Edited by Jeronim Perovic Cold War Energy Jeronim Perovic´ Editor Cold War Energy A Transnational History of Soviet Oil and Gas Editor Jeronim Perovic´ Department of History University of Zurich Zurich, Switzerland ISBN 978-3-319-49531-6 ISBN 978-3-319-49532-3 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-49532-3 Library of Congress Control Number: 2017930572 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2017 This work is subject to copyright All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations Cover illustration: © Jeronim Perovic´ 2016 Printed on acid-free paper This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland PREFACE BY THE EDITOR The history of the Cold War remains incomplete without taking into consideration the role of Soviet energy, in particular in relation to oil and natural gas The various Soviet campaigns to extract natural resources in ever-larger quantities were means to support the needs of the country’s military as well as its energy-intensive economy However, Soviet energy exports also served as an important tool in Moscow’s project to integrate the socialist states of Eastern Europe into a single economic space With regard to the states of the capitalist West, Soviet energy export largely served the purpose of gaining access to technology and hard currency While the growing share of “red” oil and gas in European energy consumption was viewed with suspicion in the West, Moscow too had reservations about the prospect of the Soviet Union becoming increasingly dependent on foreigners for technology inputs and hard currency During the period of détente in the 1970s, however, trade in energy was to become the main driver of Soviet–West European economic cooperation, eventually evolving into the kind of East–West energy interdependence that determines relations between Russia and Europe to this day If anything, the Soviet Union was a rather reluctant energy power Considering only official statistics, the story of Soviet energy is one of success, as oil and gas extraction and export figures rose year by year, making the Soviet Union one of the world’s leading international energy powers But in actual politics, the issue of energy was more often a burden rather than an asset The image portrayed in the West during the Cold War about the Soviet Union trying to use energy as a political weapon, as a way v vi PREFACE BY THE EDITOR to tighten its grip over its Eastern European allies and counter American influence in Western Europe, is at least partly misleading and in need of revision Also, the view that Soviet energy policy was generally driven by an expansionist geopolitical agenda ignores the fact that the Soviet Union repeatedly faced domestic energy shortages, and Moscow saw cooperation with Western companies and states as a way to overcome internal economic problems In East–West relations, Soviet energy was at times a cause of tension and confrontation, but much more often a political “softener.” The Iron Curtain was a dividing line between East and West, but nowhere was this curtain more porous than in the domain of energy flows This book takes a fresh look at international relations during the Cold War, challenging some of the long-standing assumptions of East–West bloc relations, as well as shedding new light on relations within the blocs regarding the issue of energy By bringing together a range of junior and senior historians and specialists from Europe, Russia and the US, this book represents a pioneering endeavour to approach the role of Soviet energy during the Cold War in a comprehensive manner, putting it into a transnational perspective The research for this volume was originally undertaken for a conference titled “Oil, Gas and Pipelines: New Perspectives on the Role of Soviet Energy During the Cold War.” This event, which took place at the University of Zurich on January 14–16, 2015, was organized by Jeronim Perovic´ together with Dunja Krempin and Felix Rehschuh from the Department of History of the University of Zurich, and was financed by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) and the Hochschulstiftung of the University of Zurich This book contains a selection of papers, which were first presented at this international conference The authors revised their papers based on discussions during the conference, the editors’ comments and the inputs provided by an anonymous reviewer The editor would like, in particular, to thank all participants of the conference who provided useful comments to the authors in preparing the resultant chapters They were Margarita Balmaceda, Alain Beltran, Elisabetta Bini, Nada Boškovska, Roberto Cantoni, Nataliia Egorova, Falk Flade, Rüdiger Graf, Jussi Hanhimäki, Per H€ogselius, Niklas Jensen-Eriksen, Suvi Kansikas, Galina Koleva, Dunja Krempin, Giacomo Luciani, Lorenz Lüthi, Viacheslav Nekrasov, David Painter, Tanja Penter, Felix Rehschuh, Oscar SanchezSibony, Benjamin Schenk, Hans-Henning Schr€oder, Andreas Wenger, and