(see Figure 5.2)? Or, to take another example, is our current
strategy and organization aimed at exploiting old ways of work-
ing by driving out variance among the workforce and generating
high levels of cooperation around a core theme of making
money now; or is it/should it be about exploring new ways/ideas
by enhancing variance and initiative around a core theme of
achieving results in the long term – the ‘innovate or die’ argu-
ment (Sutton, 2001; Roberts, 2004)? We will return to this ques-
tion later in this chapter. The second question is concerned with
how strategy is, or should be, devised and implemented: is strat-
egy best devised and implemented in a top-down, big bang fash-
ion, exemplified by the headline-grabbing, CEO-envisioned and
driven, programme of change; or are we better to follow a more
middle-emergent and incremental approach that involves as
many people as possible and addresses the politics of change all
of the way through the process (see Figure 5.2)?
164 CorporateReputations,BrandingandPeople Management
Planned
strategy
Profit
maximizing
Emergent
strategy
Multiple
goals
Figure 5.2
Answers to Whittington’s Two Questions on the nature of strategy
(based on Whittington, 2001).
Though we acknowledge that there is a ‘both – and’ answer to
these questions, we will use them in their simple form to provide
a framework for our analysis of HR strategy, reputations and
brands. This approach may be less clear-cut than accepting the
dominant views of the best practice or best fit schools, and we
will be treading on some big toes in the process, but part of our
role is to evaluate received wisdom, even that which appears on
the pages of the Harvard Business School Press and is frequently
‘endorsed’ by the UK-based CIPD and the Society of Human
Resource Management (SHRM) in the USA. So, the rest of this
chapter will address the following two questions on HR strategy:
■ To what uses should HR strategy be put?
■ How should HR strategies be developed in practice?
HR strategy: why does it matter?
HR strategy and best practice
Let’s look at a case that helps illustrate many of the points we
wish to address in this chapter and the importance of the two
questions.
Chapter 5 Four lenses on HR strategy and the employment relationship 165
Box 5.1 HRM at Paragon
Many of the cases in this book have been based on a best practice
approach in which high performance HR strategies have been aligned
with the strategic vision of an organization to produce strong organ-
izational identities, reputations and brands. One of the problems, how-
ever, with using evidence from headline cases of best practice in high
performing companies is that you don’t always know if best practices
were the causes of high performance if you don’t test them out in other
situations – most importantly, the use of the self-same practices in com-
panies that were low performers ( Joyce et al., 2003). This was one of
the criticisms of the ‘In Search of Excellence’ companies, so influential
in the 1980s, nearly half of whom were no longer excellent five years
after Peters and Waterman reported that excellent companies were
excellent because of seven practices. The best practice literature, which
is so easily digested, is widely available on airport book shelves; and the
166 CorporateReputations,BrandingandPeople Management
pressures to ‘follow the pack’ are so strong that it is very likely that
many firms that continue to perform poorly use the same high per-
formance practices. Even worse, what’s the betting on best practice
leading to total failure?
Here is a case of one company that exemplifies the best practice
approach. The rise of the Paragon company is the stuff of legends among
the business press. It was attributed with inventing radically new business
concepts in the 1980s, with re-inventing itself many times during the
1990s and described in one of the major business publications as one of
the ‘Most Innovative Companies’ five years in a row, was 24th on Fortune’s
Best Companies to Work For, number 2 on Reputation of Employee
Talent, and number 1 on the Reputation of Quality of Management. So,
on any test of reputation management, this company was up there with
the best. How had it achieved such adulation?
Paragon’s credo of innovation and high performance
Paragon was attributed with re-defining the rules of the previously highly
regulated industry in which it became a dominant player by (1) embra-
cing a free market philosophy; (2) repeatedly developing new business
models to earn superior revenues in a rapidly changing industry and
market environment; and (3) re-defining its mission and strategy – it had
been a well-known producer of specialist products and services with
large amounts of capital assets but during the 1990s became a trading
company only, not only in these products and services but in related
ones. In doing so, it reflected the general trends in industry to focus on
its specialist competence in transforming itself into a new-economy,
knowledge-based company trading on its intellectual capital. As its CEO
repeatedly said, ‘assets were bad, intellectual capital was good’.
