Chinas achilles heel the belt and road initiative and its indian discontents

China’s Achilles’ Heel The Belt and Road Initiative and Its Indian Discontents Srikanth Thaliyakkattil China’s Achilles’ Heel Srikanth Thaliyakkattil China’s Achilles’ Heel The Belt and Road Initiative and Its Indian Discontents Srikanth Thaliyakkattil Independent Scholar Kerala, India ISBN 978-981-13-8424-0    ISBN 978-981-13-8425-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8425-7 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd 2019 This work is subject to copyright All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-­01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore Preface and Acknowledgments This book is the product of a sustained curiosity emerged out of reading, listening, and in certain ways experiencing what is called One Belt One Road initiative by China or in the current form Belt and Road initiative (BRI) (the Chinese name of the BRI (一带一路) never changed—pointing to the difficulty of translating and communicating Chinese concepts through English—It is also the case with many other languages) BRI was announced during my final years as a doctoral candidate in the School of International Studies, Peking University The announcement was followed by a “blitzkrieg” of BRI campaigns It filled every sphere of the social life of Chinese, especially in media and academia It was also the twilight period of the “China dream” campaign, which didn’t go well and was fading away Me and many of my colleagues thought it will also go in the way of “China dream” My colleagues in Peking University were also proud that the previous dean of our School Wang Jisi was rumoured to be the one who proposed the BRI idea, but it remains as a rumour Unlike the “China dream” campaign BRI campaign was massive, encompassing several government departments, several think tanks and university research departments, some of them opened just in the name of BRI or its component Silk Road The special character of the BRI campaign was that it was internal and external, for other campaigns like “China dream” the external focus was limited In the Chinese academic circles, academicians are also concerned with material rewards, it was not the question what is BRI? Which concerned them, but that it came with lots of material rewards was the most important attraction For Chinese young scholars academic papers with BRI in the title got accepted and published quickly, v vi  PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS a­ cademicians and media analysts still are in a race to pounding out books on BRI, and carriers are made out of BRI. Hundreds of PhD thesis and Master’s thesis was written about Belt and Road initiative The trick was that attach the BRI to the title of the thesis or frame the thesis in such a way to include the BRI label, the advantage was that the academic output or media output with BRI label got instant visibility and acceptability In its initial phase several foreign scholars, businessmen, media analysts from the developed world and developing world self-recruited themselves and went on to the pilgrimage of China as publicists of BRI in search of the “benefit” of the BRI. But outside China there was an ever-growing number of critics of the BRI and currently they form, arguably, the largest group It fed into the ever-growing literature of BRI. It was the label and narrative of the BRI that was important After leaving Beijing, spending my time in India and Singapore gave me very different and varied perspectives of the BRI. Outside China, the BRI discussions both in media and academia, concentrated on the projects which China labelled as BRI, its merits and demerits Take out the label of BRI it ended up as a benefit/ risk analysis of certain projects It was in want of a deeper understanding I started this research, and which ended up as a monograph How much of what I understood that I can communicate through this monograph is in doubt, but within the timeframe and available resources, the only consolation is that I tried my best I found out that BRI also had a huge disadvantage BRI was and is the largest external campaign conducted by China It was relatively easy for China to brand BRI as a benevolent one inside China because of the almost absolute control of Government over media and academia However, outside China the label of BRI was interpreted by the countries which have powerful and influential English media and academia For instance, one such country, India was successful in framing BRI as a threat, with concerns emerging out of BRI labelled projects adversely affecting its sovereignty and territorial integrity Western media and academia also interpreted the Chinese label of BRI as a threat and exploitative China’s first large-scale attempt to build a benevolent narrative of its engagements with the world is a failure and in it India played a pivotal part The failure of the BRI narrative and currently turning it into a hegemonic and non-­ benevolent narrative outside China will have internal and external repercussions Through BRI, China also signalled to regional powers like India and the only reigning superpower United States that China wants to be a dominant power in the global and regional politics The rollback of   PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS  vii Chinese ambitions is started earnestly by an Indo-Pacific strategy with India and US as its core BRI is turning out to be one of the greatest blow to China in its global engagement, will China emerge from it is a question only time can answer Though sometimes history misguides, History can also sometimes serve as the guide to the future, for Chinese Communist Party took several devastating blows in its history, it survived the Chinese civil war, Sino-Soviet split, Cultural Revolution, and Tiananmen Square, and it may probably survive the BRI debacle and wait for another chance for the glory of becoming the superpower I am grateful to the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), the National University of Singapore for providing space and resources for this research I thank all my ex-colleagues, especially Sojin, Jivanta, Chulanee, Amitt, Dipinder and Deeparghya for their support and encouragement Without the kind support and work environment provided by the ISAS administration, it will be impossible to come up with this book I would like to thank the Chairman of the institute Ambassador Gopinath Pillai, the Director of the institute Professor Raja Mohan, Professor Subrata Mitra, Johnson Davasagayam, Hernaikh Singh, Sitara, Peggy, Sally, Shilin, and Sheila for their support and cooperation during the time I spend in ISAS. However, all the opinions expressed in this book are mine and I take full responsibility for any mistakes sneaked into this volume Kerala, India Srikanth Thaliyakkattil Contents 1 Introduction: The BRI as Strategic Camouflage  1 2 The Road to the Belt and the Road 37 3 The BRI and Its Different Manifestations 77 4 India May Join and Benefit from the BRI: A Chinese View113 5 The BRI and the Good, Not So Good and Bad Business with India139 6 India as Jealous Foe and the BRI165 7 Belt and Road vs the Indo-Pacific195 8 Conclusion: The Way to War235 Index249 ix List of Tables Table 1.1 Table 1.2 Major global financial institutions—Country voting share in % China led major new financial institutions—Country voting share in % Table 1.3 Nepal—Top bilateral donors (2016–2017) Table 3.1 List of regional/national linking initiatives or development plans for BRI “alignment” 19 96 xi CHAPTER Introduction: The BRI as Strategic Camouflage On April 27 and 28, 2018, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping met in the Chinese province of Wuhan to reset the floundering relationship between their respective countries The content of the two-day meeting was replete with positivity During the summit, Modi said that “both India and China are ancient civilisations and important neighbours of each other We [China and India] must strengthen dialogue, exchanges and cooperation, live in peace and build a friendship that lasts from generation to generation.”1 The praise and emphasis on similarities were also reciprocated by Xi Jinping, according to whom “Both China and India are countries with a splendid history and culture, and the two countries share many similarities in culture China and India should conduct more extensive and deeper exchanges, jointly commit to the rejuvenation of Eastern civilisation, advocate respect for the diversity of civilisations and promote the harmonious coexistence of different civilisations.”2 The post-Wuhan summit statements of India and China show the divergences between the thinking of the two countries about important issues that impact the relations between them According to India’s post-­ summit statement, “Prime Minister Modi and President Xi recognised the common threat posed by terrorism and reiterated their strong condemnation of and resolute opposition to terrorism in all its forms and manifestations They committed themselves to cooperate on counterterrorism.”3 However, in China’s post-summit statement, terrorism was © The Author(s) 2019 S Thaliyakkattil, China’s Achilles’ Heel, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8425-7_1 8  CONCLUSION: THE WAY TO WAR  243 and watch made Indian opposition more glaring India’s opposition to the BRI later turned out to be the core factor triggering the renewed effort of the US rebalancing to Asia or, in its new name, the renewed Indo-Pacific strategy In the Indo-Pacific strategy, India has become the core balancer, and the US is the main offshore balancer The Indo-Pacific strategy, with India as its core, is based on the realisation by the US that India is the consistent, willing and determined balancer of China in Asia, even determined to go it alone without the support of the US, as demonstrated by its opposition to the BRI. India’s criticism of the BRI became a rallying point for other countries, such as Japan and Australia It also emboldened these countries to form a quadrilateral framework of cooperation under the banner of the Indo-Pacific strategy with demonstrated effectiveness, such as the Malabar naval exercise conducted off the shores of Guam The joint military exercises involving Japan, the US, and India signalled the operationalisation of the Indo-­ Pacific strategy, and they also demonstrated the wide range of support provided by regional powers and the US for India’s engagement in the Pacific region Additionally, the United States has also increased its assistance to India to increase its maritime capabilities, strengthening India’s efforts to balance China in the Indian Ocean region and beyond The Institutionalisation of Memories of the 1962 War The Chinese depict 1962 Sino-Indian War as a misadventure by India, driven by its great power ambition and aggressive realist principles The 1962 war is frequently mentioned in the Chinese discourse about India’s rejection of the BRI. Coinciding with the BRI, the Chinese government has also institutionalised its 1962 war memories In 2014, China’s top legislature, the National People’s Congress, approved September 30 as Martyrs’ Day As defined by the Chinese government, martyrs are “people who sacrificed their lives for national independence and prosperity, as well as the welfare of people in modern times, or after the First Opium War.”5 In the following year, 2015, China carried out remembrance parades and functions to commemorate Chinese martyrs Chinese martyrs of the 1962 war were also remembered, and functions were held to institutionalise memories of the war On September 30, 2015, in Tibet, a memorial park opened in the border county of Zayul, where 447 soldiers who died during the Indian-Chinese conflict were buried In the park, a monument 244  S THALIYAKKATTIL commemorating the Sino-Indian War stands 19.62 metres tall, symbolising the year in which China fought India in a border dispute During the opening ceremony, representatives of veterans and officials unveiled the monument, while soldiers carried coffins to the tombs According to Feng Shouzheng, a veteran, “The Park carries the spirits of martyrs, which is helpful for raising people’s awareness of national defence.”6 India also paid tributes to its 1962 war martyrs during the 50th anniversary of the war in 2012.7 The institutionalisation of these war memories through anniversary rituals and commemorations also ingrained the threat perceptions and the image of India as a hostile country among China’s elites and masses Reflecting this attitude, references to the 1962 war have increasingly figured in the Chinese discourse on India’s attitude towards the BRI Although Chinese scholars rarely address India’s objection that the CPEC violates India’s sovereignty, when it is addressed, Chinese scholars take the position that China has always taken a principled stand on the Kashmir issue The “principled stand on the Kashmir issue” refers to the Chinese claim that China has never interfered in the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan In India, this claim is viewed as a contradiction because the CPEC itself, with the construction of a road and other infrastructure through the disputed territory of Kashmir, constitutes Chinese interference in the Kashmir dispute The institutionalisation of war memories is reflected in the frequent reference to the war in the Chinese discourse about the Indian attitude towards the BRI and in attributing aggressive intentions to India Chinese scholars and media try to depict India as an aggressive “bully.” However, Chinese scholars also acknowledge that India’s “aggressive” stand is viewed as “standing up” to China, especially by the US.  Some Chinese scholars even attribute the renewed Indo-Pacific strategy as an Indian ploy The core of the Indo-­ Pacific strategy is the United States-India partnership, and it is viewed as such by China Both the Chinese and American discourses on India’s objections to the BRI suggest that India’s resistance to the BRI resulted in the Indo-Pacific strategy, with the Indian-American partnership as its core In contrast to the BRI, the Indo-Pacific narrative is more inclusive and is based on the shared values of the four participating democratic countries: India, the United States, Japan, and Australia The main declared objectives of the Indo-Pacific strategy are to maintain open seas; the strategy also maintains the traditional security architecture reinforced with Indian participation, securing public goods for global trade 8  CONCLUSION: THE WAY TO WAR  245 Silk Road to War With the securitisation of the BRI and the entrenched threat perceptions of China, there will be combined attempts by the Indo-Pacific powers to rollback China’s power and influence in the Indian Ocean region Given the potential slowdown of Chinese economic growth, China will find it difficult to consistently maintain a strong presence in the Indian Ocean region However, even with diminished power, China will remain one of the major powers in the region Indeed, some Chinese scholars have warned that the West is exaggerating China’s power and influence to make China overextend and overstretch its power, thus depicting it as a threat and an expansionist power; with the Chinese BRI, it seems that Chinese officialdom has not listened to these warnings and has miscalculated its power to create its own narrative The BRI has sharpened the edges of the geopolitics in the region, it has reinforced the Indo-Pacific strategy, with India as its core, and it has given India, the United States and other powers a clear signal that China is attempting to carve out a space for itself with institutions, rules and norms created or influenced by China, that is, a China-dominated parallel system of global governance Currently, China is only one of the important powers in South Asia However, the critical factor is that China is the crucial player against which most other major players are aligned China’s actions in the South Asian region that have been under the BRI label have proven to be strategic, resulting in a security threat to the regional power—India This will result in a consistent escalation of threat perceptions and counter-strategies against China in the region by India and Western countries The US and India are still a dominant and important factor in the stability and prosperity of the South Asian region The Chinese attempt to create its own narrative and to create a China-centric order in the Asian region is proving to be counterproductive China’s internal discourse of accusing India of holding great power ambitions and of being jealous of China only shows that China is convinced of its own narrative that India should not resist China’s strategic advances in the region even if it has to compromise its own sovereignty This Chinese “great power chauvinism” makes its attitudes towards and policies with regard to India more strident This framework of thinking will not allow China to accept India’s regional power status; China will continue to make strategic moves to erode India’s strategic position in the region, contributing to the escalation of the threat perceptions and the pushback against China’s strategic expansion in the 246  S THALIYAKKATTIL region The Chinese perceptions of India as a spoiler of its superpower aspirations are becoming stronger This will create more crisis-like situations in the Indo-Pacific region, making it ripe for conflicts and even war The BRI has also proven to India the futility of courting China and of economic relations and other modes of relations with China to incentivise changes in Chinese state behaviour China’s dismissiveness towards India’s concerns led to India’s determined response For India, because of its physical proximity to other South Asian countries, it is relatively easy to conduct long-term balancing without much expense to its resources, and joining with Western countries and the support of the US only enhance India’s position Ultimately, India has emerged as a better storyteller than China In general, democracies tell better stories than authoritarian regimes They can also better adapt and evolve the narratives they create about themselves There is no need to search for legitimacy because legitimacy is built into the system through the election process, debates, negotiations and, at times, violence The Chinese system must seek legitimacy through economic development or other means, but the stories that it creates about itself will be challenged by the global discourse, both internally and externally, and the CCP will find it to be an enormous challenge to instil belief in its system internally and a far more insurmountable challenge to instil belief in its ways of economic engagement externally The BRI narrative will prove to be one of the greatest strategic mistakes made by rising China The BRI narrative has been met by India’s counter-­ narratives, and India has interpreted the BRI as a Chinese narrative to dominate Asia and to camouflage China’s strategic intentions in many regions of the world, especially the Indian Ocean region Unlike the BRI, the Indo-Pacific strategy is backed by countries that have powerful resources for global narrative creation US media dominate global media, and with India and Australia having a large English-speaking population, vibrant English-language media and universities that use English as the medium of instruction, it is easy for Indo-Pacific countries to create a narrative and to spread their version of the story In contrast, as many Chinese specialists have also argued, the Chinese propaganda system, which only tries to project perfect and infallible China and is impervious to criticism, will always be viewed with suspicion and mistrust, even within China China’s attempt to create a China-centric Asian narrative and global narrative through the BRI is a failure Based on the Chinese discourse about India’s objections to and criticisms of the BRI, it is evident that India has played a pivotal role in the failure of the BRI to provide 8  CONCLUSION: THE WAY TO WAR  247 a “good story” for China As some Chinese analysts have concluded, India grasped the core purpose of the BRI, that is, to create a China-centric narrative India did not attempt to compete with China in investing or building infrastructure Its cost-effective way of countering the BRI was to create India-centric narratives and to reject and refute the BRI narrative The Indian success in foiling the BRI narrative was based on India’s realisation that by saying that it would join the BRI, India would be relegated to the status of a secondary power in Asia, a mere “beneficiary” of the Chinese initiative In other words, the “benefit” of the BRI itself is a framework through which China wants to illustrate its dominant economic relationship with other countries China’s framework of analysing Indian actions through the lens of India’s pursuit of great power status is leading China to overlook India’s concerns in the region China’s own pursuit of great power status is influencing its perception of India as a secondary power Any anomaly in Indian behaviour that is contrary to its perceived secondary power status, such as India’s own regional connectivity initiatives, is viewed by China in terms of India’s “wild ambition”, and India’s security concerns in the South Asian region and Indian Ocean region are viewed as Indian hegemony China also views India’s partnership with the United States as a containment strategy Currently, the threat perceptions of China are in a spiralling stage, in correlation with the increasing Indian cooperation with Indo-­ Pacific countries China’s entrenched perceptions of Indian behaviour may not change within a short period of time; thus, under the current scenario of increasing mutual threat perceptions between India and China, as well as the US determination to contain China’s ambitions to become the dominant power in the Asian region, the Indo-Pacific region is ripe for confrontational power politics Notes Cao Qingqing, “China embraces growing coffee culture,” CGTN, December 6, 2017, https://news.cgtn.com/news/33677a4d30637a6333566d54/ share_p.html (accessed January 2, 2018) Cao Qingeing, “China embraces growing coffee culture.” Eleanor Albert, “Christianity in China, Backgrounder,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 11, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/christianity-china (accessed November 3, 2018); Sarah Zheng, “Christianity’s ‘explosive growth’ in China – And the official pushback,” inkstone, March 248  S THALIYAKKATTIL 30, 2018, https://www.inkstonenews.com/china/christianity-protestantchurch/article/2133812 (accessed November 3, 2018) “White papers of government of China  – Freedom of Religious Belief in China (October 1997),” Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, June 1996, http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/ Freedom/index.htm (accessed September 28, 2018) “3rd Ld-Writethru-China Focus: Martyrs’ Day marked across China,” Xinhua General News Service, September 30, 2015 Ibid PTI, India pays homage to martyrs of 1962 Sino-India war for first time, India Today, October 20, 2012, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/ india-china-war-defence-minister-a.k-antony-indian-air-for ce119190-2012-10-20 (accessed November 8, 2018) Bibliography 3rd Ld-Writethru-China Focus: Martyrs’ Day marked across China 2015 Xinhua General News Service September 30 Albert, Eleanor 2018 Christianity in China, Backgrounder Council on Foreign Relations October 11 https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/christianitychina Accessed November 3, 2018 PTI 2012 India pays homage to martyrs of 1962 Sino-India war for first time India Today October 20 https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/indiachina-war-defence-minister-a.k-antony-indian-air-force-119190-2012-10-20 Accessed November 8, 2018 Qingqing, Cao 2017 China embraces growing coffee culture CGTN December https://news.cgtn.com/news/33677a4d30637a6333566d54/share_p.html Accessed January 2, 2018 White papers of government of China  – Freedom of Religious Belief in China 1997 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China October http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/Freedom/index.htm Accessed September 28, 2018 Zheng, Sarah 2018 Christianity’s ‘explosive growth’ in China – And the official pushback Inkstone March 30 Index A Abe, Shinzo, 207 Academics, 82 Act East, 127, 213 Afghanistan, 91 Aid, 176 AIIB, 85 Aircraft, 205 Akbar, M. J., Alliance, 196 Allies, 198 Allocate, 46 Ambassador, 77 Ambition, 126 America First policy, 214 American dream, 52 American media, 176 Andaman Nicobar Islands, 209 Anti-dumping, 148 Approval, 156 Arab, 94 Archaeological, 58 Army, 17 Asia, Asia Pacific, 196 Assam, 117 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Attack, 213 Attitudes, 182 Audiences, 61 Australia, 21, 95 Autonomy, 219 Ayurveda, 122 Azhar, Masood, B Balance, 177 Balancer, 203 Baloch, 12 Balochistan, 12 Bangladesh, 19 Bangladesh, China, India, and Myanmar (BCIM), 115 Bank, 196 Banned, 39 Barriers, 150 © The Author(s) 2019 S Thaliyakkattil, China’s Achilles’ Heel, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8425-7 249 250  INDEX Bay of Bengal, 209 Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-­ Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), 185 Behaviour, Beidou satellite navigation system, 84 Beijing, 53 Beijing University, 58 Belief, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Beneficiary, 120 Benefit, 16, 81 Bhutan, 14 Big data, 15 Bihar, 117 Blue Ocean, 218 Boao forum for Asia, Border issue, 2, 124 Border points, 17 Boundary, 2, 181 Brand, 153 Brazil, 176 Bretton Woods system, 196 Brexit, 45 Bridge rail project, 78 British, 151, 155 Buddha, 57 Buddhism, 95 Bullet train, 119 Bullying, 187 Bureau Of East Asian And Pacific Affairs, 217 Burns, William J., 199 Business, 82, 153 Businessman, 214 C Camouflaging, 55 Campaigns, Campbell Bay, 209 Capability, 201 Capital, 188 Capitalism, 38 Carter, Ashton, 206 Center for Strategic and International Studies, 81 Central Asian, 85 Channels, 181 Chen Fei, 143 Chen Wenling, 141 Cheng Dawei, 89 Cheng Guo, 89 China, China-centric, 9, 22, 87 China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), 80 China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), China Telecom, 15 China threat theory, 46 Chinese, 11 activities, 63 businesses, 39 characteristics, 39 dream, 52 government, scholars, 39 Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Christian, 8, 47 Cities, 40, 53 Civilisations, Classics, 49 Climate change, Clinton, Hillary Rodham, 199 Collapse, 37 Colombo, 80 Colonial, 46 Colonisation, 11 Communication, 119 Communist Party, Companies, 80, 155 Compete, 179  INDEX  Competition, 127 Concept, 167, 206 Conciliatory, 216 Conflict, 44, 202 Confucianism, 51 Confucius Peace Prize, Connectivity, 14, 129 Consumerism, 184 Contain, 217 Contradictions, 39, 217 Converge, 216 Cooperation, 119 Cooperative, 114 Core values, 49 Counterweight, 211 Country, 62 Credit, 84 Crisis, 45 Critic, 197 Criticise, 39 Croatia, 95 Cultural exchanges, 39 Cultural initiative, Culture, Custine, Marquis Astolphe de, D Dai Xu, 42 Daily Times, 11 Dalai Lama, 125 Dance, 57 Dance-drama, 56 Debt, 12 Decision-making, 147 Defence, 79, 217 Delegitimised, 38 Deleuze and Guattari, 53 Democracy, Democratisation, 38 Demographic, 141 Deng Xiaoping, 40 Dependency, 21 Deployment, 87 Desai, Meghnad, Developing country, 39 Development, 19 Diplomacy, 186 Discontent, 79 Discourse power, 3, 38, 39 The Discovery of India, 169 Disintegration, 38 Disputes, 183 Divisions, 44 Djibouti, 93 Doklam, 146 Dominant, 39 Dominate, 167 Dream, Drones, 197 Dui jie, 89 Dunhuang caves, 56 E East Timor, 77 Economic engagement, 77 Economic initiative, Educational, 51 Efficiency, 44 Elites, 44 Empire, 11, 57 Encircle, 212 Enemy, 202 Engines, 206 English, 55 Environmental protection, 86 Ethnic groups, 50 Eurasian, 85 Europe, Evangelical groups, 47 Expansion, 19, 146 Expansionist, 212 Experts, 116 251 252  INDEX Extortion, 46 Eyadema, d’Armee Gnassingbe, 58 F Facebook, 182 Falldin, Thorbjorn, 58 FDI, 20 Feng Weijiang, 93 Fibre link, 15 Fifth column, 48 Fiji, 220 Financial, Financing, 79 Five principles of peaceful coexistence, Foreign aid, 19 investment, 20 policy, Foucault, Michel, 53 Framework, 37 Freedom, 207 Free internet, 46, 47 Free speech, 40, 46 Fudan University, 119 Fusion, 143 G G2, 214 G7, 195 Gadhafi, Moammar, 42 Gandhi, Indira, 175 Gansu song, 56 Gas, 86 Geelong Port, 14 Geopolitics, Germany, 95 Global, Global governance, Globalisation, Goat, 86 Gobi Desert, 56 Google, 46 Great global power, 9, 165 Guam, 207 Gulf, 176 Gwadar Port, 12 H Haidalla, Mohamed Khouna Ould, 57 Hainan radio, 88 Hambantota Port, 12 Happiness, 52 Harris, Jennifer, 196 He Yafei, 98 Hedge/hedging, 128, 215 Hegemony, 114 Himalayan, 82 Hinduism, 122 History/historical, 10, 56 Hostility, 124 Hu Jian, 84 Hu Shisheng, 146 Hua Guofeng, 57 Huawei, 21, 153 Human beings, Humanities, 49 Human rights, 174 Humiliation, 171 Hussain, Ejaz, 11 I Ideas, 87 Images, 114 Imperialism, 48 Imports, 151 Impoverished, 118 India, Indian Ocean, 79, 166 Indian Ocean Rim Association, 185  INDEX  Indian threat perception, 11 Indira Doctrine, 175 Indonesia, 20, 77 Indo-Pacific, Industry, 82 Information, 42 Infrastructure, 12 Institutions, Integration, 139 Intellectuals, 44 Intentions, 113 Interdependency, International Coffee Organization (ICO), 236 International system, Internet, 155 Invasion, 47 Investment, 81, 115 Iran, 57 Iranian, 57 Islamic Republic of Mauritania, 57 Italy, 195 Kolkata, 117 Kong De Ming, 88 Korea, 96 Kuanganov, Farkhad, 97 Kyauk Pyu Port, 21 J Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), Jaitley, Arun, 197 Japan, 58 Jealousy, 173 Ji Xianlin, 58 Jiang Yingchun, 43, 44 Jiangsu, 146 Jim Yong Kim, 81 L Label, 21 Labour, 157 Laws, 156 Lawyers, 82 Le Yichang, 140 Le Yucheng, 113 Leadership, 196 Lee Kuan Yew, 57 Legal system, 44 Legitimacy, Lhasa, 15 Li Daokui, 41 Li Keqiang, 116 Li Xiao, 151 Li Xuhui, 48 Liberation, 38 Link/linkages, 53, 117, 142 Liu Hongliang, 125 Liu Hongyang, 77 Liu Xiaobo, Liu Yanfeng, 213 Lodz, 82 Lowy Institute, 183 Loyang, 57 Luo Zhaohui, 113 K K2K, 117 Kashmir, Kathmandu, 17 Kazakhstan, 91 Kerala, 127 Kishida, Fumio, 218 M Made in China 2025, 149 Mahara, Krishna Bahadur, 14 Make in America, 214 Make in India, 149 Makerere University, 81 Malabar, 197 253 254  INDEX Malacca, 167, 209 Maldives, 21 Manipur, 117 Manufacturing, 115 Mao, 56 Mao Keji, 211 Maoist, 40 Maritime Silk Road, 56, 58 Market, 219 Marshall Plan, 19 Marxist, Mattis, Jim, 198 Meaning, 10 Media, Mentality, 209 Miao Lu, 98 Middle East, 42 Militarisation, Military, 41 Missionary, 48 Mistrust, 79 Modi, Narendra, Moghaddam, 57 Mongolia, 90, 213 Monroe Doctrine, 175 Monroe, Kristen Renwick, Mukherjee, Pranab, 174 Muldoon, Robert D., 57 Multilateral trading system, Mumbai, 118 Muslim, 219 Myanmar, 14, 21 N Narrative, 3, 52 National conditions, 50 Nationalism, 151 Naval/navy, 58, 197 Nawangwe, Barnabas, 81 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 151, 169 Neighbourhood, 219 Neo-colonisation, 48 Nepal, 13 Nepal Armed Police Force Academy, 17 Netherlands, 168 Netizens, 46 New Era, 97 Newspapers, 128, 183 New York Times, 184 New Zealand, 57 NGO, 18 Nigeria, 156 1962 war, 2, 118 Nobel Peace Prize, Nonparticipation, 63 North African, 42 Northeast, 155 Nuclear deterrent, 41, 42 Nuclear power, 205 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), 204 Nur Otan, 97 Nye, Joseph, 81 Nyerere, Julius K., 57–58 O Objective broadcasting, 62 Offensive, 41, 235 Offensive realist, 212 Oil, 86 One Belt One Road (OBOR), Opportunities, 152 Order, 45 Organisations, 90 P Pacific, 199 Pakistan, Panikkar, K. M., 169 Patterson, Molly, Peace, 2, 79  INDEX  Pentagon, 201 People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 17 Perceptions, 38, 144 Persian, 57 Perspective, 84 Plunder, 46 Poland, 82 Poor, 118 Poverty, 172 Power, 38, 46 Powerchina Company, 18 Press, 195 Pride, 51, 170 Prime minister, 174 Products, 122 Profit, 80 Project Mausam, 126 Projects, 12 Propaganda, 18, 46 Prosperity, 45 Protectionism, 83 Psychological, 62 Public good, 115 Public opinion, 183 Putin, 42 Q Qian Feng, 127 Quadrilateral, 198 R Racism, 47 The railway, 18 Rakhine, 21 Realism, 215 Rebalancing, 199 Red Tape, 155 Refugees, 16 Regional, 205 Rejuvenation, 52 Religious, 44 Ren Yuanzhe, 211 Republic, 207 Republican period, 48 Re-Sinicise, 48 Resources, 60, 85 Responsible, 41 Rhetorical, 211 Rich, 45, 46 Rivalry, 127 Romanian, 57 Routes, 79, 122 Russia Today (RT), 43 S Sagarmala, 128 Scholars, 22 Secretary, 88 Security threat, Shanghai, 53 Shenhav, Shaul R., Shenzhen, 97 Shi Benxing, 95 Shuping Yang, 40 Silk Road, 37 Silver bullet, 235 Singapore, 126 Singh, Manmohan, 167 Sinicise, Sinification, 49 Skills, 63 Small, 91 Socialism, 38 Socialist democracy, 44 Social media, 46 Social sciences, 49 Software, 152 South Asian, 4, 9, 119 South China Sea, 205 Southeast Asia, 96, 167 South Pacific Island states, 220 255 256  INDEX Sovereignty, 4, 124 Soviet Union, 5, Spain, 168 Speech, and law-based society, 46 Spice, 126 Sri Lanka, 12 Stability, 45 State Council, 80 Stivers, Jonathan, 198 Story, Strategic thinkers, 166 Strategists, 216 Strategy/strategic, 3, 79 String of pearls, 211 Submarine, 166 Subsidies, 149 Subversion, 43 Superiority, 209 Superpower, 5, 172 Survival, Swing state, 176 T Tai chi, 122 Taiwan, 125 Tamakoshi Hydroelectric Project, 18 Taoism, 96 Tech/technology, 6, 217 Territorial integrity, Terrorism, Terrorist, Thailand, 57 Theory, 37, 41 Think tanks, 90 Threat, Tibet, 14 Tillerson, Rex, 198 Tinsulanonda, General Prem, 57 Traditional culture, 37 Traditions, 49 Transparency, 84 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 205 Tributary, 80 Trump, Donald, Trust, 124 Turkey, 95, 176 Twitter, 182 U Uganda, 81 Ukraine, 42 Unequal treaties, 48 Unilateral, 99 United Nations (UN), 2, 99 University of Maryland, 40 V Vacuum, 37 Vague, 113 Verdet, Ilie, 57 Victim, 180 Vietnam, 95 Vigilant, 184 Vulnerabilities, 217 W Wang Jun, 15 Wang Tao, 206 Wang Yi, 16 War, 42 Warfare, 42 Weibo, 53 West, West Bengal, 117 Western Han dynasty, 56 Westernisation, 49 Western media, Western narrative,  INDEX  West Seti Hydropower project, 17 Wild, 126 Win-win situation, World Bank (WB), 81 Worldview, 41 Wu Zhaoli, 201 Wuhan, Yang Siling, 212 Ye Hailin, 187 Yoga, 122 Young generation, 49 Yu Hong, 18 Yubaraj Khatiwada, 17 Yunnan, 14, 54 X Xi Jinping, Xiao Jian, 44–45 Xiao Xian, 125 Xihua Normal University, 120 Xing-Chun Long, 120 Xinhua, Xinjiang, 14, 48, 54 Xuanzang, 96 Xue Cheng, 97 Z Zhang Jiadong, 119 Zhang Qian, 56 Zhang Wei, 38 Zhangmu border point, 15 Zhao Gancheng, 147 Zhao Ke-Jin, 93 Zheng He, 54 Zhong Shan, 14 Zhu Danpeng, 236 Zhu Jidong, 52 Zhu Zuyi, 58 Zia-ul-Haq, Mohammed, 57 ZTE, 154 Y Yan Kefei, 48 257 ... 2 The Road to the Belt and the Road  37 3 The BRI and Its Different Manifestations 77 4 India May Join and Benefit from the BRI: A Chinese View113 5 The BRI and the Good, Not So Good and. .. of PhD thesis and Master’s thesis was written about Belt and Road initiative The trick was that attach the BRI to the title of the thesis or frame the thesis in such a way to include the BRI...China’s Achilles Heel Srikanth Thaliyakkattil China’s Achilles Heel The Belt and Road Initiative and Its Indian Discontents Srikanth Thaliyakkattil Independent