Tame and half-hearted war - intervention, reprisal and necessity

6 Tame and half-hearted war: intervention, reprisal and necessity [I]n cases where a strong state or group of states finds itself obliged to undertake what are practically measures of police against weak and recalcitrant powers, [reprisals] may be a useful alternative to war. They are less destructive and more limited in their operation. It is true that they may be used to inflict injury on small states, and extort from them a compliance with unreasonable demands. But war can be equally unjust, and would certainly cause more suffering. T. J. Lawrence 1 The distinction between perfect and imperfect wars, inherited from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, continued to exist in the nine- teenth, although under different labels. Perfect wars were the ones that fitted the positivist analysis: conflicts in which one state attempted to force its will upon another, or in which two states reciprocally attempted to impose their respective wills onto one another. As observed above, wars in this proper legal sense were seen as clashes of policy or interest rather than of law. But these fully fledged perfect wars of the positivists constituted, so to speak, only the showy surface of interstate violence. Beneath that surface was another type of armed action by states to which the label ‘measures short of war’ was commonly given. Clausewitz had recognised this distinction in holding that conflicts between states occupied an entire spectrum of degrees of violence. At the one extreme, he placed the ‘pure’ type of war, ‘a death struggle for total existence’. At the other end was limited war for limited ends, when issues of only slight importance were at stake. In such instances, Clausewitz observed, war becomes reduced to ‘something tame and half-hearted’. It will often be 1 Lawrence, Principles, at 343–4. 215 ‘nothing more than armed neutrality, a threatening attitude meant to support negotiations, a mild attempt to gain some small advantage’. In thesesituations,‘thehostilespiritoftruewar’waslacking. 2 It was the task of lawyers to decide where along this spectrum to make the cut, or dividing line, between conflicts that qualified as wars and ones that did not. On one side of the line was the state of war properly speaking, with the application of the legal institution of war in all its fullness. On the other side were measures short of war, which were regarded as acts of war taking place during a state of peace. 3 What distinguished measures short of war from a true state of war was – very broadly speaking – their over-all nature as measures of law enforcement, as opposed to measures of national policy, which were the preserve of true war. Measures short of war were therefore, in essence, the nineteenth-century version of just wars. There was a deep irony here. Where just wars had formerly been seen as ‘ideal types’ of war – i.e., as wars in the very truest sense – they were now excluded altogether from the category of war in the nineteenth-century sense. Just wars had been, so to speak, ‘demoted’. But they were still very much part of the inter- national scene, even if they commanded less attention than wars, both at thetimeandsince.Infact,insomeways,thenineteenthcentury represented something of a golden age of just wars, albeit in their newer and more modest incarnation. These nineteenth-century just wars have yet to receive the systematic study that they deserve; and the present treatment can only survey their broader features. They came in a dizzying variety of forms; but, for present purposes, they may be said to have fallen into three principal categories. One was intervention, which referred, during this period, to the use of armed force to promote general community interests. These represented just wars in perhaps their purest form – early versions of what would be known in the United Nations era as enforcement or peacekeeping operations. 4 As such, they constituted a striking innova- tion on the international legal scene. A second category consisted of reprisals – but reprisals which were now very different in character, in many ways, from past practices. In the nineteenth century, for the first time, reprisals came to be state-to-state affairs, involving the use of armed force, in marked contrast to the past when they had been mere property-sequestration measures directed against individuals. The third 2 Clausewitz, On War, at 218. 3 See, for example, 1 Calvo, Droit international, at 802–3. 4 See Chevalier, ‘Sainte-Alliance’. 