Strategic corporate negotiations a framework for win win agreements

Strategic Corporate Negotiations A Framework for Win-Win Agreements Andrea Caputo Strategic Corporate Negotiations Andrea Caputo Strategic Corporate Negotiations A Framework for Win-Win Agreements Andrea Caputo University of Lincoln Lincoln, UK ISBN 978-3-030-15478-3    ISBN 978-3-030-15479-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15479-0 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 This work is subject to copyright All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations Cover illustration: Pattern © Melisa Hasan This Palgrave Pivot imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland To my family and to my friends, who always supported me Foreword Written by Richard Cyert and James March in 1963, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm still represents, without doubt, a catalyst book in the study of how dominant coalitions take strategic decisions; in fact, since its publication, many strategic choices have started to be substantially considered as negotiated processes On this basis, and especially because of the current hyper-complexity featuring our socio-economic system, understanding how strategic negotiations de facto happen, and how they could happen better, represents an important and lively area in the research on and practice of corporate decision-making Win-lose and win-win scenarios, BATNAs, Reservation Prices, and third parties, but also heuristics, cognitive biases and the personality of who negotiates: in this exciting, constantly evolving, scientific context, this book written by Andrea Caputo (Lincoln Business School) contributes to the addressing of these simple, but meaningful, research questions: How can negotiations be currently conceived? How and why they occur? How can the strategic negotiations be improved, in terms of results for all (not just some of) the parties involved? The reading of this book can be enjoyable for both scholars and practitioners The former can find it useful because it constitutes an appropriate mix of theory and empirical evidence; this is also, thanks to the reported qualitative case study analysis, regarding the important negotiation that recently occurred between Fiat and Chrysler The latter, at the same time, can find it valuable because it represents an easy-to-read, instructive, toolkit for enlarging the pie in many of the daily negotiations that happen in the corporate world at the top decision-making level vii viii  FOREWORD Andrea has been the first graduate, then doctoral student, whom I have supervised at the University of Rome Tor Vergata; he has a passion for and interest in negotiations that started when he was a boy I am so proud and happy that this passion, together with hard work and intellectual curiosity over time, has supported him in achieving international recognition in this field Rome, Italy January 30, 2019 Gianpaolo Abatecola Reference Cyert, R. M., & March, J. G (1963) A Behavioral Theory of the Firm Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall Preface This work is intended as an attempt to answer the following questions, through a careful analysis of the literature and the study of a business case: How can strategic corporate negotiation support competitive advantage? What is the effect of the entry of third parties in a strategic corporate negotiation initially configured as bilateral? Can such entrance of third parties bring the strategic corporate negotiation from distributive to integrative? The book consists of six chapters The first chapter, based on a review of the current literature on negotiation, provides the theoretical basis for the concept of negotiation The concept of negotiation could be defined as a joint decision-making process, between two or more individual or collective actors, which identifies the features that characterize the negotiations and the fundamental elements of the negotiating structure: the parts, the subjects, and the interests The second chapter reflects on the possibility of strategically manipulating the elements of the negotiating structure, deepening the theme of multilateral negotiations The doctrine has identified three dimensions with respect to which multilateral negotiations differ from bilateral negotiations: scope, complexity, and heterogeneity Multilateral negotiations therefore appear to be complex social interactions due to, on the one hand, the configuration of the preferences of several parties and, on the other hand, interpersonal dynamics that increase in complexity in line with the increase in the parties involved Negotiators can benefit from amplitude, complexity, and heterogeneity The existence of a negotiating configuration with several parties, often having different and mostly ix x  PREFACE complementary interests, leads to the achievement of very satisfactory agreements The third chapter investigates the relationship between strategy and negotiation, contextualizing the importance of negotiation for strategic success The fourth chapter introduces the industry in which the business case is introduced: the automotive industry This industry analysis is carried out starting