Envy, inferiority and injustice three bases of anger about inequality

6 Envy, Inferiority, and Injustice: Three Bases of Anger About Inequality colin wayne leach Envy is a challenge to God (Aquaro, 2004; Schimmel, chap 2, this volume) In envying another party’s personality, possession, or position, one questions God’s divine distribution of good fortune As Chaucer’s (c 1387/1951, p 506) Parson character expressed it in The Canterbury Tales, envy “is the worst of sins as it [ .] is flatly against the Holy Ghost, source of Bounty.” As if standing against God was not enough, envy also puts one in opposition to (2) the fortune, (3) those to whom the fortune is bestowed, and (4) the system by which the fortune is bestowed (e.g., God’s divine right) Although religious teachings also aim at preventing the enmity and aggression believed to be associated with envy (Aquaro, 2004; Foster, 1972; Schimmel, chap 2, this volume), envy is wrong and dangerous in religious terms because it is, in essence, a statement of secularism Only by denying God’s divine system of distribution may mere mortals dare to desire someone else’s good fortune Given that God and religion are denied in envy, the feeling must rely on belief in a secular system by which good fortune should be distributed (for descriptions of such systems, in this volume, see Belk, chap 12; Lindholm, chap 13; Parrott and Rodriguez Mosquera, chap 7; Zizzo, chap 11) Thus, by definition, to envy is to advance a (secular) claim about how fortune should be distributed among people (especially oneself!) Because justice is an important secular system of distribution, expressing one’s desire for another party’s fortune in terms of injustice serves to add psychological and moral)force to one’s claim (for reviews, see Mikula, 1993; Miller, 2001; Lind & Tyler, 1988) Because envy is often expressed in terms such as “I deserve what she has,” some commentators have argued that a claim of injustice is central, or even necessary, to envy (Schoeck, 1969; Smith, 1991; van Dijk, Ouwerkerk, Goslinga, Nieweg, & Gallucci, 2006) However, as Thucydides and then Nietzsche taught, enviers’ feelings that they deserve another’s good fortune are not necessarily based in a sense of justice “Desert claims [ .] are often based on one’s personal desires” according to Ben-Ze’ev (1992, 94 Leach, C.W (2008) Envy, inferiority and injustice: Three bases of anger about inequality In R.H Smith (Ed.), Envy: theory and research (pp 94-116) Oxford: 3070-117-006.indd 94 5/14/2008 5:35:49 PM Oxford University Press Envy, Inferiority, and Injustice 95 p 561; see also Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2007) Thus, to believe that one deserves the good fortune possessed by another one only need desire it Of course, one may also feel deserving of another’s good fortune because one views oneself as possessing the requisite ability or skill or as having made the necessary effort to achieve it These are the bases of felt desert emphasized by Feather (1999) and before him by Aristotle In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle (cited in Kauffmann, 1974, p 382) argued that, “A person is thought to be great-souled if he claims much and deserves much He that claims less than he deserves is small souled.” When people view themselves as generally good or competent, they may also feel deserving of good fortune, even if it is possessed by another party (Heider, 1958) Indeed, most people in most circumstances view themselves as good people deserving of good fortune Thus, felt desert of another’s good fortune may follow from many judgments that have nothing to with a sense of justice To envy another party’s good fortune is to feel deserving of it because fortune should be distributed by some secular system that enables one to claim it for oneself (e.g., simple desire, ability, effort, general goodness) Thus, as argued in more detail below, there is little reason to view a sense of injustice as an element of envy Indeed, by excluding a sense of injustice from envy, scholars are better able to differentiate envy from righteous, justice-based, anger at inequality (Ben-Ze’ev, 1992; Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2007) I also argue below that there is good reason to exclude other elements widely thought to characterize envy Although the present volume attests to a broad agreement that envy is based in a sense of (domain or global) inferiority brought about by a comparison to a successful party and malicious ill will toward this party (for other reviews, see Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2007; Parrott, 1991; Smith & Kim, 2007), I think that neither of these elements are necessary to envy Instead, I suggest that envy, inferiority (domain or global), and injustice are best thought of as three distinct bases of anger about the inequality between oneself and another party These three bases of anger are illustrated in Figure –1 The main aim of this chapter is to examine the relationship between anger about inequality based in envy and that based in inferiority (domain or global) or injustice To make this possible, envy must be conceptualized in a more narrow way than in most previous treatments In the first section, I argue that envy is best conceptualized as anger resulting from a frustrated desire for a fortune that is possessed by another party but is perceived as possible for oneself (and thus is something one feels one deserves) In the second and third sections, I suggest that inferiority (domain or global) and perceived injustice may serve as conceptually independent bases of anger about inequality Although inferiority-based anger and justice-based anger may co-occur with envy, become blended with envy, or be displaced or dissembled expressions of hidden envy, anger based in (domain or global) inferiority or injustice should be distinguished from that based in envy In essence, I echo others in arguing that to understand the association between envy and a sense of injustice, envy cannot be conceptualized in a way that necessarily includes a sense of injustice (Ben-Ze’ev, 1992; Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2007; Rawls, 1971) or perceived inferiority (domain or global; Leach & Spears, 2007) 3070-117-006.indd 95 5/14/2008 5:35:49 PM 96 Envy, Inferiority, and Injustice a) ENVY Frustrated desire for felt desert possessed by another party Anger (at): fortunate self (for lacking what could be gained) system of distribution b) RESSENTIMENT Inferiority: In a specific domain or more globally Anger (at): fortunate self system of distribution C) RIGHTEOUS ANGER (”resentment,” “indignation”) Own Unjust Deprivation Anger (at): fortunate self system of distribution Other’s Unjust Fortune Anger (at): fortunate self system of distribution Figure 6.1 A, Envy; B, Ressentiment; C, Righteous anger (“resentment,” “indignation”) Greater expected anger at a target is indicated by a darker shade Envy Envy without anger is not envy proper (Klein, 1957; Parrott, 1991; Rawls, 1971); prophets and preachers have better things to than to rail against a “benign envy” that is more admiration than anger But one may ask, “anger at what or whom?” Envy may lead 3070-117-006.indd 96 5/14/2008 5:35:50 PM Envy, Inferiority, and Injustice 97 one to anger at God, the fortune, the fortunate, and/or the system by which fortune is bestowed (Parrott, 1991; Smith, 2004) Emotion theory suggests that the anger in envy is directed at those parties viewed as responsible for depriving one of a felt desert that one lacks (Lazarus, 1991; Parrot, 1991; Smith, 1991, 2004) In this way the anger in envy is similar to other forms of anger in response to a blockage of one’s goals by another party or by circumstance (Lazarus, 1991; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988) The anger in envy may also be experienced as a feeling of frustration at lacking a felt desert that is possessed by another party (Salovey & Rodin, 1986) This frustration may be experienced as anger at the self for failing to achieve the good fortune possessed by another party (Lazarus, 