The praxis of theorizing in psychology from traditional to critical perspectives

Praxis This manuscript is not the copy of record and does not exactly replicate the authoritative document published by Routledge The published article is available as: Teo, T (2022) The praxis of theorizing in psychology: From traditional to critical perspectives In B D Slife, S C Yanchar, & F C Richardson (Eds.), Routledge international handbook of theoretical and philosophical psychology: Critiques, problems, and alternatives to psychological ideas (pp 537-551) Routledge https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003036517-33 For the published version contact the author at tteo@yorku.ca Praxis The praxis of theorizing in psychology: From traditional to critical perspectives Thomas Teo York University This research was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Praxis Abstract Employing the term praxis refers to the idea that theorizing has not only a traditional but also a critical dimension and that it can be accomplished in academia as well as everyday contexts Distinguishing theorizing as an activity from theory, and articulating the relationship between theorizing and interpreting, it is suggested that the process begins with experiencing or observing a problem Critical theorizing accounts for the cultural-historical and socio-political dimensions of a problem, temporality, change as a possibility to transcend the status quo, and reflexivity as well as its implications and consequences As a concrete starting point, it is suggested that theorizing begins with concepts, that are used for critiquing, reconstructing and creating materials Using examples from the discipline of psychology and psychosocial realities, the praxis of theorizing is demonstrated It is argued that in theoretical activity critique, reconstruction and creation are entangled Finally, it is suggested that theorizing is not just an individual but a collective and relational praxis Praxis This chapter challenges the idea that theories and theorizing are confined to the academic world based on quantitative empirical studies It contests the assumptions that theories emerge “naturally” after doing empiricist work, that theorizing is self-evident, that a top-down approach (by the scientist) using criteria such as parsimony (for instance, simplicity) is beneficial or sufficient, and that psychological theorizing can ignore the nexus of the individual and the sociohistorical world In contrast, from a critical-psychological point of view, it is suggested that everyone can theorize using empirical material in its broadest meaning (including everyday experiences), that theorizing can be a bottom-up collective and reflexive activity that makes it relevant to community members, and that critical theorizing can justice to the psychosocial reality, understanding that individual, relational and societal life are connected Using the term praxis in the title not only refers to the practice but also to the critical activity of theorizing (Freire, 1997), which supposes that theorizing has traditional as well as critical components (see also Horkheimer, 1937) Theorizing needs to be distinguished from theory, with former referring to an activity and latter denoting the results of theorizing, which is accomplished in formal languages, models, visualizations, but more often in psychology, in written texts While theorizing can be non-linear, theories are expressed in linear statements (with a beginning, middle, and end) that contain assumptions, assertions, postulates, axioms, concepts, ideas, empirical results, explanations, etc that are, ideally, connected and coherently expressed in language Scientific theories, the result of the process of scientific theorizing, are the purview of academia and research, whereas the practice of theorizing is and can be exercised in everyday life The chapter intends to encourage the practice and praxis of theorizing in all domains of life Praxis What is the purpose of theorizing? What motivates “us” to theorize? Theorizing begins with a question, concern, thesis about the characteristics of an issue, an argument that needs to be developed, a problem that needs to be understood or solved Theorizing captures realities or possibilities (“what is possible?”), a neglected topic, a misunderstanding, a process, and so on Theorizing wants to and should justice to the problem (problem stands here for all the things that could be theorized) (Teo, 2021) Theorizing takes place in the world (everywhere) and as such theorizing is subject to historical, cultural, and societal conditions, paradigmatic and programmatic commitments (a psychoanalyst theorizes a problem differently than a behaviorist), subjective and intersubjective interests and tendencies Disinterested theorizing is conceivable but empirically not occurring, and more or less obvious personal and social interests should be identified or disclosed when theorizing The quality of theorizing can be assessed on whether it does justice to problems and depends on the quality of the questions, materials, observations, interpretations, understandings, and applications The question itself indicates the breadth and depth on how a “material” could be theorized; it may draw on existing frameworks and knowledge but, in critical traditions, moves beyond the status quo Theorizing requires material because one works with and theorizes something Material can be personal and others’ observations, experiences, objects, events, processes, texts, results, data, etc For instance, if one wants to theorize the meaning of dreams, one can work on one’s own dreams, other