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See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/313893317 Embodying Culture: Integrated Cognitive Systems and Cultural Evolution Chapter · February 2017 CITATIONS READS 546 authors: Richard Menary Alexander James Gillett Macquarie University Macquarie University 42 PUBLICATIONS 1,687 CITATIONS 14 PUBLICATIONS 18 CITATIONS SEE PROFILE Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects: Enculturated Cognition View project All content following this page was uploaded by Alexander James Gillett on 20 February 2018 The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file SEE PROFILE This article was downloaded by: Macquarie University Library On: 12 Feb 2018 Access details: subscription number 10204 Publisher:Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Howick Place, London SW1P 1WG, UK The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of the Social Mind Julian Kiverstein Embodying Culture Publication details https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315530178.ch4 Richard Menary, Alexander James Gillett Published online on: 07 Dec 2016 How to cite :- Richard Menary, Alexander James Gillett 07 Dec 2016 ,Embodying Culture from: The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of the Social Mind Routledge Accessed on: 12 Feb 2018 https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315530178.ch4 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR DOCUMENT Full terms and conditions of use: https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/legal-notices/terms This Document PDF may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes Any substantial or systematic reproductions, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date The publisher shall not be liable for an loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material Downloaded By: Macquarie University Library At: 02:40 12 Feb 2018; For: 9781315530178, chapter4, 10.4324/97813155301 EMBODYING CULTURE Integrated cognitive systems and cultural evolution Richard Menary and Alexander James Gillett1 Introduction The Cognitive Integration (henceforth CI) framework posits the existence of integrated cognitive systems (henceforth ICS) In this chapter we outline the nature of ICS and their phylogenetic history We shall argue that phylogenetically earlier forms of cognition are built upon by more recent cultural innovations Many of the phylogenetically earlier components are forms of sensorimotor interactions with the environment (Menary 2007a, 2010a, 2016) These sensorimotor interactions are redeployed (or retrained) to service more recent cultural innovations (Dehaene & Cohen 2007) Take, for example, a rudimentary ability for tool use, that is refined and then built upon by innovations over many generations.The same refined sensorimotor skills for manipulating tools can be redeployed to recent cultural innovations for writing with stylus, brush or pencil (Menary 2015) Redeployment happens after a process of learning or training and the cultural innovations are inherited and spread out across groups.2 This process depends upon both high fidelity cultural inheritance and a high degree of plasticity (Sterelny 2012), which in humans is a specialised form of learning driven plasticity (Menary 2014) Learning driven plasticity (henceforth LDP) is the capacity for functional changes that are acquired from (usually) scaffolded learning in a highly structured social niche This results in a multi-layered system with heterogeneous components, dynamically interwoven into a complex arrangement of processes and states in an integrated cognitive system The coordination dynamics of the system are, at least in part, understood in terms of the physical dynamics of brain–body–niche interactions in real-time One of the key ingredients of ICS is the social/cultural practices, which we call normative patterned practices (henceforth NPP), that govern the dynamics of brain–body–niche interactions NPPs operate at both social levels and individual, even sub-personal, levels They originate as patterns of activity spread out over a population of agents (Roepstorff et al 2010); consequently they should be understood primarily as public systems of activity and/or representation that are susceptible to innovative alteration, expansion and even contraction over time They are transmitted horizontally across generational groups and vertically from one generation to the next At the individual level they are acquired most often by learning and training (hence the importance of LDP), and they manifest themselves as changes in the ways in which individuals think, but also the ways in which they act (intentionally) and the ways in 72 Downloaded By: Macquarie University Library At: 02:40 12 Feb 2018; For: 9781315530178, chapter4, 10.4324/97813155301 Embodying culture which they interact with other members of their social group(s) and the local environment NPPs, therefore, operate at different levels (groups and individuals) and over different timescales (intergenerationally and in the here-and-now) The main aim of this chapter is to give an overview of the CI framework in terms of phylogenetically ancient embodied interactions with the environment and the more recent culturally evolved practices that redeploy our primitive capacities for sensorimotor interactions and manipulations of tools, objects and, in a very recent innovation, public systems of representation In doing so, we provide a case for the enculturation of our bodies and brains In the first section we outline the role of brain–body–niche interactions in ICS In the second section we place these interactions into the context of an inherited cognitive niche In the third section we lay out the fundamentals of the process of enculturation, and in the final section we outline the enculturation of our basic abilities for mathematical cognition as an example of the enculturation process ICS and embodied engagements The CI framework explains how we learn to be active cognitive agents who think by manipulating their environments and by interacting with one another in social groups One of the key theses of CI is that body and environment coordinate, such that the environment is a resource available to the organism for acting, thinking and communicating In particular we look at the role of body–environment coordination in the assembly of ICS The coordination dynamics of the system are understood