistan, for example A IMPACT OF RIVALRIES Rivalries between various actors often have destabilizing effects on the Caspian region The term ‘Caspian region’ refers to the countries bordering the Caspian Sea—Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Iran, Turkmenistan and Russia—plus the neighboring countries of Armenia, Georgia, Turkey and Uzbekistan The author acknowledges her appreciation to the conference participants for their contributions to the findings of this memorandum The author would like to especially thank Emily Van Buskirk and Melissa Carr for their extensive contributions to this memorandum EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM The competition and rivalry between the U.S and Russia, the U.S and Iran, and between Russia and Turkey significantly impact the stability of the Caspian region Moreover, the actions of these powers often complicate conflict resolution between the countries comprising the Caspian region Over the last decade, the U.S and Russia have at times exhibited “neo-Cold War” behavior in their rivalry over the region At the same time, local states have attempted to “suck in” the great and regional powers, involving them in local struggles and playing them against each other Moscow has perceived Washington’s policies as competitive While the U.S aims to implement a Caspian policy that is relatively cooperative with Russia, Moscow nevertheless perceives Washington’s policies as competitive, and has viewed the BakuTbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, for instance, as an attempt to exclude Russia from Caspian resources, instead of as an attempt to enhance the options in the region by developing east-west corridors and multiple pipeline routes (as envisioned by the designers of this policy) Russia interprets some U.S policies that target Iran as anti-Russian U.S policies aimed at averting the expansion of Iranian influence in the Caspian region are often interpreted by Moscow as anti-Russian activities This misunderstanding has had a detrimental affect on Russia’s perception of U.S polices in the region The Caspian is high priority for Russia Some of the conference participants postulated that the U.S and Russia would sooner reach an accommodation over the Middle East or the Balkans than they would over the Caspian, because of the region’s strategic importance to Russia Interactions between Russia and U.S are not necessarily “zero-sum.” Despite the rivalry on a variety of subjects, on a number of Caspian issues Russian and U.S interests clearly overlap: attaining stability in Afghanistan, preventing the flow of refugees, and halting both human and narcotic trafficking Moreover, both sides clearly benefit from stability in the South Caucasus Alignments are based on interests, not culture or religion In the Caspian region cooperative alignments emerge that are not based on nominal religious or ideological identity or orientation, but instead on complimentary interests This has made for unexpected political and strategic bedfellows such as Iran and Armenia, and Russia and Iran Historical factors play a much smaller role in determining alliances and cooperation than current, concrete interests Rivalries in the region are intertwined and cooperative frameworks are not rigidly based on divisions of ideology or identity This allows disparate groups to evolve, work together, and then disband on an almost constant basis When one discusses loyalties and interests, there are no ‘absolutes’ in the Caspian region Domestic lobbies have significant influence over state policies in the region Domestic inputs play a large role in many of the policies of the states in the region: Russia (expatriates from the Caucasus, economic concerns), Iran (where ethnic Azerbaijanis make up a third of the population), Turkey (Chechen, and Abkhaz minorities), U.S (Armenian domestic community) U.S domestic elements play a dominant role in determining U.S policies toward the Caspian region, often leading to policies contrary to the declared objectives of the U.S (e.g EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM section 907 of the Freedom Support Act3) The heavy involvement of domestic lobbies and diaspora communities at times creates incoherent state polices The Caspian region is overburdened by rivalries and struggles that are not directly related to the area, but instead arise from the agendas of outside actors Regions are trading and interacting despite states’ lack of ties Despite unresolved problems and conflicts on the state-to-state level, many provinces of rival states still conduct trade and cooperate on the local level: for example, the cooperation agreements between the Kars Province in Turkey and the Gyumri Province in Armenia and the general indirect trade between the two sides; trade between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the Republic of Georgia; and direct trade and cultural and educational cooperation between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijani-populated provinces in Iran, despite Tehran’s attempts to prevent these direct ties Many of these border zones have become hubs of exchange and cooperation, and they have the potential to become epicenters of vibrant intellectual and technical innovation B U.S POLICY TOWARD THE CASPIAN REGION: The U.S communicates mixed signals to the states that comprise the Caspian region On the one hand, the U.S consistently declares that one of its main policy goals is strengthening the independence of the states in the region; on the other, the U.S labels these countries “NewlyIndependent States (NIS)” and refers to them as part of the “Former Soviet Union,” as if their independence even after 10 years is still conditional In addition, these states are handled by departments that deal primarily with Russia, signaling that the U.S still interacts with the region through the prism of Moscow.4 The United States also sends conflicting signals regarding its support for stability in the region: the U.S declares that it strives for stability as a major goal, yet at the same time, it pressures the Caspian states to grant full rights to minority groups which threaten the stability of local regimes (e.g Islamic political groups in Central Asia) Bureaucratic politics often create substantial inconsistencies in U.S policies Bureaucratic politics often create inconsistencies in both the perception and execution of U.S policy This results, in part, from the conflicting public statements made by different government arms (e.g., the U.S military versus the State Department), which have different policy agendas Additionally, the U.S must take into account the fact that policy statements made by representatives of certain government agencies, the Department of Defense (DoD), for example, have different impacts and connotations than statements made by other government agencies, such as the State Department The U.S needs to coordinate its statements and allocate them in such a manner that the appropriate spokesperson enumerates a clearly articulated policy Section 907 prohibits U.S assistance (with the exception of assistance for nonproliferation and disarmament programs) to the government of Azerbaijan under the Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of 1992 (also known as the Freedom Support Act) “until the President determines, and so reports to the Congress, that the Government of Azerbaijan is taking demonstrable steps to cease all blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and NagornoKarabakh.” Later modifications in the legislation have enabled the granting of humanitarian/NGO assistance The Bush Administration has taken steps to rectify this situation and some of the government’s departments, such as the National Security Council and the State Department, are making an effort to both rename and reorganize some of these departments EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM Misperceptions of U.S intentions and policies toward the Caspian region are influenced by the fact that many in Moscow and in the states of the region view pronouncements by different journalists and editorial staffs (e.g The New York Times) as representing official policy U.S policy at times addresses the Russia of yesterday and not the Russia of today U.S policy toward the Caspian region seems to address the behavior of the Russia of 1991-1994, instead of the Russia of today Since the Soviet breakup, Russian policy toward the Caspian region has gone through a number of changes Until 1994, Russia was adamant about retaining hegemony in economic and security matters in the Caspian region, as well as having Russian troops returned to the former borders of the U.S.S.R Since 1994, Russia has modified its goals in the region While still aiming for maximum influence and accrual of benefits, Russia now realizes that it must accommodate other powers and interests in the region Recognizing the independence of the new states, Russia still strives for maximum influence over them, sometimes subversively exploiting minority groups to achieve its own aims Russia, however, is now far more reluctant to employ this tactic than it has been in the past, because of Russian vulnerability to separatist activity in the northern Caucasus Russian policy in the Caspian region and the extent of its cooperation with the U.S affects the overall state of U.S.-Russian relations Conversely, the U.S.-Russian interaction in the Caspian itself affects the overall bilateral relations between the two countries The U.S needs to recognize the difference between relative power and relevant power While Russia is no longer a superpower on strategic parity with the U.S., Moscow retains many levers for influencing the Caspian region that the U.S cannot, or is not willing to, apply: i.e., “relevant” versus “relative” power Moreover, some actions are available to Russia at a much lower cost than they are to the U.S.: such as the use of military troops Certain policies, like obstructing U.S pipeline plans, cost Russia less to implement than they cost the U.S to undo or reverse In other words, it is easier to obstruct than to build The applicable resources that Russia has at its disposal in the Caspian region—for instance, destabilization through local forces or even the introduction of military troops—must be part of U.S calculations in assessing Russia’s potential actions in the Caspian That being said, the use of such means is not without cost to Russia, and would certainly not be indiscriminate The beginnings of anti-Americanism U.S engagement in the Caspian region is still quite modest, despite American declarations to the contrary Moreover, the first signs of anti-American sentiments are emerging This trend seems to come from a variety of factors, including the disappointment resulting from the perceived failure of the U.S to meet its own declared security, economic, and political commitments in the region Some states, foremost among them Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, demonstrated an almost unwavering pro-U.S orientation, and took many steps to encourage American involvement These gestures were often met with apathy and escalating demands from the United States U.S democratization efforts in the region also contribute to the increasing anti-American trend: these efforts are viewed by some as condescending, or as attempts by the U.S to export values to the region The lack of U.S recognition that many of the societies in the region share democratic and liberal values, yet interact in culturally different ways than Americans, has hurt some liberalization efforts Moreover, U.S democratization programs often emphasize formal and measurable indications of change (election monitoring for instance), instead of long-term, gradual and sustainable change Foreign-sponsored programs often empower elites and individuals to challenge the existing power structures, creating animosity among certain groups In addition, at times, the perception that some value-laden programs are of foreign origin produces a reflexive EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM animosity toward them Those who design U.S assistance programs need to be extremely conscious of how their programs become perceived on the ground Washington often overestimates the religious factor While the Muslim peoples of the Caspian region possess multiple national and ethnic identities, Washington often assumes that their nominal religious identity as Muslims is their most important sense of identity If it is generally assumed that most states act to pursue their geostrategic interests, Washington policymakers too often think that Muslim states act in irrational ways, somehow driven by religious zeal An overemphasis of the Islamic factor leads the U.S to lose sight of many foreign policy opportunities In addition, official U.S governmental reports have a tendency to exaggerate the extent of the connections between the Muslim countries in the area, (such as Azerbaijan) to radical Islamic groups: the State Department’s 1999 Patterns of Global Terrorism Report demonstrates this tendency C POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS Analyze the Caspian as a multi-polar region The Caspian region should be analyzed with a paradigm that moves beyond the traditional bipolar regional perspective, one that accommodates the multiple interactions in both U.S and Russian calculations toward the region Examples might include a U.S.-Russia-Iran model or a U.S.Russia-Iran-Turkey model U.S policy must address current Russian activity The U.S should design and implement policies toward the Caspian region that are aimed at addressing Russia’s policies under Putin and not the policies of the preceding regimes Consequently, the U.S should recognize that Russia is now implementing a more centralized and focused policy in the area, and that Moscow is less inclined than in the past to actively destabilize the region At the same time, Moscow has learned to tolerate many stances that it once viewed as intolerable The U.S should continue to project its commitment to the independent policies of the states of the Caspian region, and not allow Russia to strong-arm them The U.S should more clearly communicate the goals of its policies The U.S should regularly communicate with Russia about the goals of its policies, especially those that target Iran, to ensure that Moscow understands that it is not the intended recipient of these moves Consolidate envoys, but communicate changes The U.S should consider organizing its envoys to the region in a more focused and centralized fashion Today, in the State Department alone, there are two special ambassadors as well as a special advisor handling the Caspian region.5 While Washington’s intention, demonstrating the importance it attaches to this area, is commendable, the result often creates mixed signals and cumbersome policies The U.S should work to coordinate policies among various agencies that have at times promoted conflicting goals Before publicly announcing institutional changes, On March 12th, the U.S State Department announced that Secretary Powell had abolished 23 “special envoy” posts, including that of the Caspian special envoy, held at the time by Elizabeth Jones Jones was renamed “Senior Advisor for Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy.” The Embassy in Kazakhstan put out a statement that Jones’s new title “is a slight change from her previous one, reflecting the new administration's prerogative The change in title does not change her status as an ambassador nor diminish her authority.” (Reuters, 3/13/01) PANEL 5: MODELS FOR U.S.