This page intentionally left blank CAMBRIDGE TEXTS IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY ADAM SMITH The Theory of Moral Sentiments CAMBRIDGE TEXTS IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Series editors KARL AMERIKS Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame DESMOND M CLARKE Professor of Philosophy at University College Cork The main objective of Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy is to expand the range, variety and quality of texts in the history of philosophy which are available in English The series includes texts by familiar names (such as Descartes and Kant) and also by less well-known authors Wherever possible, texts are published in complete and unabridged form, and translations are specially commissioned for the series Each volume contains a critical introduction together with a guide to further reading and any necessary glossaries and textual apparatus The volumes are designed for student use at undergraduate and postgraduate level and will be of interest not only to students of philosophy, but also to a wider audience of readers in the history of science, the history of theology and the history of ideas For a list of titles published in the series, please see end of book ADAM SMITH The Theory of Moral Sentiments EDITED BY KNUD HAAKONSSEN Boston University The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, UK 40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA 477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia Ruiz de Alarcón 13, 28014 Madrid, Spain Dock House, The Waterfront, Cape Town 8001, South Africa http://www.cambridge.org © in the introduction and editorial matter, Cambridge University Press 2004 First published in printed format 2002 ISBN 0-511-03902-6 eBook (Adobe Reader) ISBN 0-521-59150-3 hardback ISBN 0-521-59847-8 paperback Contents Introduction Chronology Further reading Note on the text Abbreviations page vii xxv xxvii xxix xxxi The Theory of Moral Sentiments Advertisement Contents Part I Of the propriety of action Part II Of merit and demerit; or, of the objects of reward and punishment Part III Of the foundation of our judgments concerning our own sentiments and conduct, and of the sense of duty Part IV Of the effect of utility upon the sentiment of approbation Part V Of the influence of custom and fashion upon the sentiments of moral approbation and disapprobation Part VI Of the character of virtue Part VII Of systems of moral philosophy Index v Introduction The nature of Smith’s moral theory Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments is apt to confuse, perhaps startle, the modern reader who approaches it with expectations formed by recent moral philosophy Though profoundly different in many respects, the moral philosophies which have dominated the debate for the last fifty years, utilitarianism and Kantianism, have a common concern with an ultimate criterion for right action Even the doctrine which in recent years has mounted the most serious challenge to these two, so-called virtue ethics, is devoted to establishing criteria for what constitutes the morally good character In other words, modern moral philosophy is primarily the hunt for a universally normative doctrine, a theory of what is right or good for humanity as such Furthermore, it is commonly backed up by meta-ethical ideas of moral judgment which presuppose such a view of philosophical ethics Smith’s idea of moral philosophy was very different, and that is one good reason for studying him; he is a challenge to our common ways of thinking For Smith the most basic task of moral philosophy is one of explanation; it is to provide an understanding of those practices which traditionally are called moral Like his close friend and mentor, David Hume, Smith saw moral philosophy as central to a new science of human nature To this purpose Smith analysed those features of the human mind and those modes of interaction between several minds which gave rise to moral practices in the human species Furthermore, he traced the different patterns which these practices assumed in response to different social, economic and political circumstances He thought that this procedure vii Introduction enabled him to say something about which features of morality appeared to be universal to humanity and which ones appeared more or less historically variable The universality in question was entirely a matter of empirically observable generality; Smith was simply suggesting that without certain elementary and quite general features we would not be able to recognize an existence as a human life Smith was, in other words, not interested in any metaphysics of morals Generally Smith analysed our moral practices in terms of the qualities of human agency, or character, but he found ways of accounting also for our tendency to follow rules and for our inclination