Thinking like a lawyer an introduction to legal reasoning

“A comprehensive overview of the standard techniques of legal reasoning It stands out because of the way it enriches the basic discussion with perspectives from legal history and theory.” —Joan Williams, UC Hastings College of the Law “The first post-realist look at legal reasoning which manages at one and the same time to take legal reasoning seriously and yet not be taken in by it Written in a lively and engaging style, this book is both comprehensive in its treatment of the subject and provocative in its central argument, namely that thinking like a lawyer means making judgments about policies Thinking Like a Lawyer is a real achievement.” —Austin Sarat, Amherst College Law students, law professors, and lawyers frequently refer to the process of “thinking like a lawyer,” but attempts to analyze in any systematic way what is meant by that phrase are rare In this practical and accessible introduction, Kenneth J Vandevelde defines this elusive phrase and clearly identifies the techniques involved in thinking like a lawyer When Vandevelde’s Thinking Like a Lawyer was first published, it became an instant classic, considered by many to be the gold standard introduction to legal reasoning The second edition offers a new generation of students, lawyers, and lay readers important insight into a well-developed and valuable way of thinking Updated throughout, this edition features a new chapter on contemporary perspectives on legal reasoning, as well as new sections on the legislative process, the judicial process, and the role of cognitive bias in jury deliberations Kenneth J Vandevelde is professor of law and former dean at Thomas Jefferson School of Law in San Diego A graduate of Harvard Law School, he has practiced law before U.S courts and international tribunals He is the author of four books and numerous articles on U.S and international law COVER DESIGN: MIGUEL SANTANA & WENDY HALITZER T H I NK ING LIKE A LAWYE R “Vandevelde restores luster to the phrase ‘thinking like a lawyer.’ Everyone, whether a newly entering law student or an experienced practitioner, will take away from Thinking Like a Lawyer valuable insights about law and lawyering in the United States.” —Christopher G Wren and Jill Robinson Wren, coauthors, The Legal Research Manual VANDEVELDE Praise for the First Edition of Thinking Like a Lawyer SECO N D ED ITI O N A Member of the Perseus Books Group www.westviewpress.com www.perseusacademic.com “Contains the best introduction to legal reasoning that I know of.” —Duncan Kennedy, Harvard Law School THINKING LIKE A LAWYER AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING KENNETH J VANDEVELDE Second Edition 0813344645-Vandevelde_Layout 10/13/10 10:29 AM Page i Thinking Like a Lawyer 0813344645-Vandevelde_Layout 10/13/10 10:29 AM Page ii 0813344645-Vandevelde_Layout 10/13/10 10:29 AM Page iii TH I N KI NG LI KE A LAWYER An Introduction to Legal Reasoning SECOND EDITION Kenneth J Vandevelde Thomas Jefferson School of Law A Member of the Perseus Books Group 0813344645-Vandevelde_Layout 10/13/10 10:29 AM Page iv Westview Press was founded in 1975 in Boulder, Colorado, by notable publisher and intellectual Fred Praeger Westview Press continues to publish scholarly titles and high-quality undergraduate- and graduatelevel textbooks in core social science disciplines With books developed, written, and edited with the needs of serious nonfiction readers, professors, and students in mind, Westview Press honors its long history of publishing books that matter Copyright © 2011 by Westview Press Published by Westview Press, A Member of the Perseus Books Group All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America No part of this book may be reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews For information, address Westview Press, 2465 Central Avenue, Boulder, CO 80301 Find us on the World Wide Web at www.westviewpress.com Westview Press books are available at special discounts for bulk purchases in the United States by corporations, institutions, and other organizations For more information, please contact the Special Markets Department at the Perseus Books Group, 2300 Chestnut Street, Suite 200, Philadelphia, PA 19103, or call (800) 810-4145, ext 5000, or e-mail special.markets@perseusbooks.com Designed by Timm Bryson Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Vandevelde, Kenneth J Thinking like a lawyer : an introduction to legal reasoning / Kenneth J Vandevelde.