CHAPTER 33 THE SHORT-RUN TRADEOFF BETWEEN INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT 785
rate of inflation. The widespread belief that there is a permanent tradeoff is a
sophisticated version of the confusion between “high” and “rising” that we all
recognize in simpler forms. A rising rate of inflation may reduce unemployment,
a high rate will not.
But how long, you will say, is “temporary”? . . . I can at most venture a
personal judgment, based on some examination of the historical evidence, that
the initial effects of a higher and unanticipated rate of inflation last for something
like two to five years.
Today, more than 30 years later, this statement still summarizes the view of most
macroeconomists.
◆ The Phillips curve describes a negative relationship
between inflation and unemployment. By expanding
aggregate demand, policymakers can choose a point on
the Phillips curve with higher inflation and lower
unemployment. By contracting aggregate demand,
policymakers can choose a point on the Phillips curve
with lower inflation and higher unemployment.
◆ The tradeoff between inflation and unemployment
described by the Phillips curve holds only in the short
run. In the long run, expected inflation adjusts to
changes in actual inflation, and the short-run Phillips
curve shifts. As a result, the long-run Phillips curve is
vertical at the natural rate of unemployment.
◆ The short-run Phillips curve also shifts because of
shocks to aggregate supply. An adverse supply shock,
such as the increase in world oil prices during the 1970s,
gives policymakers a less favorable tradeoff between
inflation and unemployment. That is, after an adverse
supply shock, policymakers have to accept a higher rate
of inflation for any given rate of unemployment, or a
higher rate of unemployment for any given rate of
inflation.
◆ When the Fed contracts growth in the money supply to
reduce inflation, it moves the economy along the short-
run Phillips curve, which results in temporarily high
unemployment. The cost of disinflation depends on
how quickly expectations of inflation fall. Some
economists argue that a credible commitment to low
inflation can reduce the cost of disinflation by inducing
a quick adjustment of expectations.
Summary
Phillips curve, p. 763
natural-rate hypothesis, p. 772
supply shock, p. 775
sacrifice ratio, p. 779
rational expectations, p. 779
Key Concepts
1. Draw the short-run tradeoff between inflation and
unemployment. How might the Fed move the economy
from one point on this curve to another?
2. Draw the long-run tradeoff between inflation and
unemployment. Explain how the short-run and long-
run tradeoffs are related.
3. What’s so natural about the natural rate of
unemployment? Why might the natural rate
of unemployment differ across countries?
4. Suppose a drought destroys farm crops and drives up
the price of food. What is the effect on the short-run
tradeoff between inflation and unemployment?
5. The Fed decides to reduce inflation. Use the Phillips
curve to show the short-run and long-run effects
of this policy. How might the short-run costs be
reduced?
Questions for Review
786 PART TWELVE SHORT-RUN ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS
1. Suppose the natural rate of unemployment is 6 percent.
On one graph, draw two Phillips curves that can be
used to describe the four situations listed below. Label
the point that shows the position of the economy in each
case:
a. Actual inflation is 5 percent and expected inflation
is 3 percent.
b. Actual inflation is 3 percent and expected inflation
is 5 percent.
c. Actual inflation is 5 percent and expected inflation
is 5 percent.
d. Actual inflation is 3 percent and expected inflation
is 3 percent.
2. Illustrate the effects of the following developments on
both the short-run and long-run Phillips curves. Give
the economic reasoning underlying your answers.
a. a rise in the natural rate of unemployment
b. a decline in the price of imported oil
c. a rise in government spending
d. a decline in expected inflation
3. Suppose that a fall in consumer spending causes a
recession.
a. Illustrate the changes in the economy using both an
aggregate-supply/aggregate-demand diagram and
a Phillips-curve diagram. What happens to inflation
and unemployment in the short run?
b. Now suppose that over time expected inflation
changes in the same direction that actual inflation
changes. What happens to the position of the short-
run Phillips curve? After the recession is over, does
the economy face a better or worse set of inflation–
unemployment combinations?
