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This article was downloaded by: [IAO-ENS Lettres & Sciences Humaines] On: 24 June 2009 Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 906455537] Publisher Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Critical Asian Studies Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713695955 HIGHLANDERS ON THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL Vatthana Pholsena Online Publication Date: 01 September 2008 To cite this Article Pholsena, Vatthana(2008)'HIGHLANDERS ON THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL',Critical Asian Studies,40:3,445 — 474 To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/14672710802274151 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14672710802274151 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material Critical Asian Studies Downloaded By: [IAO-ENS Lettres & Sciences Humaines] At: 17:02 24 June 2009 Pholsena / Ho Chi Minh Trail 40:3 (2008), 445–474 HIGHLANDERS ON THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL Representations and Narratives Vatthana Pholsena ABSTRACT: The history of the hinterlands of the Indochinese peninsula, astride the frontier between Laos and Vietnam, during the first and second Indochina wars (1946–75) is arguably the least informed of this turbulent period The aftermath of World War II saw the establishment of revolutionary bases at the junction between southeastern Laos and central and southern central Vietnam in highly strategic areas that were conduits for the “Ho Chi Minh Trail.” This article aims to go beyond conventional diplomatic and military histories of the Indochina wars to examine war from below In particular, the second half of the article is constructed around the narratives of two female war veterans of ethnic minority origins who conducted most of their revolutionary activities during the Vietnam War along the Ho Chi Minh Trail Particular attention is given to their motivations and wartime lives, linked to their transformation from members of upland populations who not long ago were described as “savages” into “revolutionaries” and “patriots.” Introduction The process of transformation of the upland peoples living in the hinterlands of the Indochinese peninsula (covering southeastern Laos, northeastern Cambo1 dia, and Vietnam’s central southern highlands ) into “revolutionaries” and “socialist men” (and women) during the Indochina wars provides the overall theme of this article In guerrilla warfare, the Vietnamese revolutionaries regarded the support of the local population — in this case, highlanders from southeastern Laos and the mountains of central-southern Vietnam — as essential During the Indochina conflicts, these highland peoples were targeted as much by the Vietnamese and Lao revolutionaries as by the French and, later on, ISSN 1467-2715 print/1472-6033 online / 03 / 000445–30 ©2008 BCAS, Inc DOI: 10.1080/14672710802274151 Downloaded By: [IAO-ENS Lettres & Sciences Humaines] At: 17:02 24 June 2009 the Americans All the belligerents saw the mountain areas of central and southwestern Vietnam as of crucial strategic importance, as we shall see below Of equal importance to the communist guerrillas (both Vietnamese and Lao) and the Western powers was the region of southeastern Laos, which became a Viet Minh stronghold during the First Indochina War and, beginning in the early 1960s, the conduit for the “Ho Chi Minh Trail,” also known as Duong Mon Truong Son (hereafter the “Trail”) This article aims to go beyond conventional diplomatic and military histories of the Vietnam wars to examine war from below It is concerned with how people were shaped by their wartime experiences To understand such processes, it is first necessary to explain the strategic significance of the highlands and the role of ethnic minorities during the wars on the communist side, in conjunction with the Viet Minh’s ethnic policy I will then focus in the second half of the article on the narratives of two female war veterans of ethnic minority origins who conducted most of their revolutionary activities during the Second Indochina War in southeastern Laos along the Trail From “Stone Age Savages” to “Modern Revolutionaries”: Winning the Highlanders’ Support There are two main upland minority areas in Vietnam: one is in the north and northwest of the country, where the highlands are dominated by various Taispeaking populations, along with Hmong, Yao, and Mon-Khmer ethnic groups Most of these peoples, except for the Mon-Khmer, came from China and in that sense are not considered as indigenous minorities The upland peoples of the Annamite Chain and the Central Highlands, classified as Austronesian or Austro-Asiatic speakers, are commonly acknowledged to be the first inhabitants of the mountainous regions of central and southwestern Vietnam that constitute the country’s second main ethnic minority area The largest groups are the Jarai, Ede (also known as Rhade), Bahnar (Bana), Sedang (Xodang), Hre, Koho, Raglai, Mnong, Stieng, and Bru-Van Kieu.4 The Jarai, Ede, and Raglai are members of the Austronesian language family; the Bahnar, Sedang, Hre, Koho, Mnong, Stieng, and Bru-Van Kieu peoples belong to the Austro-Asiatic language family, like the ethnic Vietnamese (Kinh or Viet) Most Bahnar and Sedang can be found in Kontum Province; the Jarai dominate Gia Lai Province; the Ede and Mnong are concentrated in Dac Lac Province; and many Koho and Bru-Van Kieu live in Lam Dong and Quang Tri, respectively.5 446 Known as the Annamite Chain in English and Truong Son in Vietnamese and the high plateaus of southern Vietnam (the Central Highlands in English and Tay Nguyen in Vietnamese) The League for the Independence of Vietnam (Viet Nam Doc lap Dong Minh, or Viet Minh) was founded in May 1941 “Truong Son Route,” indicating its geographic location in the Truong Son mountains that form the natural border between Vietnam and Laos Christie 2000, 94; Langer and Zasloff 1970, 37 An Independent WriteNet Researcher 2002, Critical Asian Studies 40:3 (2008) Downloaded By: [IAO-ENS Lettres & Sciences Humaines] At: 17:02 24 June 2009 In Laos, the ethnic Lao, who are the politically and economically dominant group (though they not constitute an overwhelming majority), live mainly in the lowlands Other lowland areas are inhabited by ethnic groups who speak a variety of Tai-Kadai languages Tibeto-Burman speakers arrived recently from southwest China, while the Hmong-Mien (Miao-Yao) peoples, also recent arrivals, came from southern and southeastern China These latter two families are confined primarily to highland areas in the northern provinces Members of the Austro-Asiatic language family are found throughout the country in both upland and lowland rural environments Southeastern Laos — comprising the eastern districts of Khammouane, Savannakhet, and Saravane provinces, the whole Sekong and Attopeu provinces, as well as the Bolovens plateau located in the east of Champassak Province — are by and large populated by Mon-Khmer (a sub-branch of the Austro-Asiatic family) language speakers With the exception of the Katang and the Makong (called Bru-Van Kieu in Vietnam), none of these ethnic groups numbers more than ten thousand people, though ethnic minority peoples constitute the majority of the population in Sekong (Katu, Triang, and Arak) and Attopeu (Oy and Brau/Brao) provinces.6 When the Franco–Viet Minh war erupted in December 1946, as returning French forces sought to reestablish control, the Vietnamese communists, following a protracted warfare strategy, intensified their efforts to win support in the highlands, the rugged terrain of which provided the ideal setting for launching their attacks against the French forces posted in the mountain valleys, and then, retreating to relatively safe areas In the same period, they began to pay consideration to the development of bases on the other side of their border However, many subgroups such as the Sre, Nop, Chil, and Lat have been lumped together into one ethnic group or misclassified under one heading, and therefore have lost their visibility and cultural recognition through this homogenization process Goudineau 2003, 14–15 McAlister 1967, 792 Important battles of the Indochina wars were fought in the highlands of southeastern Laos, as well as in northern and central southern Vietnam, with all sides — the French, the Americans, the Viet Minh, and the Pathet Lao — recruiting highland peoples for their troops Confronted with communist guerrilla warfare, the French and later the Americans found themselves resorting to unconventional warfare strategy By 1952, the French had created a network of guerrilla units from the Central Highlands to the Tai region in the north, called the