216 WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS type of measure short of war was rather different, in that it did not descend from the medieval conception of just wars. It comprised emer- gency actions of various kinds, falling under the broad heading of necessity. These were exercises of the inherent, primeval right of survi- val, comprising such actions as self-defence, together with related mea- sures such as rescue missions and punitive expeditions. It will be readily observed that all three of these categories of measures short of war had one feature in common: that they involved armed action by major powers, either alone or in concert, against lesser ones. There can be few ironies greater than the fact that, in this area of practice which descends so directly from the just- war outlook of the Middle Ages, with its stress on justice and the rule of law, the hard face of power politics should be so ubiquitously present. Brute force and the rule of law have always been uneasy, if sometimes necessary, companions of one another, at the best of times. And the motives of major powers exerting their might to build a better world have ever been open to the readiest suspicion. The nineteenth century was the first period in history in which these disturbing considerations played a major role in international affairs. It would not be the last. The art of intervention In considering intervention in the nineteenth century, we must put entirely out of our minds the almost wholly pejorative sense which that term has taken on since the Second World War. 5 In the nineteenth century, it had a much more positive image, connoting action undertaken not in the name of narrow national self-interest but rather in the pursuit of community norms such as preserving the peace, promoting self-determination of peoples or preventing and punishing atrocities. William Edward Hall spoke of intervention as ‘a measure of prevention or police’, often taken in the interest of preventing the outbreak of a war or of providing some measure of assistance to the state in which it occurred. 6 This conferred onto intervention an aura of selfless action, idealism and community service, presenting a stark contrast to the self-centred Hobbesian frame of mind which prevailed in ‘normal’ interstate relations. It therefore had the strong 5 On the early uses of the term ‘intervention’, see Winfield, ‘History’, at 131–9. 6 Hall, Treatise, at 281. TAME AND HALF - HEARTED WAR 217 flavour of natural law and the just-war ethos to it. 7 For this very reason, however, it aroused great opposition from positivist-minded lawyers, as it was directly antithetical to the fundamental positivist principle of the sovereignty and independence of states and of the rigorous equality of states before the law. 8 This powerful affinity between intervention and the just-war outlook was nowhere more apparent than in the writing of the century’s fore- most intellectual champion of the practice, the Scottish lawyer James Lorimer. His approach is of interest because he, practically alone of the major international-law writers of the nineteenth century, stood con- sciously apart from the prevailing positivist consensus. He frankly deprecated positivist thought as representing what he called the ‘nega- tive’ or ‘national’ school of jurisprudence. Positivism, he maintained, was negative in its rejection of any overarching body of ethical thought governing international relations and its reliance instead on treaties and customary practices of states as the sole source of international law. And it was national in its fixation on the isolated nation-state as the ultimate unit of the international community, walled off from other states by the doctrines of sovereignty, independence and non-intervention. Lorimer’s positive (or ‘cosmopolitan’) conception of international law was not, emphatically, to be confused with positivism. On the contrary, it was a forthright embrace of the natural-law idea that the states of the world formed an interconnected, interdependent moral community. In such a community, as in any community worthy of the name, duties to the society at large must prevail over merely selfish concerns. 9 In nineteenth-century parlance, intervention did not necessarily imply military action. It could take the form of, say, an offer to mediate in a dispute or an actual war. The British lawyer Robert Phillimore identified no fewer than six kinds of intervention, falling into two broad categories: intervention in the internal affairs of a state (such as the replacing of one government by another), and intervention for the purpose of safeguarding international peace and security. This second category, which Phillimore held to rest on much more solid legal ground than the first, consisted of action for either of two specific purposes: the preservation of the over-all balance of power, or the protection of 7 For a general survey of the subject in its nineteenth-century sense, see Stowell, Intervention. 8 For principled opposition to the lawfulness of intervention, on these grounds, see 1 Calvo, Droit international, at 195–8; and Bluntschli, Droit international, at 252–4. 9 1 Lorimer, Institutes, at 9–11. 218 WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS victims of oppression on religious grounds (what would later be termed humanitarian intervention). 10 The American lawyer Henry Wheaton posited that the number of situations that might give rise to interven- tions was so large and varied as to preclude the formulation of any set of general legal rules on the subject. 