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Running head: THE FUTURES OF EAB The Futures of EAB Peter R Killeen Arizona State University Killeen@asu.edu Killeen Page Abstract For 50 years Experimental Analysts of Behavior (EAB) have been riding the crests of waves raised by BF Skinner His technical innovations and conceptual simplifications were a powerful breath of fresh air, and the large effect sizes engineered with contingencies of reinforcement gave its practitioners confidence in their methods The goals of EAB meanwhile went unexamined, its antimentalistic philosophy untested, and the gap between laboratory and life inevitably widened This gap can only be bridged by renewed conversations on the fundamentals of our field, and new technologies to examine behavior that we have largely ignored Interpretative accounts—showing that reinforcement may have played an important role in some complex or exceptional behavior—is no longer enough To ensure a future for EAB several things must happen We must learn that data have little value until embedded in a coherent narrative; and the best of those are called theories The biological EAB must reach levels up to biology/ethology/ecology; and levels down to physiology/neuroscience The psychological EAB must recognize the value of bringing into our tool-box treatments of states such as affects and dispositions; operations such as attention, rumination, goal-setting, and reframing; and craft a better understanding of belief systems in general The social EAB must strive to generalize basic laws formulated in open-loop controlled laboratory settings to dynamic interactive closed-loop processes with two or more interacting systems To be successful these endeavors require respect for other approaches to these phenomena, and collaborations with scientists who know more about them than we yet Killeen Page The Futures of EAB Despite some apparent successes (e.g., Schlinger Jr, 2010), predicting the “Probable Future Status of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior” (EAB) is risky business Upon showing how to predict something much simpler—the replicability of an experimental effect—I was sternly admonished by respected colleagues that predicting the future is impossible (Maraun & Gabriel, 2010; Miller, 2009) I just knew that someone would say that; as they might have predicted that I would disagree (Killeen, 2010, 2015a; Lecoutre & Killeen, 2010), but such predictions went against their convictions I am amazed at how well Siri predicts the weather, down to the hour when clouds will break for a sunny stroll This is not the retrodiction that most researchers do, calling it prediction With this kind, you can leave the umbrella at home and stay dry; not look back wet and regret: “I just knew it was going to rain” Siri was made possible by massive data sets and deep learning algorithms Skinner also amassed data, from which order could arise We as a field, however, have not yet deployed deep learning algorithms on the cumulative and other records that engorge our texts and journals; order arises, when it does, piecemeal Prediction is one of the twin goals of EAB; but just why should it be? How often and well we it? Chastened by Miller and Maraun & Gabriel, I shall put off to the end any attempt at prediction, when I will have had time to query Siri and come to terms with her answer Current Status EAB has a data glut and a theory insufficiency Algorithms and theories to process our data are not features of EAB—EAB is not, after all, a TAB Google Scholarize “skinner reinforcement learning” (no quotes) for the last decade and you will get 17,000 hits Change Killeen Page skinner to “sutton” and you get 19,000 Our empirics has outpaced our science and even our technology Skinner end-ran delicate hypotheses about behavior in straight alleys and T-mazes to generate robust performances that needed no t-tests to convince an audience: Something powerful was in hand Nothing wrong with the quaint apparatuses of his forbears—they had more ecological validity than a box—but they did not scale to assembly line production of megabytes of data the way the Skinner box did Those megabytes fueled many dissertations, mine among them Behaviorism had been waiting for a Henry Ford, and Fred Skinner, born four years after the Model T, was his name Greenwald (2012) calculated that more Nobel prizes have been awarded for tools, inventions and methods than for discoveries: Think MRI, cloud chamber, in vitro fertilization, CCD sensor, PCR reactions, etc And this is consistent with citation statistics (Van Noorden, Maher, & Nuzzo, 2014) “The Nobel Prizes for Physics in 1992, 1994, 1995, and 2002 were awarded for designs of apparatus and methods to detect subatomic particles…” (Greenwald, 2012) Skinner, many of us believe, deserved a Nobel Prize for his apparatuses and methods that detect supra-atomic behavior, no less than for his clarity of vision Greenwald’s sentence went on, alas: “…whose existence had been theorized but never empirically observed … existing theory played roles both in designing the particle detectors and in guiding statistical analyses…, allowing conclusions that the theorized particles had indeed been observed” Well, Henry didn’t get a free trip to Stockholm, and neither