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Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places NATIONAL AND E THNIC CONFLIC T IN THE T WENT Y- FIR ST CENTURY Brendan O’Leary, Series Editor Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places Edited by Joanne McEvoy and Brendan O’Leary U N I V E R S I T Y O F P E N N S Y LVA N I A P R E S S PHIL ADELPHIA Copyright © 2013 University of Pennsylvania Press All rights reserved Except for brief quotations used for purposes of review or scholarly citation, none of this book may be reproduced in any form by any means without written permission from the publisher Published by University of Pennsylvania Press Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104-4112 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper 10 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Power sharing in deeply divided places / edited by Joanne McEvoy and Brendan O’Leary — 1st ed p cm — (National and ethnic conflict in the twenty-first century) Includes bibliographical references and index ISBN 978-0-8122-4501-1 (hardcover : alk paper) Ethnic groups—Political activity activity Minorities—Political Representative government and representation Ethnic conflict—Political aspects Cultural pluralism—Political aspects I McEvoy, Joanne II O'Leary, Brendan JF1061.P68 2013 320.90089—dc23 2012041497 Hodgson CON TEN T S Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places: An Advocate’s Introduction Brendan O’Leary PART I POWER SHARING AND ELECTORAL SYSTEMS Electoral Rules and Ethnic Representation and Accommodation: Combining Social Choice and Electoral System Perspectives Bernard Grofman 67 The Track Record of Centripetalism in Deeply Divided Places Allison McCulloch 94 Electoral Engineering for a Stalled Federation Kris Deschouwer and Philippe Van Parijs 112 PART II HISTORICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FORAYS INTO POWER SHARING A Theory of Accommodation Versus Conflict: With Special Reference to the Israel-Palestine Conflict Ronald Wintrobe 135 The Success of Religion as a Source for Compromise in Divided Empires: Ottoman and Safavid, Past and Present Benjamin Braude 176 vi Contents Geopolitics and the Long-Term Construction of Democracy Randall Collins 198 Courts, Constitutions, and the Limits of Majoritarianism Samuel Issacharoff 214 PART III CONTEMPORARY POWERSHARING QUESTIONS A Revised Theory of Federacy and a Case Study of Civil War Termination in Aceh, Indonesia Alfred Stepan 231 10 We Forbid! The Mutual Veto and Power-Sharing Democracy Joanne McEvoy 253 11 Northern Ireland: Power Sharing, Contact, Identity, and Leadership Ed Cairns 278 12 Public Opinion and Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places Colin Irwin 295 13 The Balkans: The Promotion of Power Sharing by Outsiders Florian Bieber 312 14 Governing Polarized Cities Scott A Bollens 327 15 Power Sharing in Kirkuk: The Need for Compromise Liam Anderson 364 16 Power Sharing: An Advocate’s Conclusion Brendan O’Leary List of Contributors Index Acknowledgments 386 423 425 437 CHAPTER Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places: An Advocate’s Introduction Brendan O’Leary The Mafia makes offers that cannot be refused In one peace process a politician was once accused of making offers that no one could understand (O’Leary 1990) Do these statements explain the difference between power and power sharing? Is power coercive capacity, whereas power sharing is incomprehensible? Power sharing is not incomprehensible, but it is frequently misunderstood To aid comprehension a comparison is useful In standard English, power is the ability to act, to be able to produce an intended effect (Russell 1992 [1938]) The powerless lack the capacity to things they might want to The powerful are in the opposite situation Power sharing, therefore, suggests spreading access to the capacity to get things done Power is also a synonym for authority, jurisdiction, control, command, sway, or dominion, as well as the capacity to persuade, induce, constrain, oblige, or force It follows that power sharing minimally means widening the access of persons or groups to the same domains or attributes In standard usage power is also “a possession,” “held” by those with authority or influence over others, especially public officials, governments, officers, managements, or establishments who constitute what Paul’s Letter to the Romans described as “the powers that be.” Power sharing, therefore, broadens membership of “the powers that be.” It also requires that the included parties have access to key and observable “decision