1991; Ortony et al., 1988; Smith, 2004) Where one perceives oneself as, at least partly, responsible for not achieving an important goal, the anger in envy may be especially self-directed and self-critical (Lazarus, 1991; Ortony et al., 1988) It is the frustrated desire for a felt desert, and the possibility that one is partly responsible for this frustration, that is at the heart of the partly self-directed anger in envy That the anger in envy may be directed at so many different targets (perhaps all at once) makes it more difficult to identify the basis of envy I think it is this “polymorphous perversity” of the anger in envy that has led so many scholars to conflate envy with several different types of anger (including resentment, indignation, contempt, and hostility) and with malicious ill will However, it is important to remember that it is the basis of envy, rather than the target of its attendant anger, that is most important to how envy is conceptualized Whether it is directed at the fortune, the system by which fortune is bestowed, or oneself, the basis of the anger in envy is the coveting of a felt desert that is enjoyed by another party and the frustration and disappointment about this specific lack The Elements of Envy As evidenced in this volume, most observers conceptualize envy as a complex mixture of different perceptions and feelings These commonly include (1) desire for the good fortune of another party, where (2) comparison to the fortunate highlights one’s inferiority in a particular domain or more globally, and promotes (3) hostile anger toward the fortunate, and (4) a malicious ill will to see the party lose its good fortune and/or to suffer additional harm In addition, some theorists suggest that envy includes a belief that (5) the fortune cannot be gained (Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2007; Schoeck, 1969) because (6) it is a limited good whereby the other party’s possession of it necessarily translates into one’s lack (Foster, 1972; Rawls, 1971); thus, (7) the fortunate is to blame for the envier’s lack of fortune (Foster, 1972; Schoeck, 1969) Most social scientists have interpreted the quantitative literature as consistent with the view that most of these seven elements are necessary to envy However, I think there is good empirical reason to see only two elements as defining envy: (1) desire for a felt desert possessed by another party (which may be associated with frustration, disappointment, and a sense that one is deficient because one lacks what one wants and deserves), and (2) feelings of anger Indeed, when people are asked to report on their experience of envy, desire of a felt desert possessed by another party and feelings of anger are shown to be the most characteristic elements For example, in one study, 3070-117-006.indd 97 5/14/2008 5:35:50 PM 98 Envy, Inferiority, and Injustice Parrott and Smith (1993, study 1) asked students to recall a time when they felt “strong envy” and to indicate to what degree their experience was characterized by a long list of attributes Participants reported that longing and wishing for something possessed by another was very characteristics of their envy experience Participants also appeared to report that disappointment about lacking what they wanted was very characteristics of their envy (e.g., feeling frustrated, unhappy, upset; see also Salovey & Rodin, 1986, studies and 3) Anger (e.g., anger, bitterness, resentfulness) was judged to be only somewhat less characteristic of participants’ envy than their frustrated desire and disappointment However, a sense of inferiority and the intense sadness associated with it (e.g., humiliation, shame, self-doubt, feeling like a failure), helplessness (e.g., helpless, not in control), and malicious ill will (e.g., hate, urge to get even) were judged to be only moderately characteristic of the experience of envy In a similar study, Smith, Parrott, Ozer, and Moniz (1994) asked university students to recall a time when they felt envy and to indicate to what degree their experience was characterized by a sense of inferiority, as well as feelings of hostility (e.g., hostile, hate, dislike) and depressiveness (e.g., low, lacking energy, depressed) Participants judged inferiority, hostility, and depressiom to be only moderately characteristic of their experience of envy Bers and Rodin’s (1984) study of the reactions of 6- to 11-year-old children to a story about a child’s failure also showed frustrated desire for a felt desert to be more central to envy than malicious ill will or intense sadness When reporting how the story’s protagonist would feel, these children reported very high levels of desire for success and viewing success as deserved and moderate levels of sadness, anger, and anger at the better-off peer Malicious feelings, such as wanting to get back at the peer, were fairly low (see also Salovey & Rodin, 1984; Salovey & Rodin, 1986, studies and 3) Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, and O’Connor (1987, study 1) influential study of the semantic similarity between a large set of emotion words also challenges the notion that envy necessarily involves malicious ill will or inferiority and its attendant emotional pain Participants in this study viewed envy as a subcategory of a broad anger prototype The envy subcategory of anger was adjacent to the disgust subcategory of anger (e.g., disgust, revulsion, contempt) as well as the suffering subcategory of sadness (e.g., agony, suffering, hurt, anguish) The subcategory of sadness terms more indicative of inferiority feelings, such as defeat, insecurity, and humiliation, were quite distant from envy Thus, participants judged envy to be a particular type of anger that is distinct in semantic meaning from emotion terms that connote hostility, ill will, or the painful feelings associated with inferiority Shaver et al (1987, study 1) also provided important evidence about the underlying dimensions of envy They found envy to be clearly negative in valence but characterized by high potency and low activity As such, envy appeared different to malicious anger terms that were higher in activity, such as wrath, hate, scorn, vengefulness, or resentment Envy’s high potency and low activity also differentiated it from the subcategory of sadness terms more indicative of feelings regarding inferiority, which tended to be low in potency However, envy’s high potency and low activity made it similar to sadness terms higher in potency than feelings regarding inferiority, such as agony, hurt, displeasure, and disappointment These terms are indicative of the more circumscribed 3070-117-006.indd 98 5/14/2008 5:35:50 PM Envy, Inferiority, and Injustice 99 and unstable feelings of disappointment that come from frustrated goal pursuit (see Ortony et al., 1988) The research reviewed above suggests that envy is best characterized by anger about a frustrated desire for a felt desert that is possessed by another The anger in envy is not necessarily associated with malicious ill will or the desire to harm the fortunate party However, because people reported that anger was central to their experience of envy, it is clear that the envy in these studies was not benign Indeed, in most studies there was little indication of the admiration or competitive aspiration that characterizes benign envy (see Belk, chap 12, this volume) Although envious people may also feel frustration and disappointment about lacking what they desire and feel deficient as a result of this lack, these feelings appear to be specific to the comparison with the fortunate party and the lack of the desired fortune Envy-based anger does not necessarily include a sense that one is inferior in an entire domain or more globally (as a person) Thus, there appears to be good empirical reason to more narrowly specify the elements of envy in the way I have suggested Conceptualizing envy as necessarily including four to seven of the elements commonly listed in definitions yields an unnecessarily complicated and vague omnibus construct There is also good conceptual reason to