to give moral weight to the consequences of actions It is this comprehensiveness that has made Smith’s theory an appealing reference point for all three of the dominating schools in modern ethics, as mentioned above, despite the fact that he did not raise the question of a validating foundation for morality Morality was, in Smith’s eyes, to be approached as a matter of fact about the human species’ history, but this does not mean that there is no normative significance to his theory It is just a very indirect normativity For one thing, as a naturalist Smith sees it as his task to detail how facts guide our actions by setting limits to what we can do, and among the facts about humanity which it would be futile to ignore are such things as the constant presence of both egoistic and altruistic attitudes or the claim to some degree of individual integrity For another thing, as a humanist Smith obviously believed that his students and readers would gain insight into their moral potential through his portraits of the complexity, even contradictions, of moral lives and moral judgments Somewhat like a novelist, he presents a wide variety of moral characters who often judge each other but who rarely are judged directly by the author, except in his capacity as a representative of ‘common opinion’ For the rest, judgment is up to the reader Smith came to the conclusion that there was a great dividing line running through human morality in just about any of its forms that were recorded in history This division was between the ‘negative’ virtue of justice, which concerned abstinence from injury, and the ‘positive’ virtues such as benevolence or prudence, which concerned the promotion of good for others or for oneself The indirect normativity of Smith’s theory is very different for these two categories of moral virtue No recognizably human life can be without either type of virtue but what we can say about each in general terms and, hence, what kind of guidance such accounts can yield, viii Of systems of moral philosophy him who is capable of wilfully deceiving The former may safely be trusted upon many occasions; the latter very seldom upon any Frankness and openness conciliate confidence We trust the man who seems willing to trust us We see clearly, we think, the road by which he means to conduct us, and we abandon ourselves with pleasure to his guidance and direction Reserve and concealment, on the contrary, call forth diffidence We are afraid to follow the man who is going we not know where The great pleasure of conversation and society, besides, arises from a certain correspondence of sentiments and opinions, from a certain harmony of minds, which like so many musical instruments coincide and keep time with one another But this most delightful harmony cannot be obtained unless there is a free communication of sentiments and opinions We all desire, upon this account, to feel how each other is affected, to penetrate into each other’s bosoms, and to observe the sentiments and affections which really subsist there The man who indulges us in this natural passion, who invites us into his heart, who, as it were, sets open the gates of his breast to us, seems to exercise a species of hospitality more delightful than any other No man, who is in ordinary good temper, can fail of pleasing, if he has the courage to utter his real sentiments as he feels them, and because he feels them It is this unreserved sincerity which renders even the prattle of a child agreeable How weak and imperfect soever the views of the open-hearted, we take pleasure to enter into them, and endeavour, as much as we can, to bring down our own understanding to the level of their capacities, and to regard every subject in the particular light in which they appear to have considered it This passion to discover the real sentiments of others is naturally so strong, that it often degenerates into a troublesome and impertinent curiosity to pry into those secrets of our neighbours which they have very justifiable reasons for concealing; and, upon many occasions, it requires prudence and a strong sense of propriety to govern this, as well as all the other passions of human nature, and to reduce it to that pitch which any impartial spectator can approve of To disappoint this curiosity, however, when it is kept within proper bounds, and aims at nothing which there can be any just reason for concealing, is equally disagreeable in its turn The man who eludes our most innocent questions, who gives no satisfaction to our most inoffensive inquiries, who plainly wraps himself up in impenetrable obscurity, The Theory of Moral Sentiments seems, as it were, to build a wall about his breast We run forward to get within it, with all the eagerness of harmless curiosity; and feel ourselves all at once pushed back with the rudest and most offensive violence. The man of