Radioactive waste management policies in seven industrialized democracies (2)

Radioactive Waste Management Policies in Seven Industrialized Democracies* BARRY D SOLOMON,?- Washington, DC, U.S.A FRED M SHELLEY,+ Los Angeles, CA, U.S.A MARTIN J PASQUALETTI,$ Tempe, AZ, U.S.A and G TOMAS MURAUSKAS,II Norman, OK, U.S.A Abstract: This paper provides an inventory of radioactive waste managcm~nt policies in seven industrializers democracies: the U.S., France Japan West Germany, Canada, the U.K and Sweden Collectively, these countries account for almost 75% of the world’s installed nuclear power capacity and over 61% of its spentfuel production Special emphasis is given to siting procedures for both high- and low-/intermediate-level waste repositories Although several low-level repositories are operating or under zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA c o nstruc tio n, only West Germany has selected a site for highlevel waste disposal, at Gorleben It is expected that siting decisions will be highly conflict-laden in each country except for pro-nuclear France The procedures for resolving potential sitingconfiicts are briefly rcvicwed Sweden’sstrategy of siting its low-level repository near Forsmark offshore beneath the Baltic seabed minimizes conflict and may become attractive to other nations Also, transnational agreements may eventually be sought as radioactive waste disposal is an intern~ltional problem This paper concludes with a comparative discussion of siting policies and their potential impacts zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA I nt roduc t ion Perhaps no aspect of the civilian nuclear fuel cycle has caused more controversy than the disposal of radioactive waste products Radioactive wastes must be disposed of somewhere - in the oceans, in space, or underground The first option has been banned by most countries, and the second option is too expensive and too risky Attention is now focused on *We wish to thank without implicating Andrew Blowers, John Fernie and Jim Johnson for helpful comments on an earlier draft of the paper The views and opinions expressed herein are solely those of the authors, and not of their respective institutions tEnergy Information Administration U.S Department of Energy, Washington, DC 20585, U.S.A *Department of Geography, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0663, U.S.A §Department of Geography, Arizona State Ul~versity, Tempe, AZ 85287, U.S.A [/Department of Geography, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK 73019 U.S.A achieving political and technical acceptability for the third option Siting decisions will produce unprecedented geographical effects that derive from the unique characteristics of the waste products Unlike wastes from other sources of energy, several types of nuclear wastes remain highly radioactive for long periods on the order of thousands of years (HARE and AIKIN, 1984) Attendant health and environmenta risks render many people unwilling to accept local waste repositories This coupled with the requirement of geological acceptability means that the number of sites eventually chosen will be relatively few, increasing average trip lengths for the waste product shipments and increasing real and perceived risks along the routes These concerns have rendered the problem of radioactive waste disposal an issue of heated political debate in many industrialized countries in recent years Although 415 international cooperation in formulating approaches and solutions has increased, each country has addressed the problem of siting waste disposal facilities in the context of its own geographical, social and political environment A wide range of expertise has accumulated, indicating the value of a comparative inventory of the radioactive waste disposal experience in different countries Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to identify and examine the characteristics of waste disposal decision-making and progress toward disposal site sclcction in seven major industrialized democracies that produce and USC‘ nuclear power: the U.S Canada, Sweden, France West Germany, the U.K and Japan Our goal is to identify common elements ~Ipplicabl~ to the resolution of locational conflicts involving radioactive waste disposal as well as to contrast the effects of policies unique to individual nations In this way, we can identify the most promising approaches to the resolution of siting conflicts within the context of democratic governance in the contemporary industrial world Nuclear Waste Disposal and Siting Conflict By 1987, the world’s nuclear energy capacity was nearly 270 GW(e) Three-quarters of this nuclear energy capacity exists in the seven countries under study, with the U.S and France alone accounting for nearly half (Table 1) Collectively, the seven countries are responsible for over (70% of the world’s cumulative spent-fuel arisings, with over ~00,000 metric tons of heavy metal expected from the envisaged nuclear power programs Although of radioactive waste the problem repository siting is formidable from a technical standpoint, it is ultimately a geogrnphicnl and a political problem It is a geographical problem in that the siting of a facility results in external effects of great magnitude which arc often beyond the control of residents in the local area It is a political problem in that intense locational conflicts often result from siting proposals, between representatives of the proposed facility site and representatives of the central government as well as among factions in the vicinity of the proposed site who support and oppose construction (CARTER 1987) In many cases, proposats to site nuclear waste repositories are met with intense opposition on the part of local residents, business interests, and government officials These interests fear the threat of direct negative externalities, including the dangers associated with leaking radioactive material and possible health hazards resulting from contamination In addition, indirect externalities such as devaluation of property, are often taken into account by opponents of facility siting When residents of the proposed site are united in theiI opposition to siting, the conflict takes the form of the zyxwvutsr c la ssic ‘no t in m y back ynrd’dilemma (~~PENSHAW 1986): a noxious facility that conveys region-wide benefits but imposes local costs must he constructed somewhcrc in the region but no locality is willing to take on the burden The geographic literature ilr replete with examples of noxious-facility conflicts involving controversial policies such as the location of freeways (WOLPERT (‘I rrl., 1973: FARRIER 1973), mental hcaith facilities (DEAR PI (il., 1977: SMITH and HA~HAM 1(X31) and the closing cti [ocal schools (REYNOLDS 19X.3) in some cases, conflict occurs rzvif/Iin the proposed site community iIs well as between the community and higher kvels of government 111the western LJ.S for LXI~lplt?