did Fred Killeen Page Skinner invented a great technology, one that made buggy whips (straight alleys), and draft-yokes (T-mazes), obsolescent But with it he bequeathed a somewhat naive1 Baconian philosophy of inductive science Cumulation of instances can lead us upward; or can just leave a heap to stumble over (Forscher, 1963) “What is the question” must always be the question, or the answers remain factoids, piled atop other factoids, as strange to strangers as an unbidden weather report In a brilliant analysis, Smith (1992) showed how the instrumental/ technological emphasis of Bacon, a significant advance over hands-off scholarship of the time, impressed upon Skinner the importance of prediction and control as the goals of his behavioral science Both are important pragmatic means of validating hypotheses But Skinner considered them important absent hypotheses, which he denigrated When an endeavor seems to be making progress, self-analysis takes back seat, if not trunk When it stalls (Robins, Gosling, & Craik, 1999), self-analysis moves up to the front, and starts navigating by what Marr (2017) calls the literature of survival That is why we are here ruminating about our future, isn’t it, Pole-axed by Poling’s (2010) ask? The crux of our difficulties is that we have a good technology, but with the important and valuable exceptions of ministering to the developmentally disabled, informing animal trainers (especially those who Bacon required the collection of facts to build toward generalizations, and the testing of those generalizations by negative instances where they may fail “Bacon's antipathy to simple enumeration as the universal method of science derived, first of all, from his preference for theories that deal with interior physical causes, which are not immediately observable” (Urbach 1987, 30) For a deeper and more informative comparison, see Smith (1992) Killeen Page train animals to undo some of the depredations of technology, e.g., Poling, 2016); and the pleas of a few observant neuroscientists (e.g., Krakauer, Ghazanfar, Gomez-Marin, MacIver, & Poeppel, 2017), EAB hasn’t recently had as large a market share as we think it deserves The market that does exist relies almost exclusively on off-the-shelf 20th century EAB when it pays any attention to EAB at all, rather than just crafting its own apps Neither our theory nor our technology has advanced much beyond our birthright (Critchfield, 2017) Contingencies of reinforcement are so powerful that they are rediscovered daily, and most of the discoverers have never heard of Skinner (Freedman, 2012) These outlanders have discovered markers, timing, attention to the disposition of their organism and the power of social reinforcement Of course, we it better than the unwashed, because we have graduate degrees in behavioral science Translating our knowledge of concurrent-chain schedules with interlocking secondary links (my first project as a grad student) into other domains requires translators; and they must be skilled ones (e.g., Biglan, 2015; Schneider, 2012), for there to be any chance that the audience will attend and appreciate But it might be better for some esoteric projects such as my first one to never get translated (Poling, 2010) Schedules of reinforcement are tools, not toys; whereas we need to perfect them and innovate new ones, it shows some lack of intellectual maturation if they remain our enduring object of study, rather than implements to take on more interesting questions One must always beware Cassandras declaring the end of science (Horgan, 2015); alarms like that were often sounded just before revolutions gave the science a new life But revolutions are upsetting, and it may be our applecart that gets upset So how we ensure the continued ascendance—or reascendance—of our ‘normal science’ of behavior analysis, in particular EAB, ere a paradigm Killeen Page shift, (or yet another), leaves it in the dust? Or should we try to preempt, by shifting our paradigm ourselves, so as to keep some ownership of it? Let’s start by inspecting what we are, the mirror we hold up to the world, the name that symbolizes how we see ourselves and what we do: EAB Experimental “An experiment is a procedure carried out to support, refute, or validate a hypothesis” (Experiment, 22 Feb 2017) One may manipulate variables just to see what happens, but without at least an implicit hypothesis, or an ensuing hypothesis, we are likely to generate just one more datum for the heap We can always find at least one paper in each issue of the Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior (JEAB) that satisfies this definition of experimental But we can always find more than one that does not Indeed, that is the case for many psychology journals (Smedslund, 2002) Skinner held that we should not test hypotheses; and accordingly, his later career was based on hypotheses by different names that typically went untested The scientific method is to ask a question of nature, clarify the question, reduce it to manipulable variables where possible, and test the implications of the hypothesis This is how we create the narratives supported by facts called theory The most powerful tests are experimental, but many other types of tests are possible in situations where the relevant variables cannot be manipulated (Cook & Campbell, 1979) If the implications are born out, formulate more precise, or more general implications, and test those When predictions fail, reexamine the aspects of the hypothesis, or its implementation, that might be at fault This is good sport Peirce called it retroduction (Hartshorne & Weiss, 1931) It can start with different questions about different aspects of nature If we are going to engage the game, it is reasonable to pick important Killeen Page questions The skill of identifying important questions is nurtured by all great scientists, but you don’t have to be great to practice it Read their biographies to acquire some sense of how this has been done; for a quick peek into one approach, check the abstracts in Cialdini and Mortensen, and Holth (Cialdini, 1980; Holth, 2017; Mortensen & Cialdini, 2010) Analysis “Analysis is the process of breaking a complex topic or substance into smaller parts in order to gain a better understanding of it” (Analysis, 27 Jan 2017) Is this really what we do? Sometimes it is, although it is more common in applied behavior analysis, where the researchers are confronted with a complex repertoire and must analyze it to determine its efficient causes (the stimuli that occasion or elicit it), its final causes (the stimuli that reinforce or punish it), and its material causes (the state of the behaving organism) EABers more often synthesize: Add a variable or change a variable to see what will happen Think Ferster and Skinner (1957) “Effects of” in the title of an article is a give-away There is nothing intrinsically wrong with such research contributions, as they add to the cumulus of knowledge; but they are generally not analytical Two big steps forward would be to live up to our name by doing more experimentation (testing organizing hypotheses) and more analysis (contingent experiments testing a set of alternative potential causes for the observed effect) Behavior Definition of the fundamental concept of a discipline is not easy, and is typically provisional: Definitions evolve Skinner started with behavior as “the movement of an organism within a frame of reference” But more generally, he defined behavior as “anything the organism is [observed to be] doing” “In the contemporary analysis of behavior, the concept of the operant Killeen Page is commonly invoked to describe what organisms do” (Catania, 1973, p 103) There is a lot of latitude there, as appropriate; although most research is conducted on a few response types, often action patterns such as pecking by pigeons, with their rate of emission being the fundamental datum (Skinner, 1950, 1963) “The operant emerges as a correlation between response classes and subsequent stimuli” (Catania, 1973, p 114) Cowie and Davison (2016) make an interesting and strong case for correlation also, but between response classes and prior stimuli This is an important liberating step, as much of what we naturally see as obviously behavior is not so obviously followed by a reinforcer This is true in the reports of ethologists (e.g., Tinbergen, 1961), and of social psychologists alike: Some of the most effective control of human behavior is accomplished by prompts and presuasions (Cialdini, 2016), not consequences that have never occurred, and may never occur Think heaven and hell Moving beyond defining our subject, behavior, in terms of the Law of Effect may help to move us out of the local optimum in which some of us may feel stuck (Malone, 1978; Tonneau, 2007) Future Status Alternate futures As a new Ph.D I had a vision of the task to which I would dedicate my life: Develop an accurate mathematical description of the effects of schedules of reinforcement on behavior Fifty years later that quest continues (Bradshaw & Killeen, 2012; Killeen, 2014b, 2015b; Killeen & Jacobs, 2017; Killeen & Nevin, 2018; Killeen & Pellón, 2013)—but going more slowly than the early version of me supposed it would Other behaviorists too numerous to mention are also Killeen Page 10 engaged in that project and making better progress Yet, is this a goal that I would wish to bequeath to their or to my students? What else is possible? As a branch of biology, characterization of how discriminative and reinforcing stimuli control behavior, enlightened by a behavior systems approach (Killeen, 2014a; Timberlake, 1999), is an admirable and achievable goal—its even partial achievement a signal accomplishment (Catania, 2013) It is a conceivable future; but there are others The biological science of behaviorism has been helped at first, and hampered at last, by Skinner’s leviathan of the operant As many have observed, the operant is not enough for a science of behavior (Baum, 2012; Malone, 1978; Staddon, 2014; Timberlake, 2004; Tonneau, 2007) It was a huge step up, but it is time for the next step In biological behaviorism, that will be a closer embeddedness in the ecology of the organism, with more attention to the induction of behavior by releasing stimuli in conjunction with behavioral states, themselves primed by motivational operations But what about psychological behaviorism? The young Skinner worked in the laboratory of a biologist, and it is diverting to imagine what might have evolved had he taken a position in biology, rather than in psychology departments (Catania, 2014) But that was never to be, given his goals for accomplishment in the realm of psychology2 (Bjork, 1997; Wiener, 1996) Verbal Behavior (Skinner, 1957), in “In his last year, Skinner spoke of writing an article entitled “Why I am not and never have been a psychologist’” (Wiener, 1996, p 100) But the reasons concerned the dominant methodology of cognitive psychology, not the problems of seeing, thinking, and talking with which both he and they grappled Killeen Page 11 gestation for 20 years, was published the same year as Schedules of Reinforcement (Ferster & Skinner, 1957), completed after a few years of intense collaborative work The latter marks the high-point of Skinner the empiricist The former is the landmark venture of interpretation of complex human behavior in terms of basic behavioral processes, endeavors of the kind that occupied him during his last decades The future of such “psychological” behaviorism is less certain, and thus perhaps more intriguing One development growing directly out of Verbal Behavior is Relational Frame Theory (S C Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001) It is a vigorous sub-field, with successful applications arising in clinical and educational psychology (Barnes-Holmes, Kavanagh, & Murphy, 2015) Another development is the extension to extended sequences of behavior (Baum, 2016; Rachlin, 2014) Analysis of the complex contingencies that naturally occur in social settings is a scientific extension of Skinner’s speculative Walden Two (Skinner, 1948/1969) In its most hopeful and idealistic guise, it is the “save the world through behaviorism” of Dick Malott (Malott, 2017) and the editors and contributors to Behavior Analysis and Social Action To mine its more pragmatic (and more successful) vein, page through the issues of Organizational Behavior Management and Behavior and Social Issues Here we find a sustained effort to develop the central Skinnerian construct of contingency into kindred concepts operating in much more complex environments, interlocking-, meta- and macro-contingencies (e.g., Glenn & Malott, 2006; L J Hayes & Houmanfar, 2006; Houmanfar & Rodrigues, 2006; Malott & Glenn, 2006) Effective use of such contingencies can be extremely powerful in complex organizations (e.g., Robertson & Pelaez, 2016), although oftentimes the successes are in interpreting the performance of already successful managers in behavioral terms (Malott, 2015), Killeen Page 12 rather than being instrumental in achieving that success—another echo of the interpretive analyses of Verbal Behavior The problem of scaling up EAB to handle interactions in open environments, where control of relevant variables is much weaker than in the laboratory, is a perennial challenge facing all sciences It is the problem of nomothetic laboratory science venturing into the ideographic world (Falk, 1956; Palmer, 2010) In nomothetic disciplines errors tend to average out, and phenomena settle into stable patterns of replicability—on the average Laws and “formulations” can be constructed In ideographic disciplines, deviations breed further deviations as often as corrections (Donahoe & Burgos, 2005) Think of butterfly effects such as the shooting of Archduke Ferdinand of Austria, which led to the displacement of 70 million Europeans and the death of 15 million Interlocking contingencies? Of course But how does one get a systematic handle on those? “Reduction [to underlying laws] is of little use to the area of investigation undergoing reduction unless the reduction formulation is able to predict and bring within its explanatory compass other phenomena associated with the area being reduced” (Falk, 1956, p 62) That is, the reduction/interpretation must add value in terms of simplification or prediction, rather than just parasitize existing structure Interpretation is necessary but not sufficient (Galizio, 1987): “science is not judged on its capacity to interpret— otherwise we would all be Freudians (Tonneau, 2007, p 140) Franỗois told a half-truth: It is judged on that capacity: The phenomena must not be inconsistent with a reductive/behavioral account (Palmer, 2015/2017)—but it must much more, it must reduce the complexity of theory (consilience/coherence) or increase its predictive ability (Killeen, 2013) Consilience may suffice: As Hoffmann (2003, p 11) noted: “Novel predictions played essentially no role in the Killeen Page 13 acceptance of the most important physical theory of the 20th century, quantum mechanics Physicists quickly accepted that theory because it provided a coherent deductive account of a large body of known empirical facts” Eventually, it also provided the most accurate quantitative predictions of any theory And prediction may also suffice; but prediction is of two types: Predictions made to test and improve models, and predictions made for pragmatic purposes (as in predicting the weather, climate change, crime, terrorist attacks, etc.) (Sarewitz & Pielke, 1999) Although ability to predict behavior is one of the twin goals that Skinner bequeathed to EAB, we seldom question why, and we rarely either type of prediction We seldom test models because few are strong enough to make predictions We often fit curves to known data, as in the matching laws, but that is demonstrating conformity (a mathematical reinterpretation, simply a more precise version of behavioral reinterpretation), not ability to predict We often show (perhaps too often) that a phenomenon, such as an FI scallop, can be replicated Such replicability is a strength of EAB What it demonstrates, however, is command of controlling variables, not prediction to new scenarios We seldom aspire to make pragmatic predictions (Skinner’s meaning of the term), as we seldom have either the data-bases or familiarity with the analytic tools Those wishing to go there—and to so could be quite a good thing for behavior analysis should study where it is occurring, such as in integrated earth sciences—or even in Google ad placements But this is no longer EAB What formulations can EAB develop to improve understanding, consilience, prediction and control? Marr (1984b) reflected on Kantor’s critique of EAB, in particular: “there still harks the danger of a constrained scientific horizon limiting observation and analysis to nonhuman and reflex-derived behaviors" (Kantor, 1970, 101) Marr’s analysis of the reasons for this are Killeen Page 14 important to consider if attempting to predict the future of EAB While largely agreeing with Kantor, Marr noted that his “world is seemingly beyond the powers of a coherent, analytical, principled account” (p 196) Such an account is the “formulation” that we require Marr notes the existence of relevant analytic tools that might be useful, “But such methods are remote from both EAB and the unique [ideographic?] aspects of behavioral events emphasized by [Kantor]” (Marr, 1984b, p 196) Emergence A problem with reduction (to a behavioral interpretation) is that it is always easier to go down a level than it is to go up a level—to induce a higher-level phenomenon from a lower level one Theories at a higher level will often involve different variables, dimensions, and laws Physiology is reducible to chemistry but not inducible from it Chemistry is reducible to quantum mechanics, but generally not inducible from it Statistical thermodynamics is reducible to mechanics and thermodynamics, but not generally inducible from them Marr bemoaned that “The experimental analysis of behavior has lagged far behind mainstream psychology, particularly cognitive psychology, in the study of complex behavior—remembering, thinking, imaging, problem solving, and the like Yet it is the study of these kinds of behavior that will provide the greatest justification of our continued existence in the community of behavioral scientists” (Marr, 1984a, p.353) Perhaps the reason for this is that we have believed Skinner’s argument that there is only one level for us, and that is behavior, and in particular the operant Success in studying complex behavior may require going up a level, measuring complex behavior in dimensions other than responses per second or Newtons of force What might those measures and methods be? Killeen Page 15 Marr (1984a), Killeen (2001), and Palmer (2010) suggest some One that they don’t mention is simulation, which has worked in explicating the nomothetic results of laboratory science (e.g., Burgos & Murillo-Rodriguez, 2007; Catania, 2005; McDowell, 2017) In a very insightful analysis of the gap in theoretical development caused by the difficulty of scaling up basic (typically non-human animal) research to complex human behavior, Ward and Houmanfar (2011) also suggest simulation; but in this case, they mean re-creation, typically in a laboratory, of many of the complex variables believed to affect performance in a less controlled setting This delimiting of confounding variables (and presumably some of the positive feedback processes that underlie ideographic scenarios) is a promising approach to understanding unfettered behavior in natural environments A similar suggestion, amongst many other useful ones, was made by Bronfenbrenner (1977) some time ago It has much in common with Cialdini’s “Fullcycle social psychology” (e.g., Mortensen & Cialdini, 2010), which adds the last return cycle of implementation of the clarified “formulation” back into the natural world This is analysis-bysynthesis (Teitelbaum & Pellis, 1992; Yuille & Kersten, 2006) Conclusion There are several futures for EAB, none mutually exclusive As practiced with nonhuman animals, it continues to develop, and will flourish insofar as it can engage and work along with biologists, animal trainers, and other effective colleagues such as Krakauer and associates (2017) Behavioral pharmacology will continue to make important translational contributions To be successful as a basic science, it must continue to explore and compare novel methods (e.g., Aparicio & Baum, 1997; Cunningham, Kuhn, & Reilly, 2015; Peele & Baron, 1988; Van Hemel, 1972), and along with them the place of the context in the ecology of the organism Killeen Page 16 To address human behavior, it must accept the role of motivations, states, and dispositions, and improve our facility with those (Dougher & Hackbert, 2000; Killeen & Jacobs, 2017) EAB has started doing this Indeed, one of its most popular recent lines of research is asking people to choose between imagined future or immediate outcomes, all largely hypothetical EAB has provided a fresh understanding of