Paragon’s peoplemanagement strategy: supporting reputations and
the brand through talent managementand high performance HRM
1 Talent managementand rewards: The CEO and HR director rec-
ognized that in creating a trading company they had to compete
with the best in the financial world and elsewhere. They decided to
recruit the best MBA graduates they could hire, at the rate of 250 a
year. As one senior manager commented, ‘We had these things called
Super Saturday. I’d interview some of these guys who were fresh out
of Harvard, and these kids could blow me out of the water. They
Chapter 5 Four lenses on HR strategy and the employment relationship 167
knew things I’d never heard of.’ The main attraction for these new
recruits was the reputation Paragon had created for itself as ‘hip,
dynamic, new-economy company’. Bright young graduates in astro-
physics and science were turned into trading specialists who could
do fast and creative deals in the performance-oriented culture.
These ‘A’ players were placed in these ‘A’ jobs of making deals, and
were rewarded appropriately by being paid as entrepreneurs, with
a salary package that embodied four elements: base salary, high per-
formance bonuses, additional perks and stock options. The main cri-
teria for bonuses were how they contributed to shareholder value.
Top performers were rewarded inordinately and promoted with-
out regard for seniority or experience. As the CEO said, ‘The only
thing that differentiates [this company] from our competitors is
our people, our talent … We hire very smart peopleand we pay
them more than they think they are worth.’
2 Human resource development: The company lived out the CEO’s
credo of building on smart people rather than assets, with HR given
a large budget for career development and to create an open market
for internal transfers. This was aimed at creating knowledge transfer
and flexibility among the many operating units and allowing free
movement across previously sacrosanct divisions. The rewards policy
supported such free movements by allowing people to retain titles,
even though they may be doing rather different jobs (and thus not
entitled to the previous title). The stock options were also designed
to give people the focus on the business, rather than identification
with their own units. Performance management was carried out on
the basis of segmenting jobs andpeople into A, B and C categories,
with A referring to the most important jobs and best performers, B
to supporting jobs and promising people, and C to marginal jobs and
marginal or poor performers. Each year, every unit was required to
put people into a forced distribution ranking and identify the bot-
tom 15% performers who were usually ‘named, shamed and fired’.
3 Design of work: The way in which work and jobs were designed
reflected the needs for innovation, entrepreneurship and high per-
formance. Work teams were provided with ‘phantom equity’ to pro-
vide them with a sense of responsibility and involvement for running
autonomous projects. This equity could be swapped for real stock
once the teams had realized a profit from their ventures. This way
Many readers will have picked up important messages regard-
ing linking strategy to good HR practice from this case, which
could well have come straight from the pages of many US texts
that follow an essentially prescriptive approach to HRM, strat-
egy and performance. But even companies that have adopted a
‘classical’, design approach to HR, beginning with the business
strategy and implementing a set of state-of-the-art HR practices,
can fail. Even worse, HR can, as Spector (2003) insightfully
argued, be the ‘un-indicted co-conspirator’ in helping a com-
pany ‘crash and burn’. For, as some readers will have guessed,
not only did Paragon fail spectacularly, but its HR talent man-
agement and reward practices helped it on its way – Paragon,
of course, being a pseudonym for Enron.
Consequently, the Paragon/Enron case should serve as a warn-
ing to HR practitioners. How they answer the first question con-
cerning the outcomes to which strategy, especially HR strategy,
should be put can cause immense damage to companies. It also
serves as a warning to those advocating a design approach to strat-
egy: many of the problems of Enron seem to be attributable to its
CEO, Jeffrey Skilling, who drove a top-down, talent management
and reward strategy that helped Enron make bad strategic deci-
sions, become a victim of ‘irrational exuberance’ and develop a
leadership of ‘bad apples’, three of the usual explanations for
the failure of Enron (Spector, 2003). So, if leadership can be
168 CorporateReputations,BrandingandPeople Management
of encouraging innovation provided Paragon with a steady stream
of business ideas, one of which was an award-winning e-business
development, which reduced transaction times by huge amounts.
The company benefited from many such developments.
4 Values: Paragon, in line with its name, promoted a value system of
communication, respect, integrity and excellence, which the CEO
used all avenues to promote. The communications and public rela-
tions function in the company, along with the CEO, used many
avenues to have people live the values in their day-to-day inter-
actions. However, this aspect of HR was probably the least successful,
since employees tended to live the unwritten value of finding new
ways to make money. From a shareholder value perspective, how-
ever, was this emphasis on revenue generation such a bad thing?
a source of failure as well as success, we should be asking our-
selves: how should HR strategies be developed in practice? So
much for a best practice approach to HR strategy, you might say?