conceptualize envy as not necessarily including malicious ill will or (domain or global) inferiority Malicious Ill Will? Anger at a frustrated desire for a felt desert that is possessed by another party is not the same as the malicious ill will in wanting to see the envied party lose its fortune or be harmed One may be angry that another has what one feels one deserves without wishing that person to suffer Indeed, research on the experience of anger shows that people tend not to feel malicious ill will toward those who have made them angry They intend to act on malicious ill will toward the target of their anger even more infrequently than they experience this desire for harm (for a review, see Averill, 1982) Despite this, many conceptualizations view malicious ill will as a necessary element of envy Given that malicious ill will is not very characteristic of envy, or of anger more generally, I think that it is useful to view malicious ill will as a possible consequence of envy rather than as a necessary element This distinction is akin to the effort at separating the emotion of anger from the desire to aggress, which is only moderately tied to anger (see Averill, 1982) Conceptualizing envy as a basis of anger makes it clear that it is not benign admiration or aspiration, while acknowledging that envy is often free of the malicious ill will that is typically presumed to be a defining characteristic of envy The fact that people are most often envious of those who are most emotionally close to them (see Tesser, 1988) probably helps explain the fact that the anger of envy tends to be less full of ill will and aggression than the murderous envy in the Bible and other dramatic portrayals Although it is clear that envy can be associated with strong dislike of the envied party and psychological distance from them, it is more difficult to feel strong ill will toward one’s intimates For example, Fischer & Roseman (2007) recently showed that anger, especially toward intimates, is associated with efforts to gain what one wants by 3070-117-006.indd 99 5/14/2008 5:35:50 PM 100 Envy, Inferiority, and Injustice coercion and the ultimate aim of reconciliation Although wanting to verbally attack the source of anger is a fairly strong impulse, people rarely want to aggress against the target of their anger or to see the target harmed (see also Averill, 1982) This is partly because, as in envy-based anger, people are most often angry at intimates and other close others Inferiority or a Specific Lack? Most conceptualizations argue that envy is the product of an unflattering comparison with a more successful party that leads one to view oneself as inferior in a particular domain or more globally (for reviews, see Foster, 1972; Schoeck, 1969; Smith & Kim, 2007) Most authors in the present volume view the upward comparison in envy as psychologically painful because, as Exline and Zell (chap 17, this volume) put it, “envy does not only tell people about their desires; it also provides a signal that they see themselves as lacking on some important dimension” (in this volume, see also Alicke & Zell, chap 5; Duffy, Shaw, & Schaubroeck, chap 10; Lindholm, chap., 13; Smith, Combs, & Thielke, chap 16) This specific lack is typically thought to lower more global selfevaluation because envy is presumed to be associated with lower self-esteem, self-worth, or self-evaluation (in this volume, see Alicke & Zell, chap 5; Belk, chap 12; Duffy, Shaw, & Schaubroeck, chap 10), and attendant feelings of shame, humiliation, and depression (in this volume, see Exline & Zell, chap 17; Smith et al., chap 16) Although it is clear that lacking a felt desert that is enjoyed by another party is likely to be experienced as disappointing, frustrating, and perhaps as highlighting something that one lacks, there is little evidence that these aspects of envy necessarily imply a view of oneself as inferior in an entire domain or more globally As shown in the research reviewed above, feelings of inferiority and attendant feelings of shame, humiliation, and intense sadness are not very characteristic of people’s experience of envy Neither is envy characterized by the low potency typical of domain or global inferiority (as shown in Shaver et al., 1987) Thus, it does not seem wise to conceptualize (domain or global) inferiority as an essential element of envy Although the envious may view themselves as comparatively “inferior” to those who possess a desired fortune, what the envier lacks is specific This is why the lack of a felt desert is experienced as a circumscribed feeling of disappointment (Salovey & Rodin, 1986, studies and 2; Smith et al., 1994) rather than more general and profound feelings of shame, humiliation, and despondency associated with domain or global inferiority (Leach & Spears, 2007; for a discussion, see Lewis, 1971) Disappointment is a more circumscribed feeling of sadness about the failure to achieve a particular goal (Higgins, 1987; Ortony et al., 1988) In contrast, the emotional pain of domain or global inferiority is more far-reaching and intense, because such inferiority presents a greater psychological threat to one’s self-concept than a more circumscribed disappointment over lacking what is possessed by a single party (Ansbacher & Ansbacher, 1956; Lewis, 1971) As I describe in more detail below, where one’s lack of a specific thing leads to a sense of domain or global inferiority, this provides a different basis of anger, distinct from envy Although a particular episode of envy, or repeated episodes of envy, may lead one to view oneself as being inferior in a domain, or more globally, any resultant 3070-117-006.indd 100 5/14/2008 5:35:50 PM Envy, Inferiority, and Injustice 101 anger is then based in the inferiority not in the more distal envy This is what Scheler (1915/1960) argued in the book Ressentiment Where one views oneself as inferior in an entire domain or more globally, felt desert is likely depressed Those suffering domain or global inferiority are likely to view themselves as impotent, and thus good fortune may appear impossible for them In contrast, envy presupposes that what is coveted could become one’s own, even if the actual likelihood is low (see Ben-Ze’ev, 1992; Elster [1998] as cited in Smith & Kim, 2007; Heider, 1958) As Lazarus (1991, p 255) put it, “if our future expectations about what we yearn for are hopeful then envy is sustained.” That what is envied could become one’s own is also made clear by the fact that envy should end if one gains what one lacks According to Scheler (1915/1960), as envy is directed at the “specific objects” of the good fortune that is wanted: It should disappear when these objects are gained: usually revenge and envy still have specific objects They not arise without special reasons and are directed at specific objects, so that they not outlast their motives The desire for revenge disappears when vengeance has been taken, when the person against whom it was directed has been punished or has punished himself, or when one truly forgives him In the same way, envy vanishes when the envied possession becomes ours (p 47) Only the position or possession of those who are similarly situated could easily become one’s own (Heider, 1958) If one is inferior in a domain as a whole, or more globally, one has little basis to think that another party’s good fortune could be one’s own In addition, it is the fortune of those similarly situated that should belong to one, as one’s similarity of situation suggests that one deserves similar fortune (Ben-Ze’ev, 1992; Heider, 1958) Although it is widely agreed that targets of envy are typically those of a similar status or circumstance (for reviews see Smith & Kim, 2007; Tesser, 1988), many commentators maintain that inferiority is essential to envy However, these two suppositions are mutually incompatible (Ben-Ze’ev, 1992) If envy is typically directed at those of a similar level within a particular domain, then the fact that one lacks what a similar other possesses cannot indicate that one is inferior in this domain or more globally The