—2nd ed p cm Includes bibliographical references and index ISBN 978-0-8133-4464-5 (alk paper) Law—Methodology Law—Interpretation and construction I Title K212.V36 2010 340'.11—dc22 2010034664 10 0813344645-Vandevelde_Layout 10/13/10 10:29 AM Page v For Lidia, Jenny, and Shelly 0813344645-Vandevelde_Layout 10/13/10 10:29 AM Page vi 0813344645-Vandevelde_Layout 10/13/10 10:29 AM Page vii contents Acknowledgments, xv introduction,  I How Lawyers Think, II The Plan of This Book, III Thinking Like a Law Student, PA R T O N E BASIC LEGAL REASON I NG  identifying applicable law,  I The Sources of American Law, 10 A Enacted Law, 11 The Legislative Process, 12 The Administrative Process, 14 B Case Law, 15 The District Court, 16 a Bringing a Dispute Before the Court, 16 b Identifying Issues, 20 vii 0813344645-Vandevelde_Layout 10/13/10 10:29 AM Page viii viii Contents c Deciding Issues, 21 d Distinguishing Between Issues of Law and Fact, 24 The Court of Appeals, 25 The Supreme Court, 27 II Identifying Applicable Law, 28 A Identifying the Government with Power: An Introduction to Choice of Law Theory, 28 Vertical Choice of Law Analysis, 29 Horizontal Choice of Law Analysis, 29 B Identifying Law by Subject Matter: An Introduction to Rule Analysis, 31 The Nature of Rules: Form, 31 The Nature of Rules: Substance, 32 The Problem of Generality, 33 C Identifying Void Rules: An Introduction to Constitutionalism, 34  analyzing the law,  I Analyzing Statutes, 37 II Analyzing Cases, 40 A The Components of a Case, 40 Facts, 40 Procedural History, 40 Questions Presented, 41 Rules of Law, 41 Application of Law to Fact, 42 Holding, 45 Disposition, 47 Dissents and Concurrences, 47 B An Introduction to Stare Decisis, 50 III Analyzing Rights and Duties, 53 A The Meaning of Right and Duty, 53 B Three Characteristics of Rights and Duties, 54 C The Significance of the Three Characteristics, 55  synthesizing the law,  I Synthesizing Rules: General to Specific, 57 0813344645-Vandevelde_Layout 10/13/10 10:29 AM Page ix Contents A The Basic Organizing Principle, 58 B Relationships Among Rules, 58 Rules Defining an Element of a More General Rule, 58 Rules Applying a More General Rule, 59 Rules Limiting a More General Rule, 60 Rules Cumulative to Another Rule, 62 Rules Contradicting Another Rule, 63 C Outlining the Synthesis, 65 II Synthesizing a Rule: Specific to General, 67 A The Basic Model, 68 B The Problem of Indeterminacy, 69 C Addressing Indeterminacy Through Policy Judgments, 71 D Using Rule Synthesis as an Advocate, 73 Supporting the New Rule, 73 Opposing the New Rule, 74  researching the facts,  I The Role of Factual Research, 77 II The Rules of Factual Investigation, 78 A The Law of Evidence, 79 Types of Evidence Admissible, 79 The Requirement of Relevance, 80 Reasons to Exclude Relevant Evidence, 81 a Unreliability: The Example of Hearsay, 81 b Prejudice: The Example of Prior Bad Acts, 82 c Other Policies: The Example of Privilege, 83 B The Burden of Proof, 83 Types of Burdens of Proof, 84 Techniques to Persuade the Trier of Fact, 86 Presumptions, 87 C The Problem of Cognitive Bias, 89  applying the law,  I Deduction, 93 A The Basic Model, 93 B The Problem of Indeterminacy, 95 C Addressing Indeterminacy Through Specificity, 96 ix 0813344645-Vandevelde_Layout 10/13/10 10:29 AM Page 318 318 Selected Bibliography D Farber & S Sherry, Beyond All Reason: The Radical Assault on Truth in American Law (1997) L Fuller, The Morality of Law (rev ed 1969) G Gilmore, The Ages of American Law (1977) T Gilovich, D Griffin, & D Kahneman, eds., Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (2002) J Harrison & J Theeuwes, Law and Economics (2008) H Hart & A Sacks, The Legal Process (1994) H L A Hart, The Concept of Law (1961) J Herget, American Jurisprudence, 1870–1970: A History (1990) M Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780–1860 (1977) ———, The Transformation of American Law, 1870–1960 (1992) W Huhn, The Five Types of Legal Argument (2nd ed 2008) D Kairys, ed., The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique (3rd ed 1998) M Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies (1987) D Kennedy & W Fisher IIII, Canons of American Legal Thought (2006) E Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (1949) D Litowitz, Postmodern Philosophy and Law (1997) K Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush (1930) D Luban, Legal Modernism (1994) R Malloy, Law and Market Economy (2000) N Mercuro & S Medema, Economics and the Law: From Posner to PostModernism (1997) E Mertz, The Language of Law School: Learning to “Think Like a Lawyer” (2007) A Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics (3rd ed 2003) S Popkin, The History and Theory of Statutory Interpretation (1999) R Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (7th ed 2007) ———, How Judges Think (2008) ———, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy (2003) E Purcell, The Crisis of Democratic Theory (1973) M Radin, Reinterpreting Property (1993) A Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (1997) A Scalia & B Garner, Making Your Case: The Art of Persuading Judges (2008) F Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer (2009) C Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (1996) ———, One Case at a Time (1999) W Twining & D Miers, How to Do Things with Rules (4th ed 1999) R Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement (1986) ———, Knowledge and Politics (1975) F Valdes, J Culp, & A Harris, Crossroads, Directions, and a New Critical Race Theory (2002) L Weinreb, Legal Reason: The Use of Analogy in Legal Argument (2005) D K Weisberg, Feminist Legal Theory: Foundations (1993) 0813344645-Vandevelde_Layout 10/13/10 10:29 AM Page 319 Selected Bibliography 319 G White, Patterns of American Legal Thought (1978) A Wing, Critical Race Feminism: A Reader (2nd ed 2003) Articles Abramowicz & Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 Stan L Rev 953 (2005) Ackerman, Law, Economics, and the Problem of Legal Culture, 1986 Duke