4. Suppose the economy is in a long-run equilibrium.
a. Draw the economy’s short-run and long-run
Phillips curves.
b. Suppose a wave of business pessimism reduces
aggregate demand. Show the effect of this shock on
your diagram from part (a). If the Fed undertakes
expansionary monetary policy, can it return the
economy to its original inflation rate and original
unemployment rate?
c. Now suppose the economy is back in long-run
equilibrium, and then the price of imported oil
rises. Show the effect of this shock with a new
diagram like that in part (a). If the Fed undertakes
expansionary monetary policy, can it return the
economy to its original inflation rate and original
unemployment rate? If the Fed undertakes
contractionary monetary policy, can it return the
economy to its original inflation rate and original
unemployment rate? Explain why this situation
differs from that in part (b).
5. Suppose the Federal Reserve believed that the natural
rate of unemployment was 6 percent when the actual
natural rate was 5.5 percent. If the Fed based its policy
decisions on its belief, what would happen to the
economy?
6. The price of oil fell sharply in 1986 and again in 1998.
a. Show the impact of such a change in both the
aggregate-demand/aggregate-supply diagram and
in the Phillips-curve diagram. What happens to
inflation and unemployment in the short run?
b. Do the effects of this event mean there is no short-
run tradeoff between inflation and unemployment?
Why or why not?
7. Suppose the Federal Reserve announced that it would
pursue contractionary monetary policy in order to
reduce the inflation rate. Would the following
conditions make the ensuing recession more or less
severe? Explain.
a. Wage contracts have short durations.
b. There is little confidence in the Fed’s determination
to reduce inflation.
c. Expectations of inflation adjust quickly to actual
inflation.
8. Some economists believe that the short-run Phillips
curve is relatively steep and shifts quickly in response to
changes in the economy. Would these economists be
more or less likely to favor contractionary policy in
order to reduce inflation than economists who had the
opposite views?
9. Imagine an economy in which all wages are set in three-
year contracts. In this world, the Fed announces a
disinflationary change in monetary policy to begin
immediately. Everyone in the economy believes the
Fed’s announcement. Would this disinflation be
costless? Why or why not? What might the Fed do to
reduce the cost of disinflation?
10. Given the unpopularity of inflation, why don’t elected
leaders always support efforts to reduce inflation?
Economists believe that countries can reduce the cost
Problems and Applications
CHAPTER 33 THE SHORT-RUN TRADEOFF BETWEEN INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT 787
of disinflation by letting their central banks make
decisions about monetary policy without interference
from politicians. Why might this be so?
11. Suppose Federal Reserve policymakers accept the
theory of the short-run Phillips curve and the natural-
rate hypothesis and want to keep unemployment close
to its natural rate. Unfortunately, because the natural
rate of unemployment can change over time, they aren’t
certain about the value of the natural rate. What
macroeconomic variables do you think they should look
at when conducting monetary policy?
IN THIS CHAPTER
YOU WILL . . .
Consider whether
the tax laws should
be reformed to
encourage saving
Consider whether the
central bank should
aim for zero inflation
Consider whether
policymakers should
try to stabilize
the economy
Consider whether
monetary policy
should be made by
rule rather than
by discretion
Consider whether
fiscal policymakers
should reduce the
government debt
It is hard to open up the newspaper without finding some politician or editorial
writer advocating a change in economic policy. The president should use the bud-
get surplus to reduce government debt, or he should use it to increase government
spending. The Federal Reserve should cut interest rates to stimulate a flagging
economy, or it should avoid such moves in order not to risk higher inflation. Con-
gress should reform the tax system to promote faster economic growth, or it
should reform the tax system to achieve a more equal distribution of income. Eco-
nomic issues are central to the continuing political debate in the United States and
other countries around the world. It is no surprise that when Bill Clinton first ran
for president in 1992, his chief strategist posted a sign to remind the staff of the
central campaign issue: “The economy, stupid.”
The previous dozen chapters have developed the tools that economists use
when analyzing the behavior of the economy as a whole and the impact of policies
FIVE DEBATES OVER
MACROECONOMIC POLICY
791
792 PART THIRTEEN FINAL THOUGHTS
on the economy. This final chapter presents both sides in five leading debates over
macroeconomic policy. The knowledge you have accumulated in this course pro-
vides the background with which we can discuss these important, unsettled is-
sues. It should help you choose a side in these debates or, at least, help you see
why choosing a side is so difficult.
SHOULD MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICYMAKERS
TRY TO STABILIZE THE ECONOMY?
In Chapters 31, 32, and 33, we saw how changes in aggregate demand and aggre-
gate supply can lead to short-run fluctuations in production and employment. We
also saw how monetary and fiscal policy can shift aggregate demand and, thereby,
influence these fluctuations. But even if policymakers can influence short-run eco-
nomic fluctuations, does that mean they should? Our first debate concerns whether
monetary and fiscal policymakers should use the tools at their disposal in an at-
tempt to smooth the ups and downs of the business cycle.
PRO: POLICYMAKERS SHOULD TRY
TO STABILIZE THE ECONOMY
Left on their own, economies tend to fluctuate. When households and firms be-
come pessimistic, for instance, they cut back on spending, and this reduces the ag-
gregate demand for goods and services. The fall in aggregate demand, in turn,
reduces the production of goods and services. Firms lay off workers, and the un-
employment rate rises. Real GDP and other measures of income fall. Rising unem-
ployment and falling income help confirm the pessimism that initially generated
the economic downturn.
Such a recession has no benefit for society—it represents a sheer waste of re-
sources. Workers who become unemployed because of inadequate aggregate de-
mand would rather be working. Business owners whose factories are left idle
during a recession would rather be producing valuable goods and services and
selling them at a profit.
There is no reason for society to suffer through the booms and busts of the
business cycle. The development of macroeconomic theory has shown policy-
makers how to reduce the severity of economic fluctuations. By “leaning against
the wind” of economic change, monetary and fiscal policy can stabilize aggregate
demand and, thereby, production and employment. When aggregate demand is
inadequate to ensure full employment, policymakers should boost government
spending, cut taxes, and expand the money supply. When aggregate demand
is excessive, risking higher inflation, policymakers should cut government
spending, raise taxes, and reduce the money supply. Such policy actions put
macroeconomic theory to its best use by leading to a more stable economy, which
benefits everyone.
CHAPTER 34 FIVE DEBATES OVER MACROECONOMIC POLICY 793
CON: POLICYMAKERS SHOULD NOT TRY
TO STABILIZE THE ECONOMY
Although monetary and fiscal policy can be used to stabilize the economy in the-
ory, there are substantial obstacles to the use of such policies in practice.
One problem is that monetary and fiscal policy do not affect the economy im-
mediately but instead work with a long lag. Monetary policy affects aggregate de-
mand by changing interest rates, which in turn affect spending, especially
residential and business investment. But many households and firms set their
spending plans in advance. As a result, it takes time for changes in interest rates to
alter the aggregate demand for goods and services. Many studies indicate that
changes in monetary policy have little effect on aggregate demand until about six
months after the change is made.
Fiscal policy works with a lag because of the long political process that gov-
erns changes in spending and taxes. To make any change in fiscal policy, a bill
must go through congressional committees, pass both the House and the Senate,
and be signed by the president. It can take years to propose, pass, and implement
a major change in fiscal policy.
Because of these long lags, policymakers who want to stabilize the economy
need to look ahead to economic conditions that are likely to prevail when their ac-
tions will take effect. Unfortunately, economic forecasting is highly imprecise, in
part because macroeconomics is such a primitive science and in part because the
shocks that cause economic fluctuations are intrinsically unpredictable. Thus,
when policymakers change monetary or fiscal policy, they must rely on educated
guesses about future economic conditions.
All too often, policymakers trying to stabilize the economy do just the oppo-
site. Economic conditions can easily change between the time when a policy action
begins and when it takes effect. Because of this, policymakers can inadvertently
794 PART THIRTEEN FINAL THOUGHTS
exacerbate rather than mitigate the magnitude of economic fluctuations. Some
economists have claimed that many of the major economic fluctuations in history,
including the Great Depression of the 1930s, can be traced to destabilizing policy
actions.
One of the first rules taught to physicians is “do no harm.” The human body
has natural restorative powers. Confronted with a sick patient and an uncertain
diagnosis, often a doctor should do nothing but leave the patient’s body to its own
devices. Intervening in the absence of reliable knowledge merely risks making
matters worse.