+ scveroi isoiatcd, rural communities in~ludiI~g Moab, Utah and Edgemont South Dakota, have supported and indeed have actively encouraged proposals nuclear to site wasto repositories Support is based on the notion that construction and operation of the facility will result in jobs and local economic development; thus the facility is regarded as salutary or likely to genera& positive, beneficial externahtirs in excess of any negative oxtcrnalitics This situation results in a much different pattern of i~)~~iti~)n~ti conflict: intense conflict develops within the ~(~I~~rnuIlit~ bctwecn supporters and opponents of siting, and consequently conflict becomes evident at the local zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfe and at the regional scale rather than solely between the local community and the central government (MURAUSKAS and SHELLEY, I%%) In either case, resolution of the inevit~IL~l~ i~~~~Iti~)rl~Ii conflict that arises from proposals to site nuclear waste repositories requires political choice The political decision process of nuclear waste disposal sitino0 can be divided into three stages: the establishment and operation of the institutions involved in the siting process in general the procedures that are used by these institutions in uiid~rt~~king a tentative siting decision and the procedures used to resolve conflicts arising from siting proposals and make a final decision Each of these components is examined in the next section in order to develop 21 logical framework for the comparative analysis of radioactive waste repository siting -~ Geoforum/@olume 18 Number 411987 Aspects of Siting Decision Policy - a PoliticalGeographic Framework for International Comparative Analysis The nature of the siting institution The many functions of democratic governance characteristic of contemporary industrial societies can be grouped into three broad categories legislative, administrative and judicial The siting of controversial facilities such as nuclear waste repositories is variously regarded as either a legislative or an administrative function Legislative functions generally require active public participation in decision-making through voting either by the public or elected representatives Administrative functions, on the other hand, generally not require voter approval although other forms of public participation, such as public hearings are often required The siting of nuclear waste repositories and the resolution of siting conflicts often depends on whether the siting decision is legislative or administrative This, in turn, can depend on the location of the siting agency within the overall structure of the governmental bureaucracy Is siting carried out by an independent agency or is it regarded as a function of a larger agency such as the U.S Department of Energy (DOE) or the Commisariat B l’I?nergie Atomique (CEA) in France? Does the agency report to the legislative or administrative branch of the government? How broad are its decision powers - must they be reviewed by either agencies of the the legislative or executive government, and if so, how? The selection of individuals involved in the siting decision process also can influence the political decision-making process The selection of these persons and the criteria constraining their decisions are affected by the extent to which the national government regards siting as a technological, locational or political issue For example, are persons involved in the siting process required or expected to hold technical degrees in engineering, geology or related fields? To what extent those involved in the siting process rely on the evidence of technical experts? Reliance on the advice of technical experts usually implies that the siting process is seen as technological and administrative rather than as overtly political or locational In such cases it is also likely that little opposition to siting decisions will be tolerated through ordinary political channels 417 The actual siting decision may be affected by numerous factors In several countries, potential sites have been identified, evaluated on the basis of technological, geological, locational and other criteria, and ranked on the basis of suitability for disposal siting, with a decision eventually made among these ranked sites and often modified on the basis of political or economic criteria Constraints may be placed on the evaluation of potential sites These constraints may be technological in nature; for example, mandating that potential facility sites meet particular geological or hydrological standards to reduce the risk of radiation contaminations Alternatively, they may be locational in nature; for example, they may require that sites be chosen in remote, sparsely populated areas or be isolated from major transportation corridors Democracies differ on the extent to which these technological criteria influence the evaluation process, which in turn can influence dramatically the outcome of political conflicts regarding siting After evaluation of potential sites, sometimes accompanied by preliminary rccomtnendations, has been completed, the political process must operate in order to develop a final decision This involves two factors-procedures for ratifying and confirming, or else overturning, the preliminary recommendation, and procedures for resolving conflicts associated with the recommendations In the U.S for example, locations in three states - Washington, Nevada and Texas-were announced as potential sites for a highlevel repository in early 1986 In the U.K., in contrast, an extensive public inquiry may be held after a siting decision has already been made, such as for the proposed nuclear power plant at Sizewell (KEMP el al., 1984) Procedures of this sort wili vary among countries: for example, does the site require ratification by the national or local legislature or by the local population? Can the preliminary recommendations of the authority be overturned at higher administrative levels, and if so, on what grounds and in what ways? Once a potential site has been determined and announced, political conflict becomes almost inevitable As previously indicated, intense local opposition is likely to emerge How is this conflict managed? What rights, if any, local residents have to overturn or modify siting decisions? In different countries, scvcral avenues for conflict resolution exist First, objection to siting proposnla may be treated in political terms In such cases, the ~~~YI~rn~lnit~~may he permitted to overturn the p~titi(~nin~ or other decision through voting democratic processes commercial nuclear power, and has been operating low-level radioactive waste (LLW) facilities for many years (KASPERSON et rd., 1983) The Low Level R~l~ii~~~lctiv~Waste Policy Act, passed by Congress in December 1%-X), requires state governments to assume responsibility for nuclear wastes produced within their border: this is accomplished through the ~st~iblishm~nt of regional compacts and rcgionnl waste disposal sitcs (KEARNEY and STl.JCKER, 1985; NORMAN, 1983; DiM~N~rO rl al., lc)S5) Amendments to the original Act adopted in December 1985, extended the original deatlline for co111pact formation, approved the lirst se ve n compacts, and rcquircd all ccNllpacts to set up disposal sites by January IYC).? If legislative activity in the light of opposition is not permitted additional rights such as notice and hcaring and public ~~~rti~ip~tj(~n in siting policy, may be granted to community leaders und activists Locitl leaders may be granted comperzsation or mitigutiorl in exchange for their support of facility construction OI in response to specific heahh, safety and cconotnic local population concerns voiced by the Compensation implies that other benefits such as The Nuclear Waste Policy Act, which established additional governmental facilities, new industrial or procedures for high-level waste (HLW) disposai was commercial ~~pp(~rtuniti~s or payment of damages approved by Congress in Deccmhtx I%? for any disru~?ti~~n caused by facility construction will (SOLOMON a nd CAMERON 1985) HLW in the be channeled into the host ~~~l~lrnunity Miti~~lti~~n U.S includes spent fuel rods a nd reprocessing waste politics art: designed to tackle the direct and indirect and will probably include both military and negative externiilitics associated with radioactive commercial wastes The fcdcral govurnmcnt has These can include the w;is\1c storage zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA ix disposal carefully charted its ‘mission plan’ for HLW disposal ~~~r~stru~ti~~liof ~idditi(~Il~ll safety features, ~U~~I-~lilt~~s including the environmental st;mdards and decisionthat a specific number of jobs in construction a nd making ‘procedures zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSR (LJ.S DEPARTMEf(II., 19X4) A key component of the concept assessn~ent phase is the construction of an underground research laboratory (URL) by the AECL Whiteshell Nuclear Research Establishnlent near Lac du Bonnet, Manitoba This facility has been controversial since it was initially proposed by AECL In 1981, residents of LX du Bonnet began vigorously opposing the construction of a 300-m shaft in granite pluton near their town Opposition was countcrcd by reassurances by AECL employees that the URL was intended strictly for research purposes However despite assurances from the governments of Canada and Manitoba that nuclear waste disposal would occur in Ontario AECL personnel have recently asserted that Manitoba cannot be excluded as a potential site for an eventual HLW repository Concerned Manitobans fear that Ontario’s nuclear GeoforumiVolume waste may (EDWARDS, 421 18 Number 4/1987 be dumped 1986) in their back yards Although permanent disposal of HLW is not expected to begin for more than 20 years, a process for the review and evaluation of potential disposal sites has already been announced by the governments of Canada and Ontario This process involves three stages: a regulatory and environmental review, a full public hearing, and a decision by the Canadian and Ontario governments based on the recommendations and information from the previous stages The federal government has designated the Atomic Energy Control Board, which is responsible to the federal Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources, as the lead regulatory agency overseeing this process (RUMMERY et al., 1983) In contrast to the program to site an HLW repository, government agencies have paid less attention to strategies to dispose of LLW Currently, there are four temporary LLW storage sites - two on AECL-owned land and two on Ontario Hydro property (HARMON et af., 1984) While public hearings on waste disposal siting are not process was required by law, a formal approval initiated in 1978 by AECL and the Ontario Hydro Co-ordinating Committee Initiation of this process followed an incident in Madoc, Ontario over test drilling, where 1200 angry citizens crowded into a school auditorium to voice their disapproval and discontent (EDWARDS, 1982) In this approval process, AECL is required to disseminate literature regarding any testing to the local public and to brief local municipal councils, local media and other concerned local groups If field testing is proposed in unorganized territory, AECL is still required to seek the approval of the nearest municipal council Only upon the approval of the local municipal council can AECL submit a formal proposal for field research to the Co-ordinating Committee The Committee then reviews the proposal along with the comments of national and provincial Members of Parliament representing the area Initially, this process was very successful for AECL testing proposals; over 50 were accepted and none were rejected Subsequently, however, non-local anti-nuclear activists began to use the process to prevent further field testing The anti-nuclear activists emphasized to local councils that no local benefits could be derived from local testing Ultimately, their success led to the suspension of the local approval process in 1981 Along with the suspension came the announcement test-drilling sites had been selected approval would not be sought that two new and that local Nuclear waste disposal has also become politicized among the communities of Northern Ontario along the Canadian Shield In particular, dissent emphasizes the fact that Ontario Hydro, while operating nuclear power plants in the densely populated South, looks largely to the North, and potentially to Manitoba for potential nuclear waste repository sites (EDWARDS, 1986) Sweden Sweden has been a leader in political decision-making on nuclear power and radioactive waste management, The Nuclear Stipulation Act was passed by Parliament in April 1977 This Act prevented the fuel loading of new nuclear reactors unless the operator has shown how and where the spent fuel would be stored with absolute safety (ABRAHAMSON 1979) This condition had to be met whether or not the spent fuel was reprocessed The Stipulation Act was seen by opponents of nuclear power as a means of preventing new nuclear reactors from obtaining operating licenses In March 1980, a plurality of the Swedish electorate voted, following extensive political debate and a voter turnout of nearly 75%, to limit the nuclear power program to 12 units (BARNABY, 1980) All of these plants will be decommissioned by the year 2010 Soon after passage of the referendum, Parliament implemented the policies In the interim, the Stipulation Act was invoked by the utilities to justify completion and licensing of six nuclear reactors that were built between April 1977 and June 1984 The Stipulation Act was formally abolished on 12 December 1985, and critics have charged that the law was circumvented in reactor licensings (BJORKLUND, 1983, 1984) A new nuclear energy law took effect on February 1984 and relaxed the central government’s technological requirements for waste disposal Instead, the new law simply requires ongoing research by the utilities on an acceptable method for radioactive waste disposal With debate over new nuclear power reactors out of the way, the Swedish government has shifted its focus nuclear waste to management The main responsibility in this area has been given to the 477 -_ Svensk Karnbranslehantering AB, also known as the is unique in that it is situated (30 m keneath the Baltic Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management seabed and connected to the mainland by two IOt)O-m Company or SKB The SKB is a wh~)lly-o~?ne~~ tunnels The rock caverns and concrete silos in the subsidiary of the private and public electric utilities It SFR will be able to house YO,OOOm’of reactor wastes must applv to several state and local agencies fol by the year 2000 (SKB 1985) Radioactive waste in permits before the central government grants final the SFR may decline to harmless levels after 1000 approval for a waste disposal or storage site The in contrast much longer-lived years to the utilities hve iIlstituted several safety studies since radioactive isotopes to he buried in the