upward comparison in envy only indicates that one is relatively “inferior” to the party who possesses a felt desert Thus, the “inferiority” in envy is more specific, and more circumscribed, than is typically acknowledged Given that one feels frustrated and disappointed (rather than ashamed and humiliated) about lacking a felt desert, I think it is more precise to say that envy is based in an upward comparison that establishes this lack of a felt desert Lacking a specific position or possession that is enjoyed by another is the basis of the specific form of anger that is envy This anger is different from anger based in inferiority (domain or global) Inferiority-based Anger: Ressentiment Excluding (domain and global) inferiority from envy enables envy to be distinguished from the inferiority-based anger that Nietzsche (1887/1967) referred to as ressentiment (see Figure –1B) Unlike envy-based anger, the anger of ressentiment is based 3070-117-006.indd 101 5/14/2008 5:35:51 PM 102 Envy, Inferiority, and Injustice in “impotence”—one is so inferior that there is nothing one can to attain good fortune Thus, one must either accept one’s inferiority or oppose the system that exalts good fortune (for a discussion, see Kauffmann, 1974) Nietzsche was an outspoken critic of ressentiment because, as a feeling of impotence, ressentiment was bereft of the “will to power.” Thus, like Hegel before him, Nietzsche thought that those suffering disadvantage were best off using their innate human potential to strive for good fortune (for discussions, see Deleuze, 1983; Kauffmann, 1974) Nietzsche (1887/1967) suggested that the emotional pain of inferiority was so aversive that individuals externalized it in the form of malicious anger at successful parties As he put it, “this need to direct one’s view outward instead of back on oneself—is the essence of ressentiment: in order to exist, slave morality always first needs a hostile external world; it needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act at all—its action is fundamentally reaction” (pp 37–38) Thus, Nietzsche argued that the inferiority-based anger of ressentiment led people to be hostile toward those more successful than they This hostility, he believed, was full of an ill will aimed at destroying the successful and the system by which they were able to gain success It should be clear that Nietzsche’s notion of ressentiment is nearly indistinguishable from prevailing notions of envy because ressentiment includes all the elements considered central to envy This may be why numerous commentators have referred to Nietzsche’s view of ressentiment as a theory of envy (Rawls, 1971; Schoeck, 1969; Smith & Kim, 2007) This conflation of envy and ressentiment may be due, in part, to Scheler’s (1915/1960) influential attempt to clarify and extend Nietzsche’s view In Ressentiment, Scheler repeatedly argued that envy is often the basis of ressentiment In a number of places, Scheler appeared to use the terms envy and ressentiment interchangeably (pp 52–53) Nevertheless, Scheler made repeated attempts to differentiate the anger of envy from the inferiority-based anger of ressentiment For example, he argued that envy remains envy rather than becoming ressentiment, as long as one seeks to gain what one lacks: “Nor will the envious fall under the dominion of ressentiment if he seeks to acquire the desired possession by means of work, barter, crime, or violence” (p 48) Only where what is wanted no longer seems achievable, can envy turn into ressentiment: Ressentiment can only arise if these emotions [such as envy] are particularly powerful but must be suppressed because they are coupled with the feeling that one is unable to act them out—either because of weakness, physical or mental, or because of fear Through its very origin, ressentiment is therefore chiefly confined to those who serve and are dominated at the moment, who fruitlessly resent the sting of authority (Scheler, 1915/1960, p 48) Thus, Scheler argued that unlike envy, ressentiment is based in an inferiority that makes one impotent and thus unable to alter the inferiority He went on to suggest that inferiority is debilitating because it is viewed an unalterable defect rather than a potentially alterable lack As Scheler (p 50) put it, ressentiment “is directed against lasting situations which are felt to be ‘injurious’ but beyond one’s control—in other words, the more the injury is experienced as destiny.” 3070-117-006.indd 102 5/14/2008 5:35:51 PM Envy, Inferiority, and Injustice 103 A good deal of theory in psychology shares Nietzsche’s view that inferiority promotes feelings of impotence, defensive malice, and ill will Likely due to Nietzsche’s influence, the psychoanalyst Alfred Adler built an entire theory of personality around the idea of an impotent “inferiority complex” (for reviews, see Ansbacher & Ansbacher, 1956) He suggested that inferiority promotes a destructive anger that undermines social relationships and societal bonds Helen Lewis (1971) also argued that feelings of (inferiority-based) shame could be redirected away from the self into hostile anger toward others Scheff (1994) extrapolated this argument to the group level in his conceptualization of a “shame-rage spiral” where groups who suffer painful feeling of inferiority-based shame are prone to a hostile anger that can serve as a basis for aggression or other malevolence Dollard and colleagues’ argument that chronic frustration is often “displaced” into aggression is a precursor of this line of thinking at the group level (for discussions, see Spears & Leach, 2004; Wills, 1981) Although there have been few direct examinations of ressentiment, some contemporary work is consistent with Nietzsche’s approach A good deal of contemporary psychological work has examined (domain or global) inferiority and anger For example, research at the individual (Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1992) level is supportive of the idea that chronic shame leads to anger, hostility, and ill will toward others (for a review, see Wills, 1981) At the group level, a wide range of work shows that pre-existing or experimentally created domain inferiority can lead to the devaluation of other groups (for reviews, see Bettencourt, Dorr, Charlton, & Hume, 2001; Spears & Leach, 2004; Wills, 1981) However, the most direct evidence for Nietzschean ressentiment comes from two recent studies on intergroup relations by Leach and Spears (2007) In two studies, students were led to believe that universities in their country were engaged in a competitive quiz game similar to Britain’s “university challenge.” Participants were then informed that their university had lost most of their matches against a pool of half of the universities in the country The emotional pain of inferiority that students felt in response was assessed with terms such as ashamed, inferior, and threatened After this, students were presented with evidence that another university in the same city had been very successful in the other pool of competition Feelings about the other group’s success were then assessed Consistent with the notion of ressentiment, those students who expressed the most pain about their group’s domain inferiority expressed very strong anger in response to the out-group’s success This inferiority-based anger was highly predictive of schadenfreude at the out-group’s subsequently presented failure in the competition In contrast, schadenfreude was very weakly predicted by preexisting dislike of the other party or desire of the other party’s success The perceived or actual injustice of the other party’s success was modestly associated with anger and was thus a modest predictor of schadenfreude Thus, inferiority-based anger (i.e., ressentiment) was most predictive of subsequent schadenfreude Based on these results, I think it is fair to ask how much independent association envy has with schadenfreude, or other malice, after one accounts for the inferiority-based anger that is often embedded in measures of envy (see also Spears & Leach, 2004) 3070-117-006.indd 103 