people’s dreams, dreams as discussed in scientific or fictional literature Material is addressed and interpreted using existing or creating concepts, theories and worldviews that inform theorizing One could draw on the concept of displacement (Freud, 1900/1955) in order to make sense of, theorize and interpret dream material Interpretations depend on the selection, usage, neglect of material, on what, when and how it is Praxis used (e.g., something heard from a radio talk show host about a pandemic might not be the best material to theorize the medical nature of a pandemic but might be used to theorize conspiracy theories) as well as on the hermeneutic (interpretative) competence of the theoretician Limitations and possibilities of interpretation and theorizing depend on the scope and depth of the traditions “we”2 draw on Good theorizing may impact the quality of applications (e.g., “how should one deal with mass shootings?”) Theorizing is a hermeneutic process and interpretation is a form of theorizing, and thus topics such as horizon, tradition, prejudice come into play (Gadamer, 1960/1997) Theorizing is close to what Dilthey (1910/1958) called higher forms of understanding, which he distinguished from elementary forms of understanding, which are ubiquitous in everyday life in the form of immediate processes Higher forms of understanding occur when something challenges “our” everyday experience, when “we” step back and makes sense of what occurred (e.g., “why did this person not shake my hand?”) “We” try to make sense of the natural, social, technological, and psychological world in “our” everyday life “We” theorize when a problem emerges, for instance, in everyday interactions, and “we” want to understand together why someone did something, what motivated them, why they made a specific choice, etc Theorizing goes beyond an immediate interpretation as “we” live “our” lives and aims at a conscious and active process of what has happened or of what is possible In the process of theorizing, theorizing itself can and should be scrutinized, confirming, disconfirming or alternative evidence weighed, and reflexivity (thinking about “my” thinking and doing) invoked, on the background of programs or worldviews Humans are indeed as much theorizing as they are interpreting beings “We” and “I” is used in quotation marks when it refers to a generalizable we or I Without quotation marks it refers to the author Praxis In critical traditions (e.g., Horkheimer, 1937), theorizing requires taking the culturalhistorical and socio-political contexts of a problem / material into account Regarding psychological issues it means not to separate individual from problems of society Critical theorizing also means to theorize the temporality and the history of problems and to apply reflexivity to one’s own theorizing, setting the conditions of the possibility for better theorizing Critical theorizing may contribute to change and ask to which degree theorizing is justifying or transcending the status quo Critical traditions also emphasize the social consequences of theorizing, e.g., not only to which degree theorizing addresses power, resistance, and social justice, but also to which degree theorizing can reduce social injustice Theorizing is not only done for theoretical but also for reasons of action Theorizing with concepts The emphasis in this contribution is on the praxis of theorizing and therefore the focus is on the usage, application, and development of concepts, understood as basic units of theorizing “We” understand problems through concepts, interconnected concepts (that form theories), and worldviews Rather than discussing what a psychological concept is and the many ideas that exist in the literature on the topic (e.g., Slaney & Racine, 2011), the more relevant question for the praxis of theorizing is what a concept accomplishes, which is addressed by drawing on the continental philosophical traditions (see also Blunden, 2012) Even more relevant than Kant (1781/1965) who suggested that through concepts experiential objects are organized and that concepts help to organize and make sense of experiences, is the dialectical tradition that emphasizes the capture of experiences, at least in their most important features, through concepts For instance, Hegel (1830/1992) suggested a model of science that captures reality in a system of concepts, and Marx (1867/1962) developed a network of concepts to understand the workings of political economy and the sources of wealth (e.g., surplus value, profit, commodity) Praxis In psychology, the importance of concepts and their developments was emphasized in the cultural-historical school (Vygotsky, 1978) as well as in German critical psychology (Holzkamp, 1983) in order to understand psychosocial realities In these traditions, concepts are understood as the basis of scientific knowledge, and should be able to comprehensively address observations and experiences, by capturing psychosocial realities and possibilities Any concept developed should be exposed to more observations and new experiences in order to further improve the concept Within dialectical traditions, the praxis of theorizing means a move from experiences to an abstract concept that identifies the general features of reality, and from there, to new concrete experiences to assesses whether the concept captured them This means that the praxis of theorizing is an open process, whereby a concept can be abandoned, revised, or sublated (incorporated) in a new or more developed concept Theorizing with concepts is an ongoing process with new experiences changing theorizing There is no logical