-RUSSIAN INTERACTION states to ‘shop around’ for a deal that suits their interests leaves the U.S feeling frustrated Rutland identified four aspects of asymmetry:  Asymmetry of time: the American time perspective is very short, i.e on the scale of the next year or two, while the Russians are in the region for the long haul  Asymmetries of information on intentions: if Russia could understand its interests in cooperation, real cooperation could take place  Asymmetry of priorities: The Caspian and Caucasus is the top international issue with Russia (not least because of Chechnya), whereas it is fifth or sixth on the U.S list of issues in U.S.-Russian relations  Asymmetries of coherence and incoherence: the U.S economic strategy for the region is coherent, but its foreign policy is incoherent (i.e sends mixed messages) The Russian Federation is the other way around: its economic strategy is incoherent, in part because its external energy policy is tied up with internal crosssubsidization of domestic consumption However, its foreign policy is fairly coherent The principle of territorial integrity, Rutland noted, has incredible strength Diplomats, lawyers, and governments draw the line hard on territorial integrity Rutland sees no feasible way that Karabagh will be severed from Azerbaijan and accepted by the international community (Kosovo will have the same problem) There have been no secessions this century that were not authorized by the international community, subject to the approval of the country losing the territory This plays into Russia’s hands, because on this issue Russia is at one with the international community: it has 1/6th of the world’s surface, and it wants to keep every inch Examining the democratic peace theory (mentioned by Monica Toft in her opening remarks, that “democracies don’t go to war with each other”), Rutland theorized that the situation in the Caucasus suggests “democracies don’t go to peace with each other either.” One reason why it is hard for democracies to make lasting peace is that it is easy for small groups and demagogues to mobilize people and oppose any form of resolution It is hard for democratic leaders to make the necessary concessions for peace to be achieved, whether out of fear of assassination, or fear of losing of power DISCUSSION Arman Grigorian offered comments first, cautioning Stuart Kaufman against use of the term ‘ancient hatreds’ when describing current issues in the Caspian region as it removes responsibility from the current players Grigorian also pointed out that resolution 907 is not crucial, because it only affects legislation and not foreign policy towards the Caspian region In fact, he asserted that recently the Armenian diaspora has actually done more to harm the Armenian government’s position Rutland theorized that the situation in the Caucasus suggests “democracies don’t go to peace with each other either.” Rutland closed his presentation with an outline of a ‘game theory’ approach to the U.S and Russian interaction in the Caspian region The results have shown that the Russians have traditionally chosen to ‘defect’ while the U.S opted for cooperation even when they knew the Russian Government was going to defect So even in this ‘repeat’ game, the U.S continued to play the ‘sucker’—a relatively rational strategy but still one that In response to a question asking for evidence that the majority of Americans are against ending the embargo against Iran, Kaufman admitted that he was referring to the ‘sound byte’ problem This issue arises in a mediaoriented, sound-byte dominated environment, such as the U.S It is all too easy for a senator 27 PANEL 5: MODELS FOR U.S.-RUSSIAN INTERACTION or congressman to condemn concessions towards Iran than it is to present a lucid case in favor of reconciliation Brenda Shaffer also pointed out that Iran is not necessarily ready to cooperate fully with the U.S., citing the frosty exchange that took place this year despite Secretary of State Albright’s appeal to Iran in March for the establishment of dialogue, and the unilateral actions taken by the U.S aimed at improving relations Roger Kaufman noted that this issue exists on an elite, executive level leader may earn the trust of his/her people, the reverse is also possible The biggest issue, however, is that the democratic process is so tough that it scares off the majority of the leaders from reconciliation The closer the parties are to a resolution, the higher the probability of problems Ambassador Cavanaugh cited the current explosive situation between Israel and Palestine as an example Ambassador Adamishin concluded the discussion by affirming that while Russia was a great power, it now has to organize its foreign policy in line with the current economic situation and reality Ambassador Cavanaugh brought up the concept of democracies hindering the difficult reconciliation of regional conflicts While a 28 DISCUSSION WITH AMBASSADORS CAVANAUGH AND ADAMISHIN U.S.-Russian Relations in the Caspian Region On-the-record discussion With the press and Harvard Community Monday, October 23, 2000 Ambassador Former RF Minister for cooperation with CIS member-states, Anatoly Adamishin Former First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Vice President (International Affairs) of Sistema Corporation Ambassador Carey U.S Special Negotiator for Nagorno-Karabagh and NIS Regional Cavanaugh Conflicts Chair: Melissa Carr Program Director, Caspian Studies Program MELISSA CARR: The Caspian Studies Program is very fortunate today to have Ambassador Cavanaugh and Ambassador Adamishin here They have both been here all day for a small experts conference that we hosted on U.S.-Russian relations and their implications for the Caspian region The discussion today covered many different topics: broadly stated we were focusing on U.S and Russian policy in the region, and analyzing how effective they are We were trying to look at things from a slightly new viewpoint, inserting international relations and security studies theories along with regional studies assessments of policy and what is going on in the region We will be putting out a summary publication from today’s conference that we will make available to all of you But we wanted to provide an opportunity for people to have an informal conversation with Ambassador Cavanaugh and Ambassador Adamishin Since both of them have flights to catch, rather than spending a lot of our time reading through the details of their bios, their bios have been distributed to you I will just start by saying that both of them are extremely high-level professionals who were extremely candid during the conversations today Hopefully the candid nature of their comments will continue because all of us at the conference benefited from their insights The way we envisioned this is that Ambassador Cavanaugh will start and speak for a few minutes Then Ambassador Adamishin will also speak for a few minutes Then we will open up the floor to questions AMBASSADOR CAVANAUGH: Thank you all for coming It is actually very nice to get away to Boston I have been traveling to lots of places for the last year—I travel about 60-70% of the time—and very few places look this nice or are as efficient in their functioning I am also pleased to be here to get to talk directly with people because I think it is important that American diplomats talk to the American people and to the press to inform and hear from them about what we are doing and working on A valuable part of the conference today was that it was bridging the theoretical that is typically dealt with at universities and the reality