Bitcoin regulation in Vietnam - Using cooperative game theory to analyse the cost sharing of Bitcoin

VIETNAM NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, HANOI VIETNAM JAPAN UNIVERSITY VU HOANG DUNG BITCOIN REGULATION IN VIETNAM – USING COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY TO ANALYSE THE COST SHARING OF BITCOIN MASTER THESIS Hanoi, 2019 VIETNAM NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, HANOI VIETNAM JAPAN UNIVERSITY VU HOANG DUNG BITCOIN REGULATION IN VIETNAM – USING COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY TO ANALYSE THE COST SHARING OF BITCOIN MASTER’S PROGRAM: PUBLIC POLICY CODE: Pilot SUPERVISORS: DR VU HOANG LINH ASSOC.PROF MASAKAZU FUKUZUMI Hà Nội, 2019 (Chữ thường, đứng, đậm, cỡ chữ 14, font chữ Times New Roman) ACKNOWLEDGEMENT Firstly, I would like to express appreciation to Prof Masakazu Fukuzumi for his enthusiastic assistance and supports for of my thesis His lesson inspired me to study in this new field – game theory, and his explanation has made the work more interesting I also want to express the special thanks to Dr Vu Hoang Linh for his advice and recommendation His support helped me find the appropriate topic and continue with initial research plan Secondly, I would like to show appreciation University of Tsukuba and Vietnam Japan University for giving me a chance to participate the master course in Vietnam and Japan Besides, I greatly appreciate with the continuous support of Office of Global Initiatives, University of Tsukuba in my 3-month internship Finally, I would like to express gratitude to my family, my friends and my teachers for encouraging me in all the progresses of this thesis i CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT i CONTENTS ii ABBREVIATIONS iii LIST OF TABLES v LIST OF FIGURES vi ABSTRACT vii CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1.1 Research background and problem statement .1 1.2 Research rationale 1.3 Research questions 1.4 Research methodology and design 1.5 Research limitation .3 CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 2.1 The characteristics of Bitcoin 2.1.1 Bitcoin value 2.1.2 Volatility of Bitcoin price .5 2.1.3 Bitcoin community 2.1.4 Bitcoin Mining 2.1.5 Exchange market 2.2 Bitcoin regulation in the world 2.3 Bitcoin regulation in Vietnam 11 2.4 Cooperative game theory and cost allocation 14 CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 20 3.1 Research method .20 3.2 Bitcoin cost sharing model 20 3.3 Cost structure in sharing model 21 3.4 Cost and utility……………………………………………………………… …24 CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS .26 ii 4.1 The result of solutions 26 4.1.1 The proportional cost allocation method 26 4.1.2 The core and Nucleolus method .27 4.1.3 The Shapley value method .31 4.2 Discussion 36 CHAPTER 5: POLICY IMPLICATION AND CONCLUSION .39 5.1 Policy implication 39 5.2 Conclusion 42 5.3 Future research 44 APPENDIX 45 REFERENCE…………………………………………………………………… 47 iii ABBREVIATIONS SBV State bank of Vietnam BTC Bitcoin ICO An initial coin offering iv LIST OF TABLES Table 2.1: The status of crypto asset regulations in the world 10 Table 3.1: Cost and utility of players in High price period .23 Table 3.2: Cost of coalitions in High price period 24 Table 3.3: Cost and utility and player in Low price period 24 Table 3.4: Cost of coalition in Low price period 25 Table 4.1: Equal proportion cost between players (yi) .26 Table 4.2: Conditional cost of players 29 Table 4.3: Terms the amount of x1, x2 and x3 30 Table 4.4: The value of xi solved by Nucleolus method with parameters 30 Table 4.5: The amount of xi (thousand dollars) for each player .30 Table 4.6: Corresponding cost allocation (thousand dollars) between players based on Nucleolus method (yi) 30 Table 4.7: The amount of xi based on Shapley value method in High price period 31 Table 4.8: The amount of xi based on Shapley value method in Low price period 32 Table 4.9: Cost allocation (thousand dollars) between player based on Shapley value method (yi) .33 Table 4.10: Result of solutions in High price period 34 Table 4.11: Results of solutions in Low price period .35 Table 4.12: Percentage of utility received by each player based on solutions concepts in High price period 36 Table 4.13: Percentage of utility received by each player based on solutions concepts in Low price period 36 v LIST OF FIGURES Figure 2.1: The price of Bitcoin from April 2018 to April 2019 Figure 2.2: Regulatory status of Bitcoins Worldwide in 2018 Figure 2.3: Coalition forms of players 16 Figure 2.4: The core of coalitional game 17 Figure 3.1: The process of research method .20 Figure 3.2: Bitcoin cost sharing model .22 Figure 4.1: The core – Shapley value – Nucleolus in high price and low price period 33 Figure 4.2: Comparison between cooperative game methods and non-cooperation situation (High price period) 34 Figure 4.3: Comparison between cooperative game methods and non-cooperation situation (Low price period) .35 Figure 5.1: Bitcoin future 43 vi ABSTRACT In 2017, The State Bank of Vietnam has stated that Bitcoin and other digital currencies are not a legal method of payment However, Bitcoin also can be considered as a commodity, asset or investment channel At present, while the number of Bitcoin investors and exchange market is increasing rapidly, there is no regulation in Vietnam to regulate the issue of this digital currency In order to harmonize the interest of stakeholders, this paper suggests the Bitcoin cost sharing model with cooperative game theory approach to elaborate the incentive why Bitcoin users should cooperate and form coalitions From that, it can help citizen increase the awareness and influence of Bitcoin in new financial environment Finally, the findings of this study also intended to assist lawmakers, regulators and investigators in regulatory process The study also focuses on educating targeted readers with the deficiencies in current policies, regulations, and legislation as well as making recommendations for future updates in the regulation of digital currencies Keyword: Bitcoin, Bitcoin regulation, Bitcoin price, Cooperative game theory vii CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1.1 Research background and problem statement Bitcoin is a digital currency introduced in 2008 by a person called “Satoshi Nakamoto” It’s an open network which allows online payment to be sent directly without a third party, transactions follow a public ledger called blockchain (Nakamoto, 2008) Nowadays, Bitcoin becomes the most widely used and accepted the digital currency Moreover, Bitcoin is considered as the financial products associated with technology but outside of the scope of this research This thesis only deals with Bitcoin at economic approach Bitcoin users in Vietnam included three main players: investors, Bitcoin miners and businesses that accept exchange in Bitcoins have grown rapidly, from 30,000 users in 2016 to 60,000 in 2017 and about 300,000 users in 2018 In this context, currently, Bitcoin miners, users and businesses cooperate together to build a sustainable community However, in some cases of conflict of interest, many users have lost money and caused adverse impacts on Bitcoin and social awareness of Bitcoin In this situation, regulatory authorities have cautioned about the risks related to Bitcoin, as well as the risk of using virtual currency for criminal activity because virtual currency is anonymous, decentralized, and not subject to management of any organization Investment activities, buying and selling virtual money, mobilizing capital through issuing virtual money (ICO), especially using virtual money by multilevel marketing is more and more complicated, threatening to affect financial markets, and can cause huge risks for participating organizations and individuals It is difficult for investors to recover money because the regulation on Bitcoin has not yet been released When Bitcoin users cooperate together, they must protect their assets and take risks by themselves So Vietnam government need to legitimize Bitcoin in the current Vietnamese context Besides, policies that directly affect stakeholders will also reduce frauds and have a better understanding of Bitcoin These 4.554.7 3.6 Proportional 3.6 3.6 3.25 2.92 3.63.55 3.8 3.33 Shapley Value Nucleolus Noncooperation Miners Businesses Investors Figure 4.3: Comparison between cooperative game methods and non-cooperation situation (Low price period) (Thousand dollars) Figure 4.2 and figure 4.3 indicate the comparison of costs sharing to each player based on different methods Table 4.11: Results of solutions in Low price period (Thousand dollars) Miners (1) Businesses (2) Investors (3) Proportional 3.6 3.6 3.6 Shapley Value 3.25 3.55 Nucleolus 4.55 2.92 3.33 Non-cooperation 4.7 3.6 3.8 35 Table 4.12: Percentage of utility received by each player based on solutions concepts in High price period Benefits (%) gained by Miners (1) Businesses (2) Investors (3) Proportional split -2.8 25.7 27.9 The Nucleolus 3.0 23.1 26.1 The Shapley value 35.5 12.8 13.4 different concepts Table 4.13: Percentage of utility received by each player based on solutions concepts in Low price period (%) Benefits (%) gained by Miners (1) Businesses (2) Investors (3) Proportional split 23.4 5.3 The Nucleolus 3.2 18.9 12.4 The Shapley value 14.9 9.7 6.6 different concepts 4.2 Discussion The total cost of buying Bitcoin in a joint venture was 14.5 or 10.8 thousand USD The results in this research were calculated from proportional split, the Shapley value and the Nucleolus method The value of cost allocation to each player in thousand dollars based on different methods and the percentage of benefits obtained by each player are presented in table 4.9 and 4.10 The comparison between the costs sharing based on game theory methods and the cost incurred to each player in noncooperation situation are also displayed in Figure 4.2 and 4.3 By comparing three allocation methods, it can be seen that the proportional methods differ significantly from other methods Comparing the cost allocated by proportional method to the non-cooperative cost, these ratio methods make some players pay more than they have to pay While using proportional split, miners must pay more than 36 their separate participation According to the Table 4.11, the percentage of benefits earned by Miners is -2.8 (High price period) and Businesses is (Low price period) based on proportional split method This negative rate of benefits suggests that this method may not make adequate incentive between players, especially Miners and Businesses to join to other players in one coalition, because the individual rationality has not been satisfied by this method However, Investors (High price period) and Miners (Low price period) have incentive to cooperate with others because of high benefits they could be earned Results based on the Nucleolus method show that this method is more advantageous for Investors (High price period) and Businesses (Low price period) Contrasting with proportional method, in Nucleolus method no player must pay more than they would have to pay individually Therefore, it provides enough incentive for all players to cooperate together Based on Shapley value method, the percentage of benefit increased for Miners (both periods) is highest compared to other players Comparison to the Nucleolus method, Miners earn more benefit Calculation results show that if three players cooperate together, it will save a relatively large cost Using the method will help limit players from leaving the big coalition In high price period, with Shapley value, players will have benefits based on contributions to the alliance In low price period, based on Nucleolus method, players will have more motivation to join the big alliance, not merely between two players Besides the advantages of fairness and efficiency, a disadvantage of the Shapley value and Nucleolus is not considering the stability of the coalition Each player's tendency to separate from the league is also different, so that the calculation these indicators are necessary because of price volatility Totally, miners earn most benefit with Shapley value method, Businesses and Investors earn most benefit by Nucleolus method Statistically, it can be concluded 37 that the Shapley value method may be more appropriate while the Nucleolus method may provide adequate encouragement for cooperation By examining the amount calculated according to these solution concepts, it can be deduced that the Shapley value and the Nucleolus method are the method of cost distribution in cooperative game theory method taking into account the individuals and groups rationality in joint ventures No players in the cooperative game pay more than they will have to pay for themselves Therefore, cooperation provides them with adequate incentives to create coalition and participate in the Bitcoin community 38 CHAPTER 5: POLICY IMPLICATION AND CONCLUSION 5.1 Policy implication In order to facilitate cooperative games in Bitcoin community, the most important issue is the legalization of Bitcoin in Vietnam today First of all, organizations, investors and startups need policy advocacy activities, highlighting the advantages of Bitcoin and Blockchain technology From there, create a creative environment, promote the development of technology, and eliminate illegal activities related to Bitcoin Although the overall benefit or utility of using Bitcoin not outweigh the risk of its adoption into the financial system, SBV still need to recognize Bitcoin and other digital asset because the number of stakeholders is increasing rapidly Besides that, illegal activities and scams make many investors lose money and they are unprotected in the law After acknowledging the existence of Bitcoin, the government will play an important role in maintaining stability and managing activities in the Bitcoin community This is also the most important factor to be able to apply cooperative game theory in Bitcoin cost sharing The frameworks for cooperation of game theory given in this article can also be the basis for designing agreements for actual negotiations between parties in the Bitcoin community Each solution offered will be used by parties to negotiate with other players when investing in Bitcoin This game can be used to simulate a realistic chatter process that negotiators have to make decisions, in a variety of strategic choices such as joining another community, or doing independently Such games are preparatory stages before formal negotiations The most important lesson from the above analysis is that the position of all parties in the Bitcoin movement is assumed to be significant from large alliances, and many rules of benefit sharing are feasible and fair Based on this results, the government can manage and ensure the rationality of cooperative contract between stakeholders 39 This regulation also restricts the multi-level marketing activities in Bitcoin community, because scam companies often offer huge profits regardless of Bitcoin's price fluctuations Moreover, the government should ensure the information transparency and manage Bitcoin community, which not only helps individuals achieve benefits and society also benefits from development of technology According to Directive 10 / CT-TTg of 2018 on managing Bitcoin and other similar virtual currencies issued by the Prime Minister, the agencies responsible for implementation include: State Bank of Vietnam; Ministry of Justice; Ministry of Finance; Ministry of Information and Communications; Ministry of Public Security; Ministry of Industry and Trade; People's Committees of provinces and cities After analyzing and discussing the results of Bitcoin cost sharing model, this study will make some suggestions on the policy for legitimizing Bitcoin and managing of Bitcoin community in Vietnam Recognize Bitcoin and Bitcoin Advocates and Stakeholders - Firstly, Ministry of Justice should define Bitcoin more carefully Now, Vietnam government not have any official document exist clarifying Bitcoin’s status in the law Secondly, we also need issue a clear set of policies and regulations regarding Bitcoin and other digital assets Finally, the government need to develop thought, active and sensible policies that protect the public without suppressing innovation technology - Involve Bitcoin Stakeholders: To avoid excessively strong and broad regulation of the Bitcoin market, Ministry of Information and Communications can ensure that they invite a variety of Bitcoin stakeholders in the negotiation and regulatory process, because their vision and needs can be fairly balanced with government benefit Ministry of Industry and Trade should work with Bitcoin organization, businesses, users and miners when creating and enforcing law 40 Regulate Bitcoin Market and businesses - Ministry of Finance clarifies their laws around licensing requirements for virtual money In order to prevent money laundering, companies participating in Bitcoin purchases must register with the Ministry of Finance and maintain records of their transaction history - Consumer Protection: Companies maintain online wallets for people who use Bitcoin to operate in legal gray areas according to the law In this case, the value is being stored on the company's servers as a text file If a user's wallet is compromised, its content is lost or stolen, companies will be refunds to users whose wallets are compromised rather than government - Clarifying Tax code: Taxation is the question surrounding Bitcoin Bitcoin has dual properties of a highly liquid instrument such as cash in a local currency and an exchange tool like foreign currency or even securities Moreover, a user has the ability to create new Bitcoin through mining, which makes it completely unlike any existing financial instrument - Combatting the illegal Markets: Money laundering and illegal trade in Bitcoin is one of the reasons why Vietnam government did not accept Bitcoin Ministry of Public Security could combat illegal markets by targeting unlawful business, rather than consumers By working with technology experts to analyze ledgers, the government can discover illegal activities in Bitcoin more effectively than cash Vietnam Bitcoin reserve The State Bank can help stabilize the currency by maintaining Bitcoin reserves They can buy and sell to supply and demand moderately, easing drastic changes in the market The government can also help Bitcoin network remains honest by providing computing power for honest nodes in the network Policy transfer 41 Bitcoin can be considered as money in a specific community but only in this community If Bitcoin moves from a community to the whole society and the country, it should be strictly managed Even in countries with modern facilities and good management like Japan, the shift from investment to real money has to go through strict regulatory authorities, which are only recognized in some jurisdictions like few areas of investment In Vietnam, Bitcoin is being considered legitimate, but it needs to be apperception that it is normally used by law-abiding parties to transact business Unluckily, Bitcoin has a history related to illegal activities, such as black market (Wannacry virus) and money laundering In case of Bitcoin as well as others cryptocurrency, Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Finance can consider the model of issuance, operation mechanism, impact factors, methods, and behavior This experience is extremely important to the government For example, in Korea, to avoid speculation, the Korean government is rushing to establish rules related to Bitcoin as limit the amount of investment, as well as the age limit for investors 5.2 Conclusion According to data analysis, traditional proportional methods cannot be fully encouraged for all participants In fact, these methods are not reasonable for some participants On the other hand, Shapley value, Nucleolus methods, although there is little difference in quantity, represents a fair and impartial method to allow financial managers to discuss how to divide Additional costs Regarding the rationality of individuals and groups, both Shapley value and Nucleolus establish the rational principles of individuals and groups It can be concluded from the data analysis that these cited methods can provide a fair atmosphere among players to agree on the amount of allocated costs Bitcoin has proven a lot of potential as a technology capable of reshaping the way we view and use money Lack of economic knowledge and electronic money can make 42 people destroy the economy made up of digital currency The purpose of Bitcoin is to create a currency through public networks without third parties and establish trust through peer collaboration Bitcoin is just the beginning of new technologies based on the blockchain platform, which will impact all areas of finance, banking, healthcare and education and so on Blockchain is an inevitable trend in the world, helping to significantly reduce transaction costs, secure data sharing and being included in university training programs Figure 5.1: Bitcoin future Source: University of Nicosia With the steady growth of digital currency, a parallel economy is growing and that is when the Vietnamese government should step in and put regulations into it Decentralized virtual currencies need to be acknowledged, Bitcoin stakeholders should be included in the decision-making process Setting rules can help governments impose taxes and prevent illegal activities from maintaining in the system It would be a mistake to say that the digital money system has developed 43 perfectly because it still lacks the platform to build a good economy that even the fiat currency cannot in history during the debacle global recession In the future, Bitcoin can become an immediate of the economy and centralized tax system of the government Perhaps this digital currency system is currently not getting nearly that It will be interesting to see how society and nations will grow without any central power because of the economic power of any country that is tied to currency 5.3 Future research In further research, a new model can use non-cooperative game theory to describe the risk attitude between players When the coalitions are reformed, each player can reduce the cost However, the price of Bitcoin is fluctuation, players still face to many risks, such as: Coalition risk, value risk, and legal risk Because the interaction in Bitcoin community is unavoidable, many concepts can apply in more case study such as: Nash equilibrium, prisoner’s dilemma, bargaining game and etc Based on these theories, further research also aims to create a new game between player, which could be used for effective governance of Bitcoin community 44 APPENDIX Assumptions For each player, they prepare the basic Bitcoin’s knowledge and when coalition reforming, they also make strategy carefully For miners, they understand the mechanism of Bitcoin market Because of volatility and the change of technology, miners need to compliance with law, self-protect personal property Investors want to make benefit from Bitcoin, they can find reliable investment company They also have to prepare the investment plan to reduce risks in Bitcoin market For businesses, they have to assurance of capital, Bitcoin reserves and technology platform Besides that, it is very important to store transaction information of clients Comprehensive collaboration: players must cooperate with each other if they want to connect and share information, restricting the monopoly and manipulation of Bitcoin prices Discounts and profit sharing are often committed in cooperation contracts, depending on the nature and prospects of cooperation projects In some projects, high profits come with risks Money benefits: The benefits of each player will be evaluated in terms of currency, players have the same marginal benefits This means this will be a transferrable utility game In the case of Bitcoin, to simplify the problem, we only focus on the cost of buying Bitcoin A portion of the profits will be taken into account in the grand coalition, as a cut of intermediate costs Optimized transfer cost: to simplify, when parties allied 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