end to theorizing should one intend to advance one’s theorizing as well as one’s theories (there is an interactive end when we express our theorizing) Other critical traditions, drawing on Kantian motives, emphasize that theorizing is not just about bringing a given perception under a general concept but to create new experiences, because concepts are not only representing, but also creating reality Schraube (2015) emphasizes that “psychological research does not just reflect reality but virtually creates reality through the way it conceptualizes it” (p 538) This statement does justice to the usage of psychological concepts, which may be based on discovery, social practices, or even on making up people (Danziger, 1997; Hacking, 1986) Social constructionist approaches emphasize that psychological concepts have a history, culture, and society Embedded in the language practices of the community of psychologists, concepts in psychology are socially constituted, show Praxis looping effects (they influence how we think about ourselves), are value-laden, but also enable psychological observations (Martin & Sugarman, 2009) Any reflection on psychological concepts must address the human-kind quality of concepts (meaning that psychological objects are not natural the way H2O might be) For the praxis of theorizing, one needs to address the degree to which existing concepts are doing justice to psychosocial reality and how they go along or oppose power and particular interests (is drapetomania - slaves fleeing slavery in the 19th century - really a mental illness?) One needs not only to distinguish between traditional and critical theorizing but also between traditional and critical concepts Whereas traditional psychological concepts are ahistorical, not capturing the relationship between the individual and society, not understanding the sociopolitical dimension of concepts, thus, supporting the status quo, critical concepts intend to address these entanglements, as well provide status-quo-transcending ideas The quality of traditional concepts and theories depends on the quality of all materials, invoking scientific criteria such as corroboration, falsification, verification, meaningfulness, sources, empirical support, objectivity, reliability, validity, parsimony, etc The quality of critical concepts may include such criteria, as well as account for the subjectivity of the theorizer, the historical dimensions of concepts and the power of psychological concepts Whereas traditional psychological concepts reflect and support the status quo by addressing problems from above, critical concepts are intended not to be “about” but “for” and “with” people (see also Teo, 2018a) In taking a radical democratic perspective, critical concepts should be able to address power and resistance Taking the contextuality and temporality of concepts into account, critical concepts invoke a reflexive dimension that situate concepts themselves This reflexivity is hardly achieved in solipsistic practices of theorizing but Praxis 10 more often in collaboration with other people It also means that the praxis of theorizing is not confined to the academic world but occurs in everyday life Critical theorizing suggests not only operating with existing schemes but providing alternative theorizing, better theorizing In critical theorizing in psychology the quality of a concept depends on the degree to which personal, interpersonal, and socio-cultural meanings are taken into account For example, if one observes that not all individuals react the same after a life-threatening event, a traditional psychologist might invoke the term resilience to make sense of that observation, with resilience understood as a quality of individuals In critical theorizing, the same term resilience might be employed, but the concept includes the idea of resilience not only as a personal, but also as a relational and socio-cultural concept (e.g., Kirmayer et al., 2011) Resilience is conceptualized not just as a private but also as a community feature For the praxis of theorizing, a psychological concept that does not include the world, the connection of the person with the world, would be a limited and limiting concept It should be clear that theorizing has implications Theorizing intelligence as culture-free, or that the result of an IQ test limits a position in life, or that within-group heritability estimates explain between-group differences, etc have significant implications It means that a concept that is based on countless empirical studies and is widely used, is not exhausted by empirical support, as the concept of IQ clearly shows (e.g., Gould, 1996) From a critical perspective, one needs to reflect on the consequences of theorizing not only in academia (specialized scientific language) but also in public life (everyday language) Psychologists must address the psychosocial and cultural consequences of theorizing If one tries to theorize a mass shooting, e.g., through a psychoanalytic or neuroscientific framework, employing psychoanalytic or Praxis 18 developed to account for historical processes that started with positive ambitions but turned into their negative opposite Horkheimer and Adorno (1947/1982) used the example of the Enlightenment that turned from progressive aspirations into totalitarianism Similar, one can ask whether the discipline of psychology in its attempt to be scientific turned into a negative, a hyperscience, which in the end and despite intentions is less scientific For political dynamics one can ask or theorize whether a project with good intentions turned into something atrocious Psychologists cannot only theorize