5/14/2008 5:35:51 PM 104 Envy, Inferiority, and Injustice Righteous, Justice-based Anger Where people believe in a secular system by which fortune is distributed, they may use a notion of justice to judge their own and others’ fortune If they judge the distribution to be unjust they are likely to feel righteous anger (Averill, 1982; Lazarus, 1991; Ortony et al., 1988) Differentiating sinful anger from the righteous variety, Chaucer’s (c 1387/1951, p 506) Parson character said, “Anger is the wicked will to vengeance Anger against wickedness, however, is good wrath, without bitterness.” Thus, to be a righteous, justice-based, anger about the inequality between oneself and another party, anger must be free of the “bitterness” of envy or ressentiment Rawls made a similar point in his influential treatise A Theory of Justice He (1971) referred to righteous, justice-based anger about inequality as “resentment”: If we resent our having less than others, it must be because we think that their being better off is the result of unjust institutions, or wrongful conduct on their part Those who express resentment must be prepared to show why certain institutions are unjust or how others have injured them What marks off envy from the moral feelings is the different way in which it is accounted for, the sort of perspective from which the situation is viewed (p 533) In other words, Rawls argued that righteous anger could be distinguished from envy because righteous anger is based in a demonstrable concern for injustice, whereas the anger of envy is based in a concern for oneself Rather than relying on the divine distribution of fortune, systems of justice use principles such as equality, equity, and effort, to judge how much good fortune any given person should receive (for reviews, see Feather, 1999; Lind & Tyler, 1987; Miller, 2001) For example, according to the equity principle of justice, individuals who invest the most should receive the most In contrast, the equality principle of justice suggests that all parties should receive an equal share of good fortune Where another’s fortune, or one’s lack of fortune, is thought to be unfair by some standard of justice it may be the basis of a righteous anger at the fortunate or at the system of distribution (see Figure –1C) In practice, however, it is difficult to assess the righteousness of anger This is partly due to the fact that English speakers appear to use the word “envy” to refer to situations they view as fair as well as those they view as unfair For example, Salovey and Rodin (1986, study 1) found that common examples of envy varied widely in their degree of unfairness–fairness Having a younger sibling who has a better job was associated with moderate envy, despite the fact that it was viewed as fair and deserved Thus, people’s use of the terms envy and justice cannot be taken as unproblematic indications of the role of justice in their anger at inequality Assessing the role of justice in anger about inequality is made more complicated by the fact that some approaches blur the boundaries between justice-based anger and envy by defining envy in broad terms that include a sense that the inequality between oneself and another is unfair (Heider, 1958; Schoeck, 1969) For example, Smith (1991) argued that a “subjective” sense of injustice is an important element of envy He defined subjective injustice as an idiosyncratic perception of injustice not validated by rule, social 3070-117-006.indd 104 5/14/2008 5:35:51 PM Envy, Inferiority, and Injustice 105 convention, or by consensus In the emotion recall study described above, Smith et al (1994) asked students if their envy had been directed at someone who had an advantage that would be widely perceived as unfairly “achieved.” Smith et al (1994) called this an “objective” sense of injustice In contrast, a “subjective” sense of injustice was measured with items tapping a belief that the participant’s “life” was unfair as well as with items that framed the other’s “advantage” as inherited or “lucky.” The perception that the “envied” people’s advantage was “objectively” unfair was moderately associated with feelings of “anger,” “hate,” “dislike,” and “hostility” toward them Thus, Smith et al (1994) concluded that where envy includes an “objective” sense of injustice, it is associated with hostile anger However, the interpretation of this result may not be so clear As the hostile anger participants reported did not include any of the other elements widely considered essential to envy, it is unclear if participants were correct to label their experience as envy Indeed, participants did not report frustrated desire or an upward comparison as part of their experience Perhaps more importantly, participants’ belief that they were inferior to the target of their “envy” was unrelated to their hostile anger Thus, according to the prevailing definition, or the narrower one I have offered here, there is little reason to label the “envy” participants reported as anything other than justice-based anger about another party’s relative advantage Although people used the term envy to describe their hostile anger at another’s advantage, that the apparent basis of this anger was perceived injustice suggests against defining this anger as envy This reinforces the point that emotion words are not necessarily reliable indicators of peoples’ experience of, or beliefs about, emotions It also illustrates the importance of my suggestion to use the basis of anger about inequality, rather than the emotion words people use to label it, as the best indicator of their feeling Smith et al (1994) also found that a “subjective” sense of injustice was moderately associated with hostile and depressive feelings, as well as a sense of inferiority Although the authors interpret this as consistent with an omnibus conceptualization of envy, the interpretation is not so clear for at least two reasons First, the measure of “subjective” injustice included the view that the participant’s entire life was unfair An unfair life is likely to be seen as more stable and global a disadvantage than another party’s unfairly obtained advantage referred to in the measure of “objective” injustice (Weiner, 1985, 1995) It is well known that disadvantages that are viewed as internal, stable, and global are linked to feelings of global inferiority and depression (for reviews, see Weiner, 1985, 1995) These feelings of global inferiority and depression are unlikely to result from perceived injustice alone Thus, it seems likely that the “subjective injustice”of Smith et al (1994) was associated with feelings of inferiority and depression because it was perceived as a stable injustice that affected the participant’s entire life Second, the measure of “subjective” injustice of Smith et al included the view that the “envied” party had advantages that were inherited at birth Inherited advantages are likely to be seen as more stable and global than obtained ones (Weiner, 1985, 1995) Thus, even where they are perceived as unfair, inherited advantages are unlikely to change as a result of one’s effort Unalterable advantage and unfairness may both serve as a basis for feelings of depression and global inferiority (see also Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2007) Given these 3070-117-006.indd 105 5/14/2008 5:35:51 PM 106 Envy, Inferiority, and Injustice concerns, future research should examine the following questions about perceived injustice Is inherited advantage viewed as more stable and global than obtained advantage? Is inherited advantage viewed as more unjust than obtained advantage? Is perceived injustice a basis of feelings of depression and inferiority when it is perceived as stable and global? More theoretically, it is unclear how well a distinction between subjective and objective injustice clarifies the issues at hand It seems obvious that all judgments of justice are subjective and thus to some degree idiosyncratic (MacIntyre, 1984; Nietzsche, 1887/1967) In the Smith et al (1994) study, individuals’ sense that “anyone would agree” seems an especially subjective sense of the normativity of one’s judgment of injustice Even where people apply widely agreed-on principles of justice, such as equity, equality, or need, individuals must make subjective judgments of what best satisfies these principles (Lind & Tyler, 1987; Miller, 2001) Research on how well individuals apply principles of justice to particular judgments makes it clear that the process of judgment is always highly subjective (for reviews, see Mikula, 1993; Miller, 2001; Lind & Tyler, 1987) These subjective judgments of injustice may focus on either side of an inequality: one’s deprivation or another party’s success Own Deprivation Theory and research on envy rarely discusses its similarity to the concept of relative deprivation However, it is clear that the two concepts overlap a great deal The most common conceptualization of “relative deprivation” views it as a feeling of dissatisfaction about lacking something that one wants and feels one deserves (for reviews, see Smith & Kessler, 2004; Walker & Smith, 2002) According to this definition, comparison with another party is not a necessary basis of relative deprivation As mentioned in the introduction, people use many different standards by which to judge what they deserve These include personal expectations for the future and normative expectations based in norms for one’s group (Hyman, 1942; Merton, 1957) In a recent meta-analytic review of psychological and sociological research, Smith and Ortiz (2002) showed these different comparisons to be related to different outcomes For example, feelings of dissatisfaction about one’s individual deprivation relative to the past or to expectations of the future were highly related to psychological distress (e.g., stress, ill health, depression) and feelings of powerlessness Felt deprivation relative to members of an individual’s in-group had a moderate association to distress Thus, unlike envy, relative deprivation allows for the possibility that it is the failure to meet one’s own standards that may be most distressing to the self As has been shown in work on self-discrepancy theory, falling short of one’s goals is a potent basis of both dejected and anxious feelings (for a review, see Higgins, 1987) Although upward comparison is not necessary to relative deprivation, Smith and Ortiz’s (2002) review showed that upward comparisons also have notable effects on psychological experience and the intention to act This is likely why some conceptualizations of relative deprivation view an upward comparison to a party who has what 3070-117-006.indd 106 5/14/2008 5:35:51 PM Envy, Inferiority, and Injustice 107 one wants as an essential element (Davis, 1959; Runciman, 1966) For example, Crosby (1976) integrated prevailing views of the time to suggest that there are five conditions for relative deprivation: (1) seeing that another party possesses (2) something that one wants, (3) feels entitled to, and (4) thinks it possible to attain, without (5) blaming themselves for lacking what they want This definition of relative deprivation is hardly distinguishable from the prevailing omnibus conceptualization of envy This may be one reason that a subset of work sought to distinguish relative deprivation by viewing as central a judgment that one’s deprivation is unjust This more precise conceptualization of relative deprivation is similar to the kind of injustice-based anger that I wish to distinguish from envy-based anger Unjust Deprivation A comparison to a party who has what one feels one deserves may establish one’s relative deprivation, but the judgment that one is unjustly deprived must be based on comparison to a standard of justice that transcends comparison to any particular party The role of perceived injustice in relative deprivation is specified in Folger’s (1986) referent cognitions theory He argues that the belief that one does not have what one wants (but could attain) leads to a form of relative deprivation experienced as a feeling of dissatisfaction Only where not having something one is capable of achieving is combined with the belief that one lacks it because of procedural injustice does one have the psychological basis of justice-based anger Folger called this justice-based anger resentment and argued that it is based in an ability to imagine that a better outcome is possible via a more just system of distribution Consistent with more general research on anger (Averill, 1983; Lazarus, 1991), a good deal of research has shown that a belief that one has been unjustly deprived relative to another party is strongly associated with anger (Davis, 1959; Runciman, 1966) For example, Kessler and Mummendey (2002) found that East Germans being “annoyed” and “explosive” about their group’s disadvantage relative to West Germans was moderately associated with perceived competition for material resources, perceived inequality in material outcomes, and the perceived injustice of the inequality Resentment was more modestly associated with viewing the inequality as stable and unlikely to change In similar research, Kessler and Mummendey (2001) found resentment about unjust relative deprivation to be a moderate predictor of individuals’ wanting to publicly protest the perceived injustice (see also Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2007) Similar results have been found in the more experimental approach of van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, and Leach (2004) In two studies, the researchers led university students to believe that their faculty was proposing an increase in the number of hours of research participation required of students This proposal was presented as either procedurally fair or unfair (i.e., students were provided or denied and opportunity to comment on the proposal) Where students were treated unfairly, they expressed greater anger, which predicted the degree to which they wanted to collectively protest the injustice Thus anger about unjust deprivation appears distinct from envy in both its antecedents and its consequences 3070-117-006.indd 107 5/14/2008 5:35:51 PM 108 Envy, Inferiority, and Injustice Unlike envy, righteous, justice-based anger is based in a perceived violation of injustice that transcends the aggrieved party’s particular deprivation Perhaps as a result, justicebased anger is associated with a willingness to act against the perceived injustice Another’s Success Anger at another party’s success is most clearly justice-based when one does not feel (unjustly or otherwise) deprived by the other party’s success In this case, anger is most obviously free of envy and (domain or global) inferiority In his attempt to debunk the myth that anger among those with inferior status is based in envy, Rawls (1971, p 540) set out the criteria for establishing righteous, justice-based, anger: “In addition to showing that a person’s conception of justice is not itself founded on envy, we must determine whether the principles of justice cited in his explanation are sincerely held as this is shown in their being applied by him to other cases in which he is not involved, or even better, in which he would suffer a loss from their being followed.” This first test of justice-based anger is met in cases where people are angry at the success of another party, where this success has no bearing on their own fortune Research on attribution theory has often examined peoples’ explanations of and attendant emotional reactions to the success and failure of other parties (for reviews, see Weiner, 1985, 1995) In general, this work shows that those who succeed through effort alone are rewarded and admired more than those who succeed through ability alone or through a combination of ability and effort Weiner (1995) argues that this is the result of people believing that succeeding through effort is more indicative of a person’s responsibility for their success However, it is important to note that the difference in reward to those who succeed through ability rather than effort is relative Those who succeed through effort alone are rewarded only slightly more than those who succeed through ability and effort together More importantly, those who succeed by ability alone are rewarded for their success Thus, success achieved by ability alone is attributed to the successful and is viewed as deserved, even it is viewed as relatively less deserved and thus less rewarded than success through effort alone Feather’s (1994) research on attitudes toward high achievers shows something similar In general, people feel positively toward the highly successful even where their success is attributed to circumstances beyond their control (e.g., the luck of a lottery, ascribed wealth, talent, or beauty) Groups that are generally successful, or who have achieved success on controlled tasks during the course of a study, also tend to be evaluated positively Even those who belong to groups that have performed less well in comparison tend to evaluate the more successful positively and to show little malice toward them (for a meta-analytic review, see Bettencourt et al., 2001) The perceived or objective fairness of the outgroup’s success has been shown to play little role in positive responses to it In highly industrialized societies at least, it seems that people reward success and reward success by effort even more so (Weiner, 1995) This trend makes anger at another party’s success stand out as something deviant and in need of explanation and defense 3070-117-006.indd 108 5/14/2008 5:35:52 PM Envy, Inferiority, and Injustice 109 In contrast to research on high achievers and reactions to individual and group success, Feather (1999) has argued that another party’s undeserved success promotes an injustice-based anger that he calls resentment Unlike the view offered here, and that of Ben-Ze’ev (1992), Feather argued that undeserved success is necessarily unjust and necessarily perceived as unjust This is why he believes that undeserved success leads to a righteous, justice-based, anger In one of the key studies offered in support of this view, Feather and Sherman (2002) asked university students to respond to a vignette where a peer’s (successful) performance in school was gained either through effort or ability They reasoned that success gained through ability, without effort, is undeserved and thus the basis for the justice-based anger of resentment Consistent with this, Feather and Sherman found participants to show greater “resentment” (e.g., “angry,” “indignant,” “resentful,” unjust) in reaction to the successful peer high in ability but low in effort This result is clearly out of step with the research on attribution for success by Weiner (1985, 1995) and others One possible reason for this divergence in findings is that, unlike attribution research, Feather and Sherman (2002) emphasized the fact that the successful party should be thought of as a peer As a second-year student at the same institution, this hypothetical peer was similar in circumstance to the students who participated in the study In fact, Feather and Sherman argued that “we tend to be more resentful of another person’s undeserved outcome the more we value that outcome and see it as important in regard to the self.” This clearly violates Rawls’ (1971) first criterion for evidence of righteous anger about injustice As the students in Feather and Sherman study seem likely to have wanted academic success for themselves (especially if it came without effort), and perhaps were also likely to feel inferior to the successful peer in the academic domain, it is unclear whether justice is the main basis of the anger they expressed about their hypothetical peer’s success By making the other party’s success highly relevant to participants’ self-concept, Feather and Sherman (2002) weakened their ability to argue that anger and felt injustice were the genuine result of a more general belief in the injustice of undeserved success Rawls’s criterion suggests that a proper empirical examination of justice-based anger requires the researcher to expose participants to a party whose unjust success is established with no reference to the self In addition, possible feelings of envy and inferiority must be accounted for and separated from injustice as distinct bases of anger To my knowledge, the only studies to achieve this are two recent experiments by Leach and Spears (2007, studies and 4) Given our interest in intergroup relations, in one experiment the researchers led students at a university in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, to believe that another university in the city was involved in an intermural competition in which the in-group was not involved We then gave them a set of results that showed the out-group to be highly successful The degree to which this success was perceived as unfair was modestly associated with feelings of anger That this anger was a righteous, justice-based, anger was supported by the fact that the perception of injustice was unrelated to wanting the other party’s success, a feeling of inferiority compared to the other 3070-117-006.indd 109 5/14/2008 5:35:52 PM 110 Envy, Inferiority, and Injustice party, dislike of the other party, or interest in the competition itself A further study that manipulated the procedural justice of the out-group’s success showed similar results, further bolstering the claim that anger at another party’s success can be mainly based in the injustice of their success, rather than frustrated desire or comparative inferiority Rawls’s (1971) second criterion for evidence of justice-based judgment is that people apply their belief in justice to cases where they will stand to lose as a result Evidence for this comes from the abundant literature on “procedural justice” (for reviews, see Lind & Tyler, 1987; Miller, 2001) This work showed that individuals are more accepting of a poor outcome and judge it to be fairer when the procedure that determined the outcome was fair However, Rawls’s criterion seems overly strict in cases where those who are badly off express what appears to be a justice-based anger about the success of others Must we really demand that the disadvantaged be prepared to lose some of the little that they have to convince us that their anger is based in justice? This criterion is reasonable enough as theoretical proof, but its use as an evidentiary requirement seems impractical Conclusions Nietzsche (1887/1967) had a cynical view of justice-based anger, suggesting that the inferiority-based anger of ressentiment was a more likely basis of anger about inequality: When it really happens that the just man remains just even toward those who have harmed him (and not merely cold, temperate, remote, indifferent; being just is always a positive attitude), when the exalted, clear objective, as penetrating as it is mild, of the eye of justice and judging is not dimmed even under the assault of personal injury, derision, and calumny, this is a piece of perfection and supreme mastery on earth—something it would be prudent not to expect or to believe in too readily On the average, a small dose of aggression, malice, or insinuation certainly suffices to drive the blood into the eyes—and the fairness out of the eyes—of even the most upright people (pp 74 –75) Because envy may be displaced or dissembled, many commentators have suggested that expressions of justice-based anger at another party’s success should not be taken at face value As should be clear from this chapter, I wholeheartedly agree The expression of what appears to be a justice-based anger about inequality must be scrutinized, just as all claims should be However, this scrutiny should not be fed by a cynical view of anger, of justice, or of opposition to inequality Neither should the scrutiny of claims of justicebased anger be led by a conceptualization of envy that conflates this form of anger with that based in justice or (domain or global) inferiority I have tried to demonstrate that a more narrow conceptualization of envy—as the frustrated desire for a felt desert possessed by another party—helps the effort to examine when a righteous concern for justice is the basis of anger and when anger