Groupement de Commandos Mixtes Aéroportés (GCMA) and led by French officers (Christie 2000, 93) Ten years on, in a strikingly similar fashion, the Americans developed their own patron-client relationship with the Montagnards In the early 1960s, faced with the necessity of defending South Vietnam against communist infiltration from Laos and burdened by ineffective South Vietnamese Special Forces, the U.S Special Forces under CIA control organized a so-called Village Defense Program in the Central Highlands, later known as Citizens’ Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) (Salemink 2003, 180 and 199–200) Eventually, “[f]aced with the inability of either Lao or Vietnamese pro-Western nationalism to build an effective bastion against communism in the region,” the Americans built up a “shield” along the Annamite Chain and in the Central Highlands consisting of members of minority groups from Pholsena / Ho Chi Minh Trail 447 Downloaded By: [IAO-ENS Lettres & Sciences Humaines] At: 17:02 24 June 2009 The Viet Minh had several reasons for intensifying their efforts to build up military forces and revolutionary bases in Laos (as well as in Cambodia) First, in developing close military and political collaboration with the local communist movement in southeastern Laos, the Viet Minh were creating a buffer zone to protect their western flank from attacks from the French troops and to enable their troops to freely intervene in Laos The Viet Minh therefore started to actively recruit new members along the western border of Vietnam, especially among nationalist-oriented resistance groups.9 Several disparate, small, and uncoordinated anti-French resistance groups operated in the mountains of southeastern Laos in those years What they soon had in common was their dependence on Viet Minh support In some cases, this assistance took the form of rice, salt, money, arms, and ammunition In others, Vietnamese advisers attached 10 themselves to the Lao or the highlanders Second, as in Cambodia, the Demo11 cratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) considered it essential that the communist movement expand its membership in Laos and train local cadres so they could lead the struggle side by side with the Vietnamese, thus carrying out a genuine 12 Indochinese revolution By supporting anticolonial movements in Laos, therefore, not only did the Viet Minh contribute to the larger independence struggle in the region, but they also gained access to and control of safe territorial bases, communication networks, and logistical corridors through which external as13 sistance could flow Indeed, Laos bordered 1,300 miles of highly permeable Vietnamese frontier, and later on, provided the best route for reaching southern Vietnam and avoiding the political problems involved in infiltrating directly through the DMZ (Demilitarized Zone) that divided the country in two in 14 1954 Until the fall of Saigon in April 1975, the safety of, and access to, these 10 11 12 13 448 the Hmong in the Plain of Jars (northeastern Laos) to the Khmer Krom in western Cochinchina (Christie 2000, 105) Rathie 1996, 31; Deuve 1999, 248 Langer and Zasloff 1970, 38 On September 1945, Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the independence of Vietnam However, the Vietnamese did not pay much consideration to the development of revolutionary bases in Laos and Cambodia before World War II Despite the leadership role of the Vietnamese communists in the anticolonial war against the French, it seemed that Ho Chi Minh was a reluctant participant in the Soviets’ federative project For him, the space for revolutionary struggle was to be restricted to Vietnam’s modern frontiers He considered French Indochina’s geographical boundaries unsuitable for carrying out revolutionary activities that were essentially guided by a nationalism of Vietnamese essence The return of the French forced the Vietnamese to change their approach See Goscha 1995, 13–46 Furthermore, northeastern Thailand was no longer a viable option as a base for communist activities due to Phibun’s increasingly anticommunist policies A coup d’état in November 1947 in Bangkok ousted the government of Pridi Phanomyong and his Seri Thai allies from power The rise to power of Phibun Songkram, the new strongman of Thailand, heralded the beginning of the end for communist support networks in Thailand, although it took two more major events before the Vietnamese reoriented their war operations eastward, namely, the rapidly increasing U.S involvement in Thailand and the Chinese Communist victory of 1949 For more details on the Vietnamese Communists’ military strategy and operations at the regional level in Laos and Cambodia during that period, see Goscha 2003 Critical Asian Studies 40:3 (2008) Downloaded By: [IAO-ENS Lettres & Sciences Humaines] At: 17:02 24 June 2009 Sculpture, Army Museum, Vientiane, Laos, March 2007 “The history of the hinterlands of the Indochinese peninsula, astride the frontier between Laos and Vietnam, during the first and second Indochina wars (1946–75) is arguably the least informed of this turbulent period.” (Credit: all photographs by author unless otherwise noted.) rear areas in Laos (as well as in Cambodia) in effect remained a constant imperative: (French) Indochina space became “a strategic unity, a single military thea15 tre of operations,” in General Vo Nguyen Giap’s own words Once highlander support was secured, it was active, and often crucial, in the 16 mountain areas David Marr argues that during the First Indochina war, “without the active involvement of some of them [the highland minority peoples], [Ho Chi Minh’s] plan to create and defend one or more liberated zones in the 17 mountains was doomed to failure.” Several scholars have described the role of the thousands of highlander cadres, veterans of the anti-French struggle, who, 14 15 16 17 The Vietnamese Demilitarized Zone was established as a dividing line between North and South Vietnam as a result of the First Indochina War (1946–1954) The th Geneva Conference on 21 July 1954, recognized the 17 parallel as a “provisional military demarcation line” temporarily dividing the country into a communist zone in the north and a noncommunist zone in the south Porter 1981, 88 My point is not to argue that the participation of highlanders in the war effort was the key factor in the communists’ final victory, either during the Franco–Viet Minh war or in the North Vietnamese–American conflict (Grant Evans, for instance, has played down the significance of the ethnic minority factor in the buildup of the revolutionary forces in Laos and the latter’s ultimate victory Unfortunately, he does not develop his argument [Evans 2002, 134].) Their role, nonetheless, should not be underestimated Marr 1981, 403 Pholsena / Ho Chi Minh Trail 449 Downloaded By: [IAO-ENS Lettres & Sciences Humaines] At: 17:02 24 June 2009 beginning in 1959–1960, after thorough political training in North Vietnam, were infiltrated into South Vietnam, where they spearheaded guerrilla warfare by securing rural bases and mobilizing other ethnic minorities in highland areas 18 traversed by the Trail The participation of highlander civilians in the war effort was critical, too Some analysts even attributed the ultimate French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 to the support of upland villagers (although recent studies also point to massive Chinese military aid as a major cause of the Viet Minh vic19 tory) Indeed, at this battle in the spring and winter of 1953–1954, most of the men and women who carried artillery pieces over the mountains for the Vietnamese communist troops had been recruited from ethnic minority villages in 20 the area Likewise, without the help of upland villagers, revolutionary bases on the Lao-Vietnamese borders, in particular at the junction between southeastern Laos and central and southern Vietnam, would not have operated as effec21 tively The Vietnamese and Lao revolutionaries needed to run communication and logistics networks to carry messages, weapons, and food in these highly strategic areas Critically, John Prados argues that “[t]he heart of the Truong Son system, pumping supplies to the South like blood coursing through the body, 22 were the porters.” The Indochina wars were as much a political as a military struggle Statesponsored nationalist historiographies in contemporary Vietnam and Laos have portrayed their countries’ ethnic minorities as early nationalists in conformity 23 with the communist principle of inter-ethnic solidarity In reality, highlanders were caught between the propaganda of the French and the Americans, on the one hand, and the Viet Minh’s and the Pathet Lao’s promises, on the other, both sides being eager to obtain their