CRITICAL MARITIME ROUTES – GULF OF GUINEA (CRIMGO) As in other EU member-States, in Portugal we have a Directorate General for Maritime Policies ẫ competờncia da DGPM portuguesa promover acỗừes de cooperaỗóo bilateral e multilateral relacionadas com o mar, de acordo com as atribuiỗừes cometidas pelo artigo 2, n 2, alínea q), Decreto Regulamentar nº 17/2012, de 31 de Janeiro Nesse contexto, a DGPM, like our sister entities in some of the other regionally-concerned member-States, respondeu Call for Tender “Critical Maritime Routes - Gulf of Guinea (CRIMGO) correspondendo Fase III deste programa financiado através Instrument of Stability O objectivo principal deste projecto da DGPM portuguesa and of our lateral equivalents within the Community, in support of the EU Commission, é: • Apoiar os pses da região Golfo da Guinộ na implementaỗóo de medidas visando a melhoria da seguranỗa marớtima na regióo, principalmente nos aspectos relacionados com o Combate Pirataria Marítima e o Roubo Armado no Mar, or, say, ilegal fishing (as has been the case, namely in Nigeria along the coast, or Benin, for example) (Nota: Para além de reflecting and reinforcing o determinado na Resoluỗóo 2039 of the UN Security Council, o projeto pretendo contribuir, no longo prazo, para a melhoria da gestão dos assuntos mar e das respectivas políticas públicas) Outros resultados específicos a serem atingidos são sobretudo de CAPACITY-BUILDING, articulated with a DG Cooperation and the European External Service: • • • Estabelecer um mecanismo regional de treino que materialize o “Projecto Educacional” e que responda às necessidades regionais na ỏrea da seguranỗa marớtima; Incrementar o nớvel de partilha de informaỗóo marớtima e das capacidades estabelecidas quer ao nớvel da região quer ao de cada um dos países beneficiários; Implementar mecanismos visando a coordenaỗóo inter-agờncia na acỗóo dos Estados no mar; ã Apoiar as Organizaỗừes Regionais na definiỗóo e implementaỗóo das suas estratộgias marớtimas A referida Call for Action ộ da maior importõncia para a cooperaỗóo portuguesa and that of the EU no que respeita ao mar, no quadro da UE para a acỗóo externa relacionada com a Política Marítima Integrada, pelo que foram estabelecidos contatos com a France Expertise International (FEI), the project coordinator, no sentido de estabelecer uma parceria com aquela entidade para responder referida Call A FEI (France Expertise International) ộ uma organizaỗóo Ministộrio dos Negúcios Estrangeiros de Franỗa reconhecida junto da Comissóo Europeia para responder a propostas desta natureza Importa referir que a relaỗóo atualmente existente com a FEI decorre jỏ envolvimento nos projectos BlueMassMed, Cooperation Project - Maritime Surveillance (recentemente aprovado) e Pre-Operational Validation Common Information Sharing Environment – POV-CISE (em planeamento) Em todos estes mesmos, a FEI tem assumido a responsabilidade pela gestóo financeira dos projectos Esta relaỗóo tem, por isso, aberto um espaỗo de oportunidade para o estabelecimento da cooperaỗóo internacional ligada ao mar, para os aspectos relacionados com a Ajuda ao Desenvolvimento e a Assistência Técnica, e onde as DGPMs, em articulation with the member-State’s MFAs, may and should coordinate and ensure the preparation of Eurpeand technical cadres for cooperation at this level, segundo o modelo de gestão que melhor se possa adequar a este tipo de atuaỗóo O consúrcio, liderado pela FEI, integra as seguintes entidades: • Direction de la Coopération de Sécurité et de Défense – (DCSD)” - Ministério dos Negócios Europeus e Estrangeiros da Franỗa; ã Fundaciún Internacional y para Iberoamộrica de Administraciún y Políticas Públicas (FIIAPP) - Espanha; • Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) - Reino Unido; Direỗóo-Geral de Polớtica Mar (DGPM) - Portugal Participam ainda os seguintes estabelecimentos de ensino de assuntos marítimos de reconhecido valor: • Satakunta University of Applied Sciences (SAMK) - Finlândia; • International Maritime Safety Security Environment Academy (IMSSEA) - Itália; • Szczecin Maritime University (AMS) - Polónia 2 Aspetos relevantes of doing so and going about things in this way: • • • • • • Visibilidade nacional e comunitária, junto dos países da regióo e das organizaỗừes multilaterais regionais; Projeto ộ neste momento liderado no terreno por um assessor técnico português (militar da Marinha na situaỗóo de Reserva fora a efectividade de serviỗo, o que garante continuidade na execuỗóo e nos processos de transiỗóo), mas pode naturalmente sờ-lo por outros Estados-membros; Oportunidade para participaỗóo de especialistas temporỏrios, nacionais dos Estados-membros; Oportunidade para as Indústrias Nacionais (TIC Marítimas) dos Estados-membros poderem participar concurso fornecimento sistema MIS; Necessidade dos assessores nacionais disporem de apoio para obtenỗóo de vistos para todos os paớses da regióo pelo perớodo de implementaỗóo projecto (3 anos) e, eventualmente, a obtenỗóo de passaportes de serviỗo; Estabelecimento de articulaỗóo DGPM-Instituto Camừes da Cooperaỗóo e da Lớngua, e nos outros Estados-membros, a instituitions laterais funcionalmente equivalentes All this, of course, must be coherent with both security and safety, as well as development aspects of both regional and EU concerns Here goes an empirical example on how to operationalize this: Joint actions of DG Trade with ECOWAS/CEDEAO, on a mutually reinfong loop: in the last few months, begininng over a year ago, an interesting set of actions has been ongoing in the Gulf of Guinea and, largely within the economic geographical purviiew of ECOWAS, thath ỗlargely overlaps with that of the Gulf Part of Central Africa i.e STP, Equartorial-Guinea, and Gambia – to just give three examples of reginall sub-Saharan African states – are also there, within the framework of ECAS This feeds into, too, with the newly agreed upon Gulf of Guinea Security Strategy, recently developed by the EU’s External Service (and also, by the way, with the increased U.S attention given a few months back to the Gulf, which Boko Haram’s recent actions only solidified in last week’s EU and U.S statements) 3 THIS IS THE WAY TO A REALLY INTEGRATED approach, beyond easy political (and sometimes buraeucratic) feel-good declarations Synergies may, of course, be found within the framework of these systemic convergences: political-military matters raised by innstability in the Mali (Azawad, etc.), and the not unconnected Guinea-Bissau civl unrest (they had a coup d’Ètat in Dcember 2012) and narco-trafficking of cocaine for ground to air missiles brought down by Hezbollah and alQaeda moves down to, shifting down from the Lybian débacle, using Tuareg guides, well-seasoned in Saharan caravan routes I would like to make an incipient policy sugggestion, by “throwing the net wide” (i) For this to be a REALLY integrated maritime policy , such a FULLY COHERENT and INTEGRATED approach should, by analogy, also extend to adjacent areas, namely the ones in the southern Mediterranean that Europe is interested in, or in Southeast Asia, or wherever, although, of course, their security contexts are not quite the same (ii) In order to this properly, maybe it is time for the Commission, eventually via DG Mare or via another formal path, to appoint a permanent representative on the External Service strucutures – somehow joining that extended family (namely DG Trade, DG Eco, DG Cooperation/EUROPE AID, DG Enlargment, and the External Action Service) And, somehow projecting it, by linking it up to the EU’s “Common Security and Defence Policy” (CSDP) That is ot say, by pushing the type of “extended family” type of integration, up to this other, and more “strategic”, hard “security and defense”, level Curiously, CSDP already actually foresees that Moreover, the European Parliament report suggests this But, let us say, the Report’s proposal was never “echoed” in CSDP texts In fact, funnily, it is not even mentionned there un des bévues domestiques de notre politique communautaire “soft”, one that, here and elsewhere, in relation to which Union institutions appear to studiously avoid a strategic compass? Or is it simply the outcome of a silo mentality, and its attendant compartimentalizations? 4 Allow me to put this into perspective: This “projection upwards”, as I called it, of serious “multi-level integration”, would (or will), obviously be one of the possible structuring paths (if I can sort of create a concept here) for “Common Security and Defense Policy”, one that will allow us to better ENHANCE the robust European Maritime Policy we are all looking for (i.e more by making it efficient, and potentially more consensual, too, by merely using existent structures which are already there, by simply operating by means of a mere increase in their connectedness) Both internally, at the Commission level and at that of the Union’s External Action Service, and “externally”, by sort of “cloning it, by analogy”, at the level of our European “Common Security and Defense Policy” (CSDP) and could lead to a common defense if the European Council acting unanimously so decides (Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union – TEU) Decisions relating to the CSDP are adopted unanimously by the Council Here is how it goes, according to what the black letter of what the Lisbon Treaty clearly stipulates: the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (e.g., Baroness Ashton, for now) is responsible for implementing the Union’s Common Security and Defense Policy and for coordinating the civilian and military aspects of the “Petersberg” tasks (Article 43 TEU) Member States may be involved in carrying out these missions under the framework of a “permanent structured cooperation”, the hard version of “reinforced cooperation” in other non-security and defense domains Such moves actually serve to fortify the so-wished-for maritime component in the external presence of Europe This also, by the way, has the merit of promoting the development of a sustained set of a substantively new “blue” ocean governance, one which will surely enrich, for both Europeans and regional actors, the linkages between the units of the consensual tripod: development, security, and good governance All of it, in the good tradition of European soft power, will softly translate into “maritime as well as naval power.” This will also amount to innovation Innovation, indeed, goes far beyond technology: as ecologists and the sustainability crowd have taught us, innovation can also be seen as a bundle of changes on how to things At issue is not only one of doing better things, but also one of doing things better Or both 5 I repeat, the Gulf of Guinea is just one example among many, unfortunately, of how things are sliding on a rather slippery slope in world security, today Surely, the EU should play a role here We owe it to ourselves and to future generations to wake up to our very tangible contemporary historical responsibilities 6 ... also there, within the framework of ECAS This feeds into, too, with the newly agreed upon Gulf of Guinea Security Strategy, recently developed by the EU? ??s External Service (and also, by the way,... between the units of the consensual tripod: development, security, and good governance All of it, in the good tradition of European soft power, will softly translate into ? ?maritime as well as naval... (Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union – TEU) Decisions relating to the CSDP are adopted unanimously by the Council Here is how it goes, according to what the black letter of what the Lisbon