is based in envy or inferiority (domain or global) Despite the benefits of a narrow conceptualization of envy, it must be admitted that anger based in envy, inferiority (domain or global), and injustice may be difficult to 3070-117-006.indd 110 5/14/2008 5:35:52 PM Envy, Inferiority, and Injustice 111 distinguish in practice There are at least four possible reasons for this First, all three bases of anger may be present, to varying degrees, in a given situation Where envy, injustice, and domain inferiority are all in operation, people may feel a complex anger based in a blend of influences (see also Parrott, 1991) However, conceptualizing this complex blend of anger as envy does little to aid analysis Indeed, an omnibus notion of envy makes it difficult to estimate the degree to which envy, domain inferiority, and injustice contribute to any given example of anger (Leach & Spears, 2007; Spears & Leach, 2004) Only by making conceptual distinctions among anger based on envy, inferiority (domain or global), and injustice may scholars assess the degree to which a given episode of anger is based on envy Second, people may express their anger in ways that are less precise than the terms preferred by scholars Indeed, people use terms such as envy, anger, rancor, and resentment, in interchangeable ways that not necessarily match scholarly definitions (Parrott & Smith, 1993; see Ortony et al., 1988) Thus, indication that anger is based in envy, domain inferiority, or injustice must not be taken solely from people’s everyday use of ambiguous emotion or other language Studies that aim to identify the conceptual elements of envy by analyzing people’s descriptions of an experience of “envy” must be interpreted in light of the many and varied usages of the term Thus, I think it is important to use the apparent bases of anger as the best indication of the emotions that people experience rather than the ambiguous label people apply to their experience (as I have done throughout this chapter; see also Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2007; Leach & Spears, 2007) Third, where envy is experienced and expressed it is typically accompanied by feelings of embarrassment (Salovey & Rodin, 1986, studies and 3) and moral selfreproach, such as shame and guilt (Parrott, 1991; Parrott & Smith, 1993) Thus, people may worry about the immorality of their envy and as a result suppress the experience or its expression (Salovey & Rodin, 1986; Silver & Sabini, 1978) This makes it difficult to observe envy in everyday life Although the experience and expression of inferioritybased anger may also be suppressed (Leach & Spears, 2007), there is less of a proscription against injustice-based anger (Averill, 1982) Thus, the degree to which these forms of anger are experienced or expressed may not be the best indication of their prevalence in psychological life Fourth, people may unconsciously “displace” their envy into less questionable forms of anger A number of modern (philosophical and psychological) approaches suggest that the obvious immorality of envy leads those who experience it to displace their feelings in the form of anger at the envied party (Klein, 1957; Scheler, 1915/1960; Schoeck, 1969) For example, it is argued that people displace their envy into what appears to be a justice-based anger at advantaged parties because they cannot accept the fact that their anger is based in wanting another party’s position or possession (for discussions, see Parrott, 1991; Smith, 2004) As the angry person has hidden the true motive of their anger from himself or herself, it may be especially difficult for observers to discern the truth Of course, “Freudian slips” and other evidence of envy may be more easily identified in this case, as the envious party is not consciously guarding against 3070-117-006.indd 111 5/14/2008 5:35:52 PM 112 Envy, Inferiority, and Injustice their unacknowledged envy (Vidaillet, chap 15, this volume) Ultimately, to judge the basis of anger in such cases, observers must scrutinize the claim of injustice and weigh the evidence of envy (Rawls, 1971) This may be easier said than done The difficulty of distinguishing envy-based anger from inferiority- and injusticebased anger is illustrated in Pushkin’s (1830/1965, p 28) oft-cited portrayal of envy in Mozart and Salieri Sitting alone in his house, Salieri admits that after hearing the “profound,” “daring” “harmony divine” of Mozart’s music, “I envy deeply, to agony.” However, Salieri goes on to describe his anger in terms more like that of justice-based anger when he asks (God?), “Where, where is justice when the sacred gift, When immortality rewards not him who serves high art by faithful work and prayer, with burning love, devotion, self-denial, But shines in light around a madcap’s head, Upon an idler’s brow?” Salieri’s allusion to the heavens and to the light around Mozart’s head suggests that Salieri feels a righteous anger at God for bestowing bounty on someone so immoral and otherwise undeserving If one as uncouth and idle as Mozart is rewarded while one as devoted as Salieri is scorned, the system by which fortune is bestowed must be unjust Although it is entirely possible that Salieri’s claim of injustice is an (conscious or unconscious) attempt to hide his envy and to legitimate his anger, it is also possible that some degree of Salieri’s anger is based in a more general belief in justice In other words, some of Salieri’s anger may be righteous The precise meaning of the “envy” that Salieri admits to is made more unclear by his reference to many other perceptions and feelings If we readers take Salieri at his word, his admission of envy seems to suggest a deep desire for Mozart’s “harmony divine.” So, too, does his description of faith and devotion to the “high art” suggest that Salieri desperately wants to be a musician of Mozart’s caliber Thus, Salieri expresses a covetous desire for Mozart’s talent In addition, Salieri’s lack of the “sacred gift” and the “immortality” that he assumes will follow from it appears to hurt him deeply and to render his prior accomplishments meaningless Thus, Mozart’s genius seems to lead Salieri to view himself as a lesser musician than Mozart Many scholars would take such an admission as an indication that Salieri’s comparison to Mozart leads Salieri to a sense of inferiority in the domain of music However, given Salieri’s claim that “I have rejoiced in the success and work of fellow-craftsmen in the art divine I never felt the sting of hate and envy,” Salieri’s deficiency appears to specifically refer to his comparison to Mozart There is no indication that Mozart’s talent leads Salieri to see himself as inferior in the domain of music itself Neither is there any indication of the kind of chronic or global inferiority that many commentators see as central to the “low self-esteem” associated with envy Thus, I think that there is little indication that inferiority (domain or global) plays much of a role in Salieri’s “envy.” In Pushkin, as in the portrayal in the film Amadeus, Salieri seems to be rendered mediocre by Mozart’s genius His comparative lack does not seem to result in an inferiority in the domain in which Salieri so desperately wants to achieve Thus, consistent with the conceptualization I offered above, envy is anger based in a frustrated desire for the felt desert that another party possesses but one lacks Although this circumscribed lack is frustrating and disappointing, it is distinct from the more profound emotional pain felt when a 3070-117-006.indd 112 5/14/2008 5:35:52 PM Envy, Inferiority, and Injustice 113 comparison to a successful party results in a more general sense that one is inferior in an entire domain or more globally Although I acknowledge the difficulty of identifying the precise basis of Salieri’s anger, I not think that calling these feelings envy does much to help In fact, combining so many different bases of anger in an omnibus term such as envy dilutes the analytic utility of the envy concept With only envy as 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