A METAPHYSICS FOR SCIENTIFIC REALISM Scientific realism is the view that our best scientific theories give approximately true descriptions of both observable and unobservable aspects of a mindindependent world Debates between realists and their critics are at the very heart of the philosophy of science Anjan Chakravartty traces the contemporary evolution of realism by examining the most promising recent strategies adopted by its proponents in response to the forceful challenges of antirealist sceptics, resulting in a positive proposal for scientific realism today He examines the core principles of the realist position, and sheds light on topics including the varieties of metaphysical commitment required, and the nature of the conflict between realism and its empiricist rivals By illuminating the connections between realist interpretations of scientific knowledge and the metaphysical foundations supporting them, his book offers a compelling vision of how realism can provide an internally consistent and coherent account of scientific knowledge anjan chakravartty is Associate Professor at the Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology and Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto A METAPHYSICS FOR SCIENTIFIC REALISM Knowing the Unobservable ANJAN CHAKRAVARTTY University of Toronto CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521876490 © Anjan Chakravartty 2007 This publication is in copyright Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press First published in print format 2007 eBook (NetLibrary) ISBN-13 978-0-511-36768-7 ISBN-10 0-511-36768-6 eBook (NetLibrary) hardback ISBN-13 978-0-521-87649-0 hardback ISBN-10 0-521-87649-4 Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate It is the fault of our science that it wants to explain all; and if it explain not, then it says there is nothing to explain Van Helsing to Dr Seward Bram Stoker, Dracula Contents List of tables List of figures Preface List of abbreviations page ix x xi xvii Part I Scientific realism today Realism and antirealism; metaphysics and empiricism The trouble with common sense A conceptual taxonomy Metaphysics, empiricism, and scientific knowledge The rise of stance empiricism The fall of the critique of metaphysics 13 17 20 Selective scepticism: entity realism, structural realism, semirealism 27 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 The entities are not alone Lessons from epistemic structuralism Semirealism (or: how to be a sophisticated realist) Optimistic and pessimistic inductions on past science The minimal interpretation of structure 27 33 39 45 52 Properties, particulars, and concrete structures 58 Inventory: what realists know Mutually entailed particulars and structures Ontic structuralism: farewell to objects? Ontological theory change Return of the motley particulars 58 61 70 76 80 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 Part II Metaphysical foundations Causal realism and causal processes 4.1 Causal connections and de re necessity vii 89 89 Contents viii 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 Is causal realism incoherent? A first answer: relations between events A better answer: causal processes Processes for empiricists 96 102 107 114 Dispositions, property identity, and laws of nature 119 The causal property identity thesis Property naming and necessity Objections: epistemic and metaphysical Vacuous laws and the ontology of causal properties Causal laws, ceteris paribus 119 126 134 141 147 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 Sociability: natural and scientific kinds 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 Law statements and the role of kinds Essences and clusters: two kinds of kinds Clusters and biological species concepts Sociability (or: how to make kinds with properties) Beyond objectivity, subjectivity, and promiscuity 151 151 156 162 168 174 Part III Theory meets world Representing and describing: theories and models 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 