loyalty The French as early as the 1930s embarked on a policy of building up a special and exclusive relationship with indigenous people in the Central Highlands, whom they named after the Monta24 gnards (meaning “mountain people” in French) They encompassed under 18 19 20 21 22 23 450 Thayer 1989; Salemink 2003, 194; McLeod 1999, 375; Duiker 1996, 198 China’s involvement in the First Indochina War was important: Beijing provided large quantities of ammunition and military equipment to the Viet Minh and helped in the training of Vietnamese military commanders and troops Chinese advisers even participated in the Vietnamese communist leadership’s decision-making process On Chinese aid to the Viet Minh during the First Indochina War, see King 1969, Chen 1993, Qiang 2000 McAlister 1967, 831–32 See, for instance, Goscha 2004 Prados 1999, 84 See Pelley 1995 (for Vietnamese nationalist historiography); Pholsena 2004 (for Lao nationalist historiography) Lao communist historiographers have reinterpreted the rebellions in the highlands of Laos that erupted in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as the pioneering fighting movements for the independence of the country A series of highland peoples’ revolts began in 1895 in the eastern regions of colonial Laos, reaching a peak between 1910 and 1916, and finally dying out in the 1930s These all expressed resistance to almost every aspect of the French administration, though these armed revolts were devoid of any kind of nationalist ideology Critical Asian Studies 40:3 (2008) Downloaded By: [IAO-ENS Lettres & Sciences Humaines] At: 17:02 24 June 2009 this name various Austronesian and Mon-Khmer ethnic groups living in Vietnam’s southern mountains in an attempt to present an image of the Montagnards as constituting — despite their cultural and linguistic differences — a 25 single category to insulate from the ethnic Vietnamese The most notable realization of this strategy was the detachment of a territory (under French rule), the Pays Montagnard du Sud-Indochinois (PMSI), or the Special Administrative Area, in the Central Highlands in 1946 The creation of an autonomous Montagnard zone was now an element of a much broader strategy: the contain26 ment of the Viet Minh threat In March 1948, the French announced the formation of a Tai Federation to include all the Tai-speaking ethnic groups living in the northwest of Tonkin (containing the present-day provinces of Lai Chau, Phong 27 Tho, and Son La) The Montagnards of the PMSI and the highlanders of the Tai Federation were thus expected by the French to oppose, and subsequently, to 28 weaken the DRV, by claiming rights for cultural and political autonomy For their part, the Viet Minh’s policy toward ethnic minorities was initially 29 very similar to the People’s Republic of China’s model Article of the 1959 Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam reiterated the policy of autonomous zones while asserting that such autonomy was to be within “the territory of Vietnam [which] is a single, indivisible whole from North to South” (Arti30 cle 1) In reality, the right of self-determination was subordinated to socialist ideals The minorities were expected to follow the path to “progress” by going through all the evolutionist stages — from primitive communism to feudalism, 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 The French name has now become a common term synonymous with highlanders or highland population Salemink 1995, 265 The politics of creating the Montagnards in the Central Highlands of Vietnam would also affect — to a lesser extent, though — the south of Laos The newly appointed Haut-Commissaire des pays moïs (“pays moïs” being a pejorative term equivalent to “savage” in Vietnamese), Lieutenant Omer Sarrault, claimed confidently in 1940 that “the ethnic and geographical unity of the ‘Pays Moïs’ should include ‘the totality of autochthonous populations both in upland Annam and Cochinchina and in Eastern Cambodia and Southern Laos’” (Salemink 1995, 273) Still, there is no evidence that the French deliberately concocted a plan to create a Montagnard identity, as they did in Vietnam The Montagnards policy was very much focused on the Central Highlands Michaud 2006, 228 Hickey 1982, 401 When the PRC was proclaimed in 1949, the traditional Han (China’s ethnic majority) goal of forced assimilation was rejected The objective of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was to end the inequality between the ethnic groups through a program of gradual cultural, economic, and political equality Steven Harrell offers a concise definition of the work as “creating autonomous regions, implementing educational and developmental plans, bringing leaders of the peripheral peoples into the fulfilling of the promise that all minzu [Chinese term of Japanese origin that can be translated as “nation,” “people,” “nationality,” or “ethnic group”], equal legally and morally, would march together on the road to historical progress, that is, to socialism” (Harrell 1995, 24) The Constitutions of Vietnam 2003, 39 After their victory over the French, the Viet Minh rewarded their ethnic minority supporters by creating in 1955 and 1956 two Pholsena / Ho Chi Minh Trail 451 Downloaded By: [IAO-ENS Lettres & Sciences Humaines] At: 17:02 24 June 2009 then to capitalism and finally 31 to socialism The Vietnamese communist ethnic policy therefore was not merely a by-product of their war strategy The policy of national equality and unity was to a great extent influenced by Lenin’s own prescriptions.32 For example, in 1934, the External Direction Bureau of the Indochinese Communist Party warned the Laos section to remember Lenin’s strategy of encouraging full liberation for ethnic minorities and of fighting against two dangers, one of which being “regional, patriotic, or chauvinist ideology, since communism recognizes only the class struggle, not the struggle of races.”33 Southern Laotian porters on Highway (From Doan In any case, the Viet Minh Cong Tinh Pictures on the Vietnam War Ho Chi Minh City: Nha Xuat Ban Thanh Pho, 1988.) strategy of incorporating the upland population in the war effort also responded to local aspirations on a more basic level The Vietnamese revolutionaries, and their Pathet Lao allies, understood that in order to carry through a war of independence, it was vitally necessary to mobilize the rural population by implementing immediate actions at the local level (e.g., building schools, providing medical care, supplying staple food) and making it clear 31 32 33 452 Autonomous Regions — the Tai-Meo zone in the northwest and the Viet Bac zone in the northeast However, the reunification of the country in 1975 heralded a return to the minority policy of the 1946 Constitution, which had made no mention of self-determination Thus, ignoring the provisions of the 1959 Constitution, the government announced on 29 December 1975 its decision to dissolve the Autonomous Regions Michaud 2000, 357 Although nationalism was a secondary problem for Lenin, it was essential to keep it under control His strategy for neutralizing the national question was guided by his perception of nationalism as the result of past discrimination and oppression Consequently, national antagonisms and mistrust were to be dissipated by a period of national equality; this policy came to be known as “the flourishing of the nations.” It was predicated upon the belief that nations would naturally move close together, a process described in the official Marxist vocabulary as the “rapprochement” or “coming together” of nations (Connor 1984, 202) Brown and Zasloff, 1986, 15 Critical Asian Studies 40:3 (2008) Downloaded By: [IAO-ENS Lettres & Sciences Humaines] At: 17:02 24 June 2009 through political training that the national revolution was the prelude to a wider social revolution, from which the peasantry would largely benefit The Viet Minh therefore were successful in recruiting highlanders both in the north and on both sides of the Annamite Chain during their struggle against the French by carefully combining propaganda, promises of autonomy, social action — though also at times resorting to violence or the threat thereof — as well as by skillfully exploiting rivalries among highland chiefs (especially in the Tai Federa34 tion) Because of the extreme brutality of the conflict their achievement in winning highlander support during the North Vietnamese-American war is harder 35 to measure, however As Clive Christie suggests, “whether the subsequent wholesale upheaval of the Montagnards was primarily caused by the fear of the North Vietnamese or by American bombing,” the debate is, in the end, rather 36 unimportant, for “the result was the same: the disruption of an entire society.” Mission