11 The principal point about intervention, though, was that it was generally (though not universally) regarded as being quite distinct from war. 12 For present purposes, it may suffice to consider interven- tions as falling into two categories, political and humanitarian. By political interventions are meant those which were designed to bolster the Vienna settlement of 1815 or, more broadly, to safeguard the general peace of Europe against actual or potential threats. By humanitarian interventions are meant those which were designed to rescue a group of foreign nationals from oppression at the hands of their rulers. Political intervention Political interventions took a variety of specific forms and occurred in a variety of different conditions. They sometimes took place in internal crises in particular states, in cases of revolutions and the like. At other times, they occurred in the context of interstate conflicts. Sometimes they had the consent of the government of the state in which they occurred, and sometimes not. Non-consensual intervention, consisting of coercive action (as opposed to diplomatic means such as mediation), merited the term ‘policing’. Sometimes, the intervening states adopted a stance of impartiality, confining themselves to intervention in the literal sense of ‘coming between’ two clashing parties. Lorimer referred to this as a ‘double intervention’. In later times, it would be referred to as peacekeeping. On other occasions, the intervening states took the side of one party against the other – a ‘single intervention’ in Lorimer’s expression. 13 Sometimes a single state did the intervening on its own initiative, and sometimes it was done by two or more powers in concert. Some of the early opportunities for intervention were for the purpose of shoring up the 1814–15 European peace settlement which was nego- tiated at the Congress of Vienna at the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars. There were some striking features of this peace settlement which 10 1 Phillimore, Commentaries, at 559–61. 11 Wheaton, Elements, at 79. 12 For a dissenting voice, see Halleck, International Law, at 334–43, who held intervention to be ‘virtually’ a war. 13 2 Lorimer, Institutes, at 53. TAME AND HALF - HEARTED WAR 219 call for notice. Most outstanding for present purposes was the fact that thearrangementsmadeweredesigned to establish not merely a factual situation but also a legal one, to which was accorded the grand sobriquet of ‘the public law of Europe’. This public law of Europe rested, in essence, on two pillars. The first, concerning relations between nations, was the principle of mutual respect by the states of Europe for the sovereignty and independence of one another. States were to be content with the territories that they had been allocated by the peace-makers at Vienna, and none should covet the possessions of the others. The second great principle operated internally in the various European states. This was a respect for legitimacy, for acceptance of established rulers – and a foreswear- ing of resort to revolutionary excesses. Change, to be sure, could and should occur. But it should occur in a measured and orderly manner without resort to the barricade and the scaffold. This internal principle entailed a strong element of reciprocity. Rulers were bound to cooperate with their subjects in the process of orderly and incremental change, through such means as constitutions and impartial judiciaries. In return, the subjects should be duly respectful of the prevailing laws and institutions, and confine their agitations to prescribed channels. The broad goal was to make arbitrariness and tyranny obsolete, along with their nemesis, revolution. One of the most innovative aspects of the 1814–15 settlement lay in thefactthatitcontainedanenforcementmechanism,intheformof (more or less) vigilant supervision by the major powers. Its origin lay in the Quadruple Alliance of 1814, comprising the principal powers allied against revolutionary France (Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia). 14 By 1818, this had become a Quintuple Alliance with the accession of France itself, now safely back under Bourbon rule. 15 Within that group, three of the countries (Austria, Prussia and Russia) associated themselves under the lofty title of the Holy Alliance. 16 These initiatives marked the first time in history that the major powers had formed themselves into a kind of directorate of international society – self-appointed, to be sure – with a view to bringing a degree of order to a hitherto chaotic and anarchic world. From across the Atlantic, Henry Wheaton described the arrangement as ‘a sort of superintending authority . over the international affairs of Europe’. 17 14 Treaty of Chaumont, 1 Mar. 1814, 63 CTS 83. 15 Protocol of the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle, 15 Nov. 1818, 69 CTS 365. 16 Austria-Prussia-Russia, Holy Alliance, 26 Sept. 1815, 65 CTS 199. 17 Wheaton, Elements, at 79. 