Descriptions and non-linguistic representations Representing via abstraction and idealization Extracting information from models The inescapability of correspondence Approximation and geometrical structures Approximate truths about approximate truth 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 Knowledge in the absence of truth simpliciter Measuring ‘‘truth-likeness’’ Truth as a comparator for art and science Depiction versus denotation; description versus reference Products versus production; theories and models versus practice References Index 183 183 187 192 199 205 212 212 214 218 224 230 235 244 Tables Table 1.1: Scientific realism and antirealisms Table 6.1: Three types of law-like generalizations ix page 10 155 References 237 (2001) The Poverty of the Linnaean Hierarchy Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Ereshefsky, M., and M Matthen (2005) ‘Taxonomy, Polymorphism, and History: An Introduction to Population Structure Theory’, Philosophy of Science 72: 1–21 Fales, E (1990) Causation and Universals London: Routledge Fine, A (1996) The Shaky Game: Einstein and the Quantum Theory, 2nd edn Chicago: University of Chicago Press Franklin, A (1986) The Neglect of Experiment Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1990) Experiment, Right or Wrong Cambridge: Cambridge University Press French, S (1989) ‘Identity and Individuality in Classical and Quantum Physics’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67: 432–46 (1998) ‘On the Withering Away of Physical Objects’, in E Castellani (ed.), Interpreting Bodies: Classical and Quantum Objects in Modern Physics, pp 93–113 Princeton: Princeton University Press (1999) ‘Models and Mathematics in Physics: The Role of Group Theory’, in J Butterfield and C Pagonis (eds.), From Physics to Philosophy, pp 187–207 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2003) ‘Scribbling on the Blank Sheet: Eddington’s Structuralist Conception of Objects’, Studies In History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 34: 227–59 French, S., and H Kamminga (eds.) 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Structural Realism and His Logic of Discovery’, in J.-L Greffe, G Heinzmann, and K Lorenz (eds.), Henri Poincare´: Science and Philosophy, pp 45–68 Berlin: Akademie Verlag and A Blanchard Index abduction, see inference to the best explanation abstraction 148 9, 190 2, 198, 221 4, 226, 233; see also approximation, conditions of Albert, David Z 73 antirealism 12 and inference to the best explanation 6, 28 and the pessimistic induction 28 and underdetermination 28 See also constructive empiricism; idealism; instrumentalism; logical empiricism; sociology of scientific knowledge approximate truth 7, 8, 29, 206 11, 212 30, 233 and interest/use relativity 210 possible worlds approach to 215 17, 223 objection to 215 17 for realists 213 similarity approach to 215; see also possible worlds approach to and theory unification 210 type hierarchy approach to 217 18, 224 and natural kinds 218 approximation, conditions of 220 1, 222, 223, 224, 226, 228 9, 230 Aristotle 156 Armstrong, David 113, 120, 121, 122, 128, 129, 130 1, 139, 145 6; see also laws of nature Aronson, Jerrold 214, 216, 217, 218 and pernicious holism 216, 217 astronomy, theory of Newtonian 209 Ptolemaic 209 Beauchamp, Tom L 103 Beckermann, Ansgar 160 Berkeley, Bishop George 10; see also idealism biological kinds, see kinds; biological species concepts biological species concepts and cluster kinds 162 ecological 163 interbreeding 163 phenetic 162 phylogenetic 163 4, 165 See also kinds Bird, Alexander 121 Black, Robert 121 Blackburn, Simon 102 Bohm, David 73 Boyd, Richard 44, 152, 171 and homeostatic clustering 171 Boyle’s law 77, 156 Broad, C D 152 capacities, see causal properties Carnap, Rudolf 11, 33, 188 and reducing disposition-talk 125 See also logical empiricism Carroll, John 146 Cartwright, Nancy 30, 125, 148, 190, 222 Cassirer, Ernst 33 Castellani, Elena 73 causal knowledge of/contact with entities, see entity