We think not. Though our book is also written with a view to
helping HR practitioners make a more relevant contribution
to their organizations, hopefully our more discursive, analytical
approach does not fall into the trap of emphasizing a one-best
way, or giving HR the centre-stage in management decision-
making. Clearly, as the formidable US HR academic George
Strauss (2001) has pointed out, British writers often misunder-
stand the US approach to HRM by elevating it to a level of
importance that it rarely achieves among US firms or in the US
university business school community. HR practitioners, because
of their ‘trained incapacity’ to think from the perspective of their
specialism, tend to look first inside the company for HR strategy
by focusing on peopleand people-related outcomes rather than
business and environmental issues (Wright et al., 2003).
Strategy surely matters in the general sense of what is import-
ant to organizations and so, we believe, does HR strategy; though
both have to be viewed from different perspectives about what
aspects of strategy matter. You can often look at HR strategy
through different lenses to get a more complex ‘reading’. In this
chapter, we have chosen to look at it through four different
lenses, all of which shed light (and, unfortunately, some heat) on
what it is and whether it matters. For, as Gareth Morgan (1997)
has pointed out, what you see depends on where (and when) you
stand; managers, including HR specialists, need to be able to
work with a number of different and even competing ideas simul-
taneously to be able to understand and manage the complicated
situations often found in managing peopleand organizations.
Chapter 5 Four lenses on HR strategy and the employment relationship 169
Four lenses on strategy and
HRM explained
Whittington organized the two dimensions in Figure 5.2 to
produce four explanations of strategy. We have adapted these
to show how HR strategy can be seen through four different
lenses, each one of which help us understand HR and evaluate
its links with reputations and brands (see Figure 5.3). All four
views are characterized by different assumptions and offer unique
answers to the questions of ‘what is strategic HRM and does it
matter?’. Note, however, the boxes and callouts have purposely
not been drawn the same size because some of these lenses are
more important than others in HR, at least in terms of their
impact on practice.
170 CorporateReputations,BrandingandPeople Management
Multiple goals
Profit maximizing
The design
school
Markets
and
evolution
Embedded
systems
Processes
and
change
Rational
planning
Action-
emergent
Figure 5.3
Four lenses on HR strategy (based on Whittington, 2001).
These four lenses or perspectives on HR strategy are: the
design perspective, classic in the sense that it is the most import-
ant and dominant one; the increasingly important process and
change perspective, which is the basis for casting HR specialists
as change agents (Ulrich and Brockbank, 2005); a market or
evolutionary view, which reduces the role of HR strategy to cost
reduction, managing downsizing and flexibility; and the embed-
ded systems approach, which focuses on how HR strategy and
practices are rooted in particular contexts or business systems,
making their transfer to other organizations, industries and
national cultures much more difficult than is usually imagined.
Let’s explain just how these four views have been arrived at
before we examine them in more detail in this and the next
chapter. There is a long tradition in the literature on HR and
employee relations (Fox, 1974) that addresses the first question
concerning the outcomes of HR strategy – whether practice or
thinking emphasizes unitary, profit maximizing outcomes such as
shareholder value or pluralist, multiple outcomes such as satisfy-
ing diverse stakeholder interests. Answers to the second ques-
tion have tended to divide according to those people favouring
rational choice and planning as a way of making strategy and
those favouring the emergent, political and action-oriented
nature of strategies (Mintzberg et al., 1998). Karl Weick (2001),
a well-known US scholar, rather provocatively set out this second
question in the form: do we think our way into action or do we
act our way into thinking? He argues for the latter, that strategy-
making is more like improvisation than design, with managers
using whatever materials/knowledge they have at hand to fashion
or craft strategy, the first step of which is to examine these materi-
als/knowledge to see what they have previously been used for and
what has been achieved with them. So, having an intimate under-
standing of what human capital and resources you have and
recombining them in novel ways is what makes good HR strategy
from an improvisation perspective. Sutton (2001) has talked
about such an approach as ‘seeing old things in new ways’, for
which he adopts the term ‘vuja de’. This is equivalent to inventing
new combinations of existing ideas.
Therefore, according to Whittington, the design school and
what we have called the embedded systems lens share one key
assumption – that planning and rational choices are important.