L J 929 (1989) Alexander, Bad Beginnings, 145 U Pa L Rev 57 (1996) ———, The Banality of Legal Reasoning, 73 Notre Dame L Rev 517 (1998) ———, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S Cal L Rev (1989) Alexander & Sherwin, The Deceptive Nature of Rules, 142 U Pa L Rev 1191 (1994) Allen & Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 Nw U L Rev 1769 (2003) Balkin, The Crystalline Structure of Legal Thought, 39 Rutgers L Rev (1986) Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation, Cardozo L Rev 799 (1985) Boyle, The Anatomy of a Torts Class, 34 Am U L Rev 1003 (1985) ———, The Politics of Reason, 133 U Pa L Rev 685 (1985) Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 Stan L Rev 765 (1982) Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 Harv L Rev 925 (1996) Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S Cal L Rev 845 (1992) Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J Legal Educ 222 (1984) Chow, Trashing Nihilism, 65 Tul L Rev 221 (1990) Coleman, The Normative Basis of Economic Analysis: A Critical Review of Richard Posner’s The Economics of Justice, 34 Stan L Rev 1105 (1982) Cornell, Toward a Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U Pa L Rev 291 (1985) Cotter, Legal Pragmatism and the Law and Economics Movement, 84 Georgetown L Rev 2071 (1996) Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 Yale L J 997 (1985) Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U Pa L Rev 1997 (2004) Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 Geo Wash L Rev 1119 (1998) Ernst, The Critical Tradition in the Writing of American Legal History, 102 Yale L J 1019 (1993) Eskridge & Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 Stan L Rev 321 (1984) Faigman, Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding: Exploring the Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U Pa L Rev 541 (1991) Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reasoning: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 Vand L Rev 533 (1992) ———, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 Minn L Rev 1331 (1988) 0813344645-Vandevelde_Layout 10/13/10 10:29 AM Page 320 320 Selected Bibliography ———, Reinventing Brandeis: Legal Pragmatism for the Twenty-first Century, 1995 U Ill L Rev 163 Farber & Frickey, Practical Reasoning and the First Amendment, 34 U.C.L.A L Rev 1615 (1987) Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 Stan L Rev 739 (1982) Fried, The Artificial Reasoning of the Law; or, What Lawyers Know, 60 Tex L Rev 35 (1981) Friedman, Standards of Persuasion and the Distinction Between Fact and Law, 86 Nw U L Rev 916 (1992) Gillette, Rules, Standards, and Precautions in Payment Systems, 82 Va L Rev 181 (1996) Golding, Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy in Twentieth-Century America: Major Themes and Developments, 36 J Legal Educ 441 (1986) Gordley, Legal Reasoning: An Introduction, 72 Cal L Rev 138 (1984) Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 Stan L Rev 57 (1984) ———, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 Yale L J 1017 (1981) Graff, “Keep Off the Grass,” “Drop Dead,” and Other Indeterminacies: A Response to Sanford Levinson, 60 Tex L Rev 405 (1982) Grey, Freestanding Legal Pragmatism, 18 Cardozo L Rev 21 (1996) ———, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 Stan L Rev 787 (1989) ———, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U Pitt L Rev (1983) Grodin, Are Rules Really Better than Standards? 45 Hastings L J 569 (1994) Hantzis, Legal Innovation Within the Wider Intellectual Tradition: The Pragmatism of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 82 Nw U L Rev 541 (1988) Hoeflich, Law and Geometry: Legal Science from Leibnitz to Langdell, 30 Am J Legal Hist 95 (1986) Huhn, The Stages of Legal Reasoning: Formalism, Analogy, and Realism, 48 Vill L Rev 305 (2003) Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want to Be Radical? 36 Stan L Rev 247 (1984) Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L J 557 (1992) Kelman, Trashing, 36 Stan L Rev 293 (1984) Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 Stan L Rev 387 (1981) ———, Distributive and Paternalistic Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 Md L Rev 563 (1982) ———, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv L Rev 1685 (1976) ———, Legal Formality, J Leg Stud 351 (1973) ———, A Semiotics of Legal Argument, 42 Syracuse L Rev 75 (1991) ———, The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 28 Buff L Rev 205 (1979) Kennedy & Klare, A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies, 94 Yale L J 461 (1984) 0813344645-Vandevelde_Layout 10/13/10 10:29 AM Page 321 Selected Bibliography 321 Kennedy & Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient? Hofstra L Rev 711 (1980) Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Forms: Rules vs Standards Revisited, 79 Ore L Rev 23 (2000) Lamond, Do Precedents Create Rules? 