realism; Cartwright, Nancy causal laws, see laws of nature causal necessity, see causation causal powers 30, see also causal properties causal processes 61, 108 14 as fundamental 111 Salmon-Dowe 114 17 and Hume 116 17 and interactions 115 and processes 115 and realism 117 See also objects; causation causal properties 41 2, 61, 119 50, 169 contextuality of 84 conventionality of groups of 83 knowledge of 62 naming 132 and rigid designation 132 and trans-world clusters 132 ‘‘many-faceted’’ 79, 138, 149 244 Index metaphysics of 111 See also structure; structural realism; semirealism; properties; property identity; laws of nature causal realism 93 114 empiricist critique of 102 incoherence of 96 102; see also Russell, Bertrand and contiguity objection 97 9, 100, 103 4, 105 and demand for causal mechanism 97, 101 and regress objection 97, 99 101 and mind-independence 93 and necessity 93 rejection of 93 102; see also Hume, David; Kant, Immanuel responses to incoherence of 103 14 and conventionality of demarcating events 105 and relations between events 105 and relations between properties 106 semirealist response to incoherence of 107 14 and causal mechanism 111 12 and causal necessity 113 14 causal processes as 108 14 role of causal properties as 107 traditional account of 96 causal theory of reference, see reference, theory of causation 42, 90 the denial of 92 INUS conditions of 100 1; see also Mackie, J L and laws of nature 13 the nature of 92 114 process theory of 96, 108 14 alternatives to 114 17 and causal mechanism 111 12 and causal properties 111 proximate 99, 105 and scientific realism 13 and semirealism 107 14 ceteris paribus law statements 148 9, 171, 173, 222 Chakravartty, Anjan 73 classical physics 71 and individuality 71 2; see also observables and Maxwell-Boltzmann statistics 71 constructive empiricism 10, 11 12, 16 and observable-unobservable distinction 11 and realist semantics 11 See also instrumentalism; van Fraassen, Bas C constructive realism 199 205; see also Giere; scientific theories, semantic/ model-theoretic view of Copernicus 209 Costa, Michael J 94 245 Craig, Edward 94 Crane, Timothy 160 Crick, Francis 40, 194; see also DNA, structure of Davidson, Donald 81, 140 de Sousa, Ronald 162 Demopoulos, William 37 description 184, 185 6, 192; see also representation Devitt, Michael 64 dispositional identity thesis (DIT) 123, 124, 126 41, 149 and emergence of natural necessity 129 31 epistemic objections to 134 6, 136 and holism 140 metaphysical objections to 137 40 dispositional realism 126 dispositions, see causal properties DNA, structure of 40 1, 54, 194 Dowe, Phil 114 17 Dretske, Fred 113, 122, 128, 130 1, see also laws of nature Duhem, Pierre and Duhem-Quine thesis Dupre´, John 162 and promiscuous realism 178 Ehring, Douglas 117 Elder, Crawford 121, 131 electron 31, 32 Ellis, Brian 121, 125, 131, 155, 156, 157, 159, 175 and the New Essentialism (NE) 155 62, 163, 165, 166, 168, 169, 176 and law-like generalizations 156 empirical adequacy 38, 39 empirical equivalence empiricism 10, 15 16, 42 as empirical stance 19 as a factual thesis 20 and metaphysics 16, 18 20 See also Hume, David; constructive empiricism; antirealism Empiricus, Sextus 96 English, Jane 38 entity realism 30 3, 89 incompleteness of 69 negative thesis of 30 ontology of 67 and pessimistic (meta-)induction 32 positive thesis of 30 pros and cons of 31 2, 47, 58 and representation 226 epistemic frameworks 216, 217; see also approximate truth, possible worlds approach to 246 Index epistemology 14 and epistemic stances 17 and epistemic warrant 29 and fact value distinction 17 and factual belief 17 and levels of analysis 17 18 and meta-stances 17 18 Ereshefsky, Mark 162, 166, 171, 175, 178 essence, see kinds events, as relata of causation 98; see also causal processes explanation causal 30, 94 metaphorical 112 13 and prediction and the success of science See also inference to the best explanation Fales, Evan 94, 105, 137 Fermi, Enrico 14 Fine, Arthur 13 and natural ontological attitude 13 Flohr, Hans 160 Franklin, Allan 66 French, Steven 34, 50, 51, 71, 73, 74, 75, 84, 189 Fresnel, Augustin 35 6, 45, 48, 50, 51, 53 and Fresnel’s equations 48 9, 51, 61 Friedman, Michael 37 gene, see Mendel, Gregor; DNA, structure of Ghiselin, Michael T 162 Giere, Ronald N 30, 189, 199 205 Glymour, Clark 112 Goodman, Nelson 219 20, 224 6, 229 and conventionalism 225 and denotation 226 and Languages of Art 219, 224 Gower, Barry 33 Greenberg, Clement 232 Griffiths, Paul 165 and historical essence 165 and phylogenetic inertia 165 Hacking, Ian 30, 31, 65, 152, 158, 226, 234; see also entity realism haecceity 73, 80, 82 Hardin, Clyde 54 Harre´, Rom 214, 217 Heisenberg, Werner 177 Hempel, Carl 172 Hiley, Basil J 73 Horwich, Paul 100 Hugget, Nick 71, 73 Hull, David 162 Hume, David 42, 78, 116 17 as causal realist 94 and causation 16, 102 and rejection of causal realism 93 Hurewicz, Witold 98 Hylton, Peter 140 idealism 10 and phenomenalism 10 See also Berkeley, Bishop George idealization 143, 147 8, 190, 191 2, 198 9, 221 2, 226, 233; see also approximation identity of indiscernibles, principle of 72, 80 individuality, see particulars inference to the best explanation (IBE) 6, 28 and antirealism and the miracle argument instrumentalism 10 11 and prediction 11 Jones, Martin R., see Thomson-Jones, Martin Kamminga, Harmke 51 Kant, Immanuel 93 and rejection of causal realism 95 Kepler’s laws of planetary motion 221 Khalidi, Muhammad Ali 177 Kim, Jaegwon 160 kinds (of objects/particulars) 151 79 cluster 157 and reductionism 159 61 essence 157 historical 165 and law statements 153 natural 152 79 and causal properties 169 and laws of nature 152 and role in scientific theories 152 and objectivity 174 phylogenetic, see biological species concepts scientific 156 King, Jeffrey C 188 Kitcher, Phillip 45, 46, 162, 167 and presuppositional posits 45 and working posits 45 Kornblith, Hilary 152 Kripke, Saul 132, 156 Kuhn, Thomas 7, 14, 180, 234 Kukla, Andre´ Ladyman, James 34, 71, 73, 74, 75, 84, 189 Laudan, Larry 7, 29, 51; see also pessimistic (meta-)induction Lavoisier, Antoine 55 6; see also oxygen Index 247 law-like generalizations, see law statements laws of nature 13, 141 and natural kinds 152 and vacuous laws 142 in-practice 143, 144 in-principle, 143 4; see also idealization and problem of missing properties 142 and problem of missing relations 142, 144 as relations between properties 113 14 law statements 122, 131, 153 5, 170, 172 behavioural 153, 155, 172 causal 153, 155, 171 definitional 153, 155, 172 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 72 and identity of indiscernibles, principle of 72 Leplin, Jarrett Lewis, David 100, 105, 129 Lierse, Caroline 121, 125 light, theories of electromagnetic 35, 45, 50 and luminiferous ether 35, 51, 66 Newtonian 35 transition between 35 6, 48 and wave optics 35 See also structural realism Lipton, Peter 6, 148 Locke, John 156 and real and nominal essence 156, 174 logical empiricism 10, 11, 187; see also logical positivism logical positivism 10, 11, 14, 26, 187, 233; see also logical empiricism and epistemology 14 as foundational 11, 13 14, 91 114 and laws of nature 13 and semirealism 91; see also causation; kinds as metaphysical stance 18, 22, 94, 124 speculative 16, 89 90 meta-stances 17 18, 20 and criterion of rationality 21 and stance relativism 21 and values 21 2, 24 See also van Fraassen, Bas C., and voluntarism Mill, John Stuart 152, 177 Miller, David 215, 216 17; see also approximate truth, possible worlds approach to Millikan, Robert 32 minimal interpretation (of structure) 48, 49, 51 4, 61; see also mathematical formalism miracle argument, the 4, and Hilary Putnam poverty of and structural realism 33 modality 126 contingency 127 necessity 127 models 189, 190 211; see also abstraction; idealization; representation; scientific theories, semantic/model-theoretic view of molecular biology 60 Molie`re, and dormitive virtues 125 Moore, G E 141 Morrison, Margaret 32 Mumford, Stephen 42, 121, 125 Mackie, J L 100 McMullin, Ernan 190, 228 Martin, C B 121 mathematical description/equations, see structural realism mathematical formalism 60 Matthen, Mohan 171 Maxwell, Grover 37 8, 41, 43 and Russell-Ramsey approach 37 8, 39 Maxwell, James Clerk 35 6, 48, 50, 51, 53 and Maxwell-Boltzmann statistics 71 and Maxwell’s equations 50 and theory of electromagnetism 45, 50 Mayr, Ernst 164 and proximate and ultimate causes 167 Mellor, D H 104, 125, 132, 143, 160 Mendel, Gregor 54 metaphysics 16 and causation 13 and commitments 13 critique of, see van Fraassen, Bas C critique of the empiricist critique of 25 natural kinds, see kinds natural ontological attitude (NOA) 13 necessary connections metaphors for 101; see also causation necessity 93 ambiguity of 98 9, 99 101 de dicto 93, 127, 131, 132 de re 93, 96, 97, 99, 111, 113 14, 124, 127, 131, 150, 223, see also laws of nature metaphysical 127 natural/nomic 127 31 mighty biceps objection to 129 See also dispositional identity thesis neutrino 14 15 Newman, M H A 37, 38 and the Newman objection 37, 38 Newton, Isaac 53, 221 and Newton’s laws 78, 156 and theory of universal gravitation 68 Niiniluoto, Ilkka 188, 214, 215, 216 17 and abstraction and idealization 221 and cognitive problems 216, 217 248 Index nominalism 81, 82 and natural necessity 128 and properties 16 and trope theories 81, 82 and unanalysable objects 81 non-referring terms 28 caloric 28, 204 crystalline spheres 3, 28 luminiferous ether 35, 51, 66 optical ether 204 phlogiston 28, 204 objects 65 abstract causal interaction of 108 14 disanalogy between everyday and quantum 74 as a heterogeneous kind 83 knowledge of 63 the nature of 81 2; see also universals; nominalism and the principle of the identity of indiscernibles 72 underdetermination of 71, 73 5; see also quantum mechanics observables 3, 13, 14 15 and individuality 71 Oddie, Graham 214, 215, 216 Okasha, Samir 166, 167 ontological relativism 83 ontology/ontological framework object-free 73; see also structural realism, ontic SR; natural ontological attitude Platonic Forms, see objects, abstract principles for revision/replacement of 76 83 explanatory role principle 76, 77 80 need principle 76 primitives principle 76; see also nominalism; universals optimistic induction 47 and rationalization post hoc 46, 52 See also semirealism oxygen, theory of 55 Papineau, David 43 particle physics, Standard Model of 72, 176 particulars 65 and causal properties 63 concept of 80 events as 80 knowledge of 63 and semirealism 80 and structural knowledge 67 See also causal processes; objects Pauli, Wolfgang 14 and Pauli exclusion principle 56 Pearl, Judea 112 perspectival realism 199; see also constructive realism pessimistic (meta-)induction (PI) 5, 7, 28 9, 47, 63, 89 and approximate truth and reference of theoretical terms 204 responses to 29 30; see also scepticism, selective and structural realism 33 phlogiston, theory of 55 Picasso, Pablo 229 Pierce, Charles Saunders and inference to the best explanation Place, U T 121 Poincare´, Henri 33, 35, 45, 48, 51 and Science and Hypothesis 35 Popper, Karl 214; see also verisimilitude possible worlds 215; see also approximate truth, possible worlds approach to Post, Heinz 50, 51 and General Correspondence Principle 51, 54 pragmatism 12, 234 prediction and instrumentalism 11 novel predictions 5, and retrodiction Priestley, Joseph 55 6; see also phlogiston processes, see causal processes properties 31, 40 auxiliary 47 epistemic function of 68 and quantum mechanics 68 and theory of gravity 68 categoricalist theory of 120 1, 123 cohering sets of 65; see also objects; particulars; minimal interpretation and conventionality of groups of 83 demarcating detection/auxiliary 48 50 detection 47 dispositional 123 and context of explanation 126 See also causal properties; Carnap, Rudolf; Molie`re occurrent 124 perceptually direct 136 sparse view of 172 and trope theory 117 property identity 120 41 and dispositional identity thesis 123, 124 and emergence of causal laws 122 primitive principle of 121 in terms of dispositions for relations 141 three crucial assumptions