SFL The SFR 1977 in accordance with the requirements of the site ensures a slow hydraulic gradient since it is below Stipulation Act The first such report, KRS-I was sea level, and the groundwater around the repository issued in December 1977 and was based on the site will be nearly stagnant (PETTERSON and assumption that Sweden would fullypursuc spent fuel HEDMAN, 1S-5) Yet the major strategic advantage rqrocessing (KAl~NE-BRANSI~E-SAK~RH~~- to the SKB from the facility may be that its offshore 197X: JOHANSSON and STEEN 1X1) Thcsecond location prevents a lo c a l government land use veto report, issued in 197X considered the disposal of unreprocessed spent fuel However, KRS-2 was Although the SKI3 is clearly the key decision-maker never accepted by the government, zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA and it was on radioactive waste managcmcnt, its chair is ~~pl3oillted by the central g(3v~rnnient and thus it replaced by KBS-3 in 19X3 The latter was used by the Its government to justify licensing the final two nuclear rcRects the current government’s policies management and staff arc comprised of scientific and reactors cngincering experts in the field of nuclear power Swden WCS ;I limited public hcaring l3roccss and Since the Swedish government decided against gov~rnnl~nt decisions cannot bc ~t~~lleI~g~~l in the further reprocessing of spent fuel in 19X5 the SKB courts Tht SKB uses technological and locational knows approximately how much radioactive waste criteria in its siting decisions with safety being one of must ultimately be disposed (Table I) The SKB several factors considered In addition, the SKB plans to store this waste for at last months at the circulatts its plans to government agcncics experts l3ower plants and then ship it to xl aw;ty-from-reuctt)r for rcvicw and other interested parties storage site at Sinipev~lrl3 near the Osk~lrsh~~r~~n and comtncntb The prime nhstaclc to siting decisions ih power station on the Baltic coast Also called CLAB this intcrmedlate storage facility, which opened on 1 the municipal council which has the right to veto any IuIy lOS5 is designed to store spent zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA fue l for 10 years niiljor land use project Pnrliament could though, if it was deemed to 13~‘ncccssary enact a spccinl law to Afterwards the spent fuel will hc encapsulated in this loc;tl lantl use veto pow\:“- cctrmxion-resistant copper and disposed nt 500 m preempt I?nvironmentaI and anti-nuclear group5 in Swccfen underground in a geologic respository (SKB, 1985: have focused their opposition on the KHS studies ANONYMOUS 19X5:1) although The SKB has been investigating IO sites for 2%HLW repository to be known as the SFL Half of the potentiar sites are in the Nclrth and half arc in the South closer to the nuclear plants (BLOWERS IYXAa) While core hole drillings at some of the sitcs began in 1977, ;I preferred site will not be chnscn until the end of the century It is then envisaged that the encapsulated spent fuel will bc emplaced in the crystalline rock, starting in 2020 (SKB 1985) The SKB is also building B repository for Sweden’s LLW and ILW reactor wastes, which not emit heat Most of this waste consists of filters and ion exchange resins that have been used for cleansing water systems in the power plants This repository, called SFR, has been under construction since I983 near the Forsmark nuclear power station Its first phase is scheduled to be operational in lY88 The SFR they ctemonstratitrnx waste disposal hnve also held llllIllcI-olIs at nuclear powcl- plants :tncl proposed sitcs (I~~(~l~KI.I!ND 108.3 10X(>) France has developed a11 aggressive policy of nuclear plant ~on~tructi~~n and reliance on nuclear power It has the second largest installed nuclear power capacity in the world after the ‘tJ.S., and it is ;I leader in the development and export of nuclear energy technology and services Government estimates show that 70% of France’s electricity l)r(3~lu~tiol~ comes from nuclear sources the highest such percentage in the world (U.S DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 1987) French program for management involves spent-fuel The radioactive reprocessing waste at La Geoforum/Volume 18 Number 4/1987 Hague and Marcoule, and short-run internal storage of HLW in engineered surface facilities followed by eventual disposal in suitable geological formations Currently, a surface facility for LLW and ILW is in operation at La Manche, near the La Hague reprocessing plant in northwestern France This facility’s capacity of 400,000 m3 of waste is expected to be reached by 1990 Consequently, the French CEA is actively searching for two additional LLW/ ILW sites A site at Soulaines (east of Paris) has already been selected, while the second site will be France either Indre or Vienne in southern (BARTHOUX and FAUSSAT, 1986) These facilities are scheduled to begin operating by 1990 Meanwhile, the CEA is planning a site for a deep geological laboratory to open by 1992 as a test and evaluation facility If in situ research there proves favorable, the site would be eventually converted to an LLW/ILW repository and a monitored retrievable storage facility for the vitrified HLW from the reprocessing plants (PAIGE and NUMARK, 1985) French democracy is highly centralized and has been so since the days of Napoleon This centralization is applicable to decisions concerning the location of nuclear waste disposal sites: the central government maintains the right to make unilateral siting decisions The regardless of local community attitudes conservative government of Giscard d’Estaing invoked this authority on several occasions, including the establishment of the La Hague site However, the socialist government of Mitterrand, elected in 1981, has relaxed this policy with the intent of increasing the voice of locally elected officials in siting decisions two agencies are involved in siting: In France, research and development concerning the closing of the fuel cycle is handled by the Compagnie G&&ale des Mat&es Nucleaires (COGEMA), while longterm waste management is undertaken by the Agence Nationale pour la Gestion des Dechets Radioactifs (ANDRA) Most of the components of the nuclear fuel cycle in France are owned by the state COGEMA is currently active in vitrification of HLW, and its operations currently include the development of two vitrification facilities at La Hague (DAMET-IE et uf., 1985) The functions of ANDRA include the location, construction and management of long-term waste disposal sites Applications for facilities throughout the nuclear fuel cycle, including nuclear waste management facilities, must be submitted through ANDRA to the Ministry of Industry, an executive 423 branch of the French Government During the early 1980s ANDRA completed a national inventory of potential sites for the deep geological laboratory, examining both sedimentary and hard rocks The most important criteria considered in the national inventory were technological, including long-term stability, low permeability, and nuclide retention (BARTHOUX, 198.5) Approximately 30 sites were included on this inventory, and ANDRA intends to select a single site by late 1987 Although the central government retains ultimate jurisdiction over siting, the French legal procedure requires the solicitation of input