making.” There must be no important “non–decision making” taking place off stage, that is, no hidden possessors of power who Brendan O’Leary control the agenda or exclude some issues from being addressed. There must instead be an open and negotiable public agenda among the powersharers, or at least among their leaders Any suppression of (controversial) issues must be mutually agreed upon among those who share power Theorists contrast “power to” and “power over” (see Morris 2002; Parsons 1969). “Power to” is ability, “power over” is domination The contrast resembles that between “positive-sum” and “zero-sum” relationships “Positive-sum” power is joint, collaborative, or cooperative All gain from its exercise, even if the benefits are not the same for all “Zero-sum power,” by contrast, describes a distinct antagonism: if power could be measured, then A’s gain and B’s loss would sum to zero Positive-sum and zero-sum conceptions not exhaust the logical possibilities of power relations The exercise of power may generate net losses (a “negative sum”) or the mutual ruin of the contending parties It may create winners and losers; there may be disparities in benefits among the winners as well as in losses among the losers; and only one party may gain, while the others experience no net losses. Power sharing, for its proponents, is defended as “power to.” It enhances collective capacity; it is “positive sum.” Those who share will gain from a constructive way of making public decisions, from which all stand to gain, notably through the preservation of order and peace Critics, by contrast, suggest that power sharing shapes public life at the expense of other and better kinds of politics— more competitive, individualist, or harmonious The opposite of power sharing is power’s monopolization by a person, faction, group, organization, or party On inspection, it is usually true that the chief power-holder has to delegate some power to organize and maintain the monopoly But to delegate power is not to share it The principal who delegates requires the delegated agent to perform specified tasks and may withdraw the mandate Monopolies of power exist, at least formally, in tyrannies, despotisms, military autocracies, monarchies, lordships, papacies, theocracies, and oneparty dictatorships They also exist, however, in democracies, a more unsettling idea To say that democracy may coexist with monopolistic domination requires no commitment to theories suggesting that behind the faỗade of electoral competition lies the power of a ruling class or a power elite (see, e.g., Miliband 1980 [1969]; Domhoff 1990; Mills 1956) For example, no matter how competitive or free elections may be, critical political power can be monopolized between elections by the incumbent president, prime minister, cabinet, and nominated judges associated with the dominant party, Introduction ethos, or ideology Even a temporary domination (between elections) is nevertheless domination, and the opportunities for elected leaders to dominate their societies against widespread or deeply held public preferences are significant (see, e.g., Nordlinger 1981, 92–94, 111–12, 130–32) That democracy might lead to domination was the theme of the “tyranny of the majority,” which deeply concerned eighteenth-century republicans, such as James Madison, and nineteenth-century liberals, such as Alexis de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill They were mostly preoccupied, however, with the impact of that possible tyranny on the individual’s property and liberty (including the individual’s religious beliefs) rather than on national, ethnic, or linguistic minorities as such (Madison, Hamilton, and Jay 1987 [1788]; Mill 1997, 5– 6, 81–82, 192–94; de Tocqueville 1988 [1835, 1840], vol 1., chap 7, esp 250ff ) Democracy is, however, also straightforwardly compatible with the (temporary) tyranny of a minority, especially democracies with institutions that encourage the “winner” to take all For example, an ideological faction, not supported by a majority of voters in a country, may nevertheless control a cabinet, which in turn controls a party, and which in turn controls a legislature In consequence, law or public policy may be dictated in the interests of the faction as long as its control is maintained. Defining Power Sharing, Deeply Divided Places, and Well-Ordered States These considerations suggest the following broad definition of power sharing: Any set of arrangements that prevent one agent, or organized collective agency, from being the “winner who holds all critical power,” whether temporarily or permanently This suggestion explains why the synonyms of power sharing usually include the following generally positive connotations: “coalition” or “cooperative” government and “consensual” and “inclusive” decision making Critics of power sharing just as powerfully insist upon negative connotations They refer to power-sharing arrangements as “rudderless” or “leaderless,” and they complain of “stalemated,” “deadlocked,” or “blocked” decision making The general definition of power sharing just suggested is broad if not vague It does not, for example, specify how power is shared among the parties It is capacious enough to include arrangements such as the Roman Republic’s executive, based on the annual election of two consuls, and its tribunes, who 428 Index Kilgour, M 16: 409, 417 Kimi, I 14: 361 King, C 14: 362 Kingsbury, D 9: 242, 252 Klein, O 11: 287, 292 Knaus, G 1: 55, 58; 13: 315, 326; 16: 415, 418 Knox, C 14: 362 Koelbe, T 1: 54; 16: 416, 418 Koetzle, W 2: 91 Komšić, Z 10: 253, 263 Kritovoulos of Imbros 6: 196 Kritz, N 14: 355, 362 Kuper, A 1: 52, 57 Kurrilld-Klitgard, P 2: 80, 92 Laakso, M 2: 92 Laitin, D 5: 156, 169, 174 Lajčák M 10: 264, 266 Lakeman, E 2: 80, 92 Lal, B 3: 103, 104, 110 Lapan, H 5: 175 Lapidoth, R 16: 406, 418 Laraki, R 2: 71–72, 90; 16: 416 Lawson, S 3: 103, 110 Leal, K 6: 179, 196 Lemarchand, R 16: 415 Levine, R 5: 169, 174 Levitt, J 16: 415, 418 Lewis, B 6: 180, 196 Liddle, R W 9: 241, 252 Lijphart: A 1: 22, 25, 26, 36, 40, 42, 43, 54, 58; M 2: 68, 83, 92; 4: 121, 131; 8: 215, 217, 220, 227; 10: 254, 257, 259, 272, 276; 14: 330, 362; 15: 372–73; 16: 387, 408, 412, 415, 418 Lindner, R 6: 179, 195, 196 Lintott, A 10: 256, 276 Linz, J 2: 87, 92; 9: 232, 240, 250 nn.1–2, 252; 10: 256, 276 Livingstone, A 11: 287, 289–90, 292 Lordos, A 12: 309, 311 Loughlin, J 14: 340, 341, 362 Lublin, D 2: 91 Lukowski, J 10: 256, 276 Lust-Okar, E 5: 169, 174 Lustick, I 1: 15, 59, 61; 14: 362; 16: 411, 414, 418, 419 Luttwak, E 16: 412, 419 Lyne, T 1: 62, 2: 93 Mabry, T 1: 59 MacBride, D 14: 341, 362 MacCulloch, D 1: 52, 59 Madison, J 1: 3, 59 Majone, G 1: 59; 16: 414, 419 Makiya, K 1: 23, 59 Maloney, G 2: 93 Mandela, N 5: 169; 14: 335 Mankad, A 11: 292 Manning, C 3: 96, 98, 110 Marshall, G 9: 249, 252 Marshall, J 1: 62; 2: 93 Martin, F 1: 55, 59; 13: 315; 16: 415, 417 Martin, R 11: 292 Mattes, M 1: 43– 44; 16: 410, 419 Maximilian I 7: 209 Mazor, A 14: 362 McAllister, I 11: 285–86, 292 McCourt, D 11: 279, 292 McCrudden, C 1: 59; 16: 398, 419 McCulloch, A 1: 22, 45– 46; 3: 94–111; 16: 387 McDonald, M 2: 91 McEvoy, J 1: 48; 10: 253–77; 16: 413 McGann, A 16: 414, 419 McGarry, J 1: 9, 15, 19, 25, 29, 32, 33, 53, 54, 59, 61, 62; 3: 107, 108, 110; 8: 217, 227; 10: 259, 261, 268, 276, 292; 11: 278, 290; 14: 330, 362; 16: 404, 413, 414, 419, 420 McGuinness, M 10: 269; 11: 279, 282, 286 McLoughlin-Volpe, T 11: 294 Mehler, A 16: 415, 421 Mehmed II 6: 180 Merrifield, A 14: 362 Merrill, S 2: 75, 92; 16: 407, 419 Metzger, B 1: 61; 16: 420 Mier, J 14: 347, 362 Miliband, R 1: 2, 60 Mill, J S 1: 3, 60 Millar, F 1: 51, 52, 60 Miller, J D 12: 305, 301 Miller, N 11: 284, 291 Miller, N R 15: 370, 384 Mills, C W 1: 2, 60 Min, B 16: 409, 421 Mishler, S 3: 99, 111 Mitchell, G 12: 301 Mitchell, P 1: 27, 34, 60; 2: 90, 92; 5: 174; 16: 407, 419 Index Mladić, R 10: 253–54 Montesquieu, C 1: 52, 60; 7: 202; 8: 221 Moore, M 1: 59 Morfit, M 9: 243, 252 Moro, A 5: 147 Morris, P 1: 2, 60 Moyersoen, J 14: 334, 363 Mozaffar, S 2: 93 Mueller, D 5: 174 Mujani, S 9: 241, 252 Murphy, A 4: 114, 131 Nagel, J 1: 37, 51, 60; 16: 389, 419 Narsey, W 3: 104, 111 Nelson, G 11: 291 Nessen, W 9: 251 n.5, 252 Netanyahu, B 5: 157 Niens, U 11: 287, 292 Nobbs, K 1: 59; 16: 406; 16: 420 Noel, S 1: 61; 16: 420 Noiriel, G 1: 53, 57 Nordlinger, E 1: 3, 60; 14: 330, 362; 16: 411, 415, 419 Norris, P 1: 42– 43, 60; 11: 278, 293; 16: 410, 412, 420 Nurdin, Dr 9: 248 Oakes, P J 11: 294 Obama, B 1: 23; 5: 157 O’Leary, B 1: 1– 66; 2: 90, 92, 93; 3: 107, 108, 111; 5: 172, 174; 8: 217, 227; 10: 259, 261, 268, 274, 276, 292; 11: 278, 290; 14: 330, 362; 15: 376–77, 385; 16: 386– 422 Olugbemi, S 15: 375, 385 Olver, C 14: 362 Onorato, R S 11: 281, 294 Opp, K-D 5: 144, 174 Ordeshook, P 2: 87 Oz, A 5: 156, 174 Paisley, I 11: 283, 286 Palley, C 14: 362 Palmer, B 9: 241, 251 Paolini, S 11: 284, 293 Pape, R 5: 147, 174 Pareti, S 3: 104, 111 Parnell, S 14: 362 Parsons, T 1: 2, 62 Peiris, P 3: 99, 111 Persson, T 10: 256, 276 429 Pettigrew, T F 11: 278, 284, 290, 293 Pildes, R 8: 214, 227 Pinder, C 11: 292 Pirie, G 14: 362 Pishevari, J 6: 191 Plato 1: 51 Platow, M J 11: 285, 289 Plutarch 1: 51 Polybius 1: 51, 62 Portes, A 1: 62 Post, J 5: 148, 175 Powell, B 1: 55, 62; 2: 84, 93 Pringle, M 14: 343, 362 Purdy, M 10: 254, 276 Putnam, R 1: 52, 62 Qarase, L 3: 103 Rabin, Y 16: 170, 412 Rabushka, A 1: 54, 62; 16: 407, 409, 416, 420 Radmanović, N 10: 253–54, 263 Rajapaksa, M 3: 99, 100 Ramet, S 16: 415 Rasler, K 5: 144, 175 Read, J 16: 414, 420 Regenwetter, M 2: 75, 93 Reicher, S 11: 282, 283, 285, 287, 289, 292, 293, 294 Reid, A 9: 251, 252 Reid, G 14: 363 Reid, S A 11: 282, 287, 289, 292 Reilly, B 1: 22, 57, 62; 2: 79, 84, 88, 90, 93; 3: 100, 105, 106, 107, 108, 111 Reynolds, A 1: 22, 62; 2: 88, 90, 93; 3: 101, 107, 111; 16: 416, 418 Reynolds, K J 11: 280, 294 Rezvani, D 1: 47, 63, 403, 420; 9: 240, 252 Richardson, D 2: 89, 93 Ricolfi, L 5: 147, 151, 175 Robertson, M 14: 360 Roeder, P 1: 10, 63; 13: 326; 14: 356, 363; 16: 412, 420, 421 Roland, G 10: 256, 276 Ropp, S A 11: 294 Rose, R 11: 279, 293 Ross, D 14: 351, 363 Rossos, A 6: 189, 197 Rothchild, D 1: 10; 13: 326; 14: 356, 363; 16: 412 430 Rousseau, J-J 1: 14 Rowthorn, B 1: 62 Royle, A 14: 343, 362 Ruehl, W 5: 144, 174 Rumbaut, R 1: 62 Rummel, R 1: 7, 15, 63 Russell, B 1: 63 Rust, M 11: 291 Rustow, D 9: 242, 252 Ruthven, M 5: 148, 175 Saari, D 2: 75, 89, 93 Saddam Hussein 5: 156–57; 14: 354–55; 15: 366 al-Sadr, M 5: 156 Saey, P 14: 334, 361 Sager, L 8: 218, 227 Salah, R 5: 160 Salamey, I 14: 363 Salih, K 1: 54, 61, 62 Salmon, P 1: 62 Samuels, D 10: 256, 276 Sandler, T 5: 175 Šarović, M 3: 97 al-Sarraf, S 14: 355, 362 Saunders, J 1: 63 Saura, J 14: 347, 363 Savun, B 1: 43– 44; 16: 410, 418 Schneckener, U 10: 257–58, 276; 11: 282, 293; 16: 389, 402, 421 Schulze, K 9: 251, 252 Schumpeter, J 1: 53, 63 Schwartz, A 16: 414, 421 Sebastián, S 10: 263, 276; 13: 326 Shalah, A 5: 160 Shapiro, I 5: 169, 174; 16: 410, 416, 417, 418 Shariatmadari, K 6: 191 Sharon, A 5: 162 Shepsle, K 1: 54, 62; 16: 407–9, 416, 420 Shevetsova, O 2: 87, 90 Shirlow, P 11: 288, 293 Shugart, M 2: 93; 16: 388, 421 Shuttleworth, I 11: 287, 292 Silajdžić, H 10: 253–54, 263, 265 Simeon, R 3: 108, 111; 10: 259, 261, 268 Sisk, T 3: 96, 111; 11: 278, 293; 14: 335, 363; 15: 370, 385; 16: 416, 421 Skiotis, D 6: 187 Slater, P E 11: 279 Index Smith, A 2: 89, 93 Smith, M 14: 363 Smooha, S 14: 363 Soberg, M 2: 93 Spahiu, N 14: 363 Spears, I 16: 415, 421 Spears, R 11: 287, 292 Speight, G 3: 103 Stansfield, G 15: 366 Stefes, C 14: 335, 363 Steiner, J 1: 27, 63 Stepan, A 1: 29–30, 47; 9: 231–52; 16: 396, 403– 6, 421 Stockwell, R 2: 91; 3: 104, 111 Suara, J 14: 363 Sugden, R 2: 90, 93 Suharto (general) 9: 240– 41 Sukarnoputri, M 9: 249 Sunstein, C 8: 223, 227 Sussman, N 5: 173 Sutarto, E (general) 9: 241, 251 n.7 Svensson, A 11: 269 Sweeney, P 14: 340, 363 Swenden, W 4: 121, 131 Swyngeedouw, E 14: 334, 362, 363 Syme, R 1: 51, 63 Taagepeera, R 2: 82, 92; 16: 388, 421 Tabar, P 14: 363 Tabellini, G 10: 256, 276 Tajfel, H 11: 280–81, 293 Takaki, R 1: 24, 63 Tam, T 11: 292 Tarte, S 3: 103, 111 Tausch, N 11: 281, 285, 292, 293 Taylor, C 1: 63 Taylor, Paul 1: 26, 54, 63 Taylor, Peter 2: 89, 93 Taylor, R 1: 54, 63 Terhorst, P 14: 334, 363 Their, A 14: 355, 362 Thomas, H 1: 53, 63 Thucydides 1: 53 Tideman, N 2: 89, 93 Tihić, S 10: 265 Tilly, C 7: 205 Tocqueville, A de 1: 3, 56; 7: 202 Tredoux, C 11: 290, 291 Trew, K 11: 281, 285, 291, 294 Trimble, D 10: 254 Index Tropp, L R 11: 278, 293 Tudor, M 11: 291 Tufakji, K 14: 351, 363 Tull, D 16: 415, 421 Tully, J 1: 35, 63 Turner, J C 11: 280, 283, 293, 294 Twite, R 14: 351, 363 Valuenzela, A 2: 92 Van den Berghe, P 1: 53, 63 van de Ven, J 14: 334, 363 Van Parijs, P 1: 46, 4: 112–31; 16: 407 Voci, A 11: 292, 293 Von Hecker, U 11: 292 Wallerstein, I 7: 208 Walter, B 1: 43, 63; 16: 408, 421 Wattenberg, M 2: 93 Weber, M 1: 55, 64; 7: 203 Weeden, K 11: 292 Weller, M 1: 59, 61; 16: 406, 420, 421 Weingast, B 1: 53, 64 Wetherell, M S 11: 294 Wever, B de 4: 130 Wheatley, S 10: 259, 277 Whyte, J 11: 281, 294 Wickremesinghe, R 3: 99, 100 Williams, R 2: 89, 93 Wilsford, D 1: 54 Wilson, R 11: 291 Wimmer, A 1: 23, 64; 16: 409, 421 Wintrobe, R 1: 46, 56, 62, 64; 5: 135–75; 16: 406 Wittek, P 6: 179 Wolff, S 1: 62; 16: 406, 416, 420, 421 Woon, L 1: 53 Wright, J 16: 422 Wright, S C 11: 294 Yadav, Y 9: 232, 250 n.2, 252 Yataganas, X 10: 256 Yellen, J 5: 173 Yiftachel, O 16: 422 Young, H P 2: 74, 90, 93 Yudhoyono, S B 9: 242, 249 Yusuf, I 9: 247 Zahar, M J 10: 263, 277 Zartman, I W 9: 242, 252 Zolberg, A 1: 53, 64 431 Subject Index Aaland (Åland) Islands 1: 47; 9: 240, 243; 16: 400– 401, 403, 405 acceptability criterion 2: 74 accommodation 5: 157–70; 14: 329; accommodationist strategies 1: 19–30; 5: 165–70 See also power sharing Aceh 9: passim; 16: 403; Free Aceh Movement (GAM) 9: 241– 49 African Union (AU) 16: 402 Albanian National Liberation Army 13: 323 Albanians 12: 301, 303 Alliance Party of Northern Ireland; 10: 271; 12: 300 All Party Representative Committee 12: 308 al Qaeda 9: 240 alternative vote (AV) (majority-preferential vote or instant run-off ) 1: 16, 33, 37, 45– 46; 2: 68, 70, 75, 78, 79, 80; defi ned 70; 3: 94–111 passim; 15: 371–72, 374; 16: 387–88 Anglo-Irish Agreement 12: 298 Anthimos I 6: 182 antiplurality voting 2: 70, 76 approval voting 2: 70 (defi ned), 75 Arabization 15: 366 arbitration 16: 399– 403 Argentina 1: 30 assimilation 1: 11, 13, 50; 6: 178; acculturation 1: 15; assimilationist strategies 1: 15–16; and devshirme 14: 329; fusion 1: 16 Australia 1: 30 Austria/Austrians 1: 30; 7: 206 autonomy 3: 101; 6: 180; 9: passim; 13: 319–22; 12: 306; 16: 392 See also consociation; federacy; federation avoid the worst criterion 2: 74 Azeris, 30 Badinter majority 13: 318 Baghdad 14: 352–53; displacement, 14: 352; map of Iraq 14: 354; politically combustible, 352–53 Bali 9: 240 Balkans 1: 49; 6: 180–81; 8: 215; 12: 301–3; 16: 395, 399 Bangladesh 1: 43; 7: 212 Basques 1: 30; 9: 231, 240; 16: 405 432 Index Belfast 11: 288; 14: 339– 43; direct rule 14: 339; map 14: 340; responsibility sharing 14: 339– 43 Belfast Agreement 10: 254, 268– 69; 11: 283; 12: passim; 14: 339; aka Good Friday Agreement 1: 49; May 1998 referendum 12: 300, 308 Belfast Telegraph 12: 297 Belgium, 1: 26–27; 4: passim; 9: 231, 247; 16: 407; consociation in 4: 121–23; 8: 216; federal institutions 4: 118–21; linguistic & territorial divisions 4: 114–18; from unitary to federal state 4: 113 Belgrade Agreement 13: 314 Benin 1: 43 Bhutan 9: 239, 251 n.4 bicameralism 8: 221 Borda, J-C./Borda rule, 2: 68; defi ned 2: 70, 75 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1: 27, 34, 48; 3: 95, 97; 8: 219; 10: passim; 12: passim; 13: passim; 14: 343; 16: 397–98, 400, 415; Constitutional Court 13: 315, 317; constitutional reform 12: 302–3; 13: 316; House of Peoples 10: 260, 264– 65, 267; House of Representatives 10: 262, 264– 65, 267; Republika Srpska 10: 262, 267; 12: 301, 308 Bosniaks See Bosnia and Herzegovina British state See United Kingdom Brussels 4: 114, 117, 118, 120–21, 130; 14: 327, 328, 332–34; communities 4: 118; evolution of institutions 4: 115 (fig 4.1), 118 ff; 14: 333 Burundi 1: 40; 16: 392, 408 Byzantine empire 6: 179; 7: 204 Canada/Canadians 1: 39, 40; 2: 82, 88; 5: 155, 165, 167– 68; 7: 210; 8: 216; 9: 231, 247; 16: 392 Catalonia 1: 36; 9: 231, 240; 16: 405 Catholic 12: 296–97, 299–300 Centre for Democracy and Reconciliation in South East Europe (CDRSEE) 12: 301, 310 centripetalism 1: 12, 19–24, 30–31, 33, 37, 45– 46; 3: passim; 16: 387–88 Chechnya 5: 147 China 7: 202; 9: 239; 12: 309 Christ, O 11: 293 citizenship 9: 235–36 civil society 1: 5– competition for power 1: 12–14 conciliar/conciliar movement 7: 199–200, 210 concurrent majority (rule[s]): qualified majority voting 4: 120; 16: 390 ff; supermajoritarianism 8: 221 condominium 1: 52 Condorcet criterion 2: 74 and passim; Condorcet efficiency 2: 74; Condorcet extension method 2: 74; Condorcet loser criterion 2: 76; Condorcet winner 2: 74 confederal state/confederation 9: 238– 40; 12: 307 consociation/consociationalism 1: 4, 14, 19, 25–28, 31, 33, 37, 38, 47; 2: 68; 8: 214–19; and courts: 8: 218–26; 10: 257; 13: 316–17; 14: 330; 16: 396–99; authoritarian consociation 1: 27; in Belgium 4: passim; 8: 216; corporate consociation 1: 27, 10: 259, 268; democratic consociation 1: 27; liberal consociation 1: 27; 10: 259, 268; under the Ottomans 6: 180 constitutionalism 1: 8–14; 8: 218 ff; certification 8: 219–24; constitutional reform 12: 302; proposals/agreements 12: passim contact hypothesis 1: 48; 11: passim control, hegemonic 14: 330 Coombes rule 2: 68; defi ned 2: 70, 76, 78 Corsica/Corsicans 1: 40 Cote d’Ivoire 16: 403 Council of Europe 10: 266 courts 8: passim; 16: 396–98 Croats 5: 155; 8: 219; 12: 301; 16: 397 cross-border institutions 1: 30 See also North-South institutions culture(s) 1: Cyprus 1: 27, 30, 47; 8: 216, 218; 10: 273; 16: 392, 400, 416; Annan Plan 10: 273 Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) 12: 310 Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) 8: 219; 10: 260, 263, 274 n.5; 12: 301, 308; 13: 314, 322; 14: 345; 16: 397, 400, 415 decentralization 9: 236; 13: 319–20 See also devolution deeply divided places 1: 5– 6; 16: 406–7 democracy 7: passim Index Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA) 13: 318 democratic transitions 14: 357 Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) 