220 WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS A great experiment was in the making. Not even in the Middle Ages – when the doctrine of the just war was most dominant – had there been any suggestion of a league of powers actually devoting their resources on an open-ended basis to upholding the basic values of the world com- munity. In its most benevolent form, this would amount to what Lorimer called ‘warlike co-operation in behalf of freedom’. 18 Imbued as he was with the natural-law spirit, Lorimer regarded this form of intervention as not merely a right but also a positive duty. 19 There were naturally those who suspected, both then and later, that the powers were, in reality, rather more concerned with their own interests than withthoseofhumanityatlarge.Bethatasitmay,therewasnodenying that at least the idea of a cooperative great-power alliance to secure international peace was a radically new one. The earliest occasion for armed action by these new-minted watch- men presented itself in the early 1820s, when the outbreak of distur- bances in Naples and Sardinia led the monarchs of those two states to appeal for assistance in restoring order. Austria duly sent troops to both, in each case subduing the revolutionary forces and restoring order and legitimacy. In the wake of the Naples intervention, the three Holy Alliance countries issued a statement carefully characterising the two Austrian actions not as wars but as ‘temporary measures of precaution’ motivated by a spirit of ‘justice and disinterestedness’. The exclusive goal of the Holy Allies, the world was assured, was to safeguard ‘the free exercise of legitimate authority’ and to combat the twin scourges of ‘Revolution and Crime’. 20 In 1823, France undertook a similar opera- tion to restore the Spanish King Ferdinand VII to full power after insurgents took control of the northern part of the country. Further interventions by the major powers, in various combinations, in the 1830s led to the independence of Belgium (from the Netherlands) and of Greece (from the Ottoman Empire). Interventions by the Concert of Europe (as the system of major- power cooperation came to be commonly known) continued to occur, albeit very sporadically, throughout the nineteenth century and even 18 1 Lorimer, Institutes, at 224. 19 2 ibid. at 121–7. Lorimer was conscious that, in the face of the positivist consensus of his time, his position was a minority one. For agreement with Lorimer, see 1 Fiore, Nouveau droit, at 517–26. 20 Declaration of the Allied Sovereigns of Austria, Prussia and Russia on the Breaking up of the Conference of Laibach, 12 May 1821, in Albrecht-Carrie ´ (ed.), Concert of Europe, at 55–7. TAME AND HALF - HEARTED WAR 221 into the twentieth. One of the most notable later initiatives occurred in 1886, when the powers imposed a naval blockade of Greece, to compel it to halt an offensive which it had launched against Bulgaria. 21 In 1897–8 came armed action once again against Greece, this time in response to its occupation of Crete (which was then part of the Ottoman Empire). In one of their most impressive cooperative efforts, no fewer than six major powers (Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy and Russia) combined to blockade the island to prevent the landing of Turkish troops, with the inevitable bloodshed that would have resulted. 22 They then compelled Greece to evacuate the island, while also insisting that Turkey grant a special autonomous status to it, as a condition for its remaining part of the Ottoman Empire. 23 There were similar developments in the Western Hemisphere in the twentieth century, with the United States assuming the leading policing role. The decisive event was the promulgation, in 1904, of what became known as the ‘Roosevelt Corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine. President Theodore Roosevelt announced that, in ‘flagrant’ cases of ‘[c]hronic wrongdoing’ on the part of Western Hemisphere states, or of ‘an impo- tence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society’, the United States might be compelled, with due reluctance, to exercise what was frankly termed ‘an international police power’. 24 The purpose was to forestall intervention by European powers and thereby to uphold the Monroe Doctrine, by ensuring that the American republics scrupu- lously complied with their international obligations – chiefly by paying their debts and according proper treatment to foreign traders and investors. The Roosevelt Corollary was no idle pronouncement. In the ensuing years, the United States intervened on a number of occasions in Caribbean and Central American states with a view to restoring order, protecting foreign nationals and safeguarding foreign investments. The Dominican Republic was occupied by the American forces on this basis 21 On this incident, see Bare ` s, Blocus pacifique, at 40–4; and Hogan, Pacific Blockade,at 126–30. 22 See Notification of the Blockade of the Island of Crete, 19 Mar. 1897, 89 BFSP 446. See also Bare ` s, Blocus pacifique, at 45–56. 