of what we are doing in Washington We had people attend the conference today from the State Department and the White House, as well as several academics who recently left government service They provided a nice sharing of different positions and information on different approaches DISCUSSION WITH AMBASSADORS CAVANAUGH AND ADAMISHIN The main message that I brought was about American interests in the Caucasus, and the efforts we are working on there which are primarily to promote American interests They are wideranging and diverse, and include political, economic and security dimensions I walked through what those were and the efforts we are taking to try to bring about a peace Sadly in the three countries of the Caucasus, there are today three conflicts: one in NagornoKarabagh involving Armenia and Azerbaijan and two in Georgia: one in South Ossetia, and one in Abkhazia I work on all of those through the State Department I also work on Moldova and Tajikistan, so I actually have many conflicts to deal with, although there has not been a lot of work lately on Tajikistan But there has been an enormous amount of work lately on Moldova In fact, we have peace talks starting at the end of the month just outside of Vienna We feel comfortable that the peace processes on some of these disputes are moving forward As I said, Moldova looks fairly good We have very good cooperation with Russia on trying to find a solution on Nagorno-Karabagh For over a year we have had a direct dialog between the president of Armenia and the president of Azerbaijan, trying to find a peace settlement that would work We are doing it in a unique way through something called the Minsk Group It is a body inside the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe It has three chairmen, from Russia, France and the United States, all working together directly with these two presidents to try to find a solution If you look, it is a nice combination: it is three UN Security Council members with vetoes, it includes a key representative of the European Union, and a representative of Russia, clearly the largest significant power in the region Finally, the United States has a very strong interest in finding a settlement Together we are bringing to bear the potential for a possible solution The essential message we were discussing today was that it is difficult to work for peace and even more difficult to succeed There can be a great deal of progress and you can get very close, but it does not necessarily mean at the end of the day that you have a successful peace settlement I think people see today in the Middle East how hard that is People have been watching Cyprus for 25 years, seeing how tough that has been to resolve as well But as I said, in some ways we have been optimistic that some of these conflicts in the former Soviet Union in fact will have settlements in the New Year or the near term AMBASSADOR ADAMISHIN: Ambassador Cavanaugh has a big advantage because he is very active in the civil service And I, after 41 years of impeccable service, am now in retirement But my advantage may be that I may speak creatively about what I think without being committed to my functional obligations I may tell you that I really liked this experts’ conference I liked the idea of having it I like how it was organized and how the discussions were carried out For me, it is a good theoretical warm up before the political decisions I am sure that such an influential forum as Harvard University will have the opportunity to bring these points of view to the top of American policy I will try certainly to the limits of my potential to the same in Moscow I very candidly told my American friends that our impression is, or maybe was, that America is trying to push Russia away from this region I received denials of such an assertion I am not totally convinced, because as Rudyard Kipling put it, “Different folks keep different views.” There are probably people who want to cooperate with Russia, and there are people who want to weaken it further, just as a country that lost the Cold War DISCUSSION WITH AMBASSADORS CAVANAUGH AND ADAMISHIN But maybe it is a more theoretical situation, because in practical ways, we cooperate with the United States I believe that what Ambassador Cavanaugh said about our cooperation on Nagorno-Karabagh is very fair Things are not moving forward But without us, the situation could have been worse At least there has been no shooting for six years In another conflict, Abkhazia and Georgia, I believe we are less happy with the cooperation with the Americans because they, to my mind, took some not very successful steps in the United Nations Organization without coordinating them with us The conflict is stalemated I don’t know Maybe it would be stalemated in any case But now we have at least a good excuse to blame Americans for it Maybe I will mention a very important thing that we came together on – the American support of the construction of pipeline from Kazakh oil fields, which the American company Chevron is now working on, to the Russian port of Novorossiisk It is really a very good common enterprise, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, which consists of both Russian and American companies On June 1st of next year, it will begin functioning with the potential of pumping something like 27 million tons of Kazakh oil At the same time, I believe that we are wiser about the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, which is practically in project study And maybe there is enough oil for everybody And maybe there is enough room for everybody to cooperate and not to collide in this region CARR: Thank you both for your opening comments We would like to allow people to ask questions Both Ambassador Cavanaugh and Ambassador Adamishin are prepared to address your questions If people have specific questions about the conference, we would be happy to answer those, but we should probably those at another time We are happy to them today if people have specific questions, but it might be better to address most of the questions to Ambassador Adamishin and Ambassador Cavanaugh at this point QUESTION: I didn’t attend the conference My name is Daphne Abeel I am a reporter for the Armenian Mirror-Spectator, a local paper here in Watertown Of course we are following all the time and reporting on whatever we can about the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict I just wondered, beyond the personal meetings between Kocharian and Aliyev, has Russia made any specific suggestions concerning the solution of the conflict? ADAMISHIN: I will repeat again that I am replying as a private citizen I am not responsible, fortunately or unfortunately, for the Russian government My impression is that the solution must be found by both sides It is practically impossible to invent a solution for them or to impose a solution on them So what we are trying to do—and by “we” I mean the Russian, American and French co-chairmen of the Minsk Group—is to try to assist the sides in finding a solution Maybe I am wrong and Ambassador Cavanaugh will correct me But it seemed some time ago that a solution was just near, that a solution was possible Unfortunately the tragic events in the Armenian parliament, as you know, broke down the situation So now I don’t see practical, very close, very near ways of solving this conflict But the fact that the two presidents are talking to each other, and the fact—maybe I dare to say—that now there is a new president in Russia who is much more active and authoritative and younger may play a role in finding a settlement To my mind, if there are delays with the settlement, it serves nobody And, it may radicalize people, especially young people on both sides So, everybody has to hurry up And I would like DISCUSSION WITH AMBASSADORS CAVANAUGH AND ADAMISHIN to declare very strongly that Russia is for the settlement There is speculation that maybe Russia is not so interested in a solution because when there is tension and conflict, we have major levers to influence both parties and so on And maybe such an aspect of this situation exists, as in every conflict But the political line, the political will, and the political decision at the highest level are to help to find a solution as soon as possible Because, maybe after Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabagh, Russia suffers more than everybody else from the continuation of this conflict CAVANAUGH: Can I give you a little more on that—what is going on today? We are working on three specific sets of issues on Nagorno-Karabagh First, a peace process: it is important to find a fundamental settlement to the problem, with a very strong intent to find something that will be durable and lasting There has been a conflict for so long that it makes no sense to throw together something that could last for a short period of time The presidents agree with that, and because of that, they are looking at bolder approaches to try to find a solution Second, we are working on getting the parties to take measures that would reduce the loss of life along the line of contact There is a cease-fire in place that has been in place for six years But in fact already this year, more than 100 people have died along the line of contact due to random firing, land mines and other incidents That is a concern Because of it, we had a border crossing in July In fact I spent the Fourth of July with my Russian and French counterparts crossing the border by foot from Azerbaijan to Armenia We asked both governments to cross This is not something easily done with the borders sealed And we asked to cross at the point where there had been the most shooting In fact, we crossed at a place where a few weeks before, a 15 or 16year-old girl had been killed in her house Someone saw her movement in the window and shot her with an assault rifle A farmer had been killed while he was just out working in a field So we chose to cross there Both sides had to clear the minefield so we could cross at that border To that, they had a whole convoluted series of steps to get the soldiers to communicate with each other And they ended up laying a telephone line across the border so that they could call and let the other side know we were coming so they wouldn’t shoot When we crossed the border, we were told to walk along the telephone line It was a very thin path We went by about six holes about this size (gesturing) that deep, where mines had been taken out that morning We brought together the two regional governors from Armenia and Azerbaijan and the local military commanders For about two or two and a half hours, they had a discussion in the middle of the no-mans land about how to deal with these kinds of shootings These are the officials who have to go back and explain to their villages and their region why this girl and farmer were shot The discussions were very animated and productive, because it was far removed from the national level Rather, it was, “How can we stop this, because I cannot explain to people why this girl gets shot in her house in the middle of the evening.” And the other official responded, “I cannot explain how the farmer got shot.” Together they worked out some steps that would allow their military to try to reduce this loss of life For one of the steps, we asked if keeping the telephone line would be helpful, because they had no direct communication In fact, they admitted that if a soldier was sleeping and shot his gun off accidentally, or if a cow or a lamb—and there are lots of stray cattle and lambs—wandered into a DISCUSSION WITH AMBASSADORS CAVANAUGH AND ADAMISHIN minefield and set off a mine, then the normal response was for people to start shooting And then soldiers start shooting back, and both would keep shooting until someone was dead They admitted that they had no way to communicate If you were on the Azerbaijani side, the military field commander, would have to call the military hierarchy in Baku, who would have to call civilian leaders, who would have to authorize the Ministry of Defense and the Foreign Ministry to try to get a communication to Armenia to go through a similar chain of command in that government to get back to the other side of the border There was no doubt somebody would be dead before that process could be done We told them we thought the telephone line would help We said, “Keep it,” and got both presidents to agree that it would stay That succeeded Both sides admitted that it probably means that some people now will live that would have been killed It is a small step, but important and was done with the Russians and the French Finally, we are lining up financial support so that if there can be success in finding a settlement, it can be implemented As Ambassador Adamishin said, in the fall of last year, 361 days ago, things were moving very quickly forward I started to become worried that if the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan might achieve a solution, the international community could have trouble implementing it The last thing we would want would be to have leaders of a country actually succeed at something that is extremely difficult, and then have the world community come up short and not be able to produce the resources in time for its timely implementation So we have started lining up financial resources as well, so that if the Presidents can succeed, the solutions can be implemented And we have made some significant progress on that point as well I should tell you the next meeting of the Minsk Group is Thursday So I leave for Vienna on Wednesday night QUESTION: Excuse me; you said the name of the group… CAVANAUGH: The Minsk Group It was established with the premise that when a solution was found, they would meet in the city of Minsk, at a time when Minsk was held in greater international regard than it is today QUESTION: I have a question for Ambassador Adamishin Recently I have read that there has been a new agreement signed between Russia, Belarus and several of the Central Asian states— the Eurasian Economic Union I guess we have seen several agreements like this before This one has an energy agreement attached to Russia and Kazakhstan I wonder about your assessment now as a private actor: will this agreement change the way you business? Or you think this agreement is going to be left “Na bumagye, kak ranshe?” (“on paper, like before”) ADAMISHIN: I will be very candid with you The main advantage of this new agreement is that there is now a rule of so-called pondered decision Before, it was one country-one voice Now we have forty percent of the votes, Byelorussia [sic] and Kazakhstan each have twenty percent, and Kirghizia [sic] and Uzbekistan have 10 percent each It means that practically no decision can pass without Russia So, in this particular agreement, we just tried to introduce what we should have done before, but with the Yeltsin, excuse me, it was impossible There was no strong defense of just Russian interests [alone], not predominant But if you have your economic DISCUSSION WITH AMBASSADORS CAVANAUGH AND ADAMISHIN weight, it is a normal practice that the important decision should be made with the consideration of this economic weight In other topics, this new agreement maybe gives more effectiveness to the old agreement about the customs union, because there is now a permanent council of vice prime ministers, not accompanied by anybody Then there is the decision that the most important decisions can be taken at the highest