psychology as a discipline or the status quo of psychological topics and issues, but also what is possible in the future Vygotsky (1978) coined the concept of the zone of proximal development to allow for an understanding of not only the current state of person’s competencies, but also what is possible when acting together with others Participatory Action Research is a method developed in critical approaches in psychology (Torre et al., 2012) to address not only the current situation but also to transcend the status quo when working with participants to collectively engage in desired changes This allows to explicitly or implicitly theorize and enact change as a possibility of human psychosocial life Temporality as a method meant for Holzkamp (1973) to reconstruct basic psychological competences He laid out an approach for conceptualizing topics such as perception, which meant incorporating its natural history and identifying the general evolutionary-biological characteristics of perception; analyze the main features of perception in their general societalhistorical characteristics by focusing on the transition of prehuman to human life forms; clarify perception under a given historical-economic reality such as capitalist society It was clear that a project that includes the natural history, prehistory, and history of humanity requires interdisciplinary approaches and materials Current historians of psychology add that temporality not only means to include evolutionary and historical time, but also developmental and even Praxis 19 situational time in order to understand, for instance, a topic such as sexuality (Pettit & Hegarty, 2014) Theorizing sexuality would mean to account for biological, cultural-historical, developmental and situational dimensions of temporality The concept of temporality itself challenges the idea that change is not possible or that there is no alternative to the status quo, which has become an important tool in current political and cultural ideologies Temporality allows to theorize the discipline, socio-political issues, and intra-psychological problems, not only as is but also what ought to be (Martin-Baro, 1994) From an epistemological point of view, “we” can theorize and develop a historical understanding in reconstructing what and why something was included or excluded in psychological research For example, epistemologists can theorize not only how concepts, instruments, and physiology (limitations of the brain) contribute to research, but also how subjectivity and social characteristics have had epistemic consequences How does class, race, gender, etc impact psychological research and can one apply concepts such as classism, racism, and sexism to psychological work? There is evidence that such theorizing in their intersectional manifestations is justified (e.g., Rosenthal, 2016) Psychologists need to reconstruct whether the discipline and practice of psychology have a Western or colonial bias, not only in terms of sampling, but equally in terms of what questions are asked, what interpretations are provided, and what applications are suggested (Teo, 2018a) From a general theoretical perspective, critical thinkers should theorize and apply the concept of epistemic ignorance that theorizes not only the results of psychology but also what is left out of and why (Ruck et al., 2019) For instance, when one reconstructs the history of empathy one might be equally interested in the history of empathy avoidance (Barnes, 2014) Who deserves and who is excluded from empathy? One can describe the status quo as WEIRD Praxis 20 (Henrich et al, 2010) but from a critical perspective it is not only about expanding the methodologies and theories of psychology, but about the decolonization of psychology (e.g., Adams et al., 2015), another concept enabling the reconstruction of psychology Such theorizing provides a shift from the voices of the privileged to the marginalized, neglected, oppressed, peripheral or voiceless groups in understanding the history and present of psychology Decolonization is not only a concept that allows for critique and reconstructing the status quo but is a constructive concept with an action impetus that theorizes the significance of colonialism and White supremacy in psychological thinking and doing From the research perspective of the historian, the reconstruction of existing concepts in psychology is an empirical and theoretical process For instance, how was intelligence (or personality, empathy, motivation, etc.) theorized, when and why? How power, political, social and financial interests come into play? Which parts of intelligence were psychologists interested in? Was intelligence discovered or constituted through its conceptualization? Is the concept of intelligence a concept from below or from above? I have suggested (Teo, 2018a) that in terms of personality, in a perspective from below, “we” might be interested whether one’s boss, manager, professor, supervisor, etc is an a-hole (Nunberg, 2012) or a bullshitter (Frankfurt, 1986/2005) Yet, “we” have no personality tests to assess a-holism or bullshitting, but “we” have measures to assess conscientiousness, agreeableness or openness to experience (Teo, 2018a) Why not? Of course, from below “we” would not even have the institutional power to give managers a test Who is defining a concept for whom? What is where and when relevant? Who decides? Do power and social interests play a role? More concretely, how was the IQ used in immigrating restriction and segregation (Gould, 1996)? Such questions provide opportunities for theorizing When Zinn (1980) used the term “a people’s history” he lays out a reconstruction that Praxis 21 is deliberately focused on writing a history from below and not from above Writing the history itself, based on concrete empirical material and concepts, forms a praxis of theorizing In order to justice in theorizing to the significance of temporality, reflexivity becomes an important tool (see e.g., Morawski, 2005) One needs to reconstruct how one’s own location, positions and social characteristics, how culture, history, and society, our frameworks, and subjectivity, contribute to theorizing Reflexivity includes a discussion of the very concepts and theories that “we” use and want to develop contribute to theorizing Such reflexivity is no guarantee that this theorizing is better, but it sets the conditions for the possibility of improving theorizing Reflexivity needs to be employed when it comes to the questions asked and not posed, the materials used or neglected, the interpretations preferred, and the recommendations made It should be clear that reflexivity, given the real limitations of “our” own horizons, epistemologies of ignorance, and privileges that “we” enjoy and maybe take for granted, cannot be accomplished in a monologue or in introspection, or even in a therapeutic relationship with another person Reflexivity needs to be a collective project that involves as many people as possible, people from and with radically different contexts and experiences Theorizing as creating Emphasizing the praxis of theorizing means that all people can theorize, employ or develop new concepts that capture given phenomena or envision alternatives Several examples were mentioned that show how theorizing with critique and temporality are entangled with creating new concepts that account more accurately for what is happening as well as enable new understandings In critical psychology, for instance, Fine and Ruglis (2009) developed the concept of circuits of dispossession in order to understand, theorize, and study psychosocial phenomena The concept suggests that psychological research and theorizing would be limited if Praxis 22 one understands a phenomenon such as school drop-out by a minority person only in terms of its correlation with other psychological variables Circuits of dispossession is a critique of a methodology focused on variables, a concept that allows understanding social issues not only as internal but as connected phenomena and guides psychologists to develop a better understanding of entangled psychosocial realities Another example is Prilleltensky’s (2008) concept of psychopolitical validity that contains a critique (limitations of existing research and practices), an implicit argument of what went wrong in traditional psychology, as well as an alternative on how “we” can expand methodological criteria It addresses the problem to which degree a psychological intervention captures individual and socio-political issues at the same time Indeed, one could argue that the center of critical psychological work focuses at giving existing concepts new meanings and to create new concepts (see the Encyclopedia of Critical Psychology, Teo, 2014) or counter-concepts (Mulvale & Teo, 2020) I would like to use the example of epistemological violence to illustrate the praxis of theorizing At the beginning stands the observation (e.g., reading) of material, including existing research on the Other One can go through the history of scientific race research, beginning, e.g., with Pieter Camper’s (1722-1789) research on facial angle and his conclusions “We” can move through the extant works in the 19th century and move to psychologists such as Rushton who divided humanity into three major races (Orientals, Whites, Blacks) and suggested, mobilizing empirical arguments, that Blacks are by nature more aggressive, less law abiding, and less intelligent than whites and Asians, supposedly because surviving in long cold winters was more demanding (see Teo, 2011) “We” can also include current articles that have suggested that black women are less attractive One can advance a methodological critique, a critique based on Praxis 23 knowledge developments in biology and anthropology, or a critique centered on the quality of this traditional theorizing Yet, “we” can theorize the practice of racism in academia itself “We” could conceptualize this type of research as scientific racism It means the application of an existing concept to what has been observed in streams of academic literature Yet, from a first-person standpoint, from the perspective of persons or groups that are constructed in such negative ways, this research is doing something to “me.” “I” experience this research, this supposed knowledge, as a form of violence, as harmful, as something that is happening to “me” The violence emerges from traditional theorizing in the gap between data and interpretation of data (Teo, 2008) From a theoretical point of view, “we” can introduce the concept of speculation, trace its meanings in the history of science, and realize that a similar problem has been discussed in the philosophy of science: the underdetermination thesis suggests that radically different theories can be supported equally on empirical grounds Experiments and empirical research in psychology contain observations and theoretical interpretations, and the realm of data is not identical with the realm of the interpretation of the data The interpretations that are provided in psychology are underdetermined by empirical results One can also look at existing concepts: Spivak (1988) introduced the concept of epistemic violence to identify the various projects in history, culture, literature, and philosophy through which the colonial subject has been constituted as “other.” Spivak used the term epistemic violence for practices of colonialism in “third-world” countries, which has become an important element in postcolonial theory However, it does not specifically apply to empirical research in the name of science and the postcolonial subject does not capture the varieties of problematizing constructions that exist in psychology, including class, gender, disability or LGBTQ+ persons For empirical research “we” need a concept that accounts for data, Praxis 24 speculation, interpretation, underdetermination, and violence In such theorizing, which connects various concepts, epistemological violence is a practice that is executed when academic interpretations of empirical results implicitly or explicitly construct the “other” as problematic or inferior, although alternative, equally viable interpretations of data exist The concept emphasizes that it matters what kind of interpretation one prefers and that as soon an interpretation has practical, behavioral, or existential consequences, particularly when it brings harm, the choice of interpretation becomes relevant Although the concept of epistemological violence has a theory surrounding it, the idea of a concept from below allows the academic and public use of the term to be flexible People who observe racist research and racist interpretations stemming from science should be able to conceptualize it as epistemological violence, without knowing all theoretical or empirical-technical details They can create new meanings for the same concept if it allows to account for their observations and experiences This can be done by individuals but may involve a collective project Another example would be the creation of the concept of socio-subjectivity (Teo, 2017) When academics talk about subjectivity, they like to address subjectivity on one hand as something internal and personal or as something that is intersubjective On the other hand, one finds critical approaches that emphasize the import of society, history, and culture when it comes to mental life, giving primacy to society Drawing on both traditions, I suggest that subjectivity has to be understood in the nexus of the intra-subjective, inter-subjective and socio-subjective Socio-subjectivity, without the need to invoke primacy, is based on the experience that if “I” were born in a different time and place, “I” would not have the same subjectivity, and as a concept should account for this reality (e.g., structures) The concept of a nexus means that neither primacy, priority, parallelism, or equal importance, etc are necessary, but that for each Praxis 25 person the entangled dimensions of subjectivity need to be theorized Any psychological performance, competence, and possibility needs to be theorized in the nexus of sociosubjectivity, intersubjectivity, and intrasubjectivity Drawing on this concept of subjectivity one can theorize neoliberal subjectivity and psychology’s allyship with neoliberalism (one could employ concepts such as governmentality in the praxis of theorizing) The neoliberal subject can be described as an entrepreneurial self that captures many persons’ neoliberal being-in-the-world (see also Sugarman, 2015) In a theory of neoliberal subjectivity, “we” should describe the mental life of persons while understanding its nexus to relational and societal realities (Teo, 2018b) “We” observe and reconstruct how one form of thinking became dominant in neoliberalism, with roots in capitalism, specifically, utilitarian, technical, economic thinking, cost-benefit analyses, in short, instrumental thinking in all lifeworlds including work, relationships, and the self In terms of emotions “we” might observe a compulsory optimism and an attachment to the status quo In terms of the will “we” might be confronted with the common idea transmitted in self-help, professional and artistic contexts, that you can change only yourself This mentality has impact on the body, which is seen as a tool in neoliberal subjectivity; training and work where education might be seen as another commodity; the family that has become an economic unit and where the same principles reign as in employment contexts; and romantic love where a relationship is understood as a business partnership At every level of reflection one can introduce concepts and theorize to make sense of what one has observed Critical traditions also intend to theorize resistance under neoliberal realities that might range from research, critical thinking, play, inner immigration, irony, art to political activism in the lifeworld and the system Praxis 26 “We” can also theorize how “we” relate to other people in the current reality of migration (Teo, 2020b) One observes the death of thousands of migrants in the Mediterranean sea; is astonished by legal trials of individuals who saved migrants from death by operating ships or providing food and water to undocumented migrants (e.g., in the desert of southern Arizona); watch migrants kicked by journalists; is shocked by the separation of children from parents, restrictive access to asylum in violation of international law, tear gas shot on young migrant children, possibly indefinite detention of migrant families; the acceptance of migrants’ deaths due to poor medical care; migrant children not receiving enough food while being held in jaillike facilities; limited access to showers, clothes, and toothbrushes; the removal of educational and recreational activities for children who are forced to sleep on concrete floors How can “we” make sense of that material? I have suggested