They differ, however, because the design school increasing share-
holder value is seen as the only legitimate claim on their activities,
while the embedded systems approach takes into account multi-
ple demands and pulls in formulating and implementing strate-
gies, such as the CSR agenda, which we shall discuss more fully in
Chapter 9. This is very similar to the competing interest problems
facing leadership we discussed in Chapter 3. For example, the
design school has focused on profit maximization and business
drivers whilst embedded systems stress the entrenched nature of
managerial actions in organizational, industrial and national
cultures, including the social backgrounds, education and pro-
fessional orientations of managers. This focus may still result in
rational choices, but this time, rational choice is exercised as a
balancing act, satisficing or optimizing between competing
claims rather than maximizing outcomes.
Chapter 5 Four lenses on HR strategy and the employment relationship 171
A good example of this balancing act would be how strategic
HR decisions are often taken in Sino-foreign joint ventures
where market forces and the profit motive have to be understood
in the context of overt political influence (Zhang and Martin,
2003). Another example from our research concerns the inter-
national recruitment consultants, Hudson International, who
were in the process of implementing an employer branding pro-
ject across their subsidiaries in a number of European countries.
Implementing the new values framework and reviews of HR prac-
tices is being achieved through a major consultation exercise
with employees in the various companies. In Europe, with its
overlay of national cultures and institutions, this has meant
taking into account not only language differences but also the
contestable notion of values. As the European HR Director
explained:
certain words we use mean very little in Germany, with no
equivalent translation. And even the notion of values itself
has different meanings in the different countries. For example,
speaking to the Italians, and telling them you have these values
that you would like to implement causes them real problems.
They look at you and say, well what were you before? Didn’t
you have values before? We never had to do that with TMP
(the American-owned previous parent company) – these
were the words and that was what you would have to use.
So each country will look at the notion of values and make
them meaningful in their context.
In contrast, the evolutionary and market-based assumptions asso-
ciated with so-called popular ecology views on organizations rest
on the relentless and unpredictable nature of the market envi-
ronment for managers, and predict their helplessness and
inability to make much of a difference to their organization’s
chances of success. In effect, this economics-dominated per-
spective sees the hidden hand of markets selecting out those
firms that will survive in the increasingly competitive global
economy and has little time for human agency and managerial
choice. As Whittington suggested, there is a cruel paradox at
work since only those firms that are fit for such competition will
survive but managers have very little ability to help shape their
172 CorporateReputations,BrandingandPeople Management
firms for survival other than make them cost-effective and fast
and flexible enough to respond to market signals of what is
required to compete.
From a very different perspective, the assumptions of those
holding a process and change perspective on HR strategy are at
odds with the dominance and rationalism of markets and the
processes of natural selection. Instead they point to the many
imperfections in market forces, the power of large firms to cre-
ate virtual monopolies through global brandingand the import-
ance of human agency in new, highly creative firms that are
able to become major players in existing and new industries by
learning faster and better. Furthermore, reflecting the idea of
Weick (2001) and ideas drawn from complexity and chaos the-
ory (Stacey, 2001), some writers have argued that managerial
attempts at long-term planning had little effect on organizational
outcomes because strategic change was a much messier, emer-
gent and politically influenced process than rational planners
assume to be true. These change writers have given much greater
emphasis to building organizational coalitions, bargaining and
learning as a way of producing incremental strategic change.
The cumulative effect of small increments in strategic change, as
Morgan (1993) has pointed out, can result in quantum or radical
change over a longer time period.
Chapter 5 Four lenses on HR strategy and the employment relationship 173
The classical approach to strategic
HRM, the focus on planning, best
practice and strategic fit
As we have already explained this school assumes that unitary
goals such as profitability or maximizing shareholder value are
the natural state of affairs or, at least, should be – to paraphrase
the US president, Calvin Coolidge, the ‘business of business is
business’ argument in which social responsibility and ethical
behaviour are not objectives that business can, or should be,
concerned with. Its adherents also hold strong beliefs that the
rational planning and design of strategy, structure and human
resource systems are the best means to achieve such unitary
. shape their
172 Corporate Reputations, Branding and People Management
firms for survival other than make them cost-effective and fast
and flexible enough. good’.
Paragon’s people management strategy: supporting reputations and
the brand through talent management and high performance HRM
1 Talent management and rewards: