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i Brother, Can You Spare a Billion? ii iii Brother, Can You Spare a Billion? The United States, the IMF, and the International Lender of Last Resort Daniel McDowell Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs Syracuse University iv Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America © Oxford University Press 2017 All rights reserved No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights organization Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer CIP data is on file at the Library of Congress ISBN 978–0 –19–0 60576–6 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America v For Sara Lu We did it vi vii CON T EN T S Figures xi Tables xiii Preface xv Abbreviations xix Introduction 1 The Puzzle The Argument Plan of the Book and Findings 11 The ILLR in Theory and Practice 18 An International LLR: A Brief History of a Concept 19 1.1 The ILLR and the Hegemon 20 1.2 The ILLR and the IMF 22 The IMF’s Limitations as ILLR 24 2.1 The Problem of Unresponsiveness 25 2.2 The Problem of Resource Insufficiency 27 The United States’ ILLR Mechanisms 30 3.1 The Mechanics of Currency Swaps 31 3.2 Speed and Independence 31 3.3 Lending Capacity 33 3.4 Division of Labor 37 Conclusions The United States Invents Its Own ILLR, 1961–1962 41 More Dollars, More Problems 42 1.1 From Dollar Gap to Dollar Glut 43 1.2 Two Threats: The “Gold Drain” and Speculation 4 In Search of an ILLR 2.1 The General Arrangements to Borrow 47 An Alternative ILLR: Central Bank Currency Swaps 53 3.1 The Fed’s Novel Idea 54 3.2 Who Needs the IMF? 56 viii ( viii ) Contents 3.3 How the Swap Lines Protected US Interests 60 3.4 Why Did Europe Cooperate? 61 Conclusions 63 The Exchange Stabilization Fund and the IMF in the 1980s and 1990s 6 The Exchange Stabilization Fund 66 Global Banking and the Debt Crisis: 1980s 70 2.1 The IMF’s “Concerted Lending” Strategy and the Problem of Unresponsiveness 71 2.2 The ESF and “Bridge Loans”: Correcting for the Problem of IMF Unresponsiveness 76 Portfolio Flows and Capital Account Crises: 1990s 78 3.1 Capital Account Crises and IMF Resource Insufficiency 81 3.2 The ESF and Supplemental Loans: Correcting for the Problem of IMF Resource Insufficiency 83 Conclusions 84 Who’s In, Who’s Out, and Why? Selecting Whom to Bail Out, 1983–1999 86 US Financial Interests and ESF Bailout Selection 88 An Empirical Model of ESF Bailout Selection 93 Results 99 Conclusions 103 US International Bailouts in the 1980s and 1990s 105 Case Selection 106 The Cases 108 2.1 Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, 1982–1983 108 2.2 Argentina, 1984 116 2.3 Poland, 1989 119 2.4 Mexico, 1995 121 2.5 Thailand, 1997 127 2.6 Indonesia and South Korea, 1997 129 2.7 Declining Use: The ESF Is Put Out to Pasture 135 Conclusions 137 The United States as an ILLR during the Great Panic of 2008–2009 139 Background: “A Novel Aspect” of the Great Panic of 2008 141 US Financial Interests and the Fed’s ILLR Actions 148 An Empirical Model of Fed Swap Line Selection 155 The Interest-R ate Threat and the Fed’s ILLR Actions 159 Transcript Analysis of FOMC Meetings 162 ix Contents ( ix ) 5.1 The Initiation of the Swap Lines and the TAF, August 2007–December 2007 163 5.2 Incremental Expansion of Liquidity Facilities, March 2008–August 2008 167 5.3 Rapid Growth of the Swap Program: September 15, 2008–October 28, 2008 168 5.4 Swap Lines for Four Emerging Markets: October 29, 2008 170 Conclusions 172 Conclusions 175 Contributions 176 The Future of the United States as an ILLR 179 Policy Implications 185 Final Thoughts 189 Appendix 191 Bibliography 197 Index 213 ... i Brother, Can You Spare a Billion? ii iii Brother, Can You Spare a Billion? The United States, the IMF, and the International Lender of Last Resort Daniel McDowell Maxwell School of Citizenship... of what I had read in my graduate seminars implied that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had, for several decades, assumed the role of an international lender of last resort (ILLR) for the. .. out of cash, they panicked and demanded their money on the spot This confluence of events meant that the Bedford Falls savings and loan was illiquid (the cash it had on hand was less than that of
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