reserve and concealment, though seldom a very amiable character, is not disrespected or despised He seems to feel coldly towards us, and we feel as coldly towards him He is not much praised or beloved, but he is as little hated or blamed He very seldom, however, has occasion to repent of his caution, and is generally disposed rather to value himself upon the prudence of his reserve Though his conduct, therefore, may have been very faulty, and sometimes even hurtful, he can very seldom be disposed to lay his case before the casuists, or to fancy that he has any occasion for their acquittal or approbation It is not always so with the man, who, from false information, from inadvertency, from precipitancy and rashness, has involuntarily deceived Though it should be in a matter of little consequence, in telling a piece of common news, for example, if he is a real lover of truth, he is ashamed of his own carelessness, and never fails to embrace the first opportunity of making the fullest acknowledgments If it is in a matter of some consequence, his contrition is still greater; and if any unlucky or fatal consequence has followed from his misinformation, he can scarce ever forgive himself Though not guilty, he feels himself to be in the highest degree, what the ancients called, piacular, and is anxious and eager to make every sort of atonement in his power Such a person might frequently be disposed to lay his case before the casuists, who have in general been very favourable to him, and though they have sometimes justly condemned him for rashness, they have universally acquitted him of the ignominy of falsehood But the man who had the most frequent occasion to consult them, was the man of equivocation and mental reservation, the man who seriously and deliberately meant to deceive, but who, at the same time, wished to flatter himself that he had really told the truth With him they have The next three paragraphs were added in edition See note to II.iii..– Of systems of moral philosophy dealt variously When they approved very much of the motives of his deceit, they have sometimes acquitted him, though, to them justice, they have in general and much more frequently condemned him The chief subjects of the works of the casuists, therefore, were the conscientious regard that is due to the rules of justice; how far we ought to respect the life and property of our neighbour; the duty of restitution; the laws of chastity and modesty, and wherein consisted what, in their language, are called the sins of concupiscence; the rules of veracity, and the obligation of oaths, promises, and contracts of all kinds It may be said in general of the works of the casuists that they attempted, to no purpose, to direct by precise rules what it belongs to feeling and sentiment only to judge of How is it possible to ascertain by rules the exact point at which, in every case, a delicate sense of justice begins to run into a frivolous and weak scrupulosity of conscience? When it is that secrecy and reserve begin to grow into dissimulation? How far an agreeable irony may be carried, and at what precise point it begins to degenerate into a detestable lie? What is the highest pitch of freedom and ease of behaviour which can be regarded as graceful and becoming, and when it is that it first begins to run into a negligent and thoughtless licentiousness? With regard to all such matters, what would hold good in any one case would scarce so exactly in any other, and what constitutes the propriety and happiness of behaviour varies in every case with the smallest variety of situation Books of casuistry, therefore, are generally as useless as they are commonly tiresome They could be of little use to one who should consult them upon occasion, even supposing their decisions to be just; because, notwithstanding the multitude of cases collected in them, yet upon account of the still greater variety of possible circumstances, it is a chance, if among all those cases there be found one exactly parallel to that under consideration One, who is really anxious to his duty, must be very weak, if he can imagine that he has much occasion for them; and with regard to one who is negligent of it, the style of those writings is not such as is likely to awaken him to more attention None of them tend to animate us to what is generous and noble None of them tend to soften us to what is gentle and humane Many of them, on the contrary, tend rather to teach us to chicane with our own consciences, The Theory of Moral Sentiments and by their vain subtilties serve to authorise innumerable evasive refinements with regard to the most essential articles of our duty That frivolous accuracy which they attempted to introduce into subjects which not admit of it, almost necessarily betrayed them into those dangerous errors, and at the same time rendered their works dry and disagreeable, abounding