... toexistbecauseofsomecognitivelimitationonourpart(McGinn1989)—wearetoostupid(orhavethewrongtypeofintelligence)toappreciatetheexplanatoryconnection.Aproperunderstandingofthephysicalandphenomenalfactswould ,in reality,showusthatoneexplainstheother.Idonotbelieveanyofthesethreestrategiesareacceptable.Thefirstsimplyflatlyconflictswiththeevidence.Itsproponentsneedtoproducemuchstrongerargumentsthantheyhaveproducedtomakeitaseriouscontender,andIampessimisticthatsuchargumentsexist.Eachoftheothertwostrategiessuffersfromanotherseriousfault:theyareexercisesinexcusemaking.Theexplanatorygapisaninstanceofexplanatoryfailure.Whenconfrontedwithexplanatoryfailure,standardpracticeinscienceistore-evaluatethetheoryforinaccuracyorincompleteness.Thesemovesattempttoblamethepsychologyorperspectiveofthetheorymakersratherthantheontologyofthetheory,andarecompletelyanomalous.Theystandinthewayoftherealpossibilitythatwecanfindabettertheory.InthischapterIwillpursueafourthstrategybytacklingtheproblemmoredirectly.Iwillshowfaultinthetheories,ratherthanthetheory-makers.Mymethodology,Page35then,ismoretraditionalthanthemethodologyoftheotherstrategies.TheconclusionIreach,however,mayseemmoreradical.Iamgoingtoarguethatphysicalthingsare"twofaced"also.Morefactsthanjustthefactsaboutwhattheydoaretrueofthem,andthesefurtherfactsmayfillthegap.Ifthisconclusioniscorrectthentheformofthetheoriestraditionallyemployedinthesciencesneedstobesupplementedbeforewecancrosstheexplanatorygap.Someonepursuingthisstrategyneedstomeetthreechallenges,whichIwilltrytodo.Thefirstchallengeistoavoidbeing ... monists—realisticanybodys—grantthatexperientialphenomenaarereal,whereby"experientialphenomena"and"experience"Imeanthephenomenaofconsciousnessconsideredjustandonlyinrespectofthequalitativecharacterthattheyhaveforthosewhohavethemastheyhavethem.because(5)doesn'trequireanexplanation,whyshouldtherebeagapinESIIeither?Isn't(8)onaparwith(5)?If(5)requiresnoexplanation,thenneithershould(8).Thus,thereisnoexplanatorygapbetweenthemental(consciousexperience)andthephysical.3—TheReplyTheobjectionpresentedinthelastsectionwasbasedontheideathatidentityclaimsdonotthemselvesrequireexplanation.Therefore,wecanuseidentityclaimsaspremisesinexplanatoryargumentswithouttherebyintroducingnewdemandsforexplanation.ThisviewworksoutnicelyforESI,involvingwater.TheobjectorarguesthatweshouldviewESII,involvingqualitativecharacter,thesameway.Buttheproblemisthattheyclearlyaren'tthesame.Somethingmustbewrongwiththeideaaboutidentityclaimsonwhichtheobjectionisbased.WheretheobjectorpointstotheexplanatoryadequacyofESIasamodelforESII,Iwouldemphasizethefactthatwedon'tneedtobeconvincedoftheadequacyofESI,whichshowshowdifferentitisfromESII.Iwillintroducetheterm"gappyidentity"toexpressthisdifference.Anidentityclaimis"gappy"ifitadmitsofanintelligiblerequestforexplanation,and''nongappy"otherwise.Itseemstomethat(5)isnongappy,whereas(8)isgappy.Iwillelaborate.Withrespectto(5),imaginethatallthemicro-physicalfactsrelevanttothebehaviorofwaterareknown,butsomeonestillasks,whyis(5)true?Asdiscussedabove,sucharequestforexplanationmightreallybearequestforjustification,inwhichcasetheexplanatorypotentialofaccepting(5)—thatwecanexplainsuchfactsaswater'sboilingandfreezingpoints—wouldsufficeasananswer.Alternatively,thequestionermightbewonderinghowwatercouldsimultaneouslyinstantiatecertain(distinct)properties.Thistoocouldbeanswered.Butsupposethatthequestionerrefusesbothoftheseattemptsatreinterpretingthequestion.ShejustinsiststhatshewantstoknowhowwatercouldbeH2O.ItseemstomeatthatpointthatwecouldPage9onlyrespondwithanincredulouslook.Afterall,whatcouldshereallybeasking?ItjustisH2O;that'sallthereistoit.Ontheotherhand,whenitcomestopsycho-physicalidentityclaimslike(8),thesituationisquitedifferent.Let'sagainimaginethatwehavealltherelevantneurophysiologicalandfunctionalfacts.Ifsomeoneweretopressthequestion,buthowisit(or,whyshoulditbe)thatbrainstateBisareddishexperience,thequestionisquiteintelligible.Ofcoursesomewouldinsistthattheidentitymustbetrue,sinceacceptingitwouldexplainalotofphenomena(suchashowreddishexperiencescauseustocallthings"red").Butevensomeoneconvincedbycausalconsiderationstoaccepttheidentitywouldstillunderstandwhatsomeonewasaskingwhenrequestinganexplanation.Wedon'tjuststareblanklywonderingwhattheycouldpossiblyhaveinmind.Onthecontrary ,the senseofpuzzlementisalltoofamiliar.Ifthisdistinctionbetweengappyandnongappyidentitiesholdsup,thenIthinkwecanreplytotheobjectionoftheprevioussection.Granted,thedifferencebetween(5)and(8)isnotthat(5)isderivablefromanalyticandmicro-physicalpremiseswhereas(8)isnot.ThereisnoanalysisofourconceptofwaterunderlyingouracceptanceofitsidentitywithH2O.Weacceptitbecauseofitsexplanatorypower.(5)itselfdoesn'trequireanexplanation.However,(5)isdifferentinthisrespectfrom(8).(5)isanongappyidentity,afactthatismanifestbyournotfindingarequesttoexplainitintelligible(thatis,onceweremovethepossiblereinterpretationsofthe14InsightsintoBlindsightA.DavidMilner16115FromGraspingtoLanguage:MirrorNeuronsandtheOriginofSocialCommunicationVittorioGallese16516Supportingthe"GrandIllusion"ofDirectPerception:ImplicitLearninginEye-MovementControlFrankH.Durgin17917SelectivePeripheralFading:HowAttentionLeadstoLossofVisualConsciousnessLianggangLou189VEmotionIntroductionAlfredW.Kaszniak197Pageix18ConsciousExperienceandAutonomicResponsetoEmotionalStimuliFollowingFrontalLobeDamageAlfredKaszniak,SherylL.Reminger,StevenZ.Rapcsak,andElizabethL.Glisky20119AttheIntersectionofEmotionandConsciousness:AffectiveNeuroscienceandExtendedReticularThalamicActivatingSystem(ERTAS)TheoriesofConsciousnessDouglasF.Watt21520LaughingRats?PlayfulTicklingArousesHigh-FrequencyUltrasonicChirpinginYoungRodentsJaakPankseppandJeffreyBurgdorf231VI245WemustalsothankourfamiliesandcolleaguesinourhomedepartmentsofAnesthesiology,Psychology,Neurology,Psychiatry,andPhilosophy,andtheUniversityofArizonaforprovidinganacademicenvironmentamenabletoourintellectualpursuits.Finally,wearegratefultoBradfordBooksandtheMITPressfortheircontinuedsupport.InparticularwethankBettyStantonforherstewardship,visionandcourageincontinuinginherlatehusband'srole.PagexvCONTRIBUTORSDickBiermanUniversityofAmsterdamRoetersstraat151018WBAmsterdam,TheNetherlandsJeffreyBurgdorfDept.ofPsychologyBowlingGreenStateUniversityBowlingGreen,OH43403A.G.Cairns-SmithDepartmentofChemistryGlasgowUniversityGlasgowG128QQScotland,UKWilliamH.CalvinDepartmentofPsychiatryandBehavioralSciencesUniversityofWashingtonSeattleWA98195-1800DavidJ.ChalmersDepartmentofPhilosophyTheUniversityofArizonaTucson,AZ85721ChristiandeQuinceyInstituteofNoeticSciencesandtheJohnF.KennedyUniversityIONS,475GateFiveRoad,Suite300Sausalito,CA94965FrankH.DurginDepartmentofPsychologySwarthmoreCollege500CollegeAvenuereasonablycompleteandsatisfyingway.Giventhistrackrecord,onemightwellexpectthataphysicalexplanationofconsciousnessisonitsway.Andindeed,investigationoftheneurophysiologicalbasisofconsciousnesshasalreadyyieldedmanyinsightsintothephenomenon.Butsomehavearguedthatanypurelyphysicalexplanationofconsciousnesswillbeincomplete.Neurophysiologywillverylikelyyieldasystematiccorrelationbetweenstatesofthebrainandstatesofconsciousness,butwillthiscorrelationbeacompleteexplanation?Ithasoftenbeensuggestedthatnophysicalaccounttellsuswhythereshouldbestatesofsubjectiveexperience—thedirectexperienceofcolors,pains,emotions,andotherphenomenologicalaspectsofourmentallives.Givenanyphysicalaccount,onecanaskwhythat ... toexistbecauseofsomecognitivelimitationonourpart(McGinn1989)—wearetoostupid(orhavethewrongtypeofintelligence)toappreciatetheexplanatoryconnection.Aproperunderstandingofthephysicalandphenomenalfactswould ,in reality,showusthatoneexplainstheother.Idonotbelieveanyofthesethreestrategiesareacceptable.Thefirstsimplyflatlyconflictswiththeevidence.Itsproponentsneedtoproducemuchstrongerargumentsthantheyhaveproducedtomakeitaseriouscontender,andIampessimisticthatsuchargumentsexist.Eachoftheothertwostrategiessuffersfromanotherseriousfault:theyareexercisesinexcusemaking.Theexplanatorygapisaninstanceofexplanatoryfailure.Whenconfrontedwithexplanatoryfailure,standardpracticeinscienceistore-evaluatethetheoryforinaccuracyorincompleteness.Thesemovesattempttoblamethepsychologyorperspectiveofthetheorymakersratherthantheontologyofthetheory,andarecompletelyanomalous.Theystandinthewayoftherealpossibilitythatwecanfindabettertheory.InthischapterIwillpursueafourthstrategybytacklingtheproblemmoredirectly.Iwillshowfaultinthetheories,ratherthanthetheory-makers.Mymethodology,Page35then,ismoretraditionalthanthemethodologyoftheotherstrategies.TheconclusionIreach,however,mayseemmoreradical.Iamgoingtoarguethatphysicalthingsare"twofaced"also.Morefactsthanjustthefactsaboutwhattheydoaretrueofthem,andthesefurtherfactsmayfillthegap.Ifthisconclusioniscorrectthentheformofthetheoriestraditionallyemployedinthesciencesneedstobesupplementedbeforewecancrosstheexplanatorygap.Someonepursuingthisstrategyneedstomeetthreechallenges,whichIwilltrytodo.Thefirstchallengeistoavoidbeing adhoc. Tomakethestrategywork,themotivationforintroducingtheseextrafactsshouldbeindependentofthemind-bodyproblem.Otherwisethetheoryislikelytoseem—andprobablybe—indulgent,andwillcompetepoorlyinthemarketplaceofideas.Thesecondchallengeistoavoidthedualistdilemma.Whateverfactsoneintroducesmustbetiedtothephysicalfactsinawaythatdoesnotmakethemcausallyirrelevent,orspookilyinteractive.Thethirdchallengeistoberelevanttotheexplanatorygap.Thetheorymustgivereasonswhythesefurtherfactsaboutthephysical,whoseexistenceonehasindependentreasontobelievein,mayfilltheexplanatorygapbetweenthephysicalandphenomenalfacts.III—ThePhysicsof...