from local officials The selection of new disposal or reactor sites requires formal application to the central government, which details potential technological and locational impacts The Minister of Industry gives the application to the Prtfet of the completed Department, or local government unit, in which the proposed facility is to be located It should be noted, however, that the Prefet is a central government appointee rather than a locally elected official The Prefet then appoints a Commission of Inquiry (Commissaire enqueteur), which is responsible for public notification of the proposed project The public is permitted to examine the application and record observations and questions on an official register The Prefet then reviews this register and submits it, along with his/her recommendation, to the Ministry of Industry While the proposed project is undergoing public scrutiny as indicated above, the Minister of Industry must also solicit approval of the proposed project on technical and public safety grounds The CEA must undertake an analysis of its technological impacts while the Ministry of Public Health examines potential safety hazards The project cannot be constructed without approval of the Ministry of Public Health Once this approval has been secured, the Minister of Industry and the Prime Minister sign a decree authorizing the installation and defining any special requirements with which the operator must comply in order to operate the facility The court system in France, while it has heard cases involving local objections to nuclear power projects, has tended to rule in favor of the ‘public’ or government interest, which is generally on the side of nuclear plant construction (DEESE, 1982) This is consistent with the fact that French law, based on the Napoleonic Code and Roman law in contrast to the Anglo-American legal tradition, places the public 324 interest France’s grounds courts countries, reliance ~coforum/Volume above private interests Thus, challenges to pro-nuclear siting policy on procedural have generally gone unheeded in French In France, unlike many other European both major politica parties favor increased on nuclear power West Germany West Germany has embraced nuclear power as a source of energy in varying degrees since the 1960s During that decade and in the early 197&, West Germany was a strong advocate of nuclear power and a leader in the construction and export of nuclear technology However, the socialist-oriented governments of Willy Brandt and ~IelrnLit Schmidt during the late 1970s were somewhat less supportive of nuclear power especially in light of the formation of the small but influential anti-nuclear Green Party (CARTER, 1987) Recently, the mare conservative government headed by Helmut Kohl has again increased its support for nuclear power, although support is again wavering in light of the Chernobyl disaster in early 1986 In contrast to France West Germany is a more locally-oriented, decentralized system of government Review of nuclear waste siting proposals occurs at national state and local levels, and care is taken to manage and avoid locational conflict at each level Recently the government of West Germany made a decision to use dry-storage casks for highly radioactive wastes as opposed to wet pools The fact that dry-storage casks are mobile and easily transported is thought to reduce public opposition to the construction of a nuclear waste disposal facility reprocessing elsewhere be undertaken at 18 Num zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgf he r 411O H7 smaller plants Recently, the community of Schwansdorf/ Wackersdorf in Bavaria has emerged as a potential site for a reprocessing piant As in several communities in the American West, local opposition to siting has been overshadowed by several considerations inducing large numbers of local residents to support siting Several reasons, including the enthusiastic support of the state’s Premier, high unemployment, the potential of obtaining low-cost power from nuclear sources and general acceptance of safety considerations as prepared by the German Company for the Reprocessing of Nuclear Fuels (DWK) have been advanced to explain local support for a reprocessing plant siting in this area (PAIGE and NUMARK 1985), The Gorleben site which is expected to rcccivc 33,000 drums of LL.W and ILW and 2300 canisters of HLW annually, was one of 26 usable salt domes which had been considered on the basis of geological criteria for preliminary study as potential sites Political opposition to siting at Gorlehen, once widespread has diminished in recent years in the light of potential economic benefits and the government’s excellent nuclear safety record (PAIGE and NUMARK, 1985) N~~nethcless, other sites such as Ahaus and the Asse salt mine (a formci LLW/ILW storage site) have been considered as backups to Gorleben Gorleben Ahaus and Wackersdorf are planned to be used as away-fromreactor storage sit6 for spent fuel awaiting reprocessing Authority forwaste management in West Germany is Currently two repositories are being zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA b uilt in West split between the utilities as represented hy the Germany The first is a LLW facility proposed at the DWK, which is responsible for all waste management site of the inactive Konrad iron ore mine near activities up to the point of final disposal, and the Salzgitter The second is a unique repository to be federal government which is responsible for final built for all levels of radioactive waste at Gorleben, disposal The nuclear fuel cycle in West Germany is where a deep salt dome wo uld be used for disposal primarily in private ownership, with some (MALTING et al 1985) The Konrad repository components including fuel fabrication and utility could be ready by 1989, while completion of the management and reprocessing in joint state and Gorleben repository is scheduled for 1998 The private ownership The Physikalisch-Technischc Gorleben site was originally planned as a complete Bundcsanstalt, a national scientific and engineering spent fuel recycling and waste management center, laboratory under the auspices of the Ministry for including interim spent fuel storage, reprocessing, Economic Affairs, has the responsibility for uranium and plutonium conversion and storage, and permanent repository siting decisions Its authority disposal of solidified waste Political considerations, includes research and development experimental however, induced the government of Lower Saxony investig~~ti~~n and licensing waste repository sites (where Gorleben is located) to advocate that proposed by the DWK (REUSE, 1982) Initial project proposals must first be submitted along with technical and safety reviews to the local town or district councii in which the faciiity is to be located All members of the state and local governments involved in the siting process are elected by the public The local council may agree or disagree with the proposal, but must state a valid reason for rejecting a proposed project Once agreement at the local level has been obtained, a formal review of the proposed project is conducted at the regional, state and federal or national tevef The federal review emphasizes technicai considerations, while the statelevel review emphasizes specific external effects, both positive and negative, that may occur following facility constructi(~~~ Independent experts chosen from among the regionaf Technical Inspectorate or the Company for Reactor Safety, which are licensed private consulting firms under government supervision, are invited to participate in the review process Public hearings are convened, and the experts form a panel which makes a recommendation on the suitability of the proposed project Following the r~comn~~ndation of the experts, the state licensing authority makes a decision about the project, basing its decision on the conclusions drawn from the pr~~ceedings Either proponents or opponents may appeal against the decision through the court system Although German law grants the federal government the right to overrule the state’s decision, in practice this has never happened Both the West German commitment to nuciear power and the procedures used to site nuclear facilities have varied substantially during the past two decades, primarily in accordance with the domestic political situation In contrast to France, where all major political parties support nuclear power, the more left-wing parties in Germany have been rather skeptical of reliance on nuclear power as a fuel source In particutar, the Green Party, whose platform is based on ~nvironmentaiism and opposition to nuclear plant construction, has had considerable impact on German nuclear energy policy despite its small size Although the influence of the Green Party dwindled during the early 198Qs, its influence has begun to revive in light of the Chernobyl nuclear accident in April 1986, suggesting the likelihood that the rate of increase in nuclear plant construction may slow down in the years ahead (ALBRIGHT, 1986) capacity, the United Kingdom’s nuclear program has a strong international presence resulting from the government’s commitment to a nuclear future, a leadership role in breeder reactor research, the present and planned expansion of reprocessing facilities capable of servicing several countries, an active interest in importing foreign reactor design, and several multinational agreements on radioactive waste disposal (HEATH, 1985) Radio~~ctive waste management in the U.K is influenced by several considerations First, the relative small land area and high population density of the country implies difficulties in selecting isolated sites As a point of comparison, the entire U.K is about the same size as Nevada in the U.S., but with about 90 times the population Inevitaby, the U.K will have a more difficult time siting waste repositories than larger countries such as the U.S., Canada or the U.S.S.R Another aspect affecting nuclear waste disposal in the U.K is the importance of military waste Public discussions of the nuclear waste issue in the U.K include both military and civilian waste, both of which are reprocessed The mihtary component will influence site selection because of a variety of special requirements associated with military waste For example, greater weighting to coastal sites would be a likely suggestion to deal most conveniently with waste from submarines Another factor affecting radioactive waste management in the U.K is the nature of the utility industry The U.K has national utilities in the form of the Central Electricity Gcne~ting Board (CEGB), which serves England and Wales, and the South of Scotland Electricity Generating Board Both of these utilities have direct g~~vernment linkages These and other features of the U.K nuclear waste situation tend to produce a centralized and isoiated atmosphere within which to develap waste disposal policy This atmosphere pfaces the U.K between France and the U.S in terms of public contribution in the poiicy-making framework Even within such a relatively tight context of decision-making, the government receives advice from several bodies, The Nuclear Industry Radioactive Waste Executive (NIREX), formed in 1982, is responsible for imptementing waste disposal policy for LLW and ILW The Department of u K Environment (DOE) develops waste management Despite zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA its modest nuclear power generating strategy and coordinates waste management research 476 and development, while the Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee and the British Geological Survey (BGS) advice the government on waste management The reconlmendations and decisions made by these organizations have produced a waste disposal policy history marked by many changes in acceptable approaches and timing (BLOWERS and LOWRY, 19X7) Public interest and involvement in nuclear-related issues has increased markedly in Britain in the past decade, especially since the publication of two reports in the mid-1970s The first was the sixth report of the British Royal Comtnission on Environmental P~~tlution chaired by Sir Brian (later Lord) Flowers (FLOWERS, 1976) Known today as the ‘Flowers Report,’ it stressed concern for storing HLW and warned against a large-scale nuclear power plant c~)r~~n~it~lerlt if safety could not be proven beyond ail reasonable doubt (FERNIE, 1980) Less than a year la&r the Windscatc Inquiry (PARKER, 1978) the discharge of low-levei c~~ncIude~~ that radioactivity from the Windscale reprocessing plant (now known as Sellafield) should be considered a serious health hazard (PA’ITERSON, 19X3) H~nccforth, the issue of nuclear power was polarized as never before, and interpretation of the word ‘reasonable’ in the Ftowers Report has often surfaced in discussions of nuclear waste which the repositorv lies, not simply the particular rock formation: “This approach reduces the emphasis on the properties of the rock unit that actually contains the waste The new approach also enables us to select areas with varied a nd m ixe d rock formations By looking at the total environment, a wide variety of rock formations that we previously would not have considered become suitable” (CHAPMAN a nd McEWEN, 1986, p 39) Waste site proposals made by NIREX, the DOE and the BGS may be sent to the local authority under the Town and Country Planning Act Although the local authority may veto the proposed site, the central g(~vernmcnt retains the legal authority to override local siting vetoes following a public inquiry (PAIGE and NUMARK, 1985) All appeals arc heard at the ministcriai level and may also involve Parliament (Resp~~nsibility for waste rn~~n~~gerncI~t in Scotland Wales and Northern Ireland rests with the Secretaries of State for these areax.) If planning permission is granted by the central gov~rnrncI~t or by the local authority, the applicant may then appty for :I construction permit A nuctcar site tic c nsc the n approves the design for the site specified III October, 1983, two sites for LLWIILW disposal were proposed hv the DoE One xite was an ~ii~~~rld(~~lc~ianhydl’itc mine about 300 m deep at Billingllarn in Cleveland This site owned by ;I Two of the recent policy changes have been with chemical company willing to turn it over to the regard to HLW and acccptabte geological conditions government, couid accommodate about 375.000 m’ The governnlcnt has decided to defer fmai decisions of ILW The se c o nd site , Elsto w, is o wne d b y the on the disposition of HLW and ILW for up to SO CEGB (which is one of the partners in NIREX) and covers about 450 acres near Bedford It wax years, and effort is now being concentrated on LLW There arc three principal zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA re a so ns for this recent envisioned for shallow burial of about 50,000 m3 by the year 2000 and would cxtcnd the lift of the Drigg decision First, the large present and anticip~~ted volume of LLW is perceived as a more immediate site problem than that of HLW, which is currently stored The decision proccdurc used to select these sites was at the SelIa~etd and Dounrey reprocessing plants vague and administrative rather than political It has Second, since the U.K stopped ocean dumping been argued that it was based mostly on convenience (which it also conducted for Belgium Switzerland acceptability rather than public and The Netherlands) in the northeast Atlantic zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFED Ocean and assumed consultation (FERNIE and OPENSHAW, I’#%%~.b; after 1982, it is forced to rciy on its limited shallow BLOWERS and LOWRY, 1987) However public land burial space at the Drigg site near Sellafield Third, there is a desire to have another LLW site in dissatisfaction with the procedure, associated with an increased public interest and involvement in nucfcar vast quantities of reactor place before energy matters, led to the aband~~nment of the ~~ecomm~ssioning waste come into the disposal Billingham site Government responded to the Stream abandonment of Billin~lla~l and growing public inv~~iv~ment in nucicar matters by addingsever~~l new The second major change affects the nature of sites for active consideration for LLW disposal only acceptable geology The entire geological setting of (ANONYMOUS, 19XOa) Three additional sites potential sites must now be considered as a whole, were considered in ic)Xh-1987 for me repository to including the overall hydrogeological environment in GeoforumiVolume 1XNumber 40987 427 nuclear power and waste management after be completed by the late 1990s A public inquiry on consulting with the JAEC, the PNC, the Nuclear the issue was to be held in 1988 These potential sites Safety Commission (NSC), the Japan Atomic Energy included South Killingholme, Humberside, a disused airfield at Fulbeck, Lincolnshire, land near the Research Institute, and other organizations (HARMON et al., 1986) The MIT1 has licensing Bradwell nuclear power station in Essex, and also the authority in cooperation with the JAEC, NSC and zyxwvutsr Elstow site It had been suggested, however, that these additional sites were proposed to placate public STA opinion rather than serve as viable alternatives to Elstow (FERNIE and OPENSHAW, 1986b; The Japanese government is continuing to promote BLOWERS, 1986b) Next, following intense public vigorously the use of nuclear power to reduce its opposition at all four proposed LLW sites, NIREX reliance on imported petroleum Nuclear power, in dropped the sites from consideration in May 1987 fact, surpassed petroleum in fiscal 1985 by providing (OAKLEY, 1987) The whole radioactive waste issue zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIH 26% of the nation’s electricity supply The MIT1 in the U.K thus remains shrouded in political wants to expand Japan’s nuclear power generating uncertainty zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA capacity more than fivefold during the next 45 years (MITI, 1986) Japan has also decided to pursue spent fuel reprocessing, as have France, West Germany Japan and the U.K A commercial reprocessing plant is Japan has been slow in confronting its radioactive planned for Rokkasho-mura in the northern part of waste management problems, partly because until the island of Honshu by 1995 In addition, a LLW the mid-1980s it had expected to rely on ocean repository using shallow land burial (following disposal (VAN DYKE et al., 1984; SOLOMON, cementation of the waste) is to be built at the same 1987) Passage of a resolution at the September 1985 site along with other nuclear fuel cycle projects meeting of the London Dumping Convention banned (JAEC, 1985) In the meantime, LLW is stored at ocean dumping of nuclear wastes indefinitely, nuclear power plant sites, where waste volume effectively ruling out this option for Japan Shifting to reduction and stabilization is promoted HLW land disposal of radioactive wastes, the Japanese Diet including reprocessed waste to be returned from amended the Law for the Regulation of Nuclear France and the United Kingdom in 1990 is to be Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors stored for 30-50 years by the PNC following in May 1986 This action followed the vitri~~ation; an ultimate deep geologic repository will recommendations made in the report of the Japan not be ready until about 2020 (HARMON er al., Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) on ‘Measures 1984) for Treatment and Disposal of Radioactive Waste,’ which was approved in October 1985 (AMANUMA, In July 1984, The Federation of Electric Power 1985) In essence, the report focuses on the Companies asked the Government of Aomori responsibilities for both LLW and HLW storage and Prefecture and the Town of Rokkasho-mura to site disposal, although it does not formally establish siting the LLW plant to be built and operated by the JNFI procedures The local government acceded to the development plans in early 1985 Contracts were signed in April A plethora of organizations share jurisdiction over 1985 to start construction in 1988 for a planned nuclear waste management A private entity, the operating date perhaps in the early 1990s Japan Nuclear Fuel Industries Company (JNFI), is in (JOHNSTONE, 1985; JAEC 1985) charge of treatment and disposal of LLW The JNFI works for the Federation of Electric Power In September 1985, the PNC proposed to construct a Companies Another private actor, the Japan HLW storage facility at the Town of Horonobe on Nuclear Fuel Service Company (JNFS), is Hokkaido (ANONYMOUS, 198Sb; SOLOMON, responsible for the custody and management of 1987) The proposed plant would receive HLW to be HLW The JNFS represents the central government’s shipped back from Europe, as well as domestically Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development generated wastes, and would be operational by 1992 Corporation (PNC), which selects sites for HLW Other wastes would be received from the vitrification storage and disposal (ANONYMOUS, 1986b) In plants planned in Japan, such as the PNC’s pilot plant addition, the Science and Technology Agency (STA) under construction at Tokai-mura This pilot plant is and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry to be completed by 1990, and facilities are planned for (MITI) set the central government’s policies on emplacing nuclear waste canisters in storage pit 428 vaults Another pilot plant for reprocessing has been operating at Tokai-mura since September I977 (FUKUDA rf ui., 1984) industrial democracies under study in this paper has chosen an HLW disposal site The U.S has chosen three potential sites; the others have yet to select their sites although most hope to have the sites in operation The PNC and the Federation of Electric Power by 2020 LLW/II_W situ selection has progressed Companies are the decision-makers who arc more rapidly: disposal facilities arc already in responsible for siting the waste repositories The operation in the U.S k-rance and the