23 An adequate history of the Concert of Europe from the legal standpoint has yet to be written in English. See, however, Dupuis, Principe d’e ´ quilibre; and Holbraad, Concert of Europe. For a valuable collection of documents, see Albrecht-Carrie ´ (ed.), Concert of Europe. 24 Bartlett (ed.), Record, at 539. 222 WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS for some eight years, from 1916 to 1924. Haı ¨ ti was under American occupation for even longer, from 1915 to 1934. These actions, however, were not considered to be true wars. 25 Humanitarian intervention The other principal form of intervention was humanitarian. As the term implies, its purpose was to prevent the occurrence, or continuation, of some kind of human tragedy, such as extreme oppression by a ruler of his subjects or a massacre of a civilian population in the course of some kind of unrest or rebellion. No form of armed activity had a more distinguished intellectual pedigree than this one. It was the quintessen- tial example of a just war in the medieval sense: a war fought for the vindication of right against wrong, free from the odour of self-interest (since foreigners were the beneficiaries of the action). Hugo Grotius, in thoroughgoing medieval spirit, even held that states had a right to intervene to rescue foreigners from oppression by their sovereign, even though the hapless subjects themselves lacked any right to resist or rebel on their own behalf. 26 Humanitarian intervention in its modern guise was first articulated – though not actually undertaken – in 1791, with the joint issuing of the Declaration of Pillnitz by Austria and Prussia, in response to events in revolutionary France. They declared that they regarded the precarious situation of the king of France to be ‘an object of common interest to all the sovereigns of Europe’ and not merely to France alone. They also announced a willingness to ‘act promptly in a mutual agreement with the necessary forces’ to restore the beleaguered king to his rightful status. 27 Although this announcement (which was not acted on) smacked more of political reaction than of humanitarianism, it con- tained the two key conceptual elements of humanitarian intervention: a statement that seemingly internal or domestic events could be a matter of common concern to the world at large even in the absence of any direct material interest; and a willingness to use force to set the situation aright. One of many problems with humanitarian intervention lay in identi- fying clear illustrations of it. There were many crises in the nineteenth 25 See generally Graham-Yooll, Imperial Skirmishes. 26 Grotius, War and Peace, at 583–4. 27 On the Declaration of Pillnitz, see Blanning, Origins, at 86–9. TAME AND HALF - HEARTED WAR 223 century (and later) in which humanitarian considerations played at least some part. But it would be difficult, if not impossible, to point to any in which humanitarian considerations were the sole factor at work. Bearing this important caveat in mind, it may be said that the first major case, arguably, of humanitarian intervention occurred in the Greek independ- ence crisis of the 1820s. It began when Britain, France and Russia first attempted to mediate between the Greeks and their Ottoman rulers and ended by their taking joint military action against the Turks. 28 Britain and France blockaded the Dardenelles Straits, as well as the Morea, to prevent further supplies from reaching the Turkish forces. They also blockaded, and then destroyed, the principal Ottoman-Egyptian fleet in Navarino harbour, with the loss of some 8,000 lives. As a result, the Ottoman Empire was forced to accept the full independence of the Kingdom of Greece. In their joint note to Turkey in 1830 on the subject, the interven- ing powers asserted that they were acting ‘[t]o fulfill an imperious huma- nitarian duty’. Their motives, they proclaimed, were the wholly selfless ones of safeguarding the general peace of Europe and consolidating the Ottoman Empire itself. 29 Further great-power intervention with at least some humanitarian component took place in Lebanon in 1860, when French troops were dispatched (with the nominal consent of the Ottoman government) in the aftermath of communal violence. 30 In the Cretan crisis of 1897–8, referred to above, there was also a strong humanitarian element, with the major powers intervening to put a stop to Ottoman oppression of Greeks. 31 It is hardly surprising to find that lawyers most sympathetic to just- war and natural-law ideals should pronounce themselves in favour of humanitarian intervention. One of them was the Italian writer Pasquale Fiore, who went so far as to maintain that there was a positive duty to intervene on the part of peoples struggling for liberty and independ- ence. 32 In the spirit of Lorimer, he denounced non-intervention in such cases as ‘an egoistic policy’ that was ‘contrary to the laws of all’. 33 28 See France-Great Britain-Russia, Protocol of Conference, 19 July 1828, 78 CTS 457. 29 Note to the Porte, 8 Apr. 1830, in Albrecht-Carrie ´ (ed.), Concert of Europe, at 121–2. On the Greek intervention, see Bare ` s, Blocus pacifique, at 18–25. 