The same can be said about treating an ailing economy. It might be desirable if
policymakers could eliminate all economic fluctuations, but that is not a realistic
goal given the limits of macroeconomic knowledge and the inherent un-
predictability of world events. Economic policymakers should refrain from inter-
v
ening often with monetary and fiscal policy and be content if they do no harm.
QUICK QUIZ: Explain why monetary and fiscal policy work with a lag.
Why do these lags matter in the choice between active and passive policy?
SHOULD MONETARY POLICY BE MADE BY RULE
RATHER THAN BY DISCRETION?
As we first discussed in Chapter 27, the Federal Open Market Committee sets
monetary policy in the United States. The committee meets about every six
weeks to evaluate the state of the economy. Based on this evaluation and fore-
casts of future economic conditions, it chooses whether to raise, lower, or leave un-
changed the level of short-term interest rates. The Fed then adjusts the money
supply to reach that interest-rate target until the next meeting, when the target is
reevaluated.
The Federal Open Market Committee operates with almost complete discre-
tion over how to conduct monetary policy. The laws that created the Fed give the
institution only vague recommendations about what goals it should pursue. And
they do not tell the Fed how to pursue whatever goals it might choose. Once mem-
bers are appointed to the Federal Open Market Committee, they have little man-
date but to “do the right thing.”
Some economists are critical of this institutional design. Our second debate
over macroeconomic policy, therefore, focuses on whether the Federal Reserve
should have its discretionary powers reduced and, instead, be committed to fol-
lowing a rule for how it conducts monetary policy.
PRO: MONETARY POLICY SHOULD BE MADE BY RULE
Discretion in the conduct of monetary policy has two problems. The first is that it
does not limit incompetence and abuse of power. When the government sends
CHAPTER 34 FIVE DEBATES OVER MACROECONOMIC POLICY 795
police into a community to maintain civic order, it gives them strict guidelines
about how to carry out their job. Because police have great power, allowing them
to exercise that power in whatever way they want would be dangerous. Yet when
the government gives central bankers the authority to maintain economic order,
it gives them no guidelines. Monetary policymakers are allowed undisciplined
discretion.
As an example of abuse of power, central bankers are sometimes tempted to
use monetary policy to affect the outcome of elections. Suppose that the vote for
the incumbent president is based on economic conditions at the time he is up for
reelection. A central banker sympathetic to the incumbent might be tempted to
pursue expansionary policies just before the election to stimulate production and
employment, knowing that the resulting inflation will not show up until after the
election. Thus, to the extent that central bankers ally themselves with politicians,
discretionary policy can lead to economic fluctuations that reflect the electoral cal-
endar. Economists call such fluctuations the political business cycle.
The second, more subtle, problem with discretionary monetary policy is that
it might lead to more inflation than is desirable. Central bankers, knowing that
there is no long-run tradeoff between inflation and unemployment, often an-
nounce that their goal is zero inflation. Yet they rarely achieve price stability.
Why? Perhaps it is because, once the public forms expectations of inflation,
policymakers face a short-run tradeoff between inflation and unemployment.
They are tempted to renege on their announcement of price stability in order to
achieve lower unemployment. This discrepancy between announcements (what
policymakers say they are going to do) and actions (what they subsequently in
fact do) is called the time inconsistency of policy. Because policymakers are so often
time inconsistent, people are skeptical when central bankers announce their in-
tentions to reduce the rate of inflation. As a result, people always expect more
inflation than monetary policymakers claim they are trying to achieve. Higher ex-
pectations of inflation, in turn, shift the short-run Phillips curve upward, making
the short-run tradeoff between inflation and unemployment less favorable than it
otherwise might be.
One way to avoid these two problems with discretionary policy is to commit
the central bank to a policy rule. For example, suppose that Congress passed a law
requiring the Fed to increase the money supply by exactly 3 percent per year. (Why
3 percent? Because real GDP grows on average about 3 percent per year and be-
cause money demand grows with real GDP, 3 percent growth in the money supply
is roughly the rate necessary to produce long-run price stability.) Such a law would
eliminate incompetence and abuse of power on the partof the Fed, and it would
make the political business cycle impossible. In addition, policy could no longer be
time inconsistent. People would now believe the Fed’s announcement of low in-
flation because the Fed would be legally required to pursue a low-inflation mone-
tary policy. With low expected inflation, the economy would face a more favorable
short-run tradeoff between inflation and unemployment.