from the elements of structural weakness in the sector Strategic steps for crisis management are identified, deepening the theme of cross-­ sectoral cooperation A theoretical analysis of this topic is provided, based on existing literature and historical analysis, investigating past cooperation agreements in the automotive sector Once the reference context has been identified, the analysis of the business case is introduced in the fifth chapter, with an illustration of the methodology adopted and of the most relevant results achieved about the negotiation, and therefore the role of the third parties, between Fiat and Chrysler From the experience of Fiat and Chrysler, it is possible to draw interesting research cues for the future, regarding the role played by third parties in negotiation, presented in the concluding sixth chapter Lincoln, UK December 2018 Andrea Caputo Contents 1 A Theoretical Framework for Negotiation  1 2 Multilateral Negotiations 29 3 Contextualizing Negotiation in Strategy 47 4 Cooperation in the Automotive Industry Prior to the 2009 Fiat–Chrysler Agreement 65 5 Case Study: The Fiat–Chrysler Negotiation in 2009  83 6 Conclusions117 xi   CASE STUDY: THE FIAT–CHRYSLER NEGOTIATION IN 2009  "Macronegoti ation" FiatChrysler alliance Negotiation between Fiat and Chrysler on the recovery plan Exchange of know-how and technologies with shares Negotiation between FiatChrysler and USA Government (President Obama's Task force) Possibility of recovery Negotiation between FiatChrysler and Trade Unions Chrysler shareholder structure Payables Negotiations between USA and Chrysler's creditors 107 Debt Rating Hourly wage Payables to pension funds Fig 5.1  Negotiation tree by issue solution to the initial problem In our case this technique was used for purposes of representation rather than solution The scheme identifies, through the colored boxes, the various sub-­ negotiations, and, through the white boxes, the subjects covered by these negotiations It can be understood how, for example, the negotiation between Fiat–Chrysler and the US government focuses on three fundamental subjects: the possibility of re-launching Chrysler, the structure of the shareholding in Chrysler, and the restructuring of the debt From this last subject, however, a further sub-negotiation arises between the US government and Chrysler’s creditors about the assessment and restructuring of the debt Through this scheme, it is clear how the success of the negotiation between Fiat–Chrysler and the US government was dependent on reaching an agreement with the creditors, in which the government was directly concerned On the other hand, as regards the sub-negotiations between 108  A CAPUTO Fiat–Chrysler and the unions, these two were the main parties, while the US and Canadian governments played the role of influencers 5.4.2.3 Interests The sub-division into several sub-negotiations allows us to simplify the analysis of the configuration of the parties’ interests The macro-level negotiation structure, as already mentioned, has changed during the negotiation process, passing from a distributive configuration of interests to a supplementary one To analyze this change in detail, the four sub-­ negotiations from the point of view of the configuration of interests will be analyzed In this regard, a reclassification of the negotiation tree is presented on the basis of interests rather than matters The structure of the sub-­ negotiations is maintained In this case, the content of the boxes represents the interests of the parties rather than the issues being negotiated (Fig. 5.2) The formalization of interests by decomposing them into sub-­ negotiations makes it possible to obtain a summary map of the interests involved and, consequently, to understand how they have been influenced during the negotiation process Figure 5.3 graphically represents the interests involved in the negotiation in relation to the main negotiating actors Six main entities were identified: Fiat, Chrysler, the Fiat–Chrysler alliance considered jointly, the US government, the American and Canadian trade unions, and Chrysler’s creditors (banks and funds) In addition to the graphic representation of the parties’ interests, we tried to relate, through the arrows, those interests that in the course of the negotiation have come to influence each other, allowing the negotiating structure to change In some cases these interdependencies have allowed for the achievement of satisfactory agreements; in others (as in the case of the debt) we have not reached an agreement but the breaking of the negotiations and the solution through a unilateral action In the case of positive influence we used a two-way continuous line arrow, while in the case of totally divergent interests we used a dotted line The first negotiation that is addressed is that between the nascent alliance and the American and Canadian trade unions This negotiation sees opposing the interests of reducing/containing labour costs by Fiat–Chrysler, to make the industrial plan feasible, with those of the unions, which wanted to preserve the benefits gained by workers and the jobs Negotiations include the governments of the two countries, which seek to influence the negotiating   CASE STUDY: THE FIAT–CHRYSLER NEGOTIATION IN 2009  Negotiation between Fiat and Chrysler on the recovery plan 109 F: International expansion, investment in know-how and technology but not financial resources C: Survival and recovery from the crisis C: Survival and recovery from the crisis "Macronegotiatio n" FiatAllianceChrysler Negotiation between FiatChrysler and Governo USA (President Obamas' Task force) USA Gov: National economy, job retention, prestige, sustainability F: international expansion, control, no financial investment Negotiation between the US Government and Chrysler creditors Negotiation between FiatChrysler and Trade Unions F-C: wage reduction, avoid cash repayments USA Gov: billion dollars, keep together with Fiat Creditors: recovering entire credit (7 billion) or obtaining a shareholding Trade unions: salary maintenance, recover credit Fig 5.2  Negotiation tree by interests outcome in favor of reaching an agreement that safeguards jobs The unions therefore give up a few days off and accept a reduction in salary, as required by Fiat–Chrysler, in exchange for shares, guaranteed in value by 110  A CAPUTO Fig 5.3  Graphical representation of interests and their influences (Caputo 2012) the State, to guarantee the repayment of social security debts The achievement of this agreement was certainly also influenced by the achievement of the agreement between the unions and Ford concerning social security debts The change in the negotiating structure through the connection between the issues, together with the external influence of previous ­agreements reached and the pressures of the governments, meant that the negotiation from distribution became a supplement As for the negotiation of the debt consolidation of Chrysler, this was the most controversial sub-negotiation and that did not lead to the achievement of the agreement In this negotiation, bilateral and pure distributive, which saw the government on the one hand and the creditors on the other, the zone of possible agreement remained negative until the   CASE STUDY: THE FIAT–CHRYSLER NEGOTIATION IN 2009  111 close of the negotiation The US government’s ultimatum and the threat to resort to Chapter 11 were useless: the parties after several concessions remained firm on distant positions It should be noted that as far as this sub-negotiation is concerned, the interests were totally opposed, not only those directly involved in the subnegotiation, but also those influencing them For example, the interest of the total recovery of credit toward Chrysler, if satisfied, would have had negative repercussions for the other sub-negotiations, affecting the possibility of an agreement between Fiat and Chrysler The activation of the Chapter 11 procedure allowed the directly correlated negotiation to arrive at a satisfactory outcome for the parties In fact, the negotiation between the Fiat–Chrysler alliance and the US government on the recovery plan ended with a satisfaction of the interests of the parties involved, in a full integration view With regard to the negotiation between Fiat and Chrysler on the industrial re-launch plan, identifying the area of possible agreement and the configuration of interests is quite easy As mentioned above, Chrysler was in a situation of latent corporate crisis, and its only chance of survival was the agreement with a strong partner in the industry With this in mind, the letter of intent was announced in January, which started negotiations with all the other parties From this point of view the negotiation is initially configured as a bilateral distribution: the purchase by Fiat of shares in Chrysler The agreement, however, considering the Chrysler crisis and the peculiarities of Fiat, is satisfactory for both parties, and the way the shares are bought in exchange for a technology transfer shifts the outcome to the supplementary area Traditionally, the deal should have been a transfer of financial resources to equity shares that would allow Chrysler to recover from the crisis But the possibility for Chrysler to draw on public funds to restore its financial situation has given way to an agreement with Fiat based on technology transfer, which has never been questioned during the negotiation process The final agreement was reached, as mentioned, thanks to the possibility of accessing the Chapter 11 procedure This move allowed the government to resolve the dispute with the creditors This agreement is obviously a summary of the agreements reached in the sub-negotiations 112  A CAPUTO 5.5   Discussion of the Findings Sebenius (1992), as mentioned earlier, focused his attention on the possibility of changing the negotiating structure A factor of novelty compared to previous studies was the consideration that the parties could change even during negotiation, not only internally, but also in the number Therefore, the scholar has noted how often external parties could enter the negotiations, but with interests related to the object of negotiation Sebenius indicates, as we saw in the first chapter, four basic elements that can be found in every negotiating situation that can be strategically manipulated, despite the level