30 On the Lebanon crisis, see Shaw and Shaw, Ottoman Empire, at 142–4. For the consent of the Ottoman government, see Convention for the Pacification of Syria, 5 Sept. 1860, 122 CTS 487. For diplomatic correspondence regarding the crisis, see 51 BFSP 278–490. 31 Shaw and Shaw, Ottoman Empire, at 206–7; and Dupuis, Principe d’e ´ quilibre, at 391–400. 32 3 Fiore, Nouveau droit, at 2–3. 33 1 ibid . at 517–26. See also, to the same effect, Wheaton, Elements , at 95–7; Sadoul, Guerre civile, at 59–60; and 1 Rolin, Droit moderne, at 162–6. 224 WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS [...]... distinction between reprisals and wars, the two schools of positivist thought differed in predictable and characteristic ways In general, those of the subjective persuasion held that reprisals were not wars because of an absence of an intention on the part of the reprisal- taking state to that effect Those of the objective viewpoint held that reprisals differed from wars in being one-way resorts to armed... Texts and Documents (London: T Nelson and Sons, 1915) TAME AND HALF-HEARTED WAR 241 speak, temporal order: first, action taken in the very face of the peril (self-defence and the rescue of nationals); second, action taken in the immediate aftermath of a crisis (hot pursuit); and finally, action taken after a certain time interval (punitive expeditions) Self-defence Self-defence continued, throughout the... 51 52 Order in Council for the Seizure and Detention of Chinese Vessels and Goods, 3 Apr 1840, 28 BFSP 1087–8 China-Great Britain, Treaty of Nanking, 29 Aug 1842, 93 CTS 465, Arts 1, 4–6, 12 TAME AND HALF-HEARTED WAR 231 of reprisal, as the obtaining of compensation for a wrong done in the past (i.e., a failure to pay debts when they fell due), or in terms of war, as coercive action forcing a country... between armed reprisals and wars.53 Other writers held reprisals to be, somewhat vaguely, a sort of half-way condition – ‘neither wholly warlike nor wholly peaceful’, in the words of T J Lawrence.54 The prevailing view, however, was that forcible reprisals were not war, but instead consisted of acts of hostility occurring during a state of peace.55 As Hall put it, reprisals were ‘acts of war in fact,... blur the once-sharp distinction between reprisals and war, to the point that it 36 37 38 See Heffter, Droit international, at 211–16; 3 Phillimore, Commentaries, at 18–20; and 2 Oppenheim, International Law, at 38–41 Kelsen, Principles, at 20–2 Naulilaa Incident Arbitration (Portugal v Germany), 31 July 1928, 2 RIAA 1011, at 1028 (Hereinafter ‘Naulilaa Arbitration’.) TAME AND HALF-HEARTED WAR 227 now... as a reprisal into a war. 71 It could achieve this feat in either of two ways: by issuing a declaration of war, or by electing to fight back.72 Lawrence candidly opined that any ‘powerful and high-spirited nation’ would react to a reprisal by declaring war. 73 This transformational power in the hands of the target country was nowhere better illustrated than in a bizarre incident, not lacking in comic-opera... at 231–2 Lawrence, Principles, at 343–4 TAME AND HALF-HEARTED WAR 237 effective’.80 Echoing (no doubt unconsciously) Augustine’s view of just wars as exercises in ‘benevolent severity’, Hall even maintained that reprisals had many benefits for the target countries as well as for the reprisal- taking states It is true [he conceded] that [the] very mildness [of reprisal action] may tempt strong powers... Natives of the Solomon Islands, 1887 Parl Papers, Vol LII, at 619–44 ´ ´ Institute of International Law, Tableau general (1873–1956), at 167–70 230 WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS Reprisal and war It was sometimes no easy matter for the untrained eye to distinguish reprisals from wars An apt illustration was provided by what historians commonly refer to as the Opium War between Britain and China in 1839–42... Natives for Outrages Committed by Them in the Solomon Islands and Other Groups of the Western Pacific, 16 June 1881, 1881 Parl Papers, Vol LX, at 521–38 See also Papers Relating to Armed Reprisals Inflicted upon Natives of Various Islands in the Western Pacific by HMS ‘Diamond’, 1886 Parl Papers, Vol LXI, at 425–76; and Report Rear Admiral and Commander-in-Chief to Assistant High Commissioner for the Western... regarded as a war by the positivist standards of nineteenth-century international law, thereby demonstrating, more dramatically than any other single development, how wide a gulf separated the nineteenth-century positivist view of war from the medieval natural-law one That the purest possible example of a traditional just war, according to the old natural-law view, was now regarded as no war at all signified, . 6 Tame and half-hearted war: intervention, reprisal and necessity [I]n cases where a strong state or group. ‘History’, at 131–9. 6 Hall, Treatise, at 281. TAME AND HALF - HEARTED WAR 217 flavour of natural law and the just -war ethos to it. 7 For this very reason, however,