Other rules for monetary policy are also possible. A more active rule might al-
low some feedback from the state of the economy to changes in monetary policy.
For example, a more active rule might require the Fed to increase monetary growth
by 1 percentage point for every percentage point that unemployment rises above
its natural rate. Regardless of the precise form of the rule, committing the Fed to
some rule would yield advantages by limiting incompetence, abuse of power, and
time inconsistency in the conduct of monetary policy.
796 PART THIRTEEN FINAL THOUGHTS
CON: MONETARY POLICY SHOULD NOT BE MADE BY RULE
Although there may be pitfalls with discretionary monetary policy, there is also an
important advantage to it: flexibility. The Fed has to confront various circum-
stances, not all of which can be foreseen. In the 1930s banks failed in record num-
bers. In the 1970s the price of oil skyrocketed around the world. In October 1987
the stock market fell by 22 percent in a single day. The Fed must decide how to re-
spond to these shocks to the economy. A designer of a policy rule could not possi-
bly consider all the contingencies and specify in advance the right policy response.
It is better to appoint good people to conduct monetary policy and then give them
the freedom to do the best they can.
Moreover, the alleged problems with discretion are largely hypothetical. The
practical importance of the political business cycle, for instance, is far from clear.
In some cases, just the opposite seems to occur. For example, President Jimmy
Carter appointed Paul Volcker to head the Federal Reserve in 1979. Nonetheless, in
DURING THE 1990S, MANY CENTRAL BANKS
around the world adopted inflation
targeting as a rule—or at least as a
rough guide—for setting monetary
policy. Brazil is a recent example.
Brazil to Use Inflation Data for
Managing Interest Rates
B
Y PETER FRITSCH
RIO DE JANEIRO—Brazil’s Central Bank
will adopt in late June a formal process
for managing interest rates based on
predefined inflation targets for the fol-
lowing 30 months, according to the
bank’s president, Arminio Fraga.
In an interview, Mr. Fraga said the
Central Bank is in the process of work-
ing out the details of an “inflation target-
ing” regime for managing interest rates
and the economy. Inflation targeting—
a system used by other countries with
free-floating currencies such as Britain,
Canada, and New Zealand—is fairly sim-
ple: If prices are rising faster than expec-
tations, interest rates are lifted to cool
off the economy. If prices are falling or
steady, rates are cut. . . .
Once in place, Brazil’s new policy
will look like the Bank of England’s.
Britain’s central bank hitched interest-
rate policy to a more visible price anchor
after the inflationary shock of the
pound’s severe weakening in 1992. To-
day, the United Kingdom targets annual
inflation at 2.5% over a two-year horizon
and adjusts short-term interest rates
when its price forecasts wander from
that goal by more than a percentage
point.
In general, outside observers like
the simplicity of this policy. “The ad-
vantage of targeting inflation is that
the Central Bank is less likely to
micromanage than if it is trying to target
the level of interest rates or the cur-
rency,” says Morgan Stanley Dean Wit-
ter & Co. economist Ernest W. Brown.
The downside of setting explicit targets
is that a hard-to-predict economy without
price controls like Brazil’s is apt to miss
its inflation targets from time to time, and
miss them publicly.
That causes some to worry about
the Brazilian Central Bank’s lack of inde-
pendence. Brazil’s Central Bank reports
to the Finance Ministry, and thus to the
president. What if missing—or hitting—
an inflation target clashes with other ad-
ministration goals, such as reducing
unemployment? “Inflation targeting goes
in the right direction of trying to insulate
the Central Bank from politics,” says
J. P. Morgan & Co. economist Marcelo
Carvalho. “Still, introducing inflation tar-
geting without proper formal Central
Bank independence risks just pouring
old wine into new bottles.”
S
OURCE: The Wall Street Journal, May 22, 1999,
p. A8.
IN THE NEWS
Inflation Targeting
. time inconsistency of policy. Because policymakers are so often
time inconsistent, people are skeptical when central bankers announce their in-
tentions to. limits of macroeconomic knowledge and the inherent un-
predictability of world events. Economic policymakers should refrain from inter-
v
ening often with