13: 318 Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 10: 254, 269–71, 275; 12: 297 Denmark 1: 29; 9: 250 n.3 devolution 9: 236; 12: 305–7 D’Hondt method 1: 28; 2: 73, 81; 10: 268 direct rule 12: 298 dispute resolution procedures 9: 236 Droop quota 2: 73, 80 Dutch Republic See Netherlands Duverger’s Law 2: 82 East Timor 9: 240 electoral engineering 4: passim; and pre-electoral incentives 4: 124 ff Estonia 2: 88 Euro 16: 395 European Commission for Democracy Th rough Law (Venice Commission) 10: 264; 13: 315 European Court of Human Rights 16: 397–98, 399 European Union (EU) 9: 247; 12: 301, 302, 308; 13: 314; and consociation 1: 26; and Copenhagen criteria 8: 214, 217; European Central Bank 16: 394; European College of Commissioners 10: 264; 16: 393; European Council 16: 393; European Council of Ministers 16: 393; European Court of Justice 16: 394; European Parliament 16: 393; and territorial pluralism 1: 33; 7: 198; 8: 214; 16: 392–95 evolution of local governance 14: 356 executive(s)/executive formation 4: 112 ff; executive power(s) 16: 389, 393 Faroe Islands 1: 29 federacy 1: 54; 9: passim; 16: 403– federalism 5: 167– 68; 8: 221; 9: passim; 14: 330 federation/federal state 2: 87; 7: 201, 208; 14: 343; 16: 403; in Belgium 4: passim; and cantonization 14: 330 See also territorial pluralism Fiji 1: 34; 2: 69; 3: 95, 102–5 433 Finland 1: 47; 16: 400, 403, 405 first place criterion 2: 74 Flanders 9: 231 floorwalking 8: 224–26 followers 5: 147–52 framing 5: 155–57 France 1: 53; 2: 71–72, 88; 7: 198, 200, 202, 204, 206; 16: 388; Th ird Republic 9: 232 Gagauz 1: 40 Galicia 16: 405 Geneva (Calvin’s) 1: 4, geopolitics and collegiality and power sharing; 7: passim Germany 1: 28; 7: 198, 202; 16: 393 ghazi state 6: 179 Gökalp, Z 6: 189 Good Friday Agreement 10: 254, 268– 69; 11: 283 See also Belfast Agreement Greece and the Macedonian question 6: 178, 188 Greenland 1: 29; 9: 240 Guyana 16: 407 Hausa-Fulani 15: 375 Helsinki 9: 243, 246, 248 Hutus 5: 156; 16: 392 immigration 9: 235 independence 12: passim index of the effective number of parties (Laakso-Taagepeera) 2: 82 India 1: 29, 34, 43; 2: 82; 7: 198, 212; 8: 216, 226; 9: 231, 239, 247; 12: 309; 16: 403, 404; Mizoram 9: 250 n.2 Indian-administered Kashmir (IaK) 12: 303–8; 16: 405 integration/integrationists 1: 11, 12, 13, 31–32, 35, 37, 50–51; appropriateness 1: 39– 40; strategies 1: 16–18 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) 12: 303 Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRODPMNE) 13: 318 International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 10: 253, 263 international law 8: 222; 9: 237 Iran 1: 47; 5: passim; and Azeri question 6: 178, 190–91; and Kurds 6: 192 434 Index Iraq 1: 47, 53; 7: 198; 212–13; 11: 279; 16: 400 Ireland, Irish state, Irish Republic 1: 30; 2: 88; 12: 298–99 Irish Republican Army (IRA) 11: 270–71 Islam 9: 240– 41 Israel 1: 46; 5: passim; building the wall inside and around the West Bank, 5: 160– 65; withdrawal from Gaza 5: 160– 65; 12: 301; 16: 414 Italy 2: 88; 7: 204–5, 208 Jakarta 9: 240, 245 Jammu 12: 306 Japan 2: 88; 7: 198; 9: 232 Jerusalem 5: 156; 14: 347–52, 349 (fig 14.5); hegemonic control 14: 347–52; politically combustible 14: 347–52 Johannesburg apartheid geography 14: 335–38, 335 (fig 14.2); transitional power sharing 14: 335–38 joint authority 12: 298–99 Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust (JRCT) 12: 310 judicial review 8: 222 Kashmir 1: 48; 5: 147; 9: 231; 12: 295, 303, 305– 6, 309–10 Kenworthy, J 11: 291, 292, 293 Kenya 1: 13; 16: 402 Kirkuk 1: 49; 14: 353–55; 15: passim; Article 58 of the TAL and 15: 382 n.7; Article 140 and 15: 367– 68, 377–78, 381; and consociation 15: 372–73; future governance 15: 369–70; and integrationism 15: 370–72; in map of Iraq 14: 354; oil 15: 368– 69; politically combustible 14: 354; power sharing in 15: 376–78; sixty-forty problem 15: 364– 65, 373–76; struggle for Kirkuk 15: 365– 68 Korea, South 1: 43 Kosovo 5: 169; 12: passim; 13: passim; Serb List for Kosovo 13: 324 Kurdistan/Kurds 1: 30, 36, 40, 54; 5: 147; 156; 6: 178; 189–90, 194; and Iraq, 6: 190; 15: passim See also Kirkuk Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) 15: 366 Kuwait 5: 157 Kyrgyzstan/Kyrgyz 1: 53 leaders/leadership 5: 137 ff; 11: passim Lebanon 1: 27, 34, 47; 5: 147; 8: 216, 218; 16: 399, 407 Macedonia 6: 188–89; 12: 301 ff; 13: passim; EU Special Representative 13: 315 Madagascar 16: 402 Magyars 1: 30 Mauritius 16: 407 median voter argument questioned 2: 83 méthode majoritaire 2: 68; defi ned 71, 75 metropolitanism 14: 357 Mitrovica 14: 360 n.16 Moldova 1: 40 Montreal 14: 359 n.14 Mostar 14: 359 n.15 multiculturalism 1: 19, 24–28, 31 Namibia 8: 226 Netherlands 1: 26; Dutch Republic 7: 207–8 New Zealand 1: 39; 2: 88; 8: 226 Nicosia 14: 359 n.15 Nigeria 1: 22, 23, 40; 15: 375; Nigerian People’s Congress 15: 375; 16: 407 nonmajoritarian institutions 16: 394, 397, 402 North Atlantic Treaty Orga nization (NATO) 12: 302, 308; 13: 314–15; 16: 400 Northern Ireland 1: 13, 27–30, 38, 40, 48, 54; 3: 107; 5: 155, 165, 169; 8: 216; 10: passim; 11: passim; 12: 295–300; 16: 399, 405, 407, 414, 416; Assembly 10: 260, 268; Bill of Rights 12: 299; Council of the Isles (officially British-Irish Council) 12: 299; North-South institutions 12: 298; public opinion 12: 295–300 Northern Marianas Islands 9: 240 Norway 9: 232 Office of the High Representative 10: 273; 13: 315–16 Ohrid Framework Agreement 12: 301; 13: 314–15 Orga nization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 3: 97; 13: 315; 16: 402 Ottoman empire 1: 4; 5: passim package 12: 297 Pakistan 7: 198, 212; 12: 305– 6, 309 Palestine/Palestinians 1: 46; 5: passim; 12: 302 Index Papua New Guinea 1: 34; 3: 108; 16: 413 parity 4: 120–21; 16: 390–96 Pavia group 4: 124, 129–30 Peace Implementation Council 13: 316 peace polls 12: passim “people,” the/multi-people 12: 295; 16: 390 plurality rule (aka winner-takes-all, “relative” majority voting but wrongly known as “first past the posts”) 2: 68; comparing PR and plurality 2: 80–84; defi ned 2: 72; plurality bloc voting 2: 73, 78 Poland 7: 206 polarized cities 14: 328 Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth 10: 256 Portugal 9: 232 Povratak (“Return”) 13: 323 power 1: 1–2 power sharing: accommodationist strategies 1: 19–30; appropriateness 1: 40– 41; and collegial power 7: 199 ff; competition for power 1: 12–14; contributions in this book 1: 45–50; defi ned 1: 1–5; defi nitional issues 16: 387–88; and electoral systems 2: 67–93; 3: 94–111; 4: 112–31; among ethnic groups 5: 155–70; and geopolitics, 7: passim; goal and instruments 1: 4; and normative debate 16: 411–12; and opposition 1: 37–38; 12: 309–10; pseudo power sharing 16: 402–3; and rational choice 5: passim; 16: 406–9; testing and empirical research on 1: 40– 45; 16: 410–11; urban approaches 14: 329–32 predetermination 10: 259, 268 preferences, single-peaked 2: 67, 76–79 Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) 12: 300 proportionality and proportional representation (PR) 1: 27, 33, 37; 2: 68, 73; in Belgium 4: 120–21, 123–29; 5: 167; 16: 387–89, 390–96; comparing PR and plurality 2: 80–84; comparing list PR and STV 2: 84–85; list PR 1: 27; 2: 73; mimicking list PR with plurality and STV with AV 2: 85–86; STV PR 1: 27; 2: 73 Prussia 7: 206 public opinion 12: passim Puerto Rico 9: 239 Quebec/Quebecois 1: 28, 36, 40; 9: 231; 16: 392 435 rational choice/social choice 2: 68 ff; 5: passim; 16: 406–9 recognition 1: 24 Republika Srpska (RS)/Serb Republic 3: 95, 96–98; 12: 301 ff; 14: 343 Roman Empire of the German Nation (Holy) 7: 199, 206–10 Romania (Rumania) 1: 30; 6: 179–80 Rome 10: 256 Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) 12: 299 Russia 7: 198, 205, 212; 12: 308; and Azeris 6: 193 Rwanda 16: 407 Safavid empire 1: 4; 5: passim Sarajevo 14: 343– 47; Dayton accords 14: 344, 346 (fig 14.4); politically fragile “reunification” 14: 343– 47 Saudi Arabia 5: 147 scoring rules 2: 75 Scotland/Scots 1: 29, 36 self-categorization theory 11: 281–84, 287 self-determination 9: 231, 236–37; 10: 259, 268 segregation 11: 284, 287 separation of powers 1: 10–12; 8: 221 Serbia/Serbs/Bosnian Serbs 1: 30; 3: 97–98; 5: 155; 8: 219; 10: 254; 13: 323; 12: passim; 16: 397; Serbia and Montenegro 13: passim Sierra Leone 8: 218 Singapore 1: 43 single-seat and multiseat methods of voting 2: 80 ff single transferrable vote (STV)(Hare or Hare-Clarke system) See proportional representation Sinhalese/Sinhala 3: 99–102; 12: 303–8; 16: 392 Sinn Féin 10: 268– 69, 271 sixty-forty problem 15: 364– 65, 373–76 Slovakia/Slovaks 1: 30 Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) of Northern Ireland 10: 254, 269; 12: 300 social identity approach 11: 280–84 social psychology 11: passim solidarity multiplier 5: 150 South Africa 1: 47; 2: 88; 5: 165, 169; 8: 218, 219–26; 16: 388, 408 sovereignty 9: 236–37 436 Index Soviet Union (USSR) 1: 54; 7: 203 Spain 1: 29; 9: 231, 247; 16: 403, 405 spoilers 13: 324 Sri Lanka 1: 13, 34, 49; 3: 95, 98–102; 7: 212; Sri Lanka 9: 242; 12: 295, 307–9; 16: 392, 407, 413 St Andrews Agreement 10: 268, 270–72 state/stateness 1: 6–7, 49–50; minimalist states 13: 321–22; state nation 9: 232; weakness of African states 7: 211–12 Sudan 16: 407 supplementary vote 3: 98 ff; 16: 413 See also alternative vote Sweden 1: 47; 16: 405 Switzerland 1: 26, 27, 28; 7: 200, 206–7, 208; 9: 232; 16: 389, 407, 415 Syria 1: 47 Tamil(s) 3: 99–102; 12: 305; 16: 392; Tamil Eelam, 12: 307 Tamil Tigers (LTTE) 3: 99; 9: 242 Tanganyika 1: 29 Tanzania 1: 29, 40 Team CVoter Foundation 12: 310 territorial pluralists/pluralism 1: 28–32, 36 third-party intervention 14: 330 Tibet 12: 305 Togo 1: 43 Transitional Administrative Law (of Iraq) 15: 366–77 tribunes 10: 256 Trinidad 16: 407 tsunami 9: 242 Turkey 1: 53; 6: 180; and Kemalism 6: 194; and Kurdish question 6: 189–90, 195 Turkish Cypriots 1: 30, 40 Turks in Bulgaria 8: 218 Tutsi 1: 40; 5: 156; 16: 392 two-round system (TRS) 1: 16; 2: 68, 72, 75; defi ned 2: 72 tyranny of the majority 1: 3, 8–12, 13, 19; 8: 215 Tyrol, South 1: 30, 40 Ukraine 1: 43 Ulster Democratic Party (UDP) 12: 300 Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) 10: 254, 269 union states 1: 29; 16: 404–5 United Kingdom/Great Britain/British state 1: 29, 52; 2: 82; 6: 176; 7: 198; 16: 403– United Nations 5: 148, 149; 9: 239, 246; 10: 273; 16: 402 United States 1: 11, 28, 35, 39; 2: 82, 88, 5: 147, 148, 157; 7: 198, 200, 208, 210–11; 9: 232, 239; 12: 296, 301, 308 urban policies and strategies, importance of 14: 358 Uzbekistan/Uzbeks 1: 43, 53 Venice, Republic of 1: 4; 7: 201, 204; and influence on United States 7: 204 veto rights, rules 1: 48; 10: passim; 13: 317–19; 16: 396 veto rules 10: passim vital national interests 10: 253–54, 258, 265, 274 n.5; 13: 317 vote pooling 1: 22; 2: 68 Wales 1: 29 winner-takes-all in single-member districts (WTA-SMD) 1: 16 Yugoslavia 16: 399, 407 Zanzibar 1: 29; 16: 407 Zimbabwe (previously Rhodesia) 16: 402, 408 Hodgson AC KNOW LEDG MENTS The editors are extraordinarily grateful to all our contributors; we hope our readers will benefit as much as we have from their experience and intellect With equal gratitude we acknowledge the Sawyer-Mellon Seminar grant, which made this volume possible At the University of Pennsylvania, Dr Roy Eidelson helped in the initial grant application and in its initial administration, as did Jenna Laske Most of the seminar’s logistics were smoothly run by the Sawyer-Mellon doctoral fellows David Bateman and Stephan Stohler, who have bright futures ahead of them in the academy Symeon Braxton proved most helpful in liaison with the Mellon Foundation The faculty, staff, graduates, and undergraduates of Penn’s Political Science Department, and those of many other social science and humanities departments at Penn and elsewhere in the Philadelphia region (notably at Haverford, Bryn Mawr, and Temple), participated extensively in the enterprise that led to this book Special thanks are also owed to the Penn Law School We must also express our profound gratitude to Ambassador Peter W Galbraith, Professor Richard Johnston of the University of British Columbia, Professor John McGarry of Queen’s University, Canada, Professor Jack Nagel of the University of Pennsylvania, Professor Pippa Norris of Harvard, Professor Philip Roeder of the University of California at Davis, and Dr Gwen Sasse of Oxford University for their contributions The University of Pennsylvania Press, especially Bill Finan, Peter Agree, and Erica Ginsburg, have been true professionals as always Joanne McEvoy wishes to say that she is indebted to her coeditor, Brendan O’Leary, for giving her the opportunity to spend a year at the University of Pennsylvania as the Sawyer-Mellon Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Penn Program in Ethnic Conflict His sage advice, sense of academic rigor, and commitment to imaginative and critical thinking on postconflict institutions are most helpful The Andrew W Mellon Foundation funded her fellowship, research, and travel She warmly thanks doctoral fellows David Bateman and Stephan Stohler for their support and friendship ... Ireland: Power Sharing, Contact, Identity, and Leadership Ed Cairns 278 12 Public Opinion and Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places Colin Irwin 295 13 The Balkans: The Promotion of Power Sharing. . .Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places NATIONAL AND E THNIC CONFLIC T IN THE T WENT Y- FIR ST CENTURY Brendan O’Leary, Series Editor Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places Edited... as its control is maintained. Defining Power Sharing, Deeply Divided Places, and Well-Ordered States These considerations suggest the following broad definition of power sharing: Any set of arrangements

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