Civilisatrice The ethnic policy of the communists during the Indochina wars was also deeply rooted in an elevated sense of their mission to bring (socialist) modernity to the highland areas They were guided by their own version of the mission civilisatrice Significantly, Christopher Goscha argues that the Vietnamese admit today that their aim was to bring modernity to these backward peoples, to change their habits and customs in favour of what they saw as superior ones The discourse of modernity was an important tool in the Vietnamese bid to win over converts and gain the trust of the 37 Laotians (and Cambodians) In communist wartime literature in Laos and Vietnam, the figure of the highland revolutionary is often split into two opposing representations In some stories, such individuals are sketchily depicted, reduced to a mute and undifferentiated presence In these accounts highland people are often subsumed within an untamed, if not hostile, landscape composed of forests, jungles, mountains, and 38 wild animals; in short, they belong to a primeval age Targeted by U.S bombing and on the brink of extinction — these stories contend — the highland people would have simply vanished had it not been for the communist intervention In contrast to such demeaning depictions, heroic portrayals of minority revolu34 35 36 37 38 McLeod 1999, 366–68; Salemink 2003, 168; Christie 2000, 94 McLeod 1999, 377 Christie 2000, 105 Goscha 2004, 156–57 These are two extracts from two North Vietnamese communist propaganda booklets: “In 1965, a few ethnic groups inhabited the province of Quang Binh [North Central Viet Nam] in very remote mountainous areas, they were still living in the Stone Age.…Some of these groups scattered to go and live in caves.…Devoted partisans went to share these people’s miserable lives, and progressively convinced them to leave their caves and settle back in their villages, their cultures.…They also learnt to use machine guns, and as good montagnards [sic], they patiently waited until the day when planes were close enough to shoot them down In addition to the use of machine guns, they also learnt agricultural techniques and the alphabet In four Pholsena / Ho Chi Minh Trail 453 Downloaded By: [IAO-ENS Lettres & Sciences Humaines] At: 17:02 24 June 2009 I wish to explore the oral testimonies of two “minority” women, Pa Phaivanh and Pa Phet, who joined the communist guerrillas in southeastern Laos (Savannakhet and Sekong provinces, respectively) in the 1950s.61 From a number of narratives collected during my field research in the southern provinces of Sekong, Saravane, and Savan- Detail of sculpture Army Museum, Vientiane, Laos, nakahet in 2003 and 2004, March 2007 “[H]eroic portrayals of minority revolutionI have chosen to describe aries, including women revolutionaries, abound in communist wartime publications.…” those of Pa Phaivanh and Pa Phet because the narratives of these two women are very different, despite the fact that their personal histories followed a similar trajectory Both were recruited as young girls, went through the same educational system and ideological circuit, and both became cadres within the revolutionary movement Pa Phaivanh’s story is consistent and linear, while Pa Phet’s is fragmented and shifting Nevertheless, borrowing Jerome Bruner’s words, both stories are “a version of reality.”62 Though their testimonies have historical value (i.e., they contain information on historical facts such as guerrilla-controlled areas, battle dates, and guerrilla activities), I am more interested in the witness of these revolutionary fighters for what their stories reveal about their own understanding of historical events Their subjectivity plays an integral role in the constitution of their past; that is, what they believed they were doing, and what they now think they did In other words, their 63 narrated past also matters because of its relation to the present Historian Alessandro Portelli has argued that “oral sources may not add much to what we 64 know…but they tell us a good deal about [the war’s] psychological costs.” Pa Phaivanh’s and Pa Phet’s contrasting reminiscences of their past are, of course, selective and subjective, evoking only certain memories Yet, by analyzing what such inconsistencies reveal in terms of deeper psychological and emotional sig- 61 62 63 64 460 Their interviews are drawn from field notes gathered during research trips carried out in the southern provinces of Sekong, Saravane and Savannakahet in 2003 and 2004 These research trips were funded by the Toyota Foundation and aimed to collect the life stories of former revolutionaries noted for their “heroic” actions during the Indochina wars in southeastern Laos In writing this article, I have also drawn upon other material collected over several years of fieldwork in the upland areas of southeastern Laos, especially in Sekong and Savannakhet provinces I have changed the interviewees’ and villages’ names throughout Bruner 1991, Ochs and Capps 1996, 25 Portelli 2006, 36 Critical Asian Studies 40:3 (2008) Downloaded By: [IAO-ENS Lettres & Sciences Humaines] At: 17:02 24 June 2009 nificance, their narratives in the end unveil characteristics of the “good Montagnards” that are not related in wartime propaganda literature and the carefully vetted memoirs of official leaders The use of personal narratives as a research tool is not only about giving voice to the obscure and the ordinary Increasingly, it also concerns the documentation of the vast field of human experiences, i.e., people’s reflective awareness of their involvement in the world The personal experiences of historical events and social changes that every personal narrative reveals in its own specific way are significant As anthropologist Roxana Waterson has stressed, “it is the combination of the deeply personal, and the social and political, embedded as it is in the manner of telling, which can make the life history such a special kind of doc65 ument.” It is this unique positioning of the subject-narrator — linking the private and the public worlds of experience — that gives the narrative its authenticity, not some assessment of the individual’s story as being “representative” or 66 “typical.” Elinor Ochs and Lisa Capps thus note that “[w]hile narrative does not yield absolute truth, it can transport narrators and audiences to more authentic 67 feelings, beliefs, and actions and ultimately to a more authentic sense of life.” An Exemplary Life When I first visited her in March 2004 Pa Phaivanh was a frail woman of about sixty years of age living in a house that, with its concrete floor, bare walls, and empty space, seemed too big for her Pa Phaivanh was a well-known revolutionary figure in Savannakhet Province Her house was therefore an obvious stop on 68 our research trip Pa Phaivanh was born in Ban Kham, a Katang village a few kilometers from Muang Phine in Savannakhet Province After some formal introductions, she began to unfold the story of her revolutionary life I would like to tell you now my story Since the age of fourteen, my parents…as I told you I was an orphan.…At the age of fourteen, I stayed with my uncles and aunts Since the age of fourteen, I was working for the Revolution Before that, to start with, soldiers, agents, had been carrying out their underground propaganda activities in the forests.…At the very be69 ginning, they were our agents, Issala [Free] agents Before getting involved, my motivations were as follows: first, I was an orphan, both my parents had died I was living with my uncles and aunts I wasn’t angry; I didn’t hold any sentiments of hatred No, I didn’t But on that day…at the age of fourteen, in 1957, on my way back from the hay [upland rice field] I met my uncle He was already working for the Revolution He was hiding 65 66 67 68 69 Waterson 2007, 12 Watson 2006, Ochs and Capps 1996, 23 The Katang (also known as Bru Katang) is a Mon-Khmer–speaking group They inhabit the highland areas straddling the border between the provinces of Savannakhet and Saravane in southeastern Laos Lao Issala (“Free Laos”) is the name of the first Lao nationalist movement that emerged during World War II Pholsena / Ho Chi Minh Trail 461 Downloaded By: [IAO-ENS Lettres & Sciences Humaines] At: 17:02 24 June 2009 He asked me: “Do you want to get involved? Do you want to study?” I then replied: “Yes, I want to study!” He took me to another agent and told him: “Write her down and take her to study politics, solidarity [sic], and all that!” My uncle also warned me: “If you meet strangers, people that you don’t know, don’t tell them that visitors came around.” And that was how it really began! Pa Phaivanh belonged to the second generation of those indigenous revolutionaries who were recruited in the late 1950s and early 1960s in the eastern regions of Laos The kind of motivation that pushed her onto the revolutionary path is not the stuff for stories of heroism What probably persuaded her to join the struggle was the disarmingly straightforward prospect (yet exceptional in those circumstances) of going to school, studying, and escaping an ordinary life “Anti-imperialist” feelings of anger and hatred would come later Several years ago, in 1998, we met a Lao man of ethnic minority origin whose memories of war run parallel to Pa Phaivanh’s story Sisouk left his village in Savannakhet Province at the age of thirteen to join the Lao Issara army in 1959 He was considered to be too young to fight and was therefore assigned to serve as a cook for the soldiers Only when his Viet Minh instructor asked him the reason why he joined the Revolution was he forced to think of an “acceptable” reply: his father was the chief of the village and the French treated him badly Added to that, his uncle was brutalized by a Lao soldier under the order of a French commander for failing to feed the troops properly Sisouk candidly explained forty years later: “I was full of hatred, so I joined the Revolution to take my revenge! But I didn’t know anything about the Liberation War or the Revolution Only after studying in Vietnam and in Russia, I found out what I had fought for.” Pa Phaivanh’s explanations are likewise confusing: Later I understood, I reflected, I clearly saw that I wanted to join the Revolution, that I wanted above all to study Secondly, I understood that…in the villages the enemy was beating us, was threatening us.…I was full of hatred, of anger…and this is why I joined the Revolution.…My uncle, my brother were arrested in 1958, 1959 I wanted to go with the soldiers In my heart, I hated the enemy! At that time, I wasn’t sure if they were French or Americans But I was full of hatred The date of my entry into the Revolution was around July 20, 1957 The inconsistencies in Pa Phaivanh’s narrative reveal the complex nature of her motivations The reasons for her involvement in the Revolution were first personal (she was an orphan — revolutionaries would become her new family — and she wanted to study) and subsequently collective (she fought to take revenge against an enemy who arrested and probably tortured her fellow fighters two years after she joined the guerrilla forces) Her motives were not initially ideological She did not become a revolutionary because of family tradition, faith in communism, socialist ideals, nor even for the liberation of women These politically inspired reasons would mature progressively As a young girl from a poor minority village who had never been to school, she saw that recruitment offered her an opportunity to get an education, which she seized and from then on never looked back She thus vividly remembers her first mission: 462 Critical Asian Studies 40:3 (2008) Downloaded By: [IAO-ENS Lettres & Sciences Humaines] At: 17:02 24 June 2009 I brought food and water to the agents I was recruited into the women’s secret organization.…[She later recalled the name of the organization]… seup khao, song khao [literally, “information investigator-rice porter”] I was also recruited as an informant to check on the enemy’s movements in Muang Phine, Muang Phalane — how many were they? I went three times to the enemy’s military base of Muang Phine Once I got the information, I gave it to Brother Khamla, who was a soldier He’s now retired He was a soldier for the enemy, for the French But he was also working for us, and he was also working for the French! I was getting the information from him As well as from Uncle Khemly…he’s now deceased Information on their weapons, big, small, and on the number of the enemy troops The enemy never suspected anything, I was only fourteen years old in 1957 I was collecting information on the enemy’s position, after which I’d go back and submit my report My third task was to inform the Issala soldiers when the enemy was about to go into the villages I then would run to the forests to inform the Issala soldiers Those were my revolutionary activities at the village level, in 1957, 1958, and 1959 The eastern districts of Savannakhet Province were then a disputed territory pitting the Pathet Lao agents against the Royal Lao Government (RLG) forces By 1957, it was no longer a military confrontation: the struggle had spread to the social and political sphere and had turned into a hide-and-seek pursuit where the communist followers remained an elusive target by blending into the population, exacerbating the RLG forces’ reprisals against the civilians.70 In the same year, J Graham Parsons, the U.S ambassador to Laos, fearing that the RLG might hand over control of the rural areas to the PL after years of state neglect, launched “Operation Booster Shot,” which spent over $3 million (still less than a tenth of total U.S aid to Laos in 1958) on highly visible economic aid projects 71 to villages In the course of the 1950s, the United States began in Laos, as in South Vietnam, a policy of building an anticommunist “bastion” that in their view could save Thailand, if not the whole of Southeast Asia, from the “commu72 nist threat.” This politicization of the Lao countryside was crudely termed by 70 71 72 By the beginning of the Geneva Conference in May 1954, two Lao parties were claiming national legitimacy: the Royal Lao Government (RLG), set up through negotiations with the French, and the Pathet Lao “resistance” government, created with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam’s (DRV) support In the course of the Geneva Conference, however, the status of the RLG as the internationally recognized Lao political entity was confirmed, as was its territorial integrity Nevertheless, the powers at the conference stated that the Pathet Lao (PL) should continue to administer the two provinces of Phong Saly and Huaphan (these two northeastern provinces had been occupied by the PL and the Viet Minh troops since December 1953) until a negotiated settlement could be reached between the RLG and the PL and the political, administrative, and military integration of these two provinces in the RLG system could be arranged Between 1954 and 1958, therefore, the RLG government regarded the PL’s integration into the Lao political mainstream as a foremost priority in order to secure the country’s long-term stability Dommen 1964, 109; Toye 1968, 114 Christie 1998, 212 Pholsena / Ho Chi Minh Trail 463 Downloaded By: [IAO-ENS Lettres & Sciences Humaines] At: 17:02 24 June 2009 the French as a state of pourriture (rottenness), when as American journalist Arthur Dommen explained, “[the villagers] arrived at the point where they believed that the web of fronts and groups in which they were enmeshed was re73 ally their government.” In other words, beginning in the late 1950s Laos began 74 gradually turning into a politically and socially fractured country It was during the early years of her revolutionary life that Pa Phaivanh changed her name to “Phaivanh,” which, significantly, is a lowland Lao name As the struggle intensified and the communists made territorial gains in the eastern districts of Savannakhet Province, Pa Phaivanh moved up the ladder of responsibility and left the physically demanding work of porter to assume the more enviable task of a propaganda agent at the provincial level, again driven by both personal desire and collective purpose It was at that moment of her life that she became aware of wider political issues and struggles Her narrative clearly shows the intersection between her personal experience and historical events In 1958, I sometimes stayed in the village, or when there was danger, lived 75 in the forest But 1959 was the most violent year My brother, my uncle were arrested The enemy shot at my comrades, at our cars [trucks?].… Then we lost our cover.…They arrested and tortured people.…I left and went into hiding in the forest Then, in 1961, it was the battles of Muong Phine and Muong Sepone These were finally liberated I was in the village at that time I was carrying out the same task, I was still a porter [lam lieng] I was carrying rice, cigarettes, oil, and so on, up to Muang Phine Then, in 1962, I left My uncle and brother came to take me At that point, I knew I wanted to leave! Because first, I was full of hatred, I hated the enemy! And secondly, I wanted to study, I especially wanted to study! At that 73 74 75 464 Dommen 1964, 91 With the recent inclusion of the Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) into the government, supplementary elections were called, which would provide for representation of the new party in the Assembly and so complete the process of national integration that began at Geneva To this end, twenty additional parliamentary seats were created and elections were scheduled for May 1958 But as the elections approached, hostilities between the two camps deepened, with the political struggle on the ground becoming increasingly violent The NLHS, with its electoral ally, the left-wing Santhiphab (Peace) Party, eventually won thirteen of the twenty-one seats that were contested in the 1958 election These results proved enough to alarm the rightwing politicians and their U.S allies in Vientiane and later (in July) to force Souvanna Phouma to resign as prime minister following the suspension of U.S aid In actuality, the electoral gains obtained by the leftist camp merely reflected a reality already entrenched in some eastern parts of the country — north and south alike — i.e., the conviction among the Lao communist partisans (and the people that were sympathetic to their cause) of the existence of two opposed governments, the Vientiane-RLG side, backed by the United States, and the Pathet Lao, supported by the Viet Minh The summer of 1959 marked a low point in the PL’s military strength Their two battalions had recently fled Luang Prabang and Huaphan provinces to reach North Vietnam and had hardly had any time to regroup by the time sixteen of their leaders were arrested and detained in Vientiane Critical Asian Studies 40:3 (2008) Downloaded By: [IAO-ENS Lettres & Sciences Humaines] At: 17:02 24 June 2009 time, I even didn’t know to read [Lao] I could only speak I sacrificed [sala] myself I left the family, the village, around June 20, 1962 I joined the propaganda group [kong kon kwai] in the province of Muang Phine I followed my uncle, my brother Like other minority cadres’ narratives we had the opportunity of listening 76 to, Phaivanh’s is closely tied up with agency, reflected in her strong desire to acquire a formal education This was clearly a determining factor in her decision to join the Revolution and to devote her life to the revolutionary struggle, though the weight of fate never completely disappears in her remembrances During the period of renewed political turmoil in Laos, which began in 1959 and ended, temporarily, with the Second Geneva Accords of 1962, the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces made significant territorial gains, extending their control into new areas of the country In January 1959 during the Fifteenth Plenum of the Vietnamese Workers Party’s Central Committee, the DRV leadership authorized the use of armed struggle in the south, to be headed by the Na77 tional Liberation Front for South Vietnam (NLFSVN) In early 1961, after negotiations with the Pathet Lao, Hanoi decided to extend the Ho Chi Minh Trail into 78 Laos Thus, in supporting the Pathet Lao by means of weapons supplies, military training, and ideological advice, the Viet Minh also aimed to pursue their own vital interests, evidenced in the Vietnam People’s Army’s incursion farther 79 west into Lao territory in the early 1960s Muong Sepone, which became one of the most important centers for the North Vietnamese transportation net80 work, fell in 1961 Pa Phaivanh’s life meanwhile was not getting any easier In the years that followed, she indefatigably contributed to the war effort, traveling to wherever her help was needed and living with the villagers, mainly women and children, who had fled the bombings and lived scattered in the forests 81 I was sent with this group to the tasseng Namchalo-Angkham [in the eastern region of present-day Savannakhet Province] I followed the older sisters, they were more experienced The people [pasason] cultivated the hay, so did we! We were by their side The people were pounding rice, so were we The people went and fetched water, so did we They were looking for food, and we helped them We never stopped, never had a break, we were by their side, with the children, with the grown-ups We kept going [pay, pay]! We also went with the soldiers We were looking for food, bamboo shoots, and so on People were living in the forest…they were our informants, kids, women without their husbands, kept us informed on the enemy’s movements.…The orphans, the widows, single women, they were trustworthy because we liberated them…it was like that! In 76 77 78 79 80 81 See Pholsena 2007 Qiang 2000, 81 Prados 1999, 15 Ang 2002, 36 Prados 1999, 24 A former administrative division replaced today by the rather vaguely defined administrative unit, khet, though the term “tasseng” is still used in rural areas in Laos Pholsena / Ho Chi Minh Trail 465 Downloaded By: [IAO-ENS Lettres & Sciences Humaines] At: 17:02 24 June 2009 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, I was on the road with the comrades.…Then, in 1967–1968, I sometimes went on my own to go and collect the “rice for helping the nation” [khao suai saat], as we called it then, the “rice to help the country.” In a sense, the tasks Pa Phaivanh undertook during wartime provided her with an independent life and a sense of adventure she would have not experienced had she stayed in her village: moving about freely as a propagandist and proselytizing for the Party Having been recruited into the struggle, she in turn mobilized children to join the Revolution, and in the same manner of her own recruitment, promised them a bright, though elusive, future: I was mobilizing the population [ladom] I was recruiting children I persuaded them to go and study, to become teachers, soldiers, nurses, doctors I wasn’t alone in my work, there were several of us We worked together During the day, we were working in the rice field and returned home in the evening After dinner, there were dances.…The youth in villages in Namchalo, we all went, girls, boys, to become agents, soldiers, doctors, students…that was my work in the emulation group.…Everyone was satisfied [hen dii] with my work I was always the first to be chosen to carry out the work [khat lieuk to daen] Because I was young and hard working, because I never stopped working I lived with the people, I fetched the water, I looked for food, for wood I lived in places where life was tough, with widows, single women, orphans, it was with them I shared my life Those were my tasks in the propaganda group from 1962 to 1968 Through the lens of her personal narrative, Pa Phaivanh personifies the model patriot whose life demanded a high degree of self-sacrifice, if not total abandonment to the Revolution She never married and did not have any children (bo mii luk, bo mii phua) She has lived with her “niece and nephew” (luk liang) in that concrete house in Savannakhet town In her exemplary narration, Pa Phaivanh never mentioned her personal suffering The harshness of her life during the war is perceptible though, particularly in the mid to late 1960s when villagers and revolutionaries alike lacked food, and more or less everything else, and had to rely on the forest to subsist Nevertheless, Pa Phaivanh never expressed anything other than collective ordeals Yet, had she found the words and been willing to, she may have told us of her regrets of not having children or never marrying, her fear and panic during the bombings or when facing possible death, the battles against diseases and exhaustion, or her sorrow at the death of villagers or comrades-in-arms Portelli notes with regard to war veterans and Resistance fighters (during World War II in Italy) that “often, these individuals are wholly absorbed by the totality of the historical event of which they were [a] part, and their account assumes the cadences and wording of epic.”82 Pierre Bourdieu, in a short essay, condemned the illusion of a life history that makes life falsely appear as “a whole, a coherent and finalized whole, which can and 82 466 Portelli 2006, 38, emphasis in the original Critical Asian Studies 40:3 (2008) Downloaded By: [IAO-ENS Lettres & Sciences Humaines] At: 17:02 24 June 2009 must be seen as the unitary expression of a subjective and objective ‘intention’ of a 83 project.” Yet, it is precisely the “biographical illusion” that gives meaning to peoples’ existences The inclination to organize experience in terms of plots is A dwelling on stilts fashioned from the remnants of bomb shells deeply human Victor in Nong district, Savannakhet Province, June 2005 “Through Turner saw experithe lens of her personal narrative, Pa Phaivanh personifies the ence as isolated semodel patriot whose life demanded a high degree of self-sacriquences of events fice, if not total abandonment to the Revolution.” marked by beginnings, middles, and endings — as ways in which people told what was most purposeful about their lives.84 By these narratives of self, people are expressing the desire to impose an order, to form a “whole” out of “constituent parts” (i.e., events), and thus, to retain a sense of their life — past and present — that is re85 flective, coherent, and meaningful At the end of her interview, Pa Phaivanh modestly expressed her contentment and gratitude toward the State for the house and her monthly war veteran pension She has kept her revolutionary virtues pristine until the end A Fragmented Story It was not easy to find Pa Phet’s house on the road to Sekong town when we first went to meet her in March 2004 When we finally saw it, it was hard to believe that it belonged to a renowned former revolutionary Though it stood only a few meters away, the tiny hut was hardly visible from the road Pa Phet lived with her nieces (luk lieng, or “adopted children”) and their families Like Pa Phaivanh, she never married and did not have any children She was born in Dakrong, a 86 Taliang village, in the district of Dachung (in the present-day province of Sekong), and joined the Revolution sometime during the 1950s in her teens At first she told us that “nobody forced (her) to join the Revolution.” Later in her interview, she was more explicit: “The soldiers persuaded me [suk nyu] ‘Come with us,’ they said, ‘you live on your own, your life is miserable, come with us!’” As an orphan and a young girl, her participation in revolutionary activities was hardly surprising as the southeastern region of Laos bordering the province of 83 84 85 86 Bourdieu 2000, 297 Turner 1986, 36 Bruner 1991, The Bahnaric-speaking Mon-Khmer Taliang (or Talieng) inhabit the province of Sekong in southeastern Laos Pholsena / Ho Chi Minh Trail 467 Downloaded By: [IAO-ENS Lettres & Sciences Humaines] At: 17:02 24 June 2009 Quang Nam in Vietnam had been infiltrated by the communists since the mid to 87 late 1940s Like most young girls who were recruited, Pa Phet first worked as a porter and a messenger (“night and day, come rain or come shine”) In 1959, she was arrested and badly beaten by “the enemy.” They had entered her village, looking for Issala agents who had already left to hide in the forests “The enemy” accused her of helping Issala soldiers, dragged her to the center of the village, and beat her “They wanted me to tell them where the agents were hidden They kept beating me I nearly died I in fact did die from all the beating but came back to life again! After that, I left the village for good and carried out my work in the district!”88 We were not the first people to whom Pa Phet had told of her ordeals at the hands of the “enemy,” which were clearly a defining moment of her life She even advised us to go to the “province” where they kept her “exhaustive biography.” To us she gave not so much a linear account as remembrances of her life through the reconstitution of compelling, introspective moments Soon after we began the interview she revealed her conflicting feelings toward the “sacrifice” she made of her right to motherhood in a distressing and unexpected way: This is what I told to my superiors.…I sacrificed everything to the point of not having a husband, never marrying And why? Because nobody liked me? But even ugly women can be loved; I’d love an ugly man I came down from the mountains to work in town, groups formed of minority people were created It was hard So, had I married and then had children, I wouldn’t have been able to carry out my work Now that I think about it, I and other women from minority villages…endured oppression and exploitation We are stricter than the Lao [lowland Lao] in protecting and respecting our customs and traditions I remember our Lao brothers and sisters, Uncle Somsune and my adopted father [Pho Lieng], Uncle Khamsuk, who told me: “You’ve got work to do, you must restrain yourself [khalam].” Restrain from what? According to him, from having relations with men, for having a relation with a man would mean I’d need him today and again tomorrow We had to recruit and train new agents, our country was in trouble, oppressed, exploited It was harder for a woman than a man Once married and with children, I would not be able to carry out my activities anymore It’s true what one says about women’s oppression and exploitation, they endure three yokes: traditions, colonialism, and their husbands Who can face them? And now that I’m old, with no children, who’s going to take care of me? We were told that the state would not abandon us once we won independence But by then what would I need? I’m old Had I married, we would have just lived our lives as a couple, on our own, just 87 88 468 Engelbert 2004; Pholsena 2006 The area became a northern Vietnamese military stronghold during the Second Indochina War In particular, large base areas were built at Chavane, which was located on a strategic junction at the borders between Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia and was an entry point into southern Vietnam Critical Asian Studies 40:3 (2008) Downloaded By: [IAO-ENS Lettres & Sciences Humaines] At: 17:02 24 June 2009 like that I can’t help thinking that had I married I would not have been able to accomplish my work, plowing the soil, fetching the water, facing the enemy on land and in the air I couldn’t have done it My friends said that I was being fussy But in reality I’d made my choice My decision, my own, was to adopt and love the children of the people like my own Was there a choice for Pa Phet to make? Or did she prefer to remember that in the end it was truly her own choice? Narratives aim to redress a “complication” 89 through the discursive structuring of a plot Yet, Pa Phet’s storytelling does not offer a satisfying (at least, for me as the person who listened to and collected her remembrances) resolution of her predicament She was not afraid to speak her mind, though, even to strangers such as us, or perhaps precisely because she had never met us before Her narrative continued to drift between past and present, filled with emotions and introspection I joined the Revolution, I was never criticized, investigated, because I always did my best I’m in a way praising myself, that’s right I worked, I studied, I left for Vietnam three times, the first time for six months studying at the first level, intermediate level, then at the high level People I meet with, we always talk about the difficulties and the tough times we went through during our revolutionary activities We talk to each other It was such a tough life [tuk]! People told me that I was stronger than men in the fighting against the enemy and that I was very determined It’s a state of mind We carried out a duty; we were responsible for people’s fate If we didn’t accomplish our task, nobody would trust us We were in charge of the youth and the women in Dakchung, Sansay, Kalum, defying the planes and all sorts of things.…Now I don’t know what else to I’ve got nothing, no house I’m not criticizing our hierarchy I’m the only one to blame I bought the materials myself to build this house I was only given the metal sheets for the roof, which I’m grateful for As for now, all’s fine, peaceful If there’s no car, I’m not going If there’s no money, I’m not going either We had nothing then But we had fun, we ate and lived with the people We walked together happily Though during those trips fear was still everywhere: fear of tigers, snakes, the enemy, spirits…of everything! In all, we obtained a lot of things, particularly regarding the liberation of women, and for this, I’m very happy It doesn’t matter if I didn’t get anything per90 sonally, I’m happy about the collective achievements Even now, I haven’t forgotten these A lot of people have left the Party, but I haven’t Because all my life has been with the Party It’s a question of commitment, and because of all we endured in the past If now I can no longer travel, I still can see the way When I see someone, a car or friends on the move, it’s as if I were traveling myself It’s how it should be understood 89 90 Ochs and Capps 1996, 27 Though Pa Phet humbly said that “she never had any status, never held any position,” she nonetheless was the head of the Women’s Union in Saravane and Sekong provinces for several years after the war Pholsena / Ho Chi Minh Trail 469 Downloaded By: [IAO-ENS Lettres & Sciences Humaines] At: 17:02 24 June 2009 As a dedicated revolutionary, Pa Phet, like Pa Phaivanh, enthusiastically lived the wartime communist slogan, “serving the people.” The Revolution and the war offered them some degree of emancipation, self-confidence, adventure (and years of living dangerously and harshly), as well as a sense of belonging But the tension between Pa Phet’s sense of self in the past and her sense of self in the present remains palpable, as she is unable to effectively reconcile her actions during the war and her experience of these actions in times of peace Toward the end of her interview, Pa