of complexity: interests, issues, and positions; alternatives to the negotiated agreement; creating and claiming value; and changing the game Right away it is easy to notice how the analysis of the company case has highlighted all these aspects Adhering to the setting of Gatti (2008), our analysis took place following the three fundamental components of the negotiating structure: the parties involved; the subjects, issues, or matters of negotiation; and the preferences and therefore the interests of the parties, which give rise to their positions This analysis allowed us to arrive at a series of results on the company case, which seem to confirm the current theory It is evident how the modification of the number of parties and of the issues, especially in the case of an increase in the number, intrinsically leads to complications in the negotiation process In this regard, Sebenius (1992) stated how the more parties (and issues), the higher the costs, the longer the time, and the greater the informational requirements for a negotiated settlement Manipulation of the parties can alter these characteristics So a greater number of parties at stake brings negotiation dynamics to a higher level of complexity than in the case of only two parts The Fiat–Chrysler case seems to corroborate this theoretical hypothesis: thanks to the construction of the trading tree, it can be seen that the multilateral negotiation to reach the alliance agreement between Fiat and Chrysler is the result of a series of interdependent sub-negotiations This greatly complicates the negotiation process, with the parties having to deal with multiple matters and interdependent interests In Fig. 5.4, we try to synthesize and represent the supporting concept developed thanks to our analysis: how the entry of third parties in the negotiation has changed the structure and the outcome   CASE STUDY: THE FIAT–CHRYSLER NEGOTIATION IN 2009  Fiat 113 Fiat USA Government Multi-party integrative negotiation Third parties entrance Two-party distributive negotiation Trade Unions Creditors Chrysler Chrysler New issues and new links between issues Changes within the negotiation structure Claiming value Creating value Fig 5.4  Modification of the negotiating structure (Caputo 2012) The transition from a bilateral/distributive to a multilateral/integrative structure was only possible thanks to the entry of third parties in the negotiation, and thanks to the complementarities present between the interests of the various parties These complementarities allowed for useful links between matters that otherwise would not have been possible in the case of bilateral negotiations These links, thanks to the complementarity of the interests, have led the parties to have a “creating value” perspective, ­looking for a common solution that would be as satisfactory as possible for everyone This includes, for example, the agreement reached with the trade unions, where a reduction in wages and vacation days allows the new company to reduce costs, and workers to keep their jobs This agreement was made possible thanks to the intervention of the US government that guaranteeing the credits claimed by the pension funds allowed the new company to not have disbursements of money, but rather to deliver shares to the workers In this way, the latter will be able to have greater control over the company’s activities, together with the guarantee of the recovery of the entire pension credit, which in the event of bankruptcy would probably have been nullified The Sebenius study (1992) identifies how positive the addition of parties to the negotiation is if they have tangible interests or can substantially 114  A CAPUTO influence the negotiation Promoting the entry of these parties can strengthen an existing coalition, contribute to forming one, thanks to a leverage effect due to links with new interests and issues From the reading of the history of the Fiat–Chrysler case and from the analysis carried out, it is clear how crucial the role of the Obama administration has been: entering as a stakeholder, who traditionally played the role of influencer, and allowed to close the negotiations in a short time (think about the 30-day ultimatum) and reach a more satisfactory ­agreement for the parties Despite this, the party did not have direct interests in the matters being negotiated, but rather indirect in the form of maintenance of employment and production: a relevant factor for the revival of the national economy We can try to imagine, for example, the negotiation on the Chrysler debt without the intervention of the US administration: in this case, the agreement would not have taken place and the alliance would have been skipped, since the interest of the latter (the complete recovery of the debt) was totally in contrast to that of Fiat (not investing money but know-how in Chrysler) It is therefore easy to suppose that the negotiations would have been broken with the sale “in pieces” of the assets of Chrysler to meet the debts We have seen in the two theoretical chapters how the change in the number of parts of a negotiation, with the entry of new parties bearing new interests and matters, can lead to the configuration of the negotiation from distributive to integrative We can confirm this trend with regard to the Fiat–Chrysler case In fact, the entry of the US government in negotiations with creditors and unions has played a decisive role, shifting the interest to a general level of national economy, from the particular of the individual actors Thanks to this, negotiation, which would have been merely distributive, has evolved into a form of integrative negotiation Consider, in addition to the case of negotiations with creditors, those with the unions: without the State guarantee on pension credits and without the restructuring plan of the company in alliance with Fiat, we can hardly imagine a solution to this dispute In the absence of the national guarantee, labor price negotiations would probably have led to more expensive agreements for the company, such as to undermine the business plan Likewise, without the alliance with Fiat, the unions would not have had the possibility to recover the pension credits, and the State would probably have had to bear the burden of repayment   CASE STUDY: THE FIAT–CHRYSLER NEGOTIATION IN 2009  115 References Caputo, A (2012) Integrative Agreements in Multilateral Negotiations: The Case of Fiat and Chrysler International Journal of Business and Social Sciences, 3(12), 167–180 Carnevale, P. J., & De Dreu, C. K W (2006) Methods of Negotiation Research (International Negotiation Series Volume II) Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers Cyert, R. M., & March, J. G (1963) A Behavioral Theory of the Firm Malden, MA: Blackwell Fattobene, L., Caiffa, M., & Di Carlo, E (2018) Interlocking Directorship Across Italian Listed Companies: Evidence from a Natural Experiment Journal of Management and Governance, 22(2), 393–425 Gatti, C (2008) Le negoziazioni nel governo dell’impresa Verso un modello di analisi Padova: CEDAM Mariani, M (2002) Decidere e Negoziare Concetti e Strumenti per l’Azione Manageriale Milano: Il Sole24Ore Sebenius, J.  K (1992) Negotiation Analysis: A Characterization and Review Management Science, 38(1), 18–38 CHAPTER Conclusions Abstract  This book advances the knowledge about the investigation of corporate strategic negotiations In particular, it does so by positioning the literature about negotiation theory into the strategic management literature, explaining the importance of negotiation for competitive advantage The case study of the negotiation in 2009 between Fiat and Chrysler is presented and analyzed to provide evidence of how strategic corporate negotiations are conducted Keywords  Strategy • Negotiation • Fiat • Chrysler • Conclusion In this work, we tried to answer the following questions: How can strategic corporate negotiation support competitive advantage? What is the effect of the entry of third parties in a strategic corporate negotiation initially configured as bilateral? Can such entry of third parties bring the strategic corporate negotiation from distributive to integrative? To this, we first tried to identify and explain the theoretical basis for the foundation of the work Starting from the more general concept of negotiation, defined as a joint decision-making process between two or more actors, individual or collective, we tried to continue narrowing the field of study toward the specific topic of strategic multilateral negotiations and the role played by third parties An investigation of the literature has become necessary and fundamental in order to identify the keys of reading useful to analyze the proposed © The Author(s) 2019 A Caputo, Strategic Corporate Negotiations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15479-0_6 117 118  A CAPUTO business case The choice of this case is in line with the recent development of a growing influence of third parties in business negotiations We have walked through the field of study of negotiations and its plethora of definitions, coming from the incredible variety of backgrounds of negotiation scholars Indeed, as negotiations are a fundamental aspect of human interactions, they have been investigated from multiple disciplines in the field of social sciences From psychology to sociology, from economics to management, scholars have tried, and still try, to provide answers to help improve negotiations Negotiations are also fundamental in business To sell a product, one must negotiate To buy a product, one must negotiate Similarly, managers negotiate for the resources to allocate to their departments Employees negotiate the tasks to perform and the conditions of their work on a daily basis Worker unions, companies, and countries negotiate deals to support business Through this in-depth reading of the theory in the field of negotiations, and specifically of what is called “Negotiation Analysis”, we have come to the identification of the fundamental elements of a negotiating structure: the parties involved; the subjects, issue, or matters object of negotiation; and finally, the preferences and interests of the parties, which give rise to their positions The analysis was therefore carried out according to these three guidelines, integrated with the thought of Sebenius (1992); in fact, this author has given one of the major contributions to the subject through the study of the phenomena of strategic modification of the negotiating structure The adaptation of the principle of local rationality (Cyert and March 1963), precisely of problem-solving techniques, was important Thanks to this methodology, it has been possible to break down the multilateral and complex negotiations into more sub-negotiations Through this decomposition, it was possible to analyze the negotiation process more easily and therefore identify the matters subject to negotiation and the interests of the parties, together with the links and complementarities developed between them As examples show, negotiations are performed at the individual level, as there will always be a person at the table, or behind the computer, to negotiate with others However, the fact that negotiations happen within the boundaries of organizations makes this activity not only bound to human interactions but also bound to organizational interactions In the work I did with my friend and colleague Adrian Borbély (Borbély and Caputo 2017), since our first chat at the International Association for  CONCLUSIONS  119 Conflict Management Annual Conference of 2014 in Leiden, Netherlands, we justify and develop the case for studying business negotiations from an organizational perspective We developed the Organizational Model of Negotiation (OMoN), which consists of four negotiation levels: individual, linkages, infrastructure, and organizational capability Its application to the Fiat–Chrysler case study can help to explain how the micro-, meso-, and macro levels of investigation of a real negotiation are interconnected and should be studied in a holistic way The first level of the model is the individual It relates to the behaviors expressed in negotiations by individual actors This level concerns how people interact at the negotiation table and stems from the large body of research in organizational psychology deemed to investigate how people negotiate Variables to take into consideration at this level are the characteristics of the negotiation, its performances, the processes and outcomes, satisfaction, and the ethics of the negotiators For example, the understanding of the cognitive biases that can be expressed by negotiators at this level and the impact of the introduction of an external party to the negotiation are fundamental to this level of analysis (Caputo 2013, 2016) The second level of the model is linkages This relates to the development of a system of negotiations within and among the organizations As such, previous negotiations are considered to be the context for subsequent negotiations, creating a path-dependent evolution of how the organization negotiates Variables to keep in consideration for this stage are the history of previous negotiations, the context of each negotiation, the situational awareness, and so on In the case of Fiat–Chrysler, it is evident how the previous negotiations held by the US governments with banks and with Ford and GM severely impacted the negotiations, not only by framing the public opinion (creating urgency for action), but also by providing experience to the individual negotiators Similarly, the investigation of the linkages between the interests of the parties and the different sub-­ negotiations showed us how the negotiations could be solved The third level of the model is infrastructure This relates to the development of the organizational infrastructure in support of the negotiations In this case, we have the investigation of the systems of information exchange among parties, or the tactical use of the Chapter 11 procedure by the US government and the subsequent formalization of the new ownership structure of Chrysler, which allowed for the removal of those negative linkages that were preventing the solution of the impasse 120  A CAPUTO The fourth level of the model is capability It relates to the development of negotiation as a strategic resource It is concerned with the strategic understanding of negotiation as a major source of competitive advantage The systemic investigation of the Fiat–Chrysler negotiation has allowed us to show how strategic the macro aspect of negotiation is (Fig. 6.1) In the case of the alliance between Fiat and Chrysler, the analysis confirmed the previous theoretical assumptions regarding the change in the negotiation structure The change in the number of parties and issues, especially in the case of an increase in the number, intrinsically leads to complications in the negotiation process The transition from a bilateral/ distributive structure to a multilateral/integrative structure was only possible thanks to a leverage effect due to links with new interests and issues Therefore, the entry of third parties in the negotiation is positive Of significance is the conclusion that the entry of third parties, such as the American administration and the trade unions, has allowed links between issues, which were expanded thanks to the entry of such new parties In turn, these links have helped the parties to discover Ability to solve a negotiation from a systemic perspective, government of the issues and interests (e.g removing Chrysler’s shareholder and creditors from the negotiation) Information exchange among parties, tactical use of the Chapter 11 procedure, formalization of the new ownership structure of Chrysler IV Organizational Capability The strategic contribution of negotiation to the organization III Infrastructure Organizational infrastructure in support of negotiations Networks of relationships among the interests of the parties involved in each sub-negotiation II Linkages How negotiations impact one another Negotiation behavior of the parties involved (e.g US Government negotiators, Fiat negotiators, Union negotiators etc.) I Individual Individual negotiations and negotiators' behavior Fig 6.1  A graphical application of the OMoN model to the Fiat–Chrysler case study  CONCLUSIONS  121 c­ omplementarities between their own interests that have allowed for the achievement of a satisfactory negotiation outcome for the parties It can be asserted that the role played by the American government was of central importance for the achievement of the negotiation outcome Although not the subject of this work, we can hypothesize, without fear, that even in the implementation phase of the agreement, the government will have a central role as guarantor of the agreements In light of the theoretical analysis of strategic corporate negotiations, and specifically the role of stakeholders in the negotiation process, and of the analysis of the Fiat–Chrysler case, some future theoretical implications can be identified It would be of particular interest to deepen the role of the stakeholders, and more specifically of the institutions, in the negotiations between companies; developing a qualitative–quantitative analysis through appropriate statistical tools on this type of negotiations, in order to understand the relationship between the entry of stakeholders into the negotiation process and the outcome achieved The work presented in this book contributes to revive the exhortation of Ertel (Ertel 1999) about studying business negotiation from an organizational perspective This book also contributes to the growing body of knowledge in this direction, for example, by providing further evidence to those studies about the strategic role of negotiations (Caputo et al 2018) In doing so, we contributed to debunk the prevalent assumption in the literature that organizations not negotiate, only individuals do, which forms the basis of the extremely prolific body of research about individual behavior in negotiations Although there will always be individuals at the negotiating tables, their negotiating behaviors are bounded by both their individual capability and the negotiation capability of their organization Organizations can nurture their negotiation capability through several actions (e.g., training, knowledge management systems, and procedures)—the list remains to be made exhaustive We believe this is fundamental for the survival of any organization and yet far from being acknowledged in the academic environment A lot could be achieved by the integration of efforts from scholars and researchers in strategy and negotiation The two fields have not yet been cross-fertilizing each other and this book hopes to contribute to this ­process Too often, academics tend to treat constructs separately from each other, analyzing them through very narrow lenses that help simplification at disadvantage of real discovery 122  A CAPUTO References Borbély, A., & Caputo, A (2017) Approaching Negotiation at the Organizational Level Negotiation and Conflict Management Research, 10(4), 306–323 https://doi.org/10.1111/ncmr.12106 Caputo, A (2013) A Literature Review of Cognitive Biases in Negotiation Processes International Journal of Conflict Management, 24(4), 274–398 https://doi.org/10.1108/IJCMA-08-2012-0064 Caputo, A (2016) Overcoming Judgmental Biases in Negotiations: A Scenario-­ based Survey Analysis on Third Party Direct Intervention Journal of Business Research, 69(10), 4304–4312 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2016.04.004 Caputo, A., Borbély, A., & Dabic, M (2018) Building Theory on the Negotiation Capability of the Firm: Evidence from Ryanair Journal of Knowledge Management https://doi.org/10.1108/JKM-02-2018-0117 Cyert, R. M., & March, J. G (1963) A Behavioral Theory of the Firm Malden, MA: Blackwell Ertel, D (1999) Turning Negotiation into a Corporate Capability Harvard Business Review, 77, 55–71 Sebenius, J.  K (1992) Negotiation Analysis: A Characterization and Review Management Science, 38(1), 18–38 Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=eoah&AN=21189031&site=ehostlive&scope=site .. .Strategic Corporate Negotiations Andrea Caputo Strategic Corporate Negotiations A Framework for Win- Win Agreements Andrea Caputo University of Lincoln Lincoln,... such as Garrone, Caprara, and Zappa, and for the management doctrine, such as Ceccanti 1.3   Characters Qualifying the Negotiation In this section, starting from the theoretical basis analyzed... parties in which one tries to establish what   A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATION  each one should give and receive in a reciprocal transaction aimed at reaching a mutually beneficial agreement