in terms of the physical dynamics of brain–body– niche interactions in real-time.3 However, the interactions that matter are those that are governed by NPPs The primary form of NPPs that we shall consider are cognitive practices (CPs) (Menary 2007a, 2010a) Cognitive practices are enacted by creating and manipulating informational structures in public space For example, by creating shared linguistic content and developing it through dialogue, inference and narrative; or it can be by actively creating and manipulating environmental structures, which might take the form of tools of public and shared representations (or a combination of both) How individuals embody CPs? They so by a process of transformation of body schemas or motor programmes (Menary 2007a, 2010b; Farne et al 2007) Motor programmes are acquired through learning and training, but existing programmes may also be extended during training Learning to catch, write, type, or flake a hand axe are examples of acquired motor programmes Cognition or thought is accomplished through the coordination of body and environment and is, therefore, governed both by body schemas and by biological and cultural norms The latter will draw on many learned skills A clear way to understand the nature of the CPs at work is the manipulation thesis The manipulation thesis (Rowlands 1999, 2010; Menary 2007a, 2010a) concerns our embodied engagements with the world, but it is not simply a causal relation Bodily manipulations are also normative – they are embodied practices developed through learning and training (in ontogeny).We outline six different classes of bodily manipulation of the environment, with the general label of Cognitive Practices.4 They are: Biological Interactions Corrective Practices Epistemic Practices 73 Downloaded By: Macquarie University Library At: 02:40 12 Feb 2018; For: 9781315530178, chapter4, 10.4324/97813155301 Richard Menary and Alexander James Gillett Epistemic Tools and Representational Systems a Epistemic Tools b Representational Systems Blended Practices Biological interactions are direct sensorimotor interactions with the environment An obvious example are sensorimotor contingencies (O’Regan and Noë 2001), a direct example of low-level, embodied interactions with the environment One might think of simple perceptionaction cycles, where direct perceptual input from the environment reciprocally causes action, which then directly feeds into further behaviour For example, Ballard and colleagues’ (1995) study details how participants in a memory-taxing pattern-copying task offload these cognitive demands through exploratory saccadic eye movements Dewey anticipated such a model in his discussion of the reflex arc (see Menary 2016).5 Corrective practices are a form of exploratory inference and are clearly present early in early cognitive development The main feature of this form of practice is action looping through the environment to correct future action (e.g instructional nudges (Sutton 2007)) This might be done verbally, or it might be done by a form of epistemic updating, testing a hypothesis through action A classic example from Vygotsky helps to illustrate: A four-and-a-half-year-old girl was asked to get candy from a cupboard with a stool and a stick as tools The experiment was described by Levina in the following way (his descriptions are in parentheses, the girl’s speech is in quotation marks): (Stands on a stool, quietly looking, feeling along a shelf with stick) “On the stool.” (Glances at experimenter Puts stick in other hand) “Is that really the candy?” (Hesitates) “I can get it from that other stool, stand and get it.” (Gets second stool) “No that doesn’t get it I could use the stick.” (Takes stick, knocks at the candy) “It will move now.” (Knocks candy) “It moved, I couldn’t get it with the stool, but the, but the stick worked.” (Vygotsky 1978, p. 25) The child uses speech as a corrective tool: “That didn’t work, so I’ll try this.” Speech as a corrective tool is a medium through which the child can correct her activity in the process of achieving the desired result It may be that hypothesis formulation and test through action is developing early in children Indeed, there is good developmental evidence for exploratory behaviour in neonates (Menary 2016) However, the dialogical nature of the self-corrective practice in this example is likely to have been developed via verbal interactions with caregivers (and possibly peers).6 Epistemic practices: A classic example is Kirsch and Maglio’s (1994) example of epistemic action in expert Tetris players Experts would often perform actions that did not directly result in a pragmatic goal.7 The actions were designed to simplify cognitive processing Other examples include the epistemic probing of an environment and epistemic diligence – maintaining the quality of information stored in the environment (Menary 2012) Epistemic diligence can take quite sophisticated forms: a simple form would be keeping the physical environment organised in such a way that it simplifies visual search (Kirsh 1995, Heersmink 2013) However, more complicated forms of epistemic diligence include updating written information in a notebook or computer file, organising it and adding information as it becomes available Epistemic tools and representational systems 74 Downloaded By: Macquarie University Library At: 02:40 12 Feb 2018; For: 9781315530178, chapter4, 10.4324/97813155301 Embodying culture 4a Epistemic tools: Many tools aid in the completion of cognitive tasks, from rulers to calculators, from pen and paper to computers Manipulating the tools as part of our completion of cognitive tasks is something that we learn, often as part of a problem-solving task So, more complicated forms of tool use are built upon simpler forms of sensorimotor interactions with the environment, and innovations allow for continual improvement of technique Some tools are more obviously designed to produce physical ends; however, other tools are designed to measure, observe, record and extend our senses (Humphreys 2004) These are more obviously epistemic tools and the way that we manipulate these tools is distinct from how we deploy, for example, the hammer.Yet, the same sensorimotor programmes for physical tool use can be redeployed as the biological basis for epistemic tool use However, without sophisticated cognitive practices and public systems of representation, epistemic tools would be as useless to us as they are to cats 4b Representational systems: Behaviourally modern humans display an incredible facility for innovating new forms of representational systems They also display a general capacity for learning how to create, maintain and deploy representations Alphabets, numerals, diagrams and many other forms of representation are often deployed as part of the processing cycle that leads directly to the completion of a cognitive task (Menary 2015) Without public systems of representation, cognitive practices of the most sophisticated kind would be impossible Therefore, it is important to have an account of what the nature of these public systems of representations are.8 Blended interactions: Complex cognitive tasks may involve combinations of practices in cycles of cognitive processing This seems likely given the hierarchical nature of ICS, where more recent practices are built upon the more ancient All levels of processing can be deployed at once depending upon the nature of the task As we shall see in the third section, mathematical cognition may call upon the manipulation of tools in conjunction with mastery of public numeral systems and algorithms for manipulating those numerals Learning driven plasticity and cognitive practices The acquisition of CPs depends upon our capacity to learn, and a capacity to learn is in turn dependent upon neural plasticity (Menary 2014) We can think of neural plasticity in three broad ways: the first is structural plasticity – actual changes to the structure of the brain; the second is functional plasticity – actual changes to the function of the brain; and the third is learning driven plasticity (Menary 2014, pp. 293–294).The important thing to note about LDP is that it is not a matter of competitive learning in a neural network with randomised initial weights Whilst the brain may be constrained or biased to producing certain kinds of functions in ontogeny, the learning environment of humans is highly structured and controlled and not simply the location of undifferentiated input Even when learning is exploratory it still takes place in a highly structured and informationally rich environment The scaffolding of culture and education makes an important contribution to the way that the brain develops in children Learning is a situated activity immersed within a suite of patterned practices It results in transformational effects on developmentally plastic brains, in the sense that our brains get sculpted by the patterns of practices in our niche The niche in question is the cultural niche and it contains practices, representations, tools, artefacts, experts, teaching methods and so on As we shall see in the third section, neural circuitry can be redeployed via LDP such that phylogenetically older circuitry can be redeployed for new cultural functions (such as learning to read, learning to recognise Arabic numerals and so on (see Dehaene & Cohen 2007) We turn next to the evolution of plasticity and the cultural inheritance of structured developmental niches 75 Downloaded By: Macquarie University Library At: 02:40 12 Feb 2018; For: 9781315530178, chapter4, 10.4324/97813155301 Richard Menary and Alexander James Gillett ICS and niche construction We are all familiar with the idea of natural selection, derived from the modern synthesis, of environmental selection pressures that influence populations of phenotypes and the inheritance of genetic material from the previous generation The relationship between environment and organism is asymmetric in the modern synthesis An extension of the modern synthesis (it should be noted that this is not a replacement) involves not seeing evolution as an asymmetric relationship of selective pressures from environments to organisms, but as a symmetrical relationship (Godfrey-Smith 1996) where organisms (and phenotypic traits) and environments co-evolve The traditional model of evolution only recognises one line of inheritance of traits from genes More recently, biologists interested in niche construction (Odling-Smee, Laland & Feldman 2003) have proposed that there is another line of inheritance: ecological inheritance Niche construction involves modifications to the ancestral environment that are bequeathed to the next generation This encompasses physical alterations, such as living in mounds or constructing hives, as well as cultural artefacts, practices and institutions Niche construction is a process by which organisms modify the selective environment such that there are new selection pressures acting on generations over long periods of time The modifications change selective pressures which in turn modify traits This occurs over long periods of evolutionary time (potentially millions of years).9 Humans are cultural “niche constructors par excellence”; however, they don’t just physically alter the environment, they also epistemically or cognitively engineer the environment (Sterelny 2003, 2012) Humans are born into a highly structured cognitive niche that contains not only physical artefacts, but also representational systems that embody knowledge (writing systems, number systems, etc.), and skills and methods for training and teaching new skills (Menary and Kirchhoff 2014) Following Sterelny (2012) we term this “cognitive capital” These highly structured socio-cultural niches have had profound evolutionary consequences in the hominin lineage The primary consequence is phenotypic and developmental plasticity We have evolved to be a very behaviourally plastic species (Sterelny 2012) Rather than thinking of humans as adapted for Pleistocene hunting and gathering environments, we should think of human behavioural and developmental plasticity as an adaptive response to the variability and contingency of the local environment (Finlayson 2009; Potts 2012; Sterelny 2003, 2012) Modern humans are capable of developing a wide range of skills that allow them to cope with a wide variety of environments.This cognitive flexibility requires an extended period of cognitive development, much more so even than that of our nearest relatives, such as the different species of great apes What’s the importance of the cognitive niche? The main innovations are to add an extra line of inheritance to the single genetic line of inheritance whereby an ecological niche, as well as genetic material, are inherited by the next generation (Odling-Smee, Laland & Feldman 2003) Organisms are born into niches that they inherit from the previous generation