level by consensus, independently of this practice of 40% and so on And I believe that it is an attempt to things seriously Because for the time being, this custom unions is not a very big success Only 60% of the tariffs are in common So you understand that there are big holes in the situation Then Kirghizia entered the WTO before Seattle This certainly plays a negative role in… But I will assess this new Eurasian Union or Community as a serious attempt to the things as they should be done QUESTION: I have a couple of Caspian questions if you will allow me One has to with the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline and what the development of it means for relations between Russia and the United States You mentioned the CPC pipeline in Kazakhstan, Ambassador The fact that the United States and Russia agree on the pipeline is not necessarily a very difficult agreement U.S oil companies are involved; they have to get their oil out It is going to a Russian port There doesn’t seem to be any other way to get the oil out except to have it go via the CPC pipeline Baku-Ceyhan is a little different There is a range of opinion on how opposed Russia is to that Sergeev, for example, says very strong things about opposition to that pipeline, and other Russian officials say it too My question here is first: if it is built, how big an irritant will the building of that pipeline be to Russian-U.S relations? How much friction will it create in the relationship? And how much will Russia to prevent it being built? Or will it simply acquiesce, if it looks like it is going to go forward, and allow it to be built without interfering? ADAMISHIN: I would begin with Confucius He used to say that when something is inevitable, just relax and try to enjoy it I don’t think we as a country, realistically speaking, have many levers to prevent the construction of this pipeline And, the official position of the Russian Government is that Russia is for multiple routes And we prove it with deeds You know, Kazakhstani oil now goes via Russian pipeline, or via Russian railway to the border with Finland, or on tankers to Baku and then to Supsa in Georgia, or with the railway to Urumchi in Xinjiang and then to China So there are already situations where the multiplicity of routes is proven in practice Then, I believe that we will have CPC functioning in June of next year Baku-Ceyhan, we still have time to see what is happening My idea is that if there is enough oil, there is enough room for at least many players I don’t think that the Kazakhstani oil will come to the south And I don’t think that the Azeri oil will go north So we may divide this situation Why aren’t people very happy with the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline? Because every calculation shows that from all parameters, it is economically disadvantageous So it is a political will to give to Turkey and to, I don’t know whom else, the possibility to play a very important role We consider that this issue must be decided in economic and not a political way As the known Soviet personage Brezhnev used to say, “The economy must be economic.” DISCUSSION WITH AMBASSADORS CAVANAUGH AND ADAMISHIN CAVANAUGH: Let me just say that we see a logic in multiple routes We see a logic in countries not having to ship their resources through countries that are direct competitors This is a problem that Azerbaijan faces if its oil and gas are shipped either north through Russia or south through Iran You become in part at their mercy in terms of the market We think that competitive routes yield competitive prices This shouldn’t be an issue of dispute between Russia and the United States In the long run, in fact, it should help spur the economic development of the region Part of the dilemma is overall economic development of the region, which is very difficult without a peaceful solution to the conflicts there If one can be found, it also will drop the political risk associated with building a pipeline and make it a more reasonable endeavor QUESTION: So you don’t see tension? CAVANAUGH: It has become an issue of contention by some, I think, who view it as a sign that the United States seeks to supplant Russia in the region But I think that is not the case The United States seeks the efficient and effective development of the oil and energy resources of the region We believe that is done through multiple routes ADAMISHIN: I have maybe one not so pleasant thing to say What we should be really against is the Trans-Caspian Pipeline The Trans-Caspian Pipeline for me is a very dangerous thing It may really destroy this unique basin, the Caspian Sea The geologic and seismic conditions, especially in the southern part of this sea are very hazardous So I believe that Russia has to what we can in order to convince people not to take this risk If you want the pipeline, it along the Caspian Sea, or maybe through Iran I don’t think the situation with Iran will be such as it is for a long time I hope anyway QUESTION: My second question has to with one of the few statements that President Putin has made on the Caspian and U.S.-Russian comparative interests This was back in April 2000 He has a way of speaking sometimes like the Oracle at Delphi; you cannot quite make out what he means It could be interpreted either way I don’t know how to interpret it, which is why I am asking this question What he said, or what he was quoted as saying before the National Security Council in April was, “We must clearly understand that the interest of our partners, Turkey, the United States and Britain, in this region, is not accidental We believe that the key question in resolving this problem is defining the balance of the interests of the state and companies We will not be able to achieve anything by the power of the state alone.” One way of looking at that statement is that he was saying that the state alone cannot achieve Russia’s state aims in the Caspian It needs to work through the companies In other words, to use the companies to achieve state interests, which is approximately the sort of the thing that happened shortly thereafter Lukoil said, “We are not going to send our oil through the BakuCeyhan pipeline.” Lukoil was given a large concession in the northern Caspian, off Kazakhstan, for Russian interests The other way of looking at that statement is that he is saying, we have to take the interests of the companies into account It is not only state interests It is the interests of Russian companies like Lukoil or Gazprom, and those are somehow separate from the government-political interests DISCUSSION WITH AMBASSADORS CAVANAUGH AND ADAMISHIN Which is it? How does he regard it? Does he want to use the companies to achieve Kremlin goals in the Caspian, or does he regard the companies as having separate interests as they used to have, apart from Kremlin political interests in the Caspian? ADAMASHIN: You invite me to be a Delphic Oracle? I know the telephone number of Mr Putin’s press secretary Maybe you can ask him directly But to be more serious, I believe that our state policy is becoming more economic in a sense, that Russian economic interests are being defended, not the political… not the prestige problems Even if they exist or take too much attention But now the government is really supporting the companies, Lukoil and Gazprom or some other We had this terrible gap when confronted with other countries where all the diplomatic mechanisms and efforts are directed at helping their businesses I was ambassador to Great Britain, and I know that the Foreign Office very proudly declares that the major part of money and the major part of time of British diplomats is dedicated to promoting British business The results of diplomacy are judged by the success of business We, I believe, are becoming a civilized country in this regard Lukoil now has some troubles in the northern part because they discovered and they explored major oil fields But it seems that in some Kazakh calculations, and their calculations were made much earlier than there was an agreement between Russia and Kazakhstan on the delimitation of the sea bed, their calculations show that Lukoil works on their, so to say, territory But we invented such an interesting thing as a, not just medium line, but modified medium line in order to permit every country to have better conditions to explore the gas fields QUESTION: I have a question to both Mr Cavanaugh said that the United States is ready to render financial assistance and should encourage the presidents to work towards the peace But it is known that Azerbaijan can survive without U.S assistance and Armenia will receive U.S assistance no matter what happens Do you think about other steps? And the question to Mr Adamishin: you said that Russia suffers more from this conflict than the conflicting parties But the green light was given by Russia to the conflict during Soviet times Does Russia think about lessening the suffering by stopping the supply of arms to one of the conflicting parties, or by some other means? CAVANAUGH: Let me say that what I was addressing was an effort to start making certain that there was sufficient international assistance from the U.S and others—to handle the enormous reconstruction and resettlement costs I don’t know that Azerbaijan could easily handle that In Azerbaijan alone, you are talking about more than 600,000 refugees to be resettled and re-housed If you look at the damage that has taken place in cities like Agdam, it is enormous The cost of that undertaking in many ways would be staggering But I believe that we have found sufficient response in the international community—including the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the United Nations agencies and other European agencies, the European Union, and the United States to try to bring together the resources to help with this effort It is an important task, but it is a task that would be essential once a solution in fact is found and concluded ADAMISHIN: Did you understand me correctly? I said that after Armenia an Azerbaijan, we suffer more than anybody else Didn’t I? Armenia and Azerbaijan certainly suffer more than we DISCUSSION WITH AMBASSADORS CAVANAUGH AND ADAMISHIN I may say first that I not agree with this assessment that the Soviet Union gave the green light for this conflict It is a long story This is maybe not a place to discuss it, but I categorically disagree with this interpretation Second, certainly we give some arms to Armenia But you have to consider the fact that both Armenia and Azerbaijan were members of the Treaty of Collective Security, the so-called Tashkent Treaty, which was stipulated in 1994 for five years When five years elapsed, Azerbaijan, together with some other countries, withdrew from this treaty Armenia is in the treaty And now in Bishkek, as you know, six countries confirmed and even increased their obligations to this treaty But the furnishing of arms on… conditions are for only common manifestation in this treaty It is not for a single conflict, but only for the cooperation between Armenia and Russia, between Russia and Tajikistan, or say Russia and Kazakhstan It doesn’t concern the delivery of the arms to the country as itself And recently the Armenians declared that there are some units of the Russian military equipment that have been withdrawn from Armenia Correct? And from Georgia as well But I don’t think that this particular circumstance hampers our efforts for the settlement of the conflict But I would like to be very definite It depends on the two parties in the conflict We, as Russia, cannot impose this agreement on them Maybe we could have done it in a so-called contested presumption But it wouldn’t last at any rate In order for it to last, it is necessary that both really agree For the time being, it is not the situation QUESTION: I have a three-pronged security question for Ambassador Adamishin If Armenia were to ask you to take Russian bases out of the country after an agreement, how would you feel about that? What is the status of Russian bases pulling out of Georgia? And how would you feel about another multi-lateral defense security organization involved in the Caucasus, sort of like not Russia ADAMISHIN: First answer is if Okay? The second answer, you know that there are agreements between Russia and Georgia that we have to withdraw two bases by the summer of next year, and two other bases in the next year This agreement was reached during the Istanbul summit of the OSCE Just on my departure from Moscow, I read that there were talks between Shevardnadze and Klebanov and probably they modified this agreement But it was only journalists’ interpretation, and I may tell you very candidly that I not know the situation for the time being But the previous agreement was that we have to withdraw our military bases from Georgia step by step Your third question concerns the organization of security in Caucasus, yes? QUESTION: Well, what would you think if Turkey and Azerbaijan, this is another “if” situation, but say Turkey and Azerbaijan sort of heightened their security arrangement with each other? ADAMISHIN: It is up to them They are two sovereign countries I thought that you were asking about some initiative put forth by the Brussels group or something But I don’t think that the time is mature for these initiatives CAVANAUGH: The reality is, it would be hard to envision an agreement where Armenia would ask for Russian troops to withdraw The Armenians feel very comfortable having Russians there DISCUSSION WITH AMBASSADORS CAVANAUGH AND ADAMISHIN as a check against Turkey Armenia has had such a bad relationship with Turkey that until that is repaired, I think you wouldn’t see them wanting the Russian forces to leave On Georgia, in fact there was agreement at the 1999 Istanbul summit that two of the Russian bases will be closed They are now working out the modalities of how to that Problems have arisen over Gudauta with the desire by the Georgian government for it to be destroyed in its entirety and a desire by the Russian government not to have to pay for that Concerns were raised by the Georgians that if Russia pulled all its equipment out but left the base intact, it could be converted to an Abkhaz military base They are still working that question out ADAMISHIN: Let’s charge Ambassador Cavanaugh to work on it (laughter) CAVANAUGH: I already am (laughter) CARR: At the risk of cutting people off, we are nearing the end of our time, and Ambassador Adamishin and Ambassador and Cavanaugh have both been working hard all day QUESTION: If I may When talking about Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, the countries that are in this region, we are talking of unified actors But there is an opinion that largely their politics depend on those who rule in these countries and the presidents of these countries, especially in the case of Georgia and Azerbaijan Presumably, if something changes and these people no longer are the presidents of these countries, you think the changes there will be drastic in their relations with the United States and with Russia? And is there any capability of conducting a consistent policy with these countries in case their leaders are absent? CAVANAUGH: It is always hard to gauge what will happen with transitions in leadership; that is a very strong hypothetical because you wouldn’t know what new leader might assume power The basic approach of the United States toward both countries would stay the same with a peaceful change in government So the likely response from us would be positive and would continue along the current path I suspect that were either the president of Azerbaijan or Armenia to pass from the scene, you would likely get someone to come in who would still follow the general policy lines that are in place You could have some modifications on key issues, but even there I think you would find that the national interest in the two countries dictates reengagement in many of the same ways I’ll give you a perfect example The Armenian President Ter-Petrossian lost power in part because of concerns over his efforts to find a solution to the problems in Nagorno-Karabagh He was succeeded by Robert Kocharian, who had been leader in Stepanakert and was heavily involved in leading the war effort And what issue does he then deal with as president of Armenia? Trying to find a peaceful solution to the problems of Nagorno-Karabagh Whoever would succeed him would instantly realize that he has no choice but to work also on that same issue to create a future for his country Were President Aliyev to pass from the scene, the new leader of Azerbaijan would instantly have to deal with the same array of issues on oil and gas development, on peace in the region, on relations with Russia, on relations with Iran that President Aliyev does QUESTION: Is the case with Georgia the same? DISCUSSION WITH AMBASSADORS CAVANAUGH AND ADAMISHIN CAVANAUGH: I think with Georgia it is the same, but it is more complicated and in many ways is more fragmented And I think that makes it harder politically You have a greater risk in Georgia with the passage of President Shevardnadze, I think, of more disunity If you look at the situation in Azerbaijan, even though a substantial part of territory is occupied, there is a stable, unitary government You could say the same about Armenia If you look at the situation in Georgia, there is not resolution on the Abkhaz problem or on the South Ossetian problem There is a sort of agreement of sorts between Adjaria and the Georgian government, but would that hold with a new leader? It could depend on the internal politics ADAMISHIN: I would add that I wish good health to Eduard Shevardnadze who was my boss for many years, and to Gaidar Aliyevich Aliyev whom I knew very well when he was a member of the Politburo Long life But I agree completely with what Ambassador Cavanaugh said The problems remain, but the people may change QUESTION: Just a final question Ambassador Adamishin mentioned new leadership in Russia President Putin might have some positive effect on the region The question to Ambassador Cavanaugh is, obviously we are coming up to an election in the United States Feel free to put in a pitch for your candidate if you like But, what changes are we likely to see in a new administration? CAVANAUGH: On these issues, I think you won’t find a significant change of policy regardless of who wins These are not high profile foreign policy engagement questions that would likely have an incoming presidential candidate say he wants to change U.S engagement today is based on fundamental American interests: humanitarian concerns, the economic sphere and overall stability And again, there is a strong domestic political constituency concerned about Armenia Some concerns have been raised in the press that Governor Bush has talked about having less American engagement abroad Often when he has addressed this topic, he is talking about the deployment of American military forces I not think this is an area people look at and typically and think about deploying American military forces Vice President Gore has followed this issue very closely In fact, he met with Robert Kocharian when he visited Washington in June They had a very long discussion about economics and agreed to economic reform in Armenia to try to bring about more effective economy But again I think you would find both candidates would continue to purse the basic policy promoting peace and development in the region ADAMISHIN: So you say that it wouldn’t change a lot? CAVANAUGH: It should not, no ADAMISHIN: Ah, it is very consoling CARR: I would like to thank all of you for coming And most of all to thank Ambassador Adamishin and Ambassador Cavanaugh for coming and for spending their day with all of us HARVARD UNIVERSITY JOHN F KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT Caspian Studies Program Participants List “U.S – RUSSIAN RELATIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CASPIAN REGION” A conference sponsored by the Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project’s Caspian Studies Program at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs October 22-23, 2000 Harvard University Ambassador Anatoly Adamishin Sistema Corporation C Maury Devine Caspian Studies Program Lyndon K Allin II US-Russia National Security Project Kennedy School of Government David Dorenfeld ExxonMobil Corporation Graham Allison Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Ben Dunlap Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project Vladimir Boxer Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project Jon Elkind National Security Council Melissa Carr Caspian Studies Program, Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project Ambassador Carey Cavanaugh U.S State Department Timothy Colton Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard University Paul Goble RFE/RL Emily Goodhue Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project Arman Grigorian Columbia University, Political Science Department Fiona Hill Eurasia Foundation and Brookings Institution Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Roman Ilto Kennedy School of Government David Rekhviashvili Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project Roger Kangas George C Marshall Center Stuart Kaufman University of Kentucky, Department of Political Science Mark Kramer Davis Center for Russian Studies, and Project on Cold War Studies, Harvard University Robert Krikorian Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, Harvard University Miriam Lanskoy Boston University Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology, and Policy Gerard Libaridian EastWest Insitute, and University of Michigan Patrick McCrann Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard University Leslie McGann U.S.-Russia National Security Project Kennedy School of Government Dennis Michaud Department of Political Science Brown University Steven Miller John Reppert Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Anthony Richter Open Society Institute Peter Rutland Wesleyan University Department of Government Carol Saivetz American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, and Davis Center for Russian Studies Anya Schmemann Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Brenda Shaffer Caspian Studies Program Lis Tarlow Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard University Monica Toft Olin Institute for Strategic Studies Harvard University Emily Van Buskirk Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project Stephen Walt Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs ... comprise the Caspian region On the one hand, the U.S consistently declares that one of its main policy goals is strengthening the independence of the states in the region; on the other, the U.S... that the U.S is not the only player in the region Russia, Turkey and China have each become actively involved in the Caspian region As such, the Caspian states have the opportunity to shop for the. .. not interests, by the countries in the region (and to a lesser extent the countries playing in the region) has defined relations in the Caspian region, especially the Caucasus These differences