Jean-Pierre Williot PREFACE BY THE EDITOR vii The editor would like to thank Dunja Krempin and Felix Rehschuh for their help in organizing this conference, and Felix Frey, Regina Klaus, Tom Koritschan, and Markus Mirschel for their logistical support during the event Christopher Findlay and Tom Koritschan provided valuable help in the preparation of this book The editor would also like to thank Molly Beck, Dhanalakshmi Jayavel, and Oliver Dyer at Palgrave Macmillan for their support during the publication process September 2016 Jeronim Perovic´ CONTENTS The Soviet Union’s Rise as an International Energy Power: A Short History Jeronim Perovic´ The Bolsheviks’ Attitude Toward Oil Oil in Wartime The Politics of Oil Trade The Soviet “Oil Offensive” The Oil Shock of 1973/74 and Moscow’s Charm Offensive Implications of the Soviet “Energy Crisis” for Eastern Europe The Iranian Revolution and the Building of the “World’s Biggest Pipeline” “Siberian Might” and Gas for Europe Structure and Overview of the Present Volume Part I From World War to Cold War: Soviet Oil and Western Reactions From Crisis to Plenty: The Soviet “Oil Campaign” Under Stalin Felix Rehschuh Oil Politics and “Second Baku” in the Interwar Period The Soviet Oil Complex and Its Eastern Parts During World War II 11 14 19 22 24 27 45 47 49 54 ix x CONTENTS The Postwar Years Conclusion Stalin’s Oil Policy and the Iranian Crisis of 1945–1946 Nataliia Egorova Introduction Short Historical Overview The USSR’s Growing Interest in Iranian Oil The USSR Enters the Competition for Oil Resources Kavtaradze’s Oil Mission in Iran Continuing Soviet Struggles The Development of the Iranian Crisis and the Oil Question Consequences of the Iranian Crisis “Red Oil” and Western Reactions: The Case of Britain Niklas Jensen-Eriksen Introduction Soviet Oil Exports “Patrons of the UK Oil Companies” The First Round The Soviets and the Board of Trade Attack Dreams of an Oil Cartel Oil for Ships Conclusion Debates at NATO and the EEC in Response to the Soviet “Oil Offensive” in the Early 1960s Roberto Cantoni Introduction The Soviet “Oil Offensive” and Western Reactions The Soviet Oil Threat at the EEC A Dangerous Friendship Troubles of a Special Relationship Conclusion 59 66 79 79 83 84 86 88 90 94 97 105 105 107 109 110 115 117 119 122 131 131 134 137 140 144 149 CONTENTS Part II From Cold War to Détente: Soviet Energy and the Expansion of East–West Trade Decision-Making in the Soviet Energy Sector in Post-Stalinist Times: The Failure of Khrushchev’s Economic Modernization Strategy Viacheslav Nekrasov Introduction Genesis of and Rationale Behind Khrushchev’s “Petrochemical Project” The “Petrochemical Project:” High Ambitions and Initial Success Gosplan, Interest Groups, and the Crisis of the “Petrochemical Project” The “Gas Pause” in the Soviet Economy (1963–1964) Khrushchev’s Attempt at Reconstructing His “Petrochemical Project” (1962–1964) The Export of Oil and Gas: Potentials and Problems Khrushchev’s Opposition to an Accelerated Construction of Oil and Gas Pipelines (1963–1964) Conclusion A Challenge to Cold War Energy Politics? The US and Italy’s Relations with the Soviet Union, 1958–1969 Elisabetta Bini Italy’s Challenge to the “Seven Sisters” ENI’s Contracts with the Soviet Union US Reactions to ENI’s Agreements Between Bipolarism and De´tente Conclusion xi 163 165 165 167 170 172 176 178 181 188 190 201 203 207 210 217 222 Gaz de France and Soviet Natural Gas: Balancing Technological Constraints with Political Considerations, 1950s to 1980s 231 Alain Beltran and Jean-Pierre Williot From Technical Partnership to the Emergence of Real Interest in Soviet Gas (1956–1969) 233 The French Gas Sector Considers Soviet Contracts as a Source of Supply (1969–1979) 236 THE FALL OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE LEGACIES OF ENERGY 411 into production were, according to Dienes, “instrumental in heavy overworking and premature peaking” of Ukrainian gas and oil reserves.22 This overexploitation of Ukrainian deposits was to have significant implications, foreshadowing Ukraine’s later energy dependency on Russia By the late 1980s, such policies caused the marginal cost of fuel supplies from Ukraine to rank among the highest in the former USSR High marginal costs were also a characteristic of Ukraine’s coal production, implying that using domestic coal to offset Ukraine’s energy dependency was possible only in a system that did not fully take into account economic cost considerations By 1991, most of Ukraine’s coal was being produced at a heavy loss.23 Thus, the level of dependency of individual Soviet republics on energy supplies from the energy-producing regions of the Soviet Union grew significantly between 1945 and 1991, both due to the change in energy mixes—with increased reliance on fuels not available locally—and as a result of the depletion and reduced domestic production of oil and gas (as in the case of Ukraine) Paradoxically, the more the Soviet Union became active in energy