U.K and zyxwvutsrqponml under personnel of these agencies are primarily scientific ct~iistrllcti~~n in Japan Wtst ~~crl~i~~ii~ and Swcdcn and engineering experts Siting procedures in Japan However construction and operation in several in contrast to the West, are fairly informal, and the countries has been delayed pending the resolution of siting authorities will consult with zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA va rio us lo c a l locational conflicts involving site selection officials A resolution is usually passed by a local council to invite the siting entity to ‘officially Several factors appear- to inlluencc siting decisions investigate the site and conduct environmental involving radioactive waste disposal Perhaps most assessments If the local officials resist, negotiations obvious is the availability of remote and sparsclq take place that usually lead to tinancial inccntivcs and populated areas Not surprisingly actual and eventual reconciliation The MIT1 a d NSC will then potentiai hitcs in thi: U.S C’anadit and Swcdcn arc hold public hearings at the site to explain the plan, found in remote rural arcas where safety risk5 to emphasizing its environmental, health and safety large num b e rs of pcoplc arc absent a nd whcrc the aspects The government’s concern over potential political clout associated with large populations is opposition to its waste sites can he seen from the lacking In those countries where remote disposal is location of its most recent proposed sites at fcasihlc locational conflict tends to focus on thcsc fictkkasho-tnur~l and Horonohc which arc both in rural areas, with emphasis on rendering the t’acilitics remote sparsely populated arcas in the North aeccptable to the local population on safety, economic and environmental grounds As such a t- c a s Siting conflicts have frequently arisen over the arc characterized by highly dcpcndent, rcsourccradioactive waste facilities proposed in Japan For based economics, cst~ll~lishn~eIit of local zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfe ~lccept~tbiiit~ instance ~~,O~)Opeople signed a petiti(~n to block the is often facilitated because the population ma>’ have repository at Rokkasho-mura The petition was had previous e xpc ric nc e with dio a c tivity a nd intended to result in a referendum by the local assembly on the matter Many local opponents of nuclear power in Japan claim that their opinions are ignored in public hearings as well (JOHNSTON~ I%??) Since the petition drive failed the Tomari Fisherie> Association sailed 30 fishing boats to obstruct cnvironmcntal asscssmcnt5 offshore r,f Aomori (ANONYMOlJS, 19Xhc) Similar (~~)positi~~~i exists at Horonobc (JOHNSTON~ 1985) Governor Yokomichi twice refused to grant the PNC permission to conduct preliminary environmental assessments at the proposed site in late 1985 About 40 protesters also tried to prevent the site survey, and political groups have been divided over the advisibility of the project (ANONYMOUS, 198%) Japan, like its Western counterparts, is experiencing an increasingly intense degree of locational conflict over radioactive waste disposal siting Conclusions At present, nuclear waste disposal siting is in its infancy (Table 2) Only West Germany of the seven b e c uuse fe w a nd rc vc nuc s ta x a lte rna tive s a rt‘ fo r prc sc nt e m plo ym e nt ‘The m o re inc o m e de nse ly populated nations elf Western Europe and Japan lack the option of disposal in remote and sparsely populated areas, although both the Rokkasho-mura site in Japan and the Gorleben and Konrad sites in West Germany arc in areas of sparse population relative to national norms Comparison of the siting procedures rcvcals considerable contrast among the countries; in many casts the procedures are reflective of the underlying philosophies of democracy in each country Thus, the decision-making procedures in the decentralized federal systems characteristic of the U.S., West Germany and Canada afford considerable autonomy to state, provincial and locat governments On the other hand, France and Japan are highly centralized nations and relatively little opportunity is afforded to local governments and populations to participate directly in siting decisions Japan’s relatively informal siting procedures also reflect the close relationship between govern~ient and industry characteristic of that nation Geoforum/Volume 429 18 Number 4/1987 Table Radioactive waste disposal sites by country Country U.S France LLWiILW sites Operating date South Carolina,* Washington and Nevada HLW site Operating date Existing Other sites to be chosen by regional compacts 1993 La Manche Soulaines Indre or Vienne Existing 1990 1990 Nevada, Washington or Texas Undecided 2003 - Rokkasho-mura 1993 Unknown 2020 West Germany Konrad and Gorleben 1989 1998 Gorleben 1998 Canada Undecided - Ontario or Manitoba 2020 U.K Drigg Undecided Existing - Unknown Forsmark 1988 Undecided Japan Sweden 2020 *The South Carolina site is scheduled to be closed by 1993 and replaced by a site in North Carolina, while the Nevada site is to be replaced by one in Colorado Philosophies of democratic decision-making reflected in the role of technical experts are also in siting decisions The more centralized democracies including France and Sweden rely most heavily on the testimony of scientists and engineers in siting decisions Elsewhere, considerable conflict over the role of techical experts is evident: in both the U.K and Canada, for example, the government tends to waste regard disposal as a technical and administrative problem while the public regards it as a more explicitly political and locational issue Undoubtedly, conflict over the siting of radioactive wastes will increase in intensity in the coming years The fact that the siting procedures themselves have been subjected in most countries to judicial scrutiny indicates the importance of the procedures to conflict outcomes Although it has been argued that centralized procedures and structures are most effective in resolving conflicts involving radioactive waste disposal, in fact those countries which have achieved the most progress in determining the sites and resolving conflicts have been those which have combined decentralization with coordination at both central and local levels Indeed, it is likely that West Germany has achieved the most progress toward permanent disposal, and West Germany has carefully integrated local and national decision-making to placate opposition and alleviate conflict It is increasingly likely that international agreements will be formulated to overcome disposal problems Some such agreements are already in place; for example, the agreement among France, the U.K., West Germany and Japan to reprocess spent fuel Recently, negotiations between China and several European nations have begun to explore the possibility of storage in remote areas of western China (PERERA, 1985) 430 Although progress has been made, uncertainty BLOWERS, A and LOWRY, D (19X7) Out of sight, oui of mind: the politics of nuclear waste in the United regarding the potential dangers associated with Kingdom In : Nrrcicw~ J’o~~w it! C’risis: folith ~md zyxwvutsr radioactive wastes will continue to pervade the f’li4r~t~in~jitr thr Nrrcfcwr Sfcitc, pp I X I hi, A Blowcr5 conflict resolution process It is unlikely that and D Pepper (Eds)