of 122 Index property kinds 154; see also kinds Psillos, Stathis 8, 30, 34, 43, 44, 46, 84, 218 and approximate truth 219, 228 and caloric theory of heat 46 and optical ether theories 46 Ptolemy 209 Putnam, Hilary 4, 54, 156 and the miracle argument and principle of benefit of the doubt 54 quantum mechanics 68 9, 73 and Bose-Einstein statistics 72 and Fermi-Dirac statistics 72 and individuality 71; see also unobservables and non-individuality 73, 80, see also identity of indiscernibles, principle of and ontic SR 71 5, 80 quiddity 121 Quine, Willard V O 6, 78, 81, 83, 152 and Duhem-Quine thesis Ramsey sentence 37 8, 39 reality mind-dependent, see antirealism mind-independent, see realism nature of 33 structure of 33 realism 9, 27; see also scientific realism Redhead, Michael 38, 40, 71, 73, 177 reference and abstraction and idealization 226 and denotation 226 indirect 38 of theoretical terms 204 theory of 51 causal 32, 52, 54, 55 causal-descriptive 54 relation relata dependence 77 as causal dependence 77 as conceptual dependence 77 relations 31 of compresence 82; see also universals; nominalism See also structure representation 40, 184 and approximate truth 219 in art 224 6, 229, 231 and conventionalism 225 and denotation 226, 229 as function of reference 226, 229 and intentionality 184 and models 190 211 realistic and non-realistic 224 and resemblance 225 and substantive similarity relation 185 249 See also abstraction; idealization Rosenberg, Alexander 54, 103, 134 Ruse, Michael 162 Russell, Bertrand 33, 36 40, 115 on causation 92 3, 96 and causal lines 92, 115 and the law of causality 93, 96 and definition of structural identity 36, 39, 59 and knowledge by acquaintance 36 and knowledge by description 36 Rutherford, Ernest 32 Ryle, Gilbert 124 Saatsi, Juha 50, 233 Salmon, Wesley 66, 114 17 Sankey, Howard 169 scepticism 10, 12, 28 selective 29, 30, 41, 44, 45, 46, 89; see also entity realism; structural realism; semirealism See also antirealism Scheines, Richard 112 Schlick, Moritz 33 Schroădinger, Irwin 160 science as means of knowledge production the success of, see the miracle argument; explanation scientific kinds, see kinds scientific realism 4, 9, 10, 11 13, 27, 89, 230 as an alternative methodology, see sociology of scientific knowledge in a broader context, see realism and causation 13, 91 commitments of 9, 13, 44, 61, 65 and degree of belief 47 and dilemma for semantic view 192, 205 empirical refutation of, see pessimistic (meta-) induction epistemological aspect of internal coherence of 13, 91 and laws of nature 13 metaphysical foundations of 11, 13 14, 91 114 metaphysics and epistemology of 14 and the miracle argument 4, and naı€ve realism 27, 67 ontological aspect of as a perennial issue 14 sceptical challenges to 28 9; see also scepticism; empiricism semantic aspect of 9, 11 See also approximate truth 250 Index scientific theories 186 211 and correspondence 190, 194, 200, 202 4, 208; see also truth, correspondence theory of Darwinian analogy regarding discontinuities in, see theory change; pessimistic (meta-)induction dynamical 205 false 215, 233 and knowledge, see description; representation; models literal interpretation of, see scientific realism mature nature of 187, 194 non-literal interpretation of, see logical empiricism; idealism in practice, see Giere, Ronald N pragmatic constraints of, see abstraction; idealization pragmatic virtues of semantic/model-theoretic view of 188 211 geometrical version of 205 11 Giere’s version of 199 205 Suppe’s version of 196 and truth aptness 194 traditional/syntactic view of 187 semirealism 41 5, 58, 69, 70, 79, 85, 89, 151, 171, 179, 183, 210, 230 and causal properties and relations 61 3, 120 and causation 91 and definition of structure 39 and dispositional realism 126 41 and geometrical structures 209 and mathematical formalism 59, 60 and natural kinds 91, 120 and nature structure distinction 42 3, 59 and optimistic induction 46 57 and particulars 80 and reference of theoretical terms 204 Shapere, Dudley 14 