the ancient problem of voluntary action (Neuringer & Jensen, 2010), and added new dimensions to experimentation itself (Roberts & Neuringer, 1998) In RFT it has carried the torch of Verbal Behavior into new realms Further progress will require that we become more comfortable with levels of analyses that require new vocabularies, and new dependent variables measured along new dimensions, ones not always inducible from basic behavioral processes, even if always reducible to those To address human behavior in open contexts, often interacting with other humans, requires a rethinking of what constitutes a scientific success More than a “behavioral reduction” is necessary, but more is very difficult It taxes the abilities of a good engineer to predict the future of simple coupled oscillators; even the best atmospheric scientist will poorly in predicting the trajectory of a falling leaf Necessary tools for the behaviorist will include system science and complexity theory Because large data bases are becoming increasingly available, deep learning algorithms may afford practical predictions (e.g., Walsh, Ribeiro, & Franklin, 2017), even if the connections learned by those machines in making predictions remain as inscrutable as the connections made in the brain Interdisciplinary collaboration will be invaluable “A better understanding of variation and selection will mean a more successful profession, but whether behavior analysis will be called psychology is a matter for the future to decide” (Skinner, 1990, p 1210) That understanding is happening, through just such interdisciplinary teams (e.g Hull, Langman, & Glenn, 2001) It is my hope that the future will decide to call us behavioral psychologists, as we move to a leading role on that stage Killeen Page 17 References Analysis (27 Jan 2017) In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Analysis&oldid=762173725 Aparicio, C F., & Baum, W M (1997) Comparing locomotion with lever-press travel in an operant simulation of foraging Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 68(2), 177-192 Barnes-Holmes, Y., Kavanagh, D., & Murphy, C (2015) Relational Frame Theory The Wiley handbook of contextual behavioral science, 115-128 Baum, W M (2012) Rethinking reinforcement: allocation, induction, and contingency Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 97(1), 101-124 doi:10.1901/jeab.2012.97-101 Baum, W M (2016) Driven by consequences: The Multiscale molar View of choice Managerial and Decision Economics, 37(4-5), 239-248 doi:10.1002/mde.2713 Biglan, A (2015) The nurture effect: How the science of human behavior can improve our lives and our world: New Harbinger Publications Bjork, D W (1997) B F Skinner: A life Washington, D C.: American Psychological Association Bradshaw, C M., & Killeen, P R (2012) A theory of behaviour on progressive ratio schedules, with applications in behavioural pharmacology Psychopharmacology, 222(4), 549-564 doi:10.1007/s00213-012-2771-4 Bronfenbrenner, U (1977) Toward an experimental ecology of human development American Psychologist, 32(7), 513 531 doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.32.7.513 Burgos, J E., & Murillo-Rodriguez, E (2007) Neural-network simulations of two contextdependence phenomena Behavioural Processes, 75(2), 242-249 doi:10.1016/j.beproc.2007.02.003 Catania, A C (1973) The concept of the operant in the analysis of behavior Behaviorism, 1, 103-116 Killeen Page 18 Catania, A C (2005) The operant reserve: a computer simulation in (accelerated) real time Behavioural Processes, 69(2), 257-278 doi:10.1016/j.beproc.2005.02.009 Catania, A C (2013) A natural science of behavior Review of General Psychology, 17(2), 133139 doi:org/10.1037/a0033026 Catania, A C (2014) Behavior analysis as a biological science: An alternate history European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 15(1), 25-31 Cialdini, R B (1980) Full-cycle social psychological research In L Beckman (Ed.), Applied social psychology annual (Vol 1) Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Cialdini, R B (2016) Pre-Suasion: A Revolutionary Way to Influence and Persuade New York, NY: Simon and Schuster Cook, T D., & Campbell, D T (1979) Quasi-Experimentation: Design & Analysis Issues for Field Settings Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co Cowie, S., & Davison, M (2016) Control by reinforcers across time and space: A review of recent choice research Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 105(2), 246269 doi:10.1002/jeab.200 Critchfield, T S (2017) Editorial: Are Theories of Reinforcement Necessary? 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Trends in cognitive sciences, 10(7), 301-308 ... causes (the state of the behaving organism) EABers more often synthesize: Add a variable or change a variable to see what will happen Think Ferster and Skinner (1957) “Effects of? ?? in the title of. .. in the study of complex behavior—remembering, thinking, imaging, problem solving, and the like Yet it is the study of these kinds of behavior that will provide the greatest justification of our... Van Hemel, 1972), and along with them the place of the context in the ecology of the organism Killeen Page 16 To address human behavior, it must accept the role of motivations, states, and dispositions,