in abstruse and metaphysical distinctions, but incapable of exciting in the heart any of those emotions which it is the principal use of books of morality to excite The two useful parts of moral philosophy, therefore, are Ethics and Jurisprudence: casuistry ought to be rejected altogether; and the ancient moralists appear to have judged much better, who, in treating of the same subjects, did not affect any such nice exactness, but contented themselves with describing, in a general manner, what is the sentiment upon which justice, modesty, and veracity are founded, and what is the ordinary way of acting to which those virtues would commonly prompt us Something, indeed, not unlike the doctrine of the casuists, seems to have been attempted by several philosophers There is something of this kind in the third book of Cicero’s Offices, where he endeavours like a casuist to give rules for our conduct in many nice cases, in which it is difficult to determine whereabouts the point of propriety may lie. It appears too, from many passages in the same book, that several other philosophers had attempted something of the same kind before him Neither he nor they, however, appear to have aimed at giving a complete system of this sort, but only meant to show how situations may occur, in which it is doubtful, whether the highest propriety of conduct consists in observing or in receding from what, in ordinary cases, are the rules of duty Every system of positive law may be regarded as a more or less imperfect attempt towards a system of natural jurisprudence, or towards an enumeration of the particular rules of justice As the violation of justice is what men will never submit to from one another, the Cicero, De officiis III.xiii.ff Of systems of moral philosophy public magistrate is under a necessity of employing the power of the commonwealth to enforce the practice of this virtue Without this precaution, civil society would become a scene of bloodshed and disorder, every man revenging himself at his own hand whenever he fancied he was injured To prevent the confusion which would attend upon every man’s doing justice to himself, the magistrate, in all governments that have acquired any considerable authority, undertakes to justice to all, and promises to hear and to redress every complaint of injury In all well-governed states too, not only judges are appointed for determining the controversies of individuals, but rules are prescribed for regulating the decisions of those judges; and these rules are, in general, intended to coincide with those of natural justice It does not, indeed, always happen that they so in every instance Sometimes what is called the constitution of the state, that is, the interest of the government; sometimes the interest of particular orders of men who tyrannize the government, warp the positive laws of the country from what natural justice would prescribe In some countries, the rudeness and barbarism of the people hinder the natural sentiments of justice from arriving at that accuracy and precision which, in more civilized nations, they naturally attain to Their laws are, like their manners, gross and rude and undistinguishing In other countries the unfortunate constitution of their courts of judicature hinders any regular system of jurisprudence from ever establishing itself among them, though the improved manners of the people may be such as would admit of the most accurate In no country the decisions of positive law coincide exactly, in every case, with the rules which the natural sense of justice would dictate Systems of positive law, therefore, though they deserve the greatest authority, as the records of the sentiments of mankind in different ages and nations, yet can never be regarded as accurate systems of the rules of natural justice It might have been expected that the reasonings of lawyers, upon the different imperfections and improvements of the laws of different countries, should have given occasion to an inquiry into what were the natural rules of justice independent of all positive institution It might have been expected that these reasonings should have led them to aim at establishing a system of what might properly be called natural The Theory of Moral Sentiments jurisprudence, or a theory of the general principles which ought to run through and be the foundation of the laws of all nations. But though the reasonings of lawyers did produce something of this kind, and though no man has treated systematically of the laws of any particular country, without intermixing in his work many observations of this sort; it was very late in the world before any such general system was thought of, or before the philosophy of law was treated of by itself, and without regard to the particular institutions of any one nation In none of the ancient moralists, we find any attempt towards a particular enumeration of the rules of justice Cicero in his Offices, and Aristotle in his Ethics, treat of justice in the same general manner in which they treat of all the other virtues. In the laws of Cicero and Plato, where we might naturally have expected some attempts towards an enumeration of those rules of natural equity, which ought to be enforced by the positive laws of every country, there is, however, nothing of this kind Their laws are laws of police, not of justice. Grotius seems to have been the first who attempted to give the world any thing like a system of those principles which ought to run through, and be the foundation of the laws of all nations; and his treatise of the laws of war and peace, with all its imperfections, is perhaps at this day the most complete work that has yet been given upon this subject. I shall in another discourse endeavour to give an account of the general principles of law and government, and of the different revolutions they have undergone in the different ages and periods of society, not only in what concerns justice, but in what concerns police, revenue, and arms, and whatever else is the object of law. I shall not, therefore, at present enter into any further detail concerning the history of jurisprudence Cf LJ (B) Cicero, De officiis I.vii.–xiii.; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, V Plato’s Laws and Cicero’s De Legibus Cf LJ (A) I.–, VI.–; LJ (B) , Cf LJ(B) : ‘Grotius seems to have been the first who attempted to give the world any thing like a regular system of natural jurisprudence, and his treatise on the laws of war and peace, with all its imperfections, is perhaps at this day the most compleat work on this subject.’ Cf § of the Advertisement above Index Academic (Platonic) school of philosophy and n, and n, n Acad´emie des Sciences, Paris n Acad´emie franc¸aise, Paris n Adams family, architects n Addison, Joseph and n, Aemilius Paulus and n affections, natural – and nn, –; and passions –, and n– affliction, sympathy in –, –, –, – Ajax, king of Salamis – and n Alembert, Jean le Rond d’ and n Alexander the Great , and n, and n, , n ambition –, ; see also rank ancients and moderns, quarrel of n anger – and nn animals –, Anne, of England and n Antigonus, Macedonian general and n Antimachus of Colophon, poet n Antiochus of Ascalon n Antipater, Macedonian general n appetites –, – Apollonius of Tyre and n approbation , , –, n, –, and n, –, – and nn, –, – and nn; see also taste Aquinas, Thomas n architecture: classical orders (Doric, Ionic, Corinthian, Tusculan, Composite) and n– Aristides ‘the Just’, Athenian statesman and n Aristippus of Cyrene and n, and n Aristodemus, of Messenia – and n Aristomenes, of Messenia – and n Aristophanes n Aristotle and n, – and n, – and n, , and n, – and nn, n, , and n, and n; see also Peripatetic school of philosophy Arrian (Flavius Arrianus) n arts, liberal – and n Arundel, Thomas Howard, second earl of and n Athenaeus, grammarian n Attila, the Hun and n Augustine of Hippo and nn authority, as principle for government and n Avaux, Claude de Mesmes, comte d’ and n Avidius Cassius, general and n Barbeyrac, Jean and n beauty –, –, – behaviour, anti-social –, , – beneficence and n–, –, –, benevolence – and nn; as virtue – and nn Bengal, suttee in Berkeley, George and n, n Bible n Birch, Thomas and n Biron, Charles de Gontaut, duc de and n Black, Joseph xxiii Index Boileau-Despr´eaux, Nicolas and n, and n Borgia, Cesare and n, – and n Bristol, John Digby, first earl of and n Brutus, Lucius Junius, Roman consul and n– Brutus, Marcus Junius, assassin of Caesar and n buccaneers and n Buffier, Claude and n– Butler, Joseph n, and n, n Butler, Samuel and n Byng, John, admiral and n Caesar, Gaius Julius and n, , – and n, and n, , and n Calas, Jean and n Callisthenes, historiographer and n Cambridge Platonists xi, n Camillus, Marcus Furius and n Campbell, Colen n casuists, casuistry and n, , and nn, , , –, – Catherine de’ Medici and n Catilina (Catiline), Lucius Sergius and n, and n, Cato, Marcus Porcius, the elder and n, and n Cato Uticensis, Marcus Porcius, the younger – and n, and n, and n, character –, – charity – Charles I, of England , , and n Charles II, of England China Christianity , n, n, Chrysippus, Stoic philosopher n, and n, and n Cicero, Marcus Tullius n, n, n, and n, n, and n, n, nn, n, and n, and n, – and n, n, n, n, nn, n, and nn, and n, n, n, , and n, and n, and n, and nn Clarendon, Edward Hyde, first earl of and n, and n Clarke, Samuel xi, xvi, and n, and n Claudius I, Roman emperor Cleanthes, Stoic philosopher and n Cleitus, killed by Alexander and n Cleomenes III, of Sparta – and n Colman, George, the elder n confession, dangers of practice of – conscience , , –, –, –, –, contracts n, and n, – and nn courage – and n, –, , – and nn cowardice – Cowley, Abraham – and n Crassus, Lucius Licinius, orator and n Crassus, Marcus Licinius, Roman politician and n credibility – Cudworth, Ralph xi, and n, and nn culture – and nn Curtius Rufus, Quintus, n n customs, usages –, , –, – and n Daoyz, S n Darwin, Charles xxiii Davila, Enrico Caterino and n death , , Defoe, Daniel n deformity – Demetrius, the Cynic and n Demosthenes, Athenian statesman and n, n Descartes, Ren´e and n desert – and nn, –, –, –, , –, and n, – and nn Diogenes Laertius n, n, and n, n, n disasters, reactions to – and n, Domitian, Roman emperor and n Dryads: see gods, pagan Dryden, John n, and n Du Bos, Jean-Baptiste and n duelling and n duty xviii, , , –, –, – eclecticism: see Neoplatonism education and n–, envy , Epaphriditus and n Index Epictetus and n, n, – and n, and n, and nn, and n Epicurus, Epicureanism xi, xx, xxi, , , – and nn, Eug`ene of Savoy, Prince and n Eumenes, Macedonian general and n Euripides and n, – and n evil – fanaticism: see religion, false fashion – and nn, fear – and nn fluxions n Fontenelle, Bernard le Bovier de and nn Fortunate Islands and n fortune –, –, – and nn Frederick II, of Prussia and n friendship, categories of and nn, – and nn frugality and n, , Gassendi, Pierre xi generosity – and nn Genghis Khan, Mongol conqueror and n God xv, xvi, , nn–, , and n– , , n, and n, , –, –, , , –, –, , –, – Godolphin, Sidney Godolphin, first earl of n gods, pagan , –, , , –, – government, civil and n, – and nn, –, , and n– Gracchus, Gaius Sempronius, Roman tribune and n Gracchus, Tiberius Sempronius, Roman tribune and n gratitude –, –, , , , , , , Gray, Thomas and n, and n greatness, riches, value of – Grotius, Hugo n, and n–, and n Gustavus Adolphus, of Sweden and n Gyaros (Nisos) and n happiness, : see also virtues, social hatred –, , , hedonism n Heineccius, J G n Heliodorus n Hesiod and n Historia Augusta n Hobbes, Thomas xi, n, and n, and n– Homer – and n, n Horace and n, and n, n Houbraken, Jakob, engraver and n humanity – and nn Hume, David xi–xii, xiv, xvi, xix, xxi, xxii–xxiii, n, n, n, n, n, n, n, n, n, n, and n, – and nn, n, n, n Hutcheson, Francis xi, xvi, xxi, n, n, and n, n, – and nn, and n, – and nn, and n Hutton, James xxiii imagination xii–xvi, xvii, –, , , , –, n, –, imprudence – and n infanticide – international relations and n– James I, of England and VI of Scotland and n, and n, n James II, of England and n Japan Jesuits n Joanna of Castile and n judgment –, , – and nn, – and n jurisprudence x, – and nn, –, – and nn justice ix, x, and nn–, –, , , , –, – and nn, , ; and animals, and nn; distributive, and n–; injustice, – and nn, – and n, – and n: see also resentment; natural instincts for, – and nn, , , n–, –; social utility of, – and nn, and n, –, –, – and nn Justinian n, n Kames, Henry Home, Lord and n, n Kant, Immanuel xxiii kinship societies Index Lactantius and n Laelius, Gaius, the elder and n Laelius, Gaius, Sapiens and n La Fontaine, Jean de and n La Mothe le Vayer, Franc¸ois de and n La Placette, Jean de, Huguenot theologian nn La Rochefoucauld, Franc¸ois, duc de and n, n La Rochefoucauld, Louis-Alexandre, duc de n Lares: see Gods, pagan Lauzun, Antonin Nompar de Caumont, comte and later duc de – and n law: duties of ; natural law, n, and n–, n; respect for law, , ; Roman law, nn; Scots law, , and n Lemery, Nicolas, chemist n licentiousness , – and nn Locke, John n, and n, and n Louis II de Bourbon, Prince of Cond´e and n Louis XIII, of France and n Louis XIV, of France – and n, n love , –, –, , –; see also charity; self-love Lucian and n, and n Lucullus, Lucius Licinius and n, n Lysander, Spartan general – and n Machiavelli, Niccol´o n, – and n Mack, Maynard, n Maclaurin, Colin and n Malebranche, Nicolas and n Mandeville, Bernard xi, xii, n, and n, n, n, – and nn, n manners, national differences in – Marana, Giovanni Paolo n Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, Roman emperor and n, , , – and nn Marivaux, Pierre and n Marlborough, John Churchill, first duke of n, and n Massillon, Jean-Baptiste – and n, and n mathematics n merit: see desert military profession – Millar, John xxi Milton, John , and n mind , , ; intellectual abilities, respect for –, ; see also imagination Minorca, siege of and n mirth –, , misfortunes – Mithridates, king of Pontus n, n Molesworth, Robert n Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, baron de la Br`ede et de, n n Moor, James n morality: nature of viii–xii, xvi–xxi, xxiv, –, –, –, – and n; and approbation, – and nn; practical, and n, – and nn; see also virtues More, Henry and n More, Sir Thomas and n music – and n nationalism – and nn nations, hostilities between – natural order , , , , nn, , , , , , , , , , , –, , , , , , , –, , necessaries, natural wants and n negligence –, – Neoplatonism and n Nero, Roman emperor and n, Newton, Sir Isaac and n, and n Nicopolis, in Epirus and n Otway, Thomas and n, and n Ovid and n pain –, –, –; see also Epicurus, Epicureanism Parmenides – and n Parmenion, Macedonian general and n– Pascal, Blaise and n, n passions –, –, –, , –, , –, , –, –, , –, , – and nn, –, – and n, –; sensation and, –, , –; see also anger; fear Pausanias, topographer n Peleponnesian War Index Peripatetic (Aristotelian) school of philosophy and n, and n, Perrault, Charles and n Persaeus, slave and disciple of Zeno Peter I, the Great, of Russia and n, and n Petrarch (Petrarca, Francesco) – and n Pharsalus, battle of and n Philip II, of Macedon and n, n, and n, n Philopoemen, Achaean general and n Philotas, son of Parmenion and n Phocion, Athenian general and n Pindar and n pirates: see buccaneers pity – planetary motion and n Plato n, and n, n, – and n, and n, , and nn, and n, – and n, , , and n; see also Academic school of philosophy; Neoplatonism pleasure: see Epicurus, Epicureanism Pliny the Younger – and n Plutarch n, n, n, n, n, n, n, nn, n, nn poetry – and nn Pompey, Roman general and n Pope, Alexander and n, and n, , and n population size and n possessions, attachment to – Pradon, Nicolas n praiseworthiness – pride –, , – and nn, – propriety xvi–xviii, , –, , , –, , , –, , – and nn, –, –, – and n, , , –, and n–; confused with vanity, and n providence prudence – and nn, –, and n; as virtue, – and nn public speaking and nn public spirit , and nn–, –, – and n Pufendorf, Samuel xi, n, n, nn, and n punishments , , –, , , – and nn, – and nn; and rank, – Pyrrhus, king of Epirus – and n Pythagoras Quinault, Philippe and n Quintilian, Marcus Fabius and n Racine, Jean and n, – and n, and n, and n, – and n Racine, Louis and n, n Raleigh, Sir Walter and n rank –, –, –, , , and n–, – and n reason , – and nn, –, – and nn, , – and nn; loss of Regulus, Marcus Atilius, Roman consul and n Reid, Thomas xxi, n, n religion , –, –; false –; see also Christianity; God resentment –, –, , , –, and n–, –, –, , –, –, , –, , Retz, Jean Franc¸ois Paul de Gondi, Cardinal de – and n, , and n, and n revenge n– rewards –, – rhetoric – and nn Riccoboni, Marie-Jeanne and n Richardson, Samuel and n Richelieu, Armand Jean Duplessis, Cardinal, duc de rights ix, x, and n Robertson, William nn Rousseau, Jean-Jacques n, n Russell, William Russell, Lord and n Rye House Plot, n St Bartholomew, Massacre of Sallust (Gaius Sallustius Crispus) Santeul, Jean de and n savages –, , , and n, Scipio Aemilianus Africanus, Publius Cornelius and nn Scipio Africanus Maior, Publius Cornelius and n, and n Scipio Nasica, Publius Cornelius and n Index self-command –, –, –, –, –, , , – and nn, –, n self-deceit – self-denial –, self-esteem –, , – and nn, – self-interest –, –, –, , and nn: see also self-love self-love , , –, , , –, –, and n–, , , , – and nn Seneca and n, and n, and n, n, nn, and n, sensation: see passion senses –, – and n; see also vision sentiment: see morality Seven Years War n Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper, first earl of and n Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper, third earl of xi, and n Shakespeare, William and n, and n Sidney, Algernon and n Simson, Robert, mathematician and n sincerity , – slavery and n Smith, Adam xxi–xxvi; Essays on Philosophical Subjects, n, n, n, n, n, n, n, n, n, n, n, n, n, n, n; Lectures on Jurisprudence, n, n, n, n, n, n, n, n, n, n, nn, n, n, n, n, n, n, n, n, n, nn; Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles-Lettres, n, n, n, n, n, n, n, n; Theory of Moral Sentiments, vii, x, xii, xiv, xvi, xx, xxii, xxiii, xxv, , n, –n, n, n; Wealth of Nations, x, xx, xxi, xxii, xxiii, xxvi, , n, n, n, n, n, nn, n, n, n, n Smith, John xi, and n society, theories of and n, – and nn Socrates and n, and n, , and nn, and n, solitude, evils of – Solon, Athenian legislator and n Sophocles and n, and n, n Southerne, Thomas and n Spanish Succession, War of the n, n Spectator, The n spectator, impartial , , , , , , , , speech – statecraft – and nn Stewart, Dugald xxiii Stewart, Matthew, mathematician and n Stoicism xi, xx, , n, n, and n, and n, and n, , – and nn, – and nn, –, ; see also Chrysippus; Cleanthes; Epictetus; Marcus Aurelius Antoninus; Seneca; suicide; Zeno Suetonius Tranquillus, Gaius n suicide – and nn; Stoic view of – and nn, , – and nn Sully, Maximilien de B´ethune, duc de and n Sulpicius Rufus, Publius, Roman tribune and n Swift, Jonathan – and n, sympathy xxiii, –, , , –, –, – and nn, , –, and n, n, , – and nn, –, , ; influence of fortune on, –, – and nn, and n–, –; see also imagination system, concept of and n–, – Tacitus, Publius Cornelius Tamerlane (Tamburlaine), Tatar conqueror and n Tarquinius Superbus n taste , , , , – and nn temperance –, Themistocles, Athenian statesman – and n, – and n Theobald, Lewis n Theramines, Athenian politician and n Thirty Years War and n, n Thomson, James and n Thucydides n Tibullus and n Tickell, Thomas n Index Tigranes, king of Armenia and n Timoleon of