These niches have been acted upon by previous generations often structuring and organising it in ways that would not otherwise occur The constructed niche places selective pressure onto phenotypes, which in turn results in further modifications of the niche, leading to a reciprocal relationship between organism and niche Over time the reciprocal relationship can result in evolutionary cascades, which can have profound effects on phenotypes, including morphological and behavioural changes (Sterelny 2005) “Humans are niche constructors par excellence” (Sterelny 2012, p. 145) To understand the nature of human niche construction, we must introduce a third line of inheritance: cultural 76 Downloaded By: Macquarie University Library At: 02:40 12 Feb 2018; For: 9781315530178, chapter4, 10.4324/97813155301 Embodying culture inheritance.10 Cultural inheritance includes tools, artefacts and so on, but also more intangible products of human cultures such as knowledge, narratives, skills and representational systems, systems of pedagogy and a large variety of practices.The cultural niche is a rich milieu in which human children learn and develop.The crucial change for behaviourally modern humans is the capacity for cumulative cultural inheritance, “which was ultimately to transform Homo sapiens into the richly cultural species we are today” (Whiten et al 2011, p. 942) The standard interpretation of the archaeological record indicates that there was a revolution approximately 60,000–40,000 years ago – the Upper Palaeolithic revolution – in which there was a real explosion of novelty and the advent of behaviourally modern humans However, there is evidence that many of these traits, including symbolic activity, could precede the Upper Palaeolithic revolution and could have appeared and vanished irregularly over the last 150,000 years or so (see Sterelny 2012 for an overview) For instance d’Errico and colleagues (2001) propose that there is evidence of symbolic activity on bone fragments 70,000 years ago Sterelny argues that this transient appearance of precursors of behavioural modernity implies that behavioural modernity is a cultural achievement premised on multiple factors rather than a single genetic change or cultural innovation This suggests that establishing the successful retention of cultural innovations is difficult, but once it can be transmitted in a stable manner that cultural niche construction escalates – what Tomasello (1999) calls the “cultural ratchet effect”.11 This fits nicely with the emphasis on cognitive niche construction proposed by the CI position The explosion of cultural and behavioural diversity that accelerates from the Upper Palaeolithic is dependent on a range of factors coming together: inherited cultural capital, phenotypic and learning driven plasticity, complex social relations and language In this period we see increasing genuine novelty in tool production and use; art, including jewellery, paintings, sculpture and musical activity; fishing and a wider range of cooperative hunting and foraging; burial practices; cultural diversification; and the first signs of proto-numerical and writing systems as novel representational innovations such as tally notch systems (see Conard 2006 for an overview).These could have been for keeping track of economic exchanges, lunar calendars or hunting tallies (d’Errico & Caucho 1994) The tools themselves, but also the skills necessary to make, maintain and deploy the tools, must be inherited from the previous generation Tool creation and use requires very refined sensorimotor skills (Stout et al 2008),12 which must be learned Basic sensorimotor skills are being retrained and extended during the acquisition process Here is where LDP really makes a difference; without LDP the acquisition of the skills required for creating, maintaining and manipulating tools would be very difficult Social learning in highly scaffolded niches and LDP are co-constraining Without a sufficient degree of neural plasticity social learning is attenuated, but without structured and stable learning environments functional redeployment of neural circuitry cannot happen through learning.This construction accounts for the structuring of the environment and its inheritance by future generations LDP accounts for how our brains can acquire novel culturally derived cognitive functions Putting the two together explains how we have evolved to be the cultural creatures that we are The next section explores the process of enculturation Enculturation Tomasello (1999, 2009) has pointed out that although other animals have culture, in humans it is both quantitatively and qualitatively unique Human culture is quantitatively unique due to the extraordinary amount of techniques and tools and accompanying NPPs which novices 77 Downloaded By: Macquarie University Library At: 02:40 12 Feb 2018; For: 9781315530178, chapter4, 10.4324/97813155301 Richard Menary and Alexander James Gillett must necessarily learn in order to survive But Tomasello also identifies two senses in which human culture is qualitatively unique: cultural ratcheting (accumulative downstream niche construction), and social institutions (“sets of behavioural practices governed by various kinds of mutually recognised norms and rules” (2009, p. xi)) – what we have termed NPPs Both of these profoundly change the nature of human cognition Learning NPPs in a developmental niche transforms a human agent’s cognitive capacities so that they can tackle cognitive tasks that were previously impossible or inconceivable A broad range of theorists have advanced enculturated cognitive positions (see Hutchins 2011; Lende & Downey 2012; Nisbet et al 2001; Roepstorff et al 2010; Tomasello 1999; Vygotsky 1978) Here we develop the position advanced by Menary (2007a, b, 2010a, b, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015) which argues that humans construct and inhabit cognitive niches in which our minds become enculturated and transformed through the learning and mastering of NPPs that govern the manipulation of environmental resources and interactions of social groups The key factors of the enculturated cognitive position of CI can be summarised as follows: [1] NPPs governing the embodied manipulations of physical tools; which operate in [2] highly structured and cooperative shared cognitive niches, importantly including a developmental component with implicit and explicit teaching through which NPPs are acquired; and this process is in turn dependent on [3] general phenotypic plasticity – especially neural plasticity – that allows for the transformative effects of the learning and enculturating processes to take place.This transformation relies on the recycling or redeploying of older cortical structures to newer cultural acquisitions (Anderson 2010, Dehaene & Cohen 2007) As Tomasello (1999, p. 7) puts it: enculturation processes not . . . create new cognitive skills out of nothing, but rather they took existing individually based cognitive skills – such as those possessed by most primates for dealing with space, objects, tools, quantities, categories, social relationships, communication, and social learning – and transformed them into new, culturally based cognitive skills with a social-collective dimension (emphasis added) Importantly, this quote highlights that enculturation is the exaptation or redeployment of pre-existing cortical structures to newer culturally generated functions But Tomasello also points out that enculturation is both an ancient and ongoing process occurring at three distinct timescales (Tomasello 1999) Firstly, over phylogenetic timescales – the evolution of the human primate; Laland et al (2010) have collected a wide range of evidence that cultural practices have affected the human genome Secondly, over historical timescales – this is the accumulation of cognitive capital with the high fidelity transmission of skilled practices and cultural knowledge both horizontally and vertically and downstream epistemic engineering in a specific cognitivecultural niche (Sterelny 2003, 2012) The veridicality of communication and learning channels within the niche allows for the retention of improvements – what Tomasello (1999) calls “cultural ratcheting” Hutchins (2001) refers to this process as the distribution of cognition across time, whereby cognitive tasks are successfully tackled intergenerationally through the collaborative and distributed effort of multiple agents building and refining shared mediums and tools that are accumulated and refined to manage recurring everyday cognitive tasks This changes the informational profile of the epistemic niche over time and alters the nature of the cognitive tasks as well Lastly, enculturation takes place over ontogenetic timescales – this is the inculcation of specific agents in developmental niches (Stotz 2010) Humans have an incredibly high propensity 78 Downloaded By: Macquarie University Library At: 02:40 12 Feb 2018; For: 9781315530178, chapter4, 10.4324/97813155301 Embodying culture for teaching and learning (Dean et al 2012; Keil 2011) A key element of human learning is the functionally correct deployment of tools and perceiving of task-salient affordances of the environment (see Vaesen 2012, p. 206) By learning to master NPPs that govern the cognitive resources that have been accumulated by previous generations, agents are able to engage in cognitive tasks that would otherwise be incredibly difficult, impossible or potentially inconceivable.This is the transformative aspect of enculturation (Menary 2007a).13 LDP and the high degree of plasticity make humans highly susceptible to enculturation processes and acquiring cultural practices and skills Older cortical structures are redeployed into newer diverse cultural functions which have transformative effects on both neuronal architecture and physiological structure of the body It also enhances the functional performance of cognitive tasks, enabling agents to tackle novel cognitive tasks This is supported by an abundance of empirical evidence in a range of experimental paradigms to support enculturation: in cognitive domains such as attention (Ketay et al 2009), perception and motor processes (Nisbet et al 2001; Draganski et al 2004); music (Gaser & Schlaug 2003); literacy and language (Castro-Caldas et al 1999); moral reasoning, social cognition and emotions (Henrich et al 2010); categorisation, judgment, reasoning, problem solving and decision making (Henrich et al 2005, 2010; Nisbet et al 2001); memory and navigation (Maguire et al 2000); and tool use (Farne et al 2007) Downey and Lende (2012) provide a very useful overview of this evidence (and for more critical assessments of some of this research, see Roepstorff et al 2010; Reynolds Losin et al 2010) In the next section we will outline the practice of mathematics as a case of the transformative effects of enculturation, and also as partially constitutive of cognitive processes in hybrid ICS encompassing brain–body–niche interactions Before we so, it is important to clarify a few key aspects of the transformation thesis Firstly, to recap: Menary (2014) argues that the convergent evidence of a late-developing cortex; an extended developmental stage in humans; evidence of continuing plasticity in adults; diverse and hostile environments in our hominin evolutionary history; and complex social situations all drive the need for LDP In developmental niches this allows for the transformation of the agent’s functional capacities through the redeployment of neural circuits to enable the bodily manipulation of external representational vehicles and thus the acquisition of new skills (Menary 2015, p. 9) In turn, this allows the scaffolded agent to both [a] tackle cognitive tasks in new ways and [b] tackle cognitive tasks that could have been previously inconceivable (also see De Cruz & De Smedt 2013; Kirsh 2010; and Nieder & Dehaene 2009) Menary (2015) goes further in clarifying this He postulates that external material symbols and tools provide “novel” functions (p. 10) – i.e functional aspects that could not be done merely in the head – and it was these novel factors that lead to their proliferation As such, Menary argues that a wide range of human cognitive abilities are partially constituted by the learnt NPPs that agents must master in order to tackle novel cognitive problems using shared public symbols and other cognitive resources (also see Dutilh Novaes 2012, 2013).These environmental resources and the NPPs that govern their usage are part of particular culturalcognitive niches that are definitive of human cognition as ICS As Nersessian puts it: culture is not something additional to human cognition, “culture is what makes human cognition what it is” (2005, pp. 31–32) It is also important to clarify that the transformative effects of deploying cognitive artefacts is often misconstrued as simply “amplifying” or “augmenting” the cognitive capacities of the agent (for example, see Bruner et al 1966) Cole and Griffin (1980) have rightly observed that the use of epistemic tools does not straightforwardly amplify cognition in the way that a physical tool amplifies our physical prowess For instance, a spade may improve an agent’s digging abilities and a loudhailer amplifies the volume of someone’s voice, but it is not strictly true 79 Downloaded By: Macquarie University Library At: 02:40 12 Feb 2018; For: 9781315530178, chapter4, 10.4324/97813155301 Richard Menary and Alexander James Gillett that the manipulation of physical public symbol systems on a page or in a calculator amplify an agent’s capacities Instead, it is more accurate to see their manipulation as the alteration of the cognitive task or functional capacities to form a cognitive system that has different and “unique” sets of cognitive properties that are not present in the agent considered in isolation (Hutchins 2006; Norman 1991) This shows that when we consider the transformative effects of enculturation processes we must be careful to discern the level of analysis (Norman 1991) Additionally, the fact that hybrid integrated cognitive systems have properties not reducible to the individual indicates the need for a shift in the unit of analysis to necessarily incorporate the cognitive niche in order to properly understand human cognition as essentially enculturated (Hutchins 2011; Menary 2012, 2013, 2015) Mathematical cognition as a process of enculturation Experiments with animals (Ansari 2008), young children (Dehaene 1997), bilingual adults (Dehaene et al 1999) and adults from cultures without discrete number words (Dehaene 2007) in a range of experimental paradigms are highly suggestive of an “ancient number system” (ANS).This system is proposed to be amodal14 (Cantlon et al 2009; Dehaene et al 1998, 2004) and displays characteristics which render it approximate and fuzzy – distance effects (whereby the error rates in quantity comparison tasks increase as the distance separating the two quantities decreases) and magnitude effects (error rates increase as the absolute totals of the quantities involved in the tasks increase) (see Dehaene 1997 for an overview) On the basis of a large body of evidence, the ANS is postulated to be evolutionarily ancient The notion being that a basic capacity for discerning and discriminating quantity is evolutionarily advantageous: whether one can detect larger benefits and avoid larger dangers is something that improves the survival of an organism (Ansari 2008; Dehaene 1997) In humans, numerous neuroimaging studies and neuropathology studies indicate that the neural basis for the ANS is in the intraparietal sulcus and surrounding regions (Dehaene 1997, 2007 and colleagues 1999) But in addition to making approximate judgments about quantities, humans can also perform discrete computations with a “discrete number system” (DNS) A wide range of neuroimaging and behavioural studies indicates that the DNS and ANS share neural correlates (see Lyons et al 2012 for an extensive list of corroborating studies) The neural basis of a mental number line and ANS involves number-detecting neurons These neurons were postulated to fire approximately with fat tails: e.g a number detector that fires for will also partially fire for and This then explains the distance effect because for any value, multiple neurons will fire at differing degrees and this causes a degree of fuzziness for judgments of largest or smallest, etc Neural net models have been made of the distance and magnitude effects (Dehaene 2007;Verguts & Fias 2004) and these were supported by evidence of single-neuron studies on rhesus monkeys (Nieder et al 2006; see Ansari 2008 and Nieder & Dehaene 2009 for discussion) The tuning curves of these number-detecting cells overlap in a manner that is consistent with what one would expect with the distance effects Importantly, rather than undermining the enculturated cognitive position as some have argued (see Zahidi & Myin forthcoming), the transition from the ANS to the DNS is perhaps one of the best examples of enculturation The two effects and approximate nature of the ANS combine to give the mental number line a logarithmic structure Dehaene (2007) has argued that the acquisition of symbolic representations in development alters the structure of the mental number line to a more precise linear format Learning how to manipulate public symbolic notation – cultural practices – has a transformative effect on both cognitive functional performance and also on neural architecture Numerous sources of evidence lead to this view: 80 Downloaded By: Macquarie University Library At: 02:40 12 Feb 2018; For: 9781315530178, chapter4, 10.4324/97813155301 Embodying culture [1] longitudinal studies of brain activity in 8–19-year-olds show decreasing activity in the PFC during mathematical tasks suggestive of automatisation, but also shows increasing activity in the left parietal cortex (the postulated neural substrate of the mental number line); [2] young children asked to space the numbers to a 100 evenly on a page place “10” at the halfway point and bunch all the larger numbers up at one end; this behaviour is absent in adults but is present in some illiterate adults of traditional communities (e.g the Munduruku of the Amazon) that not have discrete number words; and [3] there is a mixed response to number tasks by bilinguals that is indicative of the participants switching into their native tongue to carry out the calculation of symbolic tasks (see Dehaene et al 1999; Lyons et al 2012; Piazza et al 2013; Viarouge et al 2010) This is clear evidence not just of enculturation, but also of the truly transformative effects that learning cultural practices can have on human cognition Culturally new capacities exapt and recycle older phylogenetic functional regions to newer culturally generated purposes (Dehaene & Cohen 2007) Dehaene further argues that the older phylogenetic functional basis constrains the extent to which it can be recycled/redeployed and shifted into a new function In this particular case the evidence suggests that an ancient primate or core neural system integrates symbolic numerical representations and that this both transforms mathematical cognitive functional capacities and alters neurological architecture Additionally, Cantlon and colleagues (2009) present evidence that young children use the same network of brain regions to tackle both symbolic and non-symbolic notations and that this is therefore an abstract, notationindependent appreciation of number This large body of evidence lends credence to the notion that the evolutionarily new use and manipulation of symbolic mediums recycles an evolutionarily older mechanism And the experiments by Lyons and colleagues (2012) also lend support to the claim that the number line is altered by enculturation These experiments reveal a disjunction between symbolic to symbolic processing and symbolic to non-symbolic processing – this matches the “rupture” noted by Radford (2003) in the development of mathematical abilities from pre-symbolic to symbolic manipulations (also see Deacon 1997; Nieder 2009) And this also fits with the wider body of evidence that shows that increased PFC activity in novices diminishes as they become expert in modern mathematical cognitive practices Finally, these learning driven neuroplastic changes reach their peak in expert mathematicians who have macroscopically altered regions that are involved in both arithmetic and also the visuospatial imagery necessary for the manipulation of complex objects required for advanced mathematics (Aydin et al 2007).15 If modern mathematical abilities involve the redeployment of older cortical structures to newer functions, we would expect to find both diversity and constraints in how humans from different cognitive-cultural backgrounds perform in mathematical cognitive tasks And indeed this is what has been found An experiment by Tang and colleagues (2006) demonstrates that the differing NPPs of different cultural-cognitive niches can have effects on both neuronal architecture and function, and behavioural performance Tang and colleagues compared two groups of students – English speakers and Chinese speakers – and found that the former had neural correlates in the perisylvian language regions whereas the latter had correlates in the premotor cortex Additionally, although of comparative intelligence, the Chinese students outperformed their English counterparts In a review, Cantlon and Brannon (2006) observed that there were many factors from the cognitive-cultural niche that could account for such differences: abacus use; differences in writing styles; differing styles of number words (Chinese number words are much less demanding on working memory); preferred cognitive strategies; and overall education systems (also see Butterworth 1999; cf Reynolds Losin et al 2010) 81 Downloaded By: Macquarie University Library At: 02:40 12 Feb 2018; For: 9781315530178, chapter4, 10.4324/97813155301 Richard Menary and Alexander James Gillett This example shows the importance of the cognitive niche for how agents approach cognitive tasks Differing sets of tools, techniques and NPPs alter how cognitive tasks are performed The importance of the brain–body–niche interactions in mathematical cognition is further demonstrated by a range of behavioural studies A series of experiments by Zhang (1997; Zhang & Norman 1994) has shown that if the structure of the external representations used for a cognitive task instantiate salient features of the abstract task properties, they facilitate cognitive offloading and reduce the information load on working memory and improve overall task performance Zhang and Norman (1995) supported these findings with an analytic comparison of various notational systems to show that the prevalence of Hindu-Arabic and general cultural invasiveness is due to the formal structure of the material symbols which makes them far superior to Roman numerals for calculations The structure of the external representation separates out the base and power dimensions in a perceptually convenient manner For example, four-hundred and forty-seven in Arabic numerals is 447 = 4 × 10(2) × × 10(1) × × 10(0), and the shape is the base and position is the power In Roman numerals it is CDXLVII and as such position does not correspond to power and the shape does not correspond to base In another set of experiments, Landy and Goldstone (2007) subtly modified seemingly non-task specific perceptual groupings around algebraic equations in a series of experiments This included increasing or decreasing the size of gaps between terms in the equations; adding in shaded areas in the backgrounds of the equations that created perceptual groups; and reordering terms to be either cognisant or contradictory to the FOIL order of operations (also see Dutlih Novaes 2012 for discussion) As in Zhang and colleagues’ work, these modifications of the structure of the external representations either aided or hindered task performance dependent on whether they were congruent to the order of operations in the equations or not Crucially, these modifications had an effect even when participants knew they were being influenced, indicating that “perceptual groupings” play a larger role in abstract mathematical thinking than is normally acknowledged We can interpret the work of a wide range of theorists from different fields (Alibali & DiRusso 1999; Landy et al 2014; Nemirovsky et al 2013; Radford 2009; Sato et al 2007) as all broadly arguing that embodied manipulations of cognitive tools – looping brain–body–niche interactions – are incredibly important in mathematical cognition; not just for pedagogy and learning, but also for high-level expert problem solving (Marghetis & Nunez 2013) Building on this we can argue that accumulative downstream cognitive niches constrain and enable how mathematical cognitive tasks are tackled Along similar lines De Cruz and De Smedt (2013) have argued that symbols (and other external representational vehicles such as body parts, gestures, number words and tally systems – see De Cruz 2008) act as “material anchors” and are “epistemic actions” – whereby the physical manipulations of the environment are not just physical movements but are themselves also movements in an abstract problem space towards a cognitive task (Kirsh & Maglio 1994; also see Hutchins 2005) De Cruz and De Smedt demonstrate their position through a number of historical case studies: zero (0); imaginary (i) and subsequent complex numbers (a+bi); negative numbers (‑n); and algebra (x, y, z, etc.) In each case, they show that the material sign played a role in discovery by facilitating the cementation (stability) of vague ideas which aids the creative effort For example, in the case of negative numbers, the minus sign was already used as an operator before the drive for closure enabled the invention of numbers “below” or “beyond” zero This allowed the possibility of conceiving of a task that was previous inconceivable De Cruz and De Smedt nicely demonstrate this by juxtaposing the seemingly mundane nature of the task in the modern era with a quote from a prominent mathematician Masères from the 17th century: “ ‘3 − is an impossibility; it requires you take from more than there is in 3, which is absurd’ ” (2013, p. 13) As Menary (2010b, 82 Downloaded By: Macquarie University Library At: 02:40 12 Feb 2018; For: 9781315530178, chapter4, 10.4324/97813155301 Embodying culture 2015) has argued, it is the learning and deploying of NPPs which govern the embodied manipulations of these cognitive artefacts and which transforms the cognitive abilities of the wider integrated cognitive system As such, the agent trained in the manipulation of mathematical notation is able to tackle cognitive tasks in a superior manner, and also able to comprehend tasks that would otherwise be impossible Conclusion Cognitive integration is a framework which allows us to explain how cognition is enculturated It does so by providing a dual account of the cultural evolution of cognition and learning It uniquely provides an account of how we embody culture and how culture provides new cognitive functions that redeploy our basic sensorimotor interactions with the environment These looping interactions and cognitive practices are a form of cognitive niche construction whereby brain–body–niche interactions alter not only the physical environment but also the inherited informational profile in which future generations are enculturated, and transforms the nature of the cognitive tasks that they face.The process of enculturation hinges on the plasticity of our brains and our capacity for flexible redeployment of existing cognitive capacities to innovative cultural functions It also requires openness to learning in highly scaffolded and social learning environments The importance of enculturation lies in the acquisition of new capacities, allowing us to perform tasks that we should otherwise be unable to Culture permeates our physical and mental lives, but it does so through our inherited cognitive capital and the plasticity of our existing cognitive circuitry Notes The chapter is jointly authored Both authors are based at the department of Philosophy, Macquarie University Sydney Research for this article was supported by the Australian Research Council, Future Fellowship FT 130100960 This is what Menary (2012, 2015) calls a process of enculturation Coordination dynamics are the interactions between the components of the system – both processes and structures (see Menary 2013 for more details) This refines Menary’s earlier analysis of cognitive practices in terms of Biological coupling, Epistemic actions, Self-correcting actions and Cognitive practices (Menary 2007a, 2010a, 2010b) The term cognitive practices is now more all-encompassing for all these other kinds of cognitive manipulations Although interactions of this kind aren’t obviously practice-like, they are often influenced by cultural practice Sensorimotor capacities that underlie our capacities for various skills, such as driving and writing, are good examples of how we embody cultural practices The exposition here aims for brevity Menary (2007a, 2016) provides a detailed account of the developmental aspects of corrective practices These actions are direct manipulations of the task structure in the environment rather than internal representations And although experts perform more physical acts, their performance is faster and more accurate than novices who rely more heavily on internal resources For such an account see Menary (2007a, Chapters 4–6) See Turner (2000) for plentiful examples 10 Or we might blend the ecological and cultural into a single line of inheritance Odling-Smee (2007) has expressed skepticism about the need for a third line of inheritance He argues that separating the ecological and the cultural is ad hoc and complicated and outweighs the benefits of treating them separately Irrespectively, cultural inheritance matters for understanding human niche construction; and there does seem to be a prima facie qualitative difference between cultural inheritance and physical engineering 11 See section three for more discussion of Tomasello 12 This is evident even in Homo habilis and the Erectines and is another example of a biological interaction 13 This has been discussed in a number of places: Menary (2007b, 2010a, 2010b, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015) 83 Downloaded By: Macquarie University Library At: 02:40 12 Feb 2018; For: 9781315530178, chapter4, 10.4324/97813155301 Richard Menary and Alexander James Gillett Or perhaps multi-modal, since the ANS appears to be sensitive to multiple sensory modalities 15 Potentially, the enculturated cognitive approach offers an interesting perspective on a perennial topic in the psychology of mathematics: the prevalence of the folk-metaphysical belief in Platonism amongst practicing mathematicians A precursor to this was formulated by the mathematician Keith Devlin (2008) We can rephrase his claim in the following manner: a possible explanation for why Platonism is the default folk-belief system of mathematical practitioners is that by redeploying cortical circuits whose original function was spatial navigation and patterns, these neural circuits bring “baggage” with them – namely, that they are directed at real entities out there in the world And the prevalence of spatial language in discussions of mathematical entities may be indicative of this References Alibali, M W. & DiRusso, A A (1999) The functions of gesture in learning to count more than keeping track Cognitive Development, 14, 37–56 Anderson, M L (2010) Neural Reuse: A fundamental organizational principle of the brain Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33, 245–264 Ansari, D (2008) Effects of development and enculturation on number representation in the brain Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 9, 278–291 Aydin, K., Ucar, A., Oguz, K K., Okur, O O., Agayev, A., Unal, Z., . . 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Mathematical reasoning and external symbolic systems Logique? ?& Analyse, 221, 45–65 Farne, Serino? ?& Ladavas (2007) Dynamic size-change of peri-hand space following tool-use: Determinants and spatial characteristics