Phet’s reflections on the legacy of the Revolution uneasily shifted to nostalgia and even disillusionment, balanced by her loyalty to the Party (or what was left of it): I nevertheless expressed my apprehension and views concerning our revolution during the New Year, though I stopped myself from talking too much, I was afraid I would annoy the others I talked about the difficulties, the ordeals of the past and the present, about the pleasures some enjoy today, too many pleasures that should be avoided or moderated The slogan of our revolution was the welfare of the people first, that of the agents second We must look around us, above, at ourselves We must remain self-critical As I was listening to Pa Phet, memories of an encounter I had in 1999 with another woman revolutionary in Sekong Province returned Her external appearance was different from the rest of the women in the village She wore her hair short, very unusual for a woman (at least in the countryside), and always wore an army shirt that covered the upper half of her sinh Her walking pace was fast and her way of talking, loud and abrupt In addition, she mingled more often with men than with women, and appeared to feel equally comfortable with both genders Although she was considered to be an “immoral” woman, she was educated and comfortable with herself She was a “revolutionary,” as she used to present herself, and often expressed nostalgia when recalling the wartime: “People were as united as if they came from the same mother’s womb!” But she would then continue with a bitter tone in her voice: “Now, it’s no longer the case Nobody cares for each other; it’s only for oneself.” It was against such loss of memory in the public world that Pa Phet spoke out.91 91 92 93 94 470 I returned to visit Pa Phet in Sekong in August 2007 She had moved to a much larger wooden house built on stilts and covered by a metal roof I first thought that the authorities had finally rewarded her for her contribution to the independence struggle The truth was altogether different: Pa Phet’s nieces and nephews (her luk lieng) had built the house themselves Langness and Frank speak of the inescapable incompleteness of lives, as well as the impossibility of any final interpretation (Langness and Frank 1981.) Quinn-Judge 2001, 269 Ibid., 268 Critical Asian Studies 40:3 (2008) Downloaded By: [IAO-ENS Lettres & Sciences Humaines] At: 17:02 24 June 2009 By Way of Conclusion Revolutionary wartime publications represented highland peoples who joined the revolutionary ranks as having leapt over the primitive, prerevolutionary stage on an exhilarating journey to modernity, leaving the “Stone Age” and metamorphosing into modern patriots striving for freedom and equality The testimonies of Pa Phaivanh and Pa Phet, both women and both of ethnic minority origin, offer possibilities for a more nuanced reading of the past The focus on their personal narratives not only gives them a voice, but also conveys war experiences from unique viewpoints The manner in which the story is told is as significant as the content of the narrative itself, and Pa Phet’s discontinuous storytelling shows the trouble she now has in trying to make sense of her present life and to imagine her future Life histories are always in some sense unfinished 92 products The rationale underlying Pa Phet and Pa Phaivanh’s stories could concur with Sophie Quinn-Judge’s comments on the lives of early Vietnamese women revolutionaries: “For the generation of women who began the revolution in Vietnam, the traditional virtues of stoicism and self-sacrifice were the 93 ones that dominated their lives.” To a large extent, Pa Phet and Pa Phaivanh’s commitment equaled that of those female Vietnamese combatants “for [whom] the party replaced the family as the object of their loyalty and the source of au94 thority in their lives.” Unlike a majority of those women, however, Pa Phet and Pa Phaivanh came from a materially poor and illiterate background; yet, through their wartime trajectories, they acquired and developed a similar faith in socialism, albeit with the two different outcomes reflected in their contrasting narratives As guerrilla agents, these women broke from a way of life with its own cultural and social norms — i.e., the “Stone Age” in the eyes of those (communist revolutionaries, socialist sympathizers, U.S missionaries, and military officers) who so eagerly sought their loyalty — to embrace socialist ideals They became emancipated: they studied, held political positions, and traveled far beyond the confines of the village life of their childhood In short, they lived exceptionally independent lives under extraordinary circumstances for women of their background and origins These achievements in the end came at a cost though: once in the vanguard of women’s liberation, they live now atypical existences as “childless single [bo mii luk, bo mii phua] old women” in a society that has reverted to more conservative norms References Alexievitch, Svetlana 2005 La guerre n’a pas un visage de femme Paris: Éditions J’ai Lu An Independent WriteNet Researcher 2002 Vietnam: Indigenous minority groups in the Central Highlands UNHCR Centre for Documentation and Research, WriteNet Paper, no 05/2001 Ang, Cheng Guan 2002 The Vietnam War from the other side: The Vietnamese communists’ perspective London: RoutledgeCurzon Antlöv, Hans, and Stein Tønnesson, eds 1995 Imperial policy and Southeast Asian nationalism, 1930–1957 Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press Pholsena / Ho Chi Minh Trail 471 Downloaded By: [IAO-ENS Lettres & Sciences Humaines] At: 17:02 24 June 2009 Bourdieu, Pierre 2000 The biographical illusion In du Gay, Evans, and Redman, eds 2000 297–303 Brown, McAlister, and Joseph J Zasloff 1986 Apprentice revolutionaries: The communist movement in Laos, 1930–1985 Palo Alto, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press Bruner, Jerome 1987 Life as narrative Social Research 54 (1): 11–32 ——— 1991 The narrative construction of reality Critical Inquiry 18 (1): 1–21 Burchett, Wilfred G 1965 Vietnam: Inside story of the guerilla war New York: International Publishers Chen, Jian 1993 China and the first Indo-China War, 1950–54 The China Quarterly 133: 85–110 Christie, Clive J 1998 Southeast Asia in the twentieth century: A reader London and New York: I.B.Tauris Publishers ——— 2000 A modern history of Southeast Asia: Decolonization, nationalism and separatism London and New York: Tauris Academic Studies Connor, Walker 1984 The national question in Marxist-Leninist theory and strategy Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press The Constitutions of Vietnam 1946–1959–1980–1992 2003 Hanoi: Gioi Publishers Deuve, Jean 1999 Le Laos, 1945–1949: Contribution l’histoire du mouvement Lao Issala Montpellier: Université Paul-Valéry Dommen, Arthur J 1964 Conflict in Laos: The politics of neutralization London: Pall Mass Press du Gay P., J Evans, and P Redman, eds 2000 2d ed Identity: A reader London, Thousand Oaks (Calif.), and New Delhi: Sage Publications Duiker, William J 1996 2d ed The communist road to power in Vietnam Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press Elliott, David W.P., ed 1981 The third Indochina conflict Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press Engelbert, Thomas 2004 From hunters to revolutionaries: The mobilisation of ethnic minorities in southern Laos and north-eastern Cambodia during the First IndoChina War (1945–1954) In Engelbert and Kubitscheck 2004 225–69 Engelbert, Thomas, and Hans Dieter Kubitscheck, eds 2004 Ethnic minorities and politics in Southeast Asia New York: Peter Lang Evans, Grant 2002 A short history of Laos: The land in between Crows Nest, N.S.W.: Allen and Unwin Face aux bombes 1969 Face aux bombes Hanoi: Éditions en langue étrangères Furuta, Motoo 1992 The Indochina Communist Party’s division into three parties: Vietnamese Communist policy toward Cambodia and Laos, 1948–1951 In Shiraishi and Furuta, eds 1992, 143–63 Goscha, Christopher E 1995 Viêt-Nam or Indochina? 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Minh Trail 40:3 (2008), 445–474 HIGHLANDERS ON THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL Representations and Narratives Vatthana Pholsena ABSTRACT: The history of the hinterlands of the Indochinese... solidarity In reality, highlanders were caught between the propaganda of the French and the Americans, on the one hand, and the Viet Minh? ??s and the Pathet Lao’s promises, on the other, both sides being... Vietnamese and Lao) and the Western powers was the region of southeastern Laos, which became a Viet Minh stronghold during the First Indochina War and, beginning in the early 1960s, the conduit for the

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