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Brother, can you spare a billion the united states, the IMF, and the international lender of last resort

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  i Brother, Can You Spare a Billion? ii   iii Brother, Can You Spare a Billion? The United States, the IMF, and the International Lender of Last Resort Daniel McDowell Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs Syracuse University iv Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America © Oxford University Press 2017 All rights reserved No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights organization Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer CIP data is on file at the Library of Congress ISBN 978–​0 –​19–​0 60576–​6 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America   v For Sara Lu We did it vi   vii CON T EN T S Figures  xi Tables  xiii Preface  xv Abbreviations  xix Introduction   1 The Puzzle   The Argument   Plan of the Book and Findings   11 The ILLR in Theory and Practice   18 An International LLR: A Brief History of a Concept   19 1.1 The ILLR and the Hegemon   20 1.2 The ILLR and the IMF   22 The IMF’s Limitations as ILLR   24 2.1 The Problem of Unresponsiveness   25 2.2 The Problem of Resource Insufficiency   27 The United States’ ILLR Mechanisms   30 3.1 The Mechanics of Currency Swaps   31 3.2 Speed and Independence   31 3.3 Lending Capacity   33 3.4 Division of Labor   37 Conclusions   The United States Invents Its Own ILLR, 1961–​1962   41 More Dollars, More Problems   42 1.1 From Dollar Gap to Dollar Glut   43 1.2 Two Threats: The “Gold Drain” and Speculation   4 In Search of an ILLR   2.1 The General Arrangements to Borrow   47 An Alternative ILLR: Central Bank Currency Swaps   53 3.1 The Fed’s Novel Idea   54 3.2 Who Needs the IMF?   56 viii ( viii )   Contents 3.3 How the Swap Lines Protected US Interests   60 3.4 Why Did Europe Cooperate?   61 Conclusions   63 The Exchange Stabilization Fund and the IMF in the 1980s and 1990s  6 The Exchange Stabilization Fund   66 Global Banking and the Debt Crisis: 1980s   70 2.1 The IMF’s “Concerted Lending” Strategy and the Problem of Unresponsiveness  71 2.2 The ESF and “Bridge Loans”: Correcting for the Problem of IMF Unresponsiveness   76 Portfolio Flows and Capital Account Crises: 1990s   78 3.1 Capital Account Crises and IMF Resource Insufficiency  81 3.2 The ESF and Supplemental Loans: Correcting for the Problem of IMF Resource Insufficiency   83 Conclusions   84 Who’s In, Who’s Out, and Why? Selecting Whom to Bail Out, 1983–​1999   86 US Financial Interests and ESF Bailout Selection   88 An Empirical Model of ESF Bailout Selection   93 Results   99 Conclusions   103 US International Bailouts in the 1980s and 1990s   105 Case Selection   106 The Cases   108 2.1 Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, 1982–​1983   108 2.2 Argentina, 1984   116 2.3 Poland, 1989   119 2.4 Mexico, 1995   121 2.5 Thailand, 1997   127 2.6 Indonesia and South Korea, 1997   129 2.7 Declining Use: The ESF Is Put Out to Pasture   135 Conclusions   137 The United States as an ILLR during the Great Panic of 2008–​2009   139 Background: “A Novel Aspect” of the Great Panic of 2008  141 US Financial Interests and the Fed’s ILLR Actions   148 An Empirical Model of Fed Swap Line Selection   155 The Interest-​R ate Threat and the Fed’s ILLR Actions   159 Transcript Analysis of FOMC Meetings   162   ix Contents  ( ix ) 5.1 The Initiation of the Swap Lines and the TAF, August 2007–December 2007   163 5.2 Incremental Expansion of Liquidity Facilities, March 2008–​August 2008   167 5.3 Rapid Growth of the Swap Program: September 15, 2008–​October 28, 2008   168 5.4 Swap Lines for Four Emerging Markets: October 29, 2008  170 Conclusions   172 Conclusions   175 Contributions   176 The Future of the United States as an ILLR   179 Policy Implications   185 Final Thoughts   189 Appendix  191 Bibliography  197 Index  213 ...  i Brother, Can You Spare a Billion? ii   iii Brother, Can You Spare a Billion? The United States, the IMF, and the International Lender of Last Resort Daniel McDowell Maxwell School of Citizenship... of what I had read in my graduate seminars implied that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had, for several decades, assumed the role of an international lender of last resort (ILLR) for the. .. out of cash, they panicked and demanded their money on the spot This confluence of events meant that the Bedford Falls savings and loan was illiquid (the cash it had on hand was less than that of

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