Shoemaker, Sydney 113, 121, 123, 131 Smith, Peter 205 11; see also scientific theories, semantic/model-theoretic view of, geometrical version of Sober, Elliot 165 sociability (of properties) 170 sociology of scientific knowledge 12, 66; see also Kuhn, Thomas Spirtes, Peter 112 Stahl, Georg 55 6; see also phlogiston, theory of Stanford, Kyle 175 Strawson, Galen 94 structural realism (SR) 30, 33 9, 45, 70 85, 89 epistemic SR 34, 35 9, 41, 42, 43, 45, 58, 70 lesson of and problem with 59 and the nature of particulars 70 and the Newman objection 37, 38, 39, 41 ontology of 67 and quantum mechanics 68 See also Russell, Bertrand incompleteness of 69 and knowledge of structure 67 and mathematical description/equations 36 and nature of (parts of) reality 33, 42 ontic SR 34, 59, 70 85 and quantum mechanics 71 See also ontology/ontological framework and structure of (parts of) reality 33, 34, 36 structuralism, see structural realism structure 34, 39 abstract 40 1, 119; see also Russell, Bertrand concrete 40 1, 120 knowledge of 62 geometrical 206 as a property of relations 37 Sua´rez, Mauricio 229 Suppe, Frederick 188, 189, 190, 196 and quasi-realism 197 Swinburne, Richard 134 6, 139 Swoyer, Chris 113, 121, 131, 137, 221 Teller, Paul 17, 73, 140, 210; see also epistemology, epistemic stances theory change methodological principles of 76 83 See also pessimistic (meta-)induction theory choice, criteria for 24, 205 theory realism 64 Thompson, J J 31, 32 Thomson-Jones, Martin 190, 233 Tichy´, Pavel 214, 215, 216 time, nature of, see causal realism, incoherence of Tooley, Michael 113, 122, 128, 130 1, 144, 145 6, see also laws of nature trope theory 117 truth qua abstraction 221 4, 227 8, 230 correspondence theory of 13, 201 2; see also scientific realism and de-idealization 228 epistemic theory of 12; see also pragmatism qua idealization 221 2, 223 4, 227 9, 230 and philosophy of art 219; see also Goodman, Nelson redundancy theory of 200 1; see also constructive realism and representation 220 See also approximate truth truth-likeness 214, 215 17, 218 and abstraction and idealization 222, 223 See also verisimilitude; approximate truth Index underdetermination (UTD) 5, 7, 28, 220 and empirical equivalence universals and bundle theories 81, 82 and natural necessity 128 realism about 81 and substratum view 81, 82 unobservables 4, 13, 14 15, 32, 38 and correspondence rules 11 detectable 4, 13, 14 15 indirect detection of (neutrino) 14 15 and individuality 72 and instrumentalism 10 and logical empiricism 11 ontological status of 70 property relations, knowledge of 61 structure of 34 undetectable 4, 13, 14 15 vacuous laws, see laws of nature van der Waals equation 227 van Fraassen, Bas C 4, 16, 17, 19, 25, 66, 71, 73, 91, 193 and criterion of rationality 21 251 and critique of metaphysics 22 and Darwinian analogy regarding successful theories and empirical stance 19 20 and stances 18 and success of science and voluntarism 18, 21; see also meta-stances See also constructive empiricism Vendler, Zeno 89 Venn, John 152 verisimilitude 214 15, 216, 217, 218; see also truthlikeness; approximate truth Vienna Circle 11; see also logical positivism Wallman, Henry 98 Watson, James 40, 194; see also DNA, structure of Way, Eileen Cornell 214, 217 Wilkerson, T E 159, 169, 178 Woodward, James 112, 148 Worrall, John 8, 34, 35, 36, 38, 45, 48, 68; see also structural realism Zahar, Elie 34, 38 Zeno, and paradox of the arrow 98 ... Philosophy, University of Toronto A METAPHYSICS FOR SCIENTIFIC REALISM Knowing the Unobservable ANJAN CHAKRAVARTTY University of Toronto CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid,... consider them Some think there are as many versions of scientific realism as there are scientific realists That is probably a conservative estimate! There are probably as many versions of realism as there... realism, and develop a metaphysics that makes sense of these commitments The end product, I hope, is a basic framework with a capacity for elaboration by realists and antirealists both, as may