11 Legal Theory (2005) Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective, 52 Vand L Rev 647 (1999) Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 Va L Rev 451 (1974) Leiter, Heidegger and the Theory of Adjudication, 106 Yale L J 253 (1996) ———, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 Colum L Rev 1138 (1999) Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism: Responding to Dean Pound, 44 Harv L Rev 1222 (1931) Lyons, Legal Formalism and Instrumentalism: A Pathological Study, 66 Cornell L Rev 949 (1981) Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 Harv L Rev 2387 (2003) ———, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum L Rev (2001) Markovitz, Duncan’s Do Nots: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Determination of Legal Entitlements, 36 Stan L Rev 1169 (1984) Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the Economic Theory of Law, 62 Minn L Rev 1015 (1978) Miles & Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U Chi L Rev 831 (2008) Minda, Jurisprudence at Century’s End, 43 J Legal Educ 27 (1993) ———, The Jurisprudential Movements of the 1980s, 50 Ohio St L J 599 (1989) Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Legal Theory: A Turn for the Worse? 41 Stan L Rev 871 (1989) Note, ’Round and ’Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal Scholarship, 95 Harv L Rev 1669 (1982) Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 Cal L Rev 1152 (1985) Posner, The Decline of the Law as an Autonomous Discipline, 1962–1987, 100 Harv L Rev 761 (1987) Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 Am L Rev 12 (1910) ———, Mechanical Jurisprudence, Colum L Rev 605 (1908) ———, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 25 Harv L Rev 489 (1912) Rachlinski, Bottom-Up and Top-Down Decisionmaking, 73 U Chi L Rev 993 (2006) Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S Cal L Rev 1699 (1990) ———, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B U L Rev 69 (1989) Radin & Michelman, Pragmatist and Poststructuralist Critical Legal Practice, 139 U Pa L Rev 1019 (1991) Scalia, The Rule of Law as the Law of Rules, 56 U Chi L Rev 1175 (1989) Schanck, Understanding Postmodern Thought and Its Implications for Statutory Interpretation, 65 S Cal L Rev 2505 (1992) 0813344645-Vandevelde_Layout 10/13/10 10:29 AM Page 322 322 Selected Bibliography Scharffs, The Character of Legal Reasoning, 61 Wash & Lee L Rev 733 (2004) Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law? 73 U Chi L Rev 883 (2006) ———, Easy Cases, 58 S Cal L Rev 399 (1985) ———, Formalism, 97 Yale L J 509 (1988) ———, Giving Reasons, 47 Stan L Rev 633 (1995) ———, Precedent, 39 Stan L Rev 571 (1987) ———, Prescriptions in Three Dimensions, 82 Iowa L Rev 911 (1997) ———, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 Harv J L & Pub Pol 645 (1991) ———, Slippery Slopes, 99 Harv L Rev 361 (1985) Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 Tex L Rev 1627 (1991) ———, Rules and Standards, 33 U.C.L.A L Rev 379 (1985) Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the Yale Experience, 28 Buff L Rev 459 (1979) ———, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: The Singular Case of Underhill Moore, 29 Buff L Rev 195 (1980) ———, Notes Toward an Intimate, Opinionated, and Affectionate History of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, 36 Stan L Rev 391 (1984) Sherwin, A Defense of Analogical Reasoning in Law, 66 U Chi L Rev 1179 (1999) ———, Judges as Rulemakers, 73 U Chi L Rev 919 (2006) Shiffron, Liberalism, Radicalism, and Legal Scholarship, 30 U.C.L.A L Rev 1103 (1983) Shutkin, Pragmatism and the Promise of Adjudication, 18 Vermont L Rev 57 (1993) Simon, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Look Through the Lens of Cognitive Psychology, 67 Brooklyn L Rev 1097 (2002) ———, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U Chi L Rev 511 (2004) Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wisc L Rev 975 (1982) ———, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 Yale L J (1984) Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 Yale L J 409 (1990) Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U Chi L Rev 462 (1987) Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic? 100 Harv L Rev 332 (1986) Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv L Rev 24 (1992) Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century American Legal Thought: A Synthesis and Critique of Our Dominant General Theory About Law and Its Use, 66 Cornell L Rev 861 (1981) Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv L Rev 405 (1989) ———, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 Harv L Rev 741 (1993) 0813344645-Vandevelde_Layout 10/13/10 10:29 AM Page 323 Selected Bibliography 323 Symposium, Interpretation Symposium, 58 S Cal L Rev (1985) ———, Symposium on Critical Legal Studies, 36 Stan L Rev (1984) ———, Symposium on Post-Chicago Law and Economics, 65 Chi.-Kent L Rev (1989) ———, Symposium on the Future of Law and Economics, 20 Hofstra L Rev 757 (1992) ———, Symposium on the Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal Thought, 63 S Cal L Rev 1569 (1990) Turley, The Hitchhiker’s Guide to CLS, Unger, and Deep Thought, 81 Nw U L Rev 593 (1987) Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional Law: An Essay in Deconstruction, 36 Stan L Rev 623 (1984) ———, Critical Legal Studies: An Introduction to Its Origins and Underpinnings, 36 J Legal Educ 505 (1986) ———, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 Yale L J 1515 (1991) ———, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretation and Neutral Principles, 96 Harv L Rev 781 (1985) Vetter, Postwar Legal Scholarship on Judicial Decisionmaking, 33 J Legal Educ 412 (1983) Wellman, Dworkin and the Legal Process Tradition: The Legacy of Hart and Sacks, 29 Ariz L Rev 413 (1987) ———, Practical Reasoning and Judicial Justification: Toward an Adequate Theory, 57 U Colo L Rev 45 (1985) Wells, Improving One’s Situation: Some Pragmatic Reflections on the Art of Judging, 49 Wash & Lee L Rev 323 (1992) White, From Realism to Critical Legal Studies: A Truncated Intellectual History, 40 Sw L J 819 (1986) ———, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth Century America, 58 Va L Rev 999 (1972) ———, The Inevitability of Critical Legal Studies, 36 Stan L Rev 649 (1984) ———, Law as Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature, 60 Tex L Rev 415 (1982) Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the Rise of the New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U L Rev 429 (1987) ———, Deconstructing Gender, 87 Mich L Rev 797 (1989) Winter, Foreword: On Building Houses, 69 Tex L Rev 1595 (1991) Wistrich, Guthrie, & Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U Pa L Rev 1251 (2005) Woodard, The Limits of Legal Realism: An Historical Perspective, 54 Va L Rev 689 (1968) 0813344645-Vandevelde_Layout 10/13/10 10:29 AM Page 324 0813344645-Vandevelde_Layout 10/13/10 10:29 AM Page 325 index Abel, Richard 267 Abstract ideas, 5, 238 Administrative law, 9, 14, 35, 60 Advocacy, 4, 39, 73–75, 108–115, 121–127, 289–250 analogy used in, 115, 121–127 deduction used in, 108–115 and indeterminacy 39, 114 rule synthesis used in 73–75 Age of Reason, 238 Analogy, 33, 91–94,115–130,299 compared with deduction 127–128 in advocacy, 121–127 indeterminacy in application of, 117–121 model of, 115–117, Anchoring effect, 89–90 Antiessentialism, 274, 276–277, 279 Antifoundationalism, 281–282, 284 Appellate courts, 12, 25–27, 40–41, 47–49, 86, 128–130, 202, 221, 251, 286, 291–294 Aristotle, 283 Articles of Confederation, 211 Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd v Superior Court, 225 Asian American jurisprudence, 278 Assault, 62, 64, 191–192, 194, 212 Austin, John, 152, 241 Autonomy, as policy, 125, 144, 146–148, 166–167, 179, 213 in contract law, 171–172, 179 and paternalism, 125, 144, 146–148, 179, 213 Availability bias, 89 Balancing 43, 72, 105–106, 120, 131, 200, 214, 216, 225, 251, 254 Battery, 59–62, 65, 80, 94–95, 101–103, 107, 114, 196–198, 292, 304 Bell, Derrick, 275 Bench trials, 21–23 Bentham, Jeremy, 150, 152, 241 Berkeley, George,237–239 Bill of Rights, 208, 214–215, 240 Binding decisions in case law, 9, 45–52, 68, 106–108, 121, 128, 130, 179, 283 in enacted law, 11 See also Holding, Stare decisis Bohr, Niels, 247 Brennan, William, 218, 225, 227 Burden of persuasion, 84–85 Burden of production, 84, 88 Burden of proof, 22, 83–90 But for test of causation, 191, 200 Choice of law, 29–30 325 0813344645-Vandevelde_Layout 10/13/10 10:29 AM Page 326 326 Index Civil litigation See Civil procedure Civil procedure, 5, 221–231, 302 See also Jurisdiction Civil rights, 229, 270–271, 277–278 Cleveland Park Club v Perry, 197 CLS See Critical Legal Studies Coase, Ronald, 260–263 Coase theorem, 264–265 Coercion, 46, 126, 147–148, 179, 244, 252 Cohen, Felix, 252 Commerce, stream of, 123, 205, 222, 227 Commerce clause See under Constitution, United States Common law, 9, 15–16, 29, 46, 52, 61, 63, 99, 130–135, 145, 240–241, 254, 262–263, 283 changes, 120–135 codification, 254 English, 15 federal, 15–16 and popular will, 145 as process, 52 and reason, 240–241 Common Law, The (Holmes), 250 Communitarianism, 269–270, 279, 287–288 Community, will of, 143–144, 148–149, 161, 166–167, 188, 201,211 Confirmation bias, 89 Conflicts of law rules, 29 See also Choice of law Congress, 12–15, 35, 211–213, 215, 221–222 228–229 Consent in civil procedure, 134, 223–224, 227–228 in contract law, 147, 181, 186, 228 in criminal law 273 in tort law, 59, 66, 196–199, 228 Consequentialism, 248 Consideration, doctrine of, 184–185 Constitution, United States, 59, 11–12, 14–16, 21, 34–35, 62–65, 99, 122–123, 141, 144–145, 165, 207–219, 222–223, 228–230, 235, 240, 245, 256, 271, 277, 302 commerce clause, 12, 210–213 due process clause, 216, 219, 222–223, 226 equal protection clause, 271, 275–277 First Amendment, 215–216 Fourteenth Amendment, 271, 275 Ninth Amendment, 214 supremacy clause, 34–35, 210, 214 Tenth Amendment, 210 See also Constitutional interpretation Constitutional interpretation, 209–210 Constitutional law See Constitution, United States Contract law, 3, 5, 11, 15, 17–18, 28–30, 55, 58, 125–126, 147, 161, 170–172, 178–179, 181–193, 195–196, 200, 205, 2221, 223, 228–230, 243, 245, 253 breach in, 188–189 consideration doctrine in, 184–185 detrimental reliance in, 185–186 loss and liability in, 189–193 objective test in, 182–183, 198, 228 offer and acceptance, 182–184, 228 perfect tender rule, 189 subjective test in, 183–184 substantial performance of, 188–189 warranty in, 145, 187, 196, 205 Contradictions, 34, 61–65, 79, 99, 100, 169, 201, 284, 293, 295, 302 Court of appeals See Appellate courts Courts See Appellate courts; District courts; Judicial review, doctrine of; Jurisdiction; Supreme Court; Trial courts Credibility, 19, 86–87 Critical Legal Studies (CLS), 266–271, 275, 279, 281–282, 284, 287 Critical race theory, 267, 270, 275–279, 302 Damages, 188, 190–192 in constitutional law, 212 in contract law, 90 in tort law, 201 Darwin, Charles, 246–247 Declaration of Independence, 240 0813344645-Vandevelde_Layout 10/13/10 10:29 AM Page 327 Index Deconstruction, 269 See also Critical Legal Studies Deduction, 91–121, 126–128, 237, 242–243, 245, 250–251, 265, 280, 285–286 in advocacy, 108–115 compared with analogy, 127–128 indeterminacy in application of, 95–108, 115 model, 93–95 See also Formalism De novo review, 26–27, 129 Depression, Great, 250 Derrida, Jacques, 269 Descartes, René Detrimental reliance, doctrine of, 181, 185–186 Dewey, John, 248–281 Dictum, 45–47, 51–52, 58, 60, 74, 106–108, 128, 132, 283 in advocacy, 74, 109–110, 112, 122, 124 in analogy, 121 in deduction, 106–108 Discovery, rules of, 18–19 Disposition, in opinion, 27, 47–50, 292 Dispositive facts, 44–45, 74, 292 use in advocacy, 74–75, 122, 124 use in analogy, 117 District courts, 16, 21, 25–27, 221, 229–231 Diversity jurisdiction See under Jurisdiction Domicile, 231 Due process See under Constitution, United States Dworkin, Ronald, 142, 280–281 Economics See Law and economics movement Efficiency, as policy, 33–34, 51, 140, 144, 148–149, 155, 158, 166–167, 170–172, 174, 181, 183–184, 186, 190–191, 198, 200–201, 205, 226, 230, 261–266, 279, 283–284, 286–297 in contract law, 181–184, 186, 190–191 327 in jurisdictional rules, 226, 230 and justice, 140, 144, 148–149, 155, 166–167, 170–172, 190 in tort law, 198, 200–201, 205 Einstein, Albert, 247 Ejusdem generis, 98–99 Emotional distress, 199–200 Empiricism, 78–79, 92, 101–102, 120, 132, 163–164, 166–168, 237–239, 246, 248, 251, 286 Enacted law, 9–12, 15, 28, 33, 37, 53, 60, 107, 127 See also Administrative law; Statutes Endowment effect, 262, 265 Ends and means, of policy, 92, 101–102, 104, 106, 119–120, 131–132, 173–175, 178–179, 204, 212–213 Enlightenment, 150, 152, 166, 168, 235, 236–240, 243–248, 251, 280, 282, 285–288 Epistemology, 154, 166–168, 236–240, 243–244, 246, 248, 251, 280–281, 285–288 Equal justice, 34, 51, 158 Equal protection clause See under Constitution, United States Erie R.R Co v Tompkins, 15 Evidence, 19, 22–23, 25–27, 39, 41,46–47, 79–90, 120, 129, 155, 165, 174, 184, 209, 302 Executive branch of government, 9, 12, 14, 160, 239 See also Administrative law Existentialism, 248 Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, 98 Factual predicate, 31, 33–35, 52, 57, 69–71, 73, 75, 91–92 94–96, 102, 107, 109, 111–112, 114, 122–123, 134, 175, 215, 218, 224, 298 Factual research, 77–78 False imprisonment, 197, 298–299, 301 Fault, 196, 198–199, 202–203 See also Negligence Federal courts See Appellate courts; District courts; Jurisdiction; Supreme Court 0813344645-Vandevelde_Layout 10/13/10 10:29 AM Page 328 328 Index Federalism, 210–212, 214, 228, 230 Federal question jurisdiction See under Jurisdiction Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 221–222 Fellow servant rule, 131 Feminist legal theory, 267, 270–279, 302 Ford Motor Company, 264–265 Formalism, 95, 142, 154–165, 167–169, 171–173, 181, 183, 191, 201, 227–228, 236, 242–254, 256, 263, 265–167, 280, 285, 287, 302 in civil procedure, 227–228 in contract law, 181, 183, 198, 201 and instrumentalism, 154–165, 167 in statutory interpretation, 162–165 Foreseeablility, 90, 186, 191, 200–201, 203–204 Forum shopping, 30 Frank, Jerome, 252 Free speech, 55, 65, 103, 106, 150–151, 174, 176, 209, 215–216 See also Obscenity; Constitution, United States Freud, Sigmund, 246 Fundamental rights, 216–219 Garratt v Dailey, 197 Geduldig v Aiello, 271–272 Generalia specialibus non derogant, 98 Generality, 33–34, 52, 55–56, 58, 60, 63, 70–74, 96, 99, 103, 109–111, 113–114, 118, 121–123, 125, 132, 140–144, 154–156, 161, 166–169, 175–178, 195–196, 198, 201, 211, 213, 217–218, 227–228, 253, 276 General jurisdiction See under Jurisdiction Gibbons v Ogden, 211 Gilligan, Carol, 272 Golden Rule, of statutory interpretation, 162 Hand, Learned, 202, 263 Hand Formula, 202–203, 206 Hart, H.L.A., 152 Hearsay, 81–82 Heidegger, Martin, 248 Heisenberg, Werner, 247 Heller, Tom, 266 Hess v Pawlowski, 223 Heuristic, 89–90 Hindsight bias, 90 Historicist tradition, 247–248, 251 Holding, 26, 35, 41, 45–47, 51–52, 57–58, 60, 67, 69, 96, 107–109, 111–112, 115–116, 118–119, 123–126, 128–130, 132–133, 191, 292 Holmes, Oliver Wendell, Jr., 196, 250–251, 281 Horwitz, Morton, 266 Hume, David, 237–239 Immunity, 36 See also Jurisdiction Implication, 134 Implied warranty, 145, 187, 196, 205 In a Different Voice (Gilligan), 272 In pari material, 98 Indeterminacy, 39, 42, 45, 69–71, 73, 91, 93, 95–97, 99–104, 109–109, 115, 117–121, 130, 148–151, 153–154, 156, 162, 165, 174–178, 202–203, 207–208, 213–214, 216, 247, 254–255, 263–269, 270, 279, 282 Individual, will of, 143–146, 166, 195–197 See also Individualism Individualism, as policy, 143–146, 151, 166–167, 170–171, 181, 183–186, 189–191, 196–199, 202–203, 213–214, 217, 226–228, 249 in civil procedure, 226–228 in constitutional law, 213–214, 217 in contract law, 181,183–186, 189–191, 196 in tort law, 196–199, 202–203 Individual rights theory See Rights theory Induction, 68–74, 128, 238, 242–243, 285 Instrumentalism, 142, 154–165, 167–169, 172–173, 281, 283–284, 302 Intent in civil procedure, 231 in constitutional law, 162–165, 209 0813344645-Vandevelde_Layout 10/13/10 10:29 AM Page 329 Index in contract, 183 in statutory interpretation, 39, 100, 155 in tort law, 58, 62, 65, 94, 196–197, 199, 203, 299 Intentionalism, 162–163, 165, 209 Intentional tort, 196–197, 199 See also Intent International Shoe Co v State of Washington, 224 Interstate commerce, 12, 210–213 Interstitial common law, 16 Intuition, 93, 101, 120, 141, 238, 240, 250, 285–286 Irrebuttable presumption, 87–88 See also Presumption Issues of fact See Questions of fact Issues of law See Questions of law Jacksonian democracy, 241, 287 James, William, 248, 281 Jefferson, Thomas, 240 Judgment as a matter of law, 23–25, 84, 88, 128 summary, 23–24, 129 Judicial branch of government, 10, 12, 15–16, 46, 239 See also Courts Judicial restraint, 208 Judicial review, doctrine of, 14, 35, 62 Jurisdiction, 12, 16–17 and choice of law, 30 diversity, 230–231 federal question, 229–230 general, 224, 228 limited, 228 original, 16 personal, 16, 134, 221–228, 252 specific, 224–226 and stare decisis, 50, 179 subject matter, 16, 221–222, 228–230 Jury system, 12, 13, 14, 15, 58, 61, 62–63, 100–101, 184 Justice, as policy, 79, 100, 114, 144, 148, 150, 152–155, 158, 166–167, 172, 174, 190, 199–202, 204–206, 224, 268, 279, 284 in civil procedure, 224, 231 329 in contract law, 190 in tort law, 199–202, 204–206 Kant, Immanuel, 150, 246 Kennedy, Duncan, 266 Langdell, Christopher Columbus, 242–243, 245, 251, 265, 291, 295 LatCrit theory, 278 Law and economics movement, 260–266, 270, 279, 283, 286–287, 302 Legal consequence of rule, 3, 31, 55, 78, 91–92, 94, 96, 102, 105, 109–110, 112, 116–117, 122–124, 156, 160, 176, 226, 282 Legal fictions, 134, 223–224 Legal formalism See Formalism Legal positivism, 250 Legal realism, 250–257, 260, 266–270, 285–287 Legal research, 34, 78 Legal standards See Standards Legislative branch of government, 12 See also Congress Leibniz, Gottfried, 237 Levi-Strauss, Claude, 268 Liberalism, 168, 239–241, 243–244, 268, 279–281 Line drawing, 104–105, 120, 131, 231, 252, 296 Litigation See Civil procedure Llewellyn, Karl, 99–100, 254 Lochner v New York, 249–250 Locke, John, 150, 237–240, 249, 280, 299 Logical positivism See Positivism Luther, Martin, 236 Macauley, Stewart, 267 MacKinnon, Catharine A., 273 Mainstream legal reasoning, 4–5, 63, 139, 255–257, 259, 269–270, 273, 286–287, 302 Majoritarianism, as policy, 143–146, 166–167, 170, 174, 181, 183, 185–186, 189, 195–199, 201–202, 205, 213, 215, 217, 226–228, 241 in civil procedure, 198–199, 213, 216–217, 226–228 0813344645-Vandevelde_Layout 10/13/10 10:29 AM Page 330 330 Index Majoritarianism, as policy (continued) in constitutional law, 213, 215–217 in contract law, 181, 183, 185–186, 189 and individualism, 144–146, 166–167, 174, 197 in tort law, 195–199, 201–202, 205 Market failure, 265 Marx, Karl, 246 Metaphysical Club, 281 Metaphysics, 152, 166–168, 238–239, 245–246, 248, 251, 279, 285–288 Michael H v Gerald D., 217 Mill, John Stuart, 241 Miller test, 215 Minimum contacts rule, 224–228 Mixed questions of law and fact, 20, 21, 25 Montesquieu, Baron de, 239 Moore, Underhill, 254 Morality, 142, 153, 189, 192, 241, 248, 250, 262, 272, 280, 290, 297 Motion, 17, 19, 23–25, 84, 129 for a directed verdit, 23, 84 for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 17, 23–24 for judgment as a matter of law, 23–24, 84, 128 for summary judgment, 23–24, 129 Naturalism, as policy, 142, 152–155, 161, 166–167, 169, 241, 245, 285–286 Natural law See Naturalism Natural rights, 239–240 Necessary facts, 44, 74, 111 Negligence, 20–21, 86, 90, 98, 129, 131, 149, 196, 198–206, 228–229, 263–264 Neopragmatism, 281 New Deal, 250, 255, 267, 270 Newton, Isaac, 238, 240, 247, 287 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 248 Nihilism, 269–270, 284 NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 211–212 Nominalism, 166–168, 238–239, 246, 251, 279, 286–287 Nonoriginalism, 162, 164–165, 209–210 Objective test 161, 163, 169, 182–184, 191, 198, 201–202 228, 237–238 in contract law, 182–184, 191 in tort law, 198, 201–202 Obscenity, 215–216 O’Connor, Sandra Day, 228 Offer and acceptance, doctrine of, 182–184, 228 On the Origin of Species (Darwin), 246 Overruling, 10, 46–48, 51, 63, 108, 121, 132–135 “Parade of horribles” arguments, 114, 126 Paternalism, as policy, 125–126, 141, 144, 146–148, 166–167, 172, 179, 181, 213 and autonomy, 125, 144, 146–148, 167, 179, 213 in constitutional law 213 in contract law, 172, 179 Pennoyer v Neff, 224–225, 229 Perfect tender rule, 189 Personal jurisdiction See under Jurisdiction Pierce, Charles Sanders, 281 Pinto, 264–265 Plain meaning 97–98, 159, 165 Planck, Max, 247 Plato, 239, 282 Plessy v Ferguson, 275 Pornography, 208–209, 273, 277 See also Obscenity Positivism, as policy, 142, 152–155, 161, 166–169, 181, 189–190, 192, 214, 241, 245, 250–251, 285–286 in constitutional law, 214 in contract law, 181, 189–190, 192 Posner, Richard, 263, 283 Postmodernism, 246, 248, 267, 269, 274, 277, 281–282, 284, 287 Pound, Roscoe, 251 Practical reasoning, 283, 287 Pragmatism, 248, 251, 281–284, 287–288 Precedent, 9, 48, 51, 67, 116–119, 121–128, 130, 141, 179–180, 218, 226, 269 284, 294, 297 Preemption doctrine, 35 Presumption, 51, 87–89, 131, 135, 160 0813344645-Vandevelde_Layout 10/13/10 10:29 AM Page 331 Index Prior bad acts, 82 Privacy, right of, 55, 150–151, 208, 217 Private law, 10, 11, 58 Privileged communication, 53, 83 Procedural law See Civil procedure Products liability, 110, 123, 150, 204–206 Promises, 2, 17, 55, 184–192, 205 Promissory estoppel, 181 See also Detrimental reliance Property, 28–29, 54–55, 64, 150–151, 197, 199, 216, 223, 248, 250, 252, 262, 280 Public law, 10, 58 Purposeful availment, 225, 227 Purposivism, 162–165 Questions of fact, 25 Questions of law, 25, 84, 203 Rational basis test, 216 See also Rational relationship test Rationalism, 166–168, 237–238, 243, 246, 248, 251, 279, 283, 285, 286 Rational relationship test, 216, 218–219 See also Rational basis test Rawls, John, 279–280 Realism, 166–168, 238–239, 245–246, 288 See also Legal realism Reasonable care, 31, 52–53, 86, 91, 110, 113, 132, 198–205 “Reasonable person,” 59, 104, 120, 161, 182–183, 198, 201–202, 205, 273 Rebuttal presumption, 87–88 See also Presumption Reception statutes, 15 Reformation, 152, 236–237, 239, 246 Regulations See Administrative law Relativity, theory of, 247–248 Renaissance, 152, 236–237, 246 Res judicata, 148–149 Rights in personam, 54 Rights in rem, 54 Rights theory, as policy, 149–152, 166–167, 169, 277 Romantic tradition, 247 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 250, 253, 270 Rorty, Richard, 281 331 Rosenblatt, Rand, 267 Rules Decision Act, 15 Rules Enabling Act, 221 Sacks, Albert 255 Sapir, Edward, 247 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 248 Saussure, Ferdinand de, 247 Scalia, Antonin, 217–218 Scientific method, 238–243 Scientific Revolution, 152, 236–237, 239, 246 Separation of powers, 12, 15, 35, 46, 50, 62–63, 208, 239, 241 Service of process, 222 “Slippery slope” arguments, 114, 126, 296 Social sciences, 246, 251–252, 254–255, 260, 265–266 Sociological Jurisprudence (movement), 251 Specific jurisdiction See under Jurisdiction Specific performance, 188 Spinoza, Benedict de, 237 Standard of review, 26–27, 41, 86, 292 Standards, 95–96, 155–158, 160–161, 168, 171, 202, 226–228, 273 Stare decisis, 9, 48, 50–52, 68, 108, 117, 121, 126, 130–132, 135 State, will of, 143–144, 148, 195–197, 244 State courts, 10, 223–225, 230 Statutes, 2, 9, 12, 14–16, 20–21, 29, 31–38, 50, 58–64, 86, 97–101, 122–123, 127, 145, 153, 162–168, 176–177, 207–212, 218–219, 221–223, 228–230, 262, 282, 285, 297 and analogy, 31–35, 37, 40 and interpretation, 10, 97–100, 162–165, 207–210 text of, 7, 70, 71, 73 See also Enacted law Statutory interpretation, 37, 63, 97–100, 162–165, 208–210 Stewart, Potter, 216 Stoics, 240 Stream of commerce rule, 225, 227 Strict liability, 196–197, 202–206 0813344645-Vandevelde_Layout 10/13/10 10:29 AM Page 332 332 Index Strict scrutiny test, 216–219 Structuralism, 268 Subjective test, 161, 183–184, 191 Subject matter jurisdiction See under Jurisdiction Sub silentio, 63, 132–134 Substantial evidence, 27, 41, 86, 129 Substantive due process, 216 Sufficient facts, 44–45, 74 Summary judgment, 23–24, 129 Supremacy clause See under Constitution, United States Supreme Court, 12, 15, 27–28, 48–50, 179, 208, 211–212, 214–229, 245, 250, 253, 171, 274–275, 292, 295 Syllogism, 93, 97, 102, 115–116, 128 250, 298–299 Testimony, 13, 18–19, 21, 45, 47, 79–83, 86–87, 89 Textualism, 162, 164–165, 171, 209 Theory of Justice, A (Rawls), 248, 279 Tompkins, Erie R.R Co v., 15 Tort law, 5, 11, 15, 58, 62, 96, 102, 1865–187, 193–206, 221, 228, 273, 278–279, 302 See also Intentional tort; Negligence; Strict liability “Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach” (Cohen), 252 Trespassing, 64, 67, 78, 131, 197 Trial courts, 16–27, 40–41, 46–47, 79, 81, 84–86, 88–90, 128–129, 221, 292–294, 302 Trubek, David, 266 Tushnet, Mark, 266 Uncertainty Principle (Heisenberg), 247 Unger, Roberto, 266 Uniform Commercial Code, 254 Universal, 152, 159, 166–168, 239, 247, 283 Utilitarianism, as policy, 112–114, 144, 149–152, 166–169, 172–173, 189–190, 204, 241, 248, 264–265, 279, 281 in contract law, 189, 190, 192 and rights theory, 149–152, 166–167, 169, 206 in tort law, 199, 201–202, 204, 206 Verdict, 22–23, 27, 41, 84, 86, 90, 128–129, 292, 294 Warranty, 145, 187, 296, 205 Wealth effect, 262, 265 Well-pleaded complaint rule, 229–230 Whorf, Benjamin Lee, 247 Wickard v Filburn, 212 William of Ockham, 239 Witnesses, 13, 18–19, 21–22, 26, 45, 80–81, 83, 86–87, 89 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 249, 282 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp v Woodson, 225 Writ of certiorari, 27 Yntema, Hessel E., 218–219 Zablocki v Redhail, 218–219 ... ? ?thinking like a lawyer, ” attempts to analyze in any systematic way what is meant by that phrase are rare Law students may be told that they must learn to think like a lawyer but are not told precisely... of law thus have a factual predicate and a legal consequence For example, a case may announce the rule that a physician performing medical services for a patient has a duty to exercise reasonable... circumstances As an illustration of the difference between lay thought and legal thought, imagine that two friends? ?a lawyer and a nonlawyer—are discussing a newspaper reporter who promised an informant