that the concept of subhumanism accounts for those practices and that subhumanism is an element in fascist subjectivity “We” could also theorize what is going on in the recent pandemic can be captured by the concept of dieabilty that accounts for discursive and material realities, making it appear acceptable to some that certain people die in the pandemic not because of active killing but because of active omission and neglect Theorizing as a collective praxis In the conduct of “our” everyday life” there are constant instances where “we” need to “practice the praxis of theorizing”, employing existing or creating new concepts This can happen with major problems such as climate change, inequality, migration or the pandemic, or this can be done in work, relationships, and self-spheres Theorizing can be exercised by looking at the limits and possibilities of a concept or a theory to account for phenomena, observations, materials Of course, as with many other activities, the praxis of theorizing must not be confined Praxis 27 to an individual but has advantages as a collective praxis that expands, advances, challenges, and co-constructs concepts that “I” might employ Processes of co-construction and co-learning may improve theorizing “We” can observe materials together, conceptualize and theorize those observations, and apply them together to relevant contexts “We” need to practice reflexivity collectively Although arguably understanding must arrive at the individual level, understanding is very much a collective and shared process Theorizing in the hand of a community, a concept in the hand of a group, can be revolutionary Let me mention the Hearing Voices projects3, originally developed in the United Kingdom The praxis of theorizing meant to consider hearing voices not just as a biomedical problem but as something that one can engage with, manage, and control Collectively discussing the issue and finding solutions meant a new approach to those voices, which was theorized and practiced together as well as individually It is an example of collective theorizing that has consequences Similar examples of theorizing can be found in critical disability studies when groups that realized that disability is not primarily a personal biomedical deficit, an individualized problem, but a social issue, while not denying unique challenges (e.g., Block et al., 2016) Theorizing and activism have led to changes in disability legislation Similarly, participatory action research shows that collective theorizing in concert with action can lead to social change (Torre et al., 2012) More generally, experiences and observations of social injustice need to be theorized in order to move forward, which does not depend on the complex theories of academia but can be accomplished in everyday life The important virtue of solidarity can be achieved when theorizing together Conclusion E.g., see the Hearing Voices Network at: https://www.hearing-voices.org/ Praxis 28 It should be emphasized that the practice and praxis of theorizing is something that needs to be exercised, exposed to more materials and to other people, in order to improve Not all theorizing is equally valid Although this is not the place to discuss systematically the criteria for good theorizing (quality of questions, materials, interpretations, applications), it should be pointed out that conspiracy theories and conspiracy concepts often depend on problematic materials (e.g., hearings somebody mentioning something), problematic questions (who stole the elections?), problematic interpretations and applications, on a narrow subjectivity and a lack of reflexivity But bad theorizing does not need to be the end, once one realizes that the praxis of theorizing is not a final product and that one can improve theorizing, develop new ideas while abandoning concepts that turned out to be a dead-end Because one can always confirm our theorizing through observations (problem of induction), observations although crucial, not have the final say One always needs to include the subjectivity (in its full sense) of the theorizer Finally, the critical praxis of theorizing applies metatheorizing to theorizing itself, which would be the topic for another chapter Praxis 29 References Adams, G., Dobles, I., Gómez, L H., Kurtiş, T., & Molina, L E (2015) Decolonizing psychological science: Introduction to the special thematic section Journal of Social and Political Psychology, 3(1), 213-238 https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.v3i1.564 Adorno, T W (1990) Negative Dialektik [Negative dialectics] Suhrkamp (Original work published 1966) Bakan, D (1967) Idolatry in religion and science In D Bakan (Ed.), On method: Toward a reconstruction of psychological investigation (pp 150-159) Jossey-Bass (Original work published 1961) Barnes M (2014) Empathy In T Teo T (Ed.) 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(1982) The problematic science: Psychology in nineteenthcentury thought Praeger Zinn, H (1980) A people's history of the United States Harper & Row ... life The chapter intends to encourage the practice and praxis of theorizing in all domains of life Praxis What is the purpose of theorizing? What motivates “us” to theorize? Theorizing begins... subjectivity (in its full sense) of the theorizer Finally, the critical praxis of theorizing applies metatheorizing to theorizing itself, which would be the topic for another chapter Praxis 29 References... temporality and the history of problems and to apply reflexivity to one’s own theorizing, setting the conditions of the possibility for better theorizing Critical theorizing may contribute to change