Corinth and n toleration, religious and n treason and n– trust – truth –, – Turenne, Henri de La Tour d’Auvergne, vicomte de and n virtues, social –, –, –, , –, –, , –, , -; see also generosity; humanity; justice; prudence; public spirit vision and n Voltaire, F M A de n, n, and n, nn, and n, and n, – and n, , and n Ulpian n utility xix, n, –; misapplied –; see also justice wants: see necessaries war – and n; see also Peleponnesian War; Seven Years War; Spanish Succession, War of the; Thirty Years War Warton, Joseph n Whichcote, Benjamin xi, n William III, of England and n Wollaston, William xi, xvi, and n wonder, surprise and n, – vanity and n–, , – and nn, , –, –, –, –, , – and nn Vertue, George, engraver and n vices –, , , – and n, –, virtue , , , , , , , , , , , –; Plato’s account of, – and nn, ; Aristotle’s account of, – and nn; Stoic view of, – and nn Xenophon n, n Zeno, of Citium and n, , and nn–, – and n, and n, Cambridge texts in the history of philosophy Titles published in the series thus far Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics (edited by Roger Crisp) Arnauld and Nicole Logic or the Art of Thinking (edited by Jill Vance Buroker) Bacon The New Organon (edited by Lisa Jardine and Michael Silverthorne) Boyle A Free Enquiry into the Vulgarly Received Notion of Nature (edited by Edward B Davis and Michael Hunter) Bruno Cause, Principle and Unity and Essays on Magic (edited by Richard Blackwell and Robert de Lucca with an introduction by Alfonso Ingegno) Cavendish Observations upon Experimental Philosophy (edited by Eileen O’Neill) Cicero On Moral Ends (edited by Julia Annas, translated by Raphael Woolf) Clarke A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God and Other Writings (edited by Ezio Vailati) Condillac Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge (edited by Hans Aarsleff) Conway The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy (edited by Allison P Coudert and Taylor Corse) Cudworth A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality with A Treatise of Freewill (edited by Sarah Hutton) Descartes Meditations on First Philosophy, with selections from the Objections and Replies (edited by John Cottingham) Descartes The World and Other Writings (edited by Stephen Gaukroger) Fichte Foundations of Natural Right (edited by Frederick Neuhouser, translated by Michael Baur) Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity (edited by Vere Chappell) Humboldt On Language (edited by Michael Losonsky, translated by Peter Heath) Kant Critique of Practical Reason (edited by Mary Gregor with an introduction by Andrews Reath) Kant Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (edited by Mary Gregor with an introduction by Christine M Korsgaard) Kant The Metaphysics of Morals (edited by Mary Gregor with an introduction by Roger Sullivan) Kant Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics (edited by Gary Hatfield) Kant Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and Other Writings (edited by Allen Wood and George di Giovanni with an introduction by Robert Merrihew Adams) La Mettrie Machine Man and Other Writings (edited by Ann Thomson) Leibniz New Essays on Human Understanding (edited by Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett) Malebranche Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion (edited by Nicholas Jolley and David Scott) Malebranche The Search after Truth (edited by Thomas M Lennon and Paul J Olscamp) Melanchthon Orations on Philosophy and Education (edited by Sachiko Kusukawa, translated by Christine Salazar) Mendelssohn Philosophical Writings (edited by Daniel O Dahlstrom) Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil (edited by Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Judith Norman) Nietzsche The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings (edited by Raymond Geuss and Ronald Speirs) Nietzsche Daybreak (edited by Maudemarie Clark and Brian Leiter, translated by R J Hollingdale) Nietzsche The Gay Science (edited by Bernard Williams, translated by Josefine Nauckhoff) Nietzsche Human, All Too Human (translated by R J Hollingdale with an introduction by Richard Schacht) Nietzsche Untimely Meditations (edited by Daniel Breazeale, translated by R J Hollingdale) Schleiermacher Hermeneutics and Criticism (edited by Andrew Bowie) Schleiermacher On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers (edited by Richard Crouter) Schopenhauer Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will (edited by Găunter Zăoller) Sextus Empiricus Outlines of Scepticism (edited by Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes) Shaftesbury Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times (edited by Lawrence Klein) Adam Smith The Theory of Moral Sentiments (edited by Knud Haakonssen) Voltaire Treatise on Tolerance and Other Writings (edited by Simon Harvey)