ƢƠN 5 : KẾT LUẬN
5.3. ƣớng nghiên cứu tiếp theo
Việc tăng thêm các quan sát theo số lượng công ty trên HOSE và HNX đồng thời gia tăng thời gian chia nhiều giai đoạn nghiên cứu trước và sau khủng hoảng tài chính thế giới sẽ làm cho kết quả nghiên cứu vững chắc hơn. Trong tổng quan kinh tế học và tài chính tìm ra 4 động cơ chủ yếu giải thích tại sao doanh nghiệp lại muốn nắm giữ tiền mặt và nắm giữ như thế nào. Ta có thể mở rộng thêm nghiên cứu về những nhân tố khác tác động tới sự quản trị tiền mặt của doanh nghiệp như động cơ về thuế, giao dịch, đại diện, phòng ngừa. Ngồi ra cịn chiều ngược lại với nghiên cứu hiệu quả của tiền mặt nắm giữ ảnh hưởng tới các yếu tố khác ra sao.
TÀI LIỆU THAM KHẢO
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PH L C
Phụ lục 1. Kết quả hồi quy phƣơng trình 1 theo phƣơng pháp OLS
Phụ lục 2. Kết quả hồi quy phƣơng trình 1 theo phƣơng pháp MM4
_cons -.0950578 .041832 -2.27 0.023 -.1771135 -.0130022 ShortDebt -.0551636 .0105575 -5.23 0.000 -.0758727 -.0344546 DeltaNCWC -.0428801 .0206956 -2.07 0.038 -.0834757 -.0022845 Acquisition -.0115594 .0170542 -0.68 0.498 -.045012 .0218933 Expenditure -.1609977 .0323178 -4.98 0.000 -.2243909 -.0976046 Size .0040527 .0015762 2.57 0.010 .0009609 .0071446 NegCashflow -.2390199 .119909 -1.99 0.046 -.4742278 -.003812 Neg -.0188406 .0127811 -1.47 0.141 -.0439114 .0062302 CashFlow .1031844 .0370189 2.79 0.005 .0305698 .175799 Q .0141876 .0084582 1.68 0.094 -.0024037 .0307788 DeltaCashH~s Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] Total 9.76930176 1503 .006499868 Root MSE = .0787 Adj R-squared = 0.0471 Residual 9.25330565 1494 .006193645 R-squared = 0.0528 Model .515996112 9 .057332901 Prob > F = 0.0000 F( 9, 1494) = 9.26 Source SS df MS Number of obs = 1504
Sargan-Hansen J statistic: 1.471 (p=0.479, d=2) Tau1^2: 0.214 (0.060) ShortDebt -.0462496 .0150748 -3.07 0.002 -.0757956 -.0167036 DeltaNCWC -.0140998 .0325555 -0.43 0.665 -.0779073 .0497078 Acquisition -.0223011 .0137217 -1.63 0.104 -.0491952 .0045929 Expenditure -.1240263 .0381306 -3.25 0.001 -.1987609 -.0492916 Size .0109436 .0026101 4.19 0.000 .005828 .0160592 NegCashflow -.7492773 .1804677 -4.15 0.000 -1.102987 -.3955672 Neg -.0173437 .0119599 -1.45 0.147 -.0407847 .0060973 CashFlow .4691626 .1089859 4.30 0.000 .2555542 .682771 _cons -.1337236 .0478813 -2.79 0.005 -.2275692 -.0398781 Q -.1804435 .0513007 -3.52 0.000 -.280991 -.0798959 DeltaCashH~s Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] (0.022) Rho^2 = 0.034 MOM4(1) EIV results N = 1504
Phụ lục 3. Kết quả hồi quy phƣơng trình 2 MM4 với phƣơng pháp phân loại ràng buộc tài chính theo chỉ số WW index
Phụ lục 4. Kết quả hồi quy phƣơng trình 2 MM4 với phƣơng pháp phân loại theo chi trả cổ tức tiền mặt
Sargan-Hansen J statistic: 1.531 (p=0.465, d=2) Tau1^2: 0.219 (0.060) ShortDebt -.046552 .0151954 -3.06 0.002 -.0763345 -.0167695 DeltaNCWC -.0135957 .032581 -0.42 0.676 -.0774532 .0502619 Acquisition -.0236588 .0142355 -1.66 0.097 -.0515597 .0042422 Expenditure -.1210286 .0377728 -3.20 0.001 -.195062 -.0469952 Size .0100434 .0032558 3.08 0.002 .0036622 .0164245 CFConstraint1Neg -.4695949 .24181 -1.94 0.052 -.9435338 .0043439 NegConstraint1 -.0337237 .0278505 -1.21 0.226 -.0883097 .0208623 CFConstraint1 .1543509 .1064701 1.45 0.147 -.0543266 .3630283 Constraint1 -.0166551 .0113756 -1.46 0.143 -.0389509 .0056408 NegCashflow -.4510149 .2471718 -1.82 0.068 -.9354626 .0334329 Neg .0185533 .0231249 0.80 0.422 -.0267706 .0638773 CashFlow .4433655 .109369 4.05 0.000 .2290062 .6577248 _cons -.1044641 .0673462 -1.55 0.121 -.2364603 .027532 Q -.1822798 .0507675 -3.59 0.000 -.2817823 -.0827773 DeltaCashHoldi~s Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] (0.022) Rho^2 = 0.037 MOM4(1) EIV results N = 1504
ShortDebt -.0489761 .0151223 -3.24 0.001 -.0786152 -.0193369 DeltaNCWC -.0157126 .0326357 -0.48 0.630 -.0796774 .0482523 Acquisition -.0231638 .0139191 -1.66 0.096 -.0504447 .0041171 Expenditure -.1269589 .0382348 -3.32 0.001 -.2018978 -.0520201 Size .0108578 .0026853 4.04 0.000 .0055947 .0161209 CFConstraint2Neg -.7504484 .4630429 -1.62 0.105 -1.657996 .157099 NegConstraint2 .0592827 .0469518 1.26 0.207 -.0327411 .1513064 CFConstraint2 .1181611 .1089682 1.08 0.278 -.0954126 .3317349 Constraint2 -.0110971 .0076852 -1.44 0.149 -.0261599 .0039656 NegCashflow -.0668912 .4431378 -0.15 0.880 -.9354254 .8016429 Neg -.0595804 .0453771 -1.31 0.189 -.1485178 .0293571 CashFlow .4459125 .1156977 3.85 0.000 .2191491 .6726759 _cons -.1246369 .0489724 -2.55 0.011 -.220621 -.0286527 Q -.1825188 .0532574 -3.43 0.001 -.2869014 -.0781362 DeltaCashHoldi~s Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] (0.022) Rho^2 = 0.038 MOM4(1) EIV results N = 1504
Phụ lục 5. Kết quả hồi quy phƣơng trình 2 MM4 với phƣơng pháp phân loại theo quy mô tài sản
Sargan-Hansen J statistic: 1.514 (p=0.469, d=2) Tau1^2: 0.215 (0.061) ShortDebt -.049361 .0153667 -3.21 0.001 -.0794792 -.0192428 DeltaNCWC -.0148292 .0326458 -0.45 0.650 -.0788139 .0491554 Acquisition -.0224462 .0140578 -1.60 0.110 -.0499989 .0051065 Expenditure -.1207381 .0378046 -3.19 0.001 -.1948338 -.0466424 Size .0098977 .0029774 3.32 0.001 .0040621 .0157333 CFConstraint3Neg -.063075 .2221763 -0.28 0.776 -.4985325 .3723825 NegConstraint3 -.0239188 .0244442 -0.98 0.328 -.0718285 .0239908 CFConstraint3 .0751045 .089741 0.84 0.403 -.1007846 .2509936 Constraint3 -.0098091 .0115946 -0.85 0.398 -.0325341 .012916 NegCashflow -.7693635 .2061088 -3.73 0.000 -1.173329 -.3653975 Neg -.00779 .013352 -0.58 0.560 -.0339594 .0183794 CashFlow .4498514 .1120849 4.01 0.000 .2301691 .6695337 _cons -.1013824 .0670729 -1.51 0.131 -.2328428 .030078 Q -.1814815 .0504648 -3.60 0.000 -.2803906 -.0825723 DeltaCashHoldi~s Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] (0.022) Rho^2 = 0.037 MOM4(1) EIV results N = 1504