exports, the more republics such as Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania became energy dependent One of the most important legacies left by the Soviet energy system for the post-Soviet states is infrastructure Its most obvious component to this day are pipelines, which were centered in Moscow and planned according to the supply needs of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation, its largest republic, in particular This resulted in a largely hub-and-spoke system, where energy-poor republics such as Ukraine and Belarus had little direct access to supplies from other energy-rich union republics besides the Russian Federation such as Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan As a result, Russia retained an inordinate level of power after 1991 not only as supplier to these states, but also as a gatekeeper for supplies from other areas—a power it used in a variety of ways in the post-1991 period These infrastructural legacies have greatly limited the energy supply options open to these states after 1991 Although some post-Soviet energy-dependent states, such as Lithuania, already started to build network connections to Western Europe with help from the EU in the 1990s, the task was enormous Gaining access to new suppliers, for example Norway, was tied to the overwhelming costs of building new pipelines During the economic crisis following the Soviet Union’s dissolution, these costs would have been exacerbated by the social cost of higher energy prices Yet infrastructural legacies go far beyond transportation If the building of a system for oil and gas reserves was deemed unnecessary by most CMEA 412 M.M BALMACEDA members, this was even more the case for post-Soviet states Where large storage capacities did exist (Ukraine’s gas storage facilities, for example, are some of the largest in Europe), they were built during the Soviet period not as a means to guarantee the republic’s supply security, but to “park” gas for further transit to Western Europe The post-Soviet states also inherited from the Soviet system infrastructural objects originally built as part of a union-wide energy system but which, with the demise of the USSR, were left in their territories For example, Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania inherited a well-developed oil refinery system, but these refineries could only work profitably as part of a larger, former Soviet market that could guarantee regular crude oil supplies from Russia and access to sales markets throughout the area A key post1991 effect was the keen interest of Russian oil companies in acquiring this infrastructure Since a refinery’s profitability depends directly on the degree to which its production capacity is used, the end of stable oil supplies from Russia led to a virtual paralysis of the sector in Belarus, Ukraine, and Lithuania Such vulnerability also makes embargos on crude oil supply (like the one imposed by Russia on Ukraine in the winter of 1994) an especially effective means of exerting influence, whether for political or economic goals By 1999, such dependence on former union-wide supply and sale markets and the disastrous effects of their dissolution made countries such as Ukraine especially receptive to Russian oil companies’ offers to take over refineries in debt-for-shares deals By 2002, most Ukrainian refineries had come under the control of Russian oil companies; by late 2014, only two of the country’s six refineries were working In the case of Belarus, the key role of domestic refineries, in synergy with specific policies pursued by the regime of Aleksandr Lukashenka, served to establish a highly profitable relationship between Minsk and Moscow, largely based on the Belarusian export of Russian oil refined in situ.24 In a manner similar to the case of the CMEA economies, artificially low energy prices sheltered the economies of the energy-dependent Soviet republics from the hard constraints of resource scarcity The effect was more significant in this case, however, because Soviet republics were far less engaged with foreign markets and thus had less of an incentive to produce internationally competitive products In particular, former Soviet states such as Ukraine and Belarus found themselves in a path dependency that encouraged them to continue living according to a model of development based on the availability of plentiful energy resources at low domestic prices, while in reality being energy-poor states THE FALL OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE LEGACIES OF ENERGY 413 The legacy of an energy trade system based on artificial prices and barter carried with it a number of problems The persistence of barter in many areas of energy trade after 1991 helped maintain a non-transparent environment prone to rent-seeking Barter practices made it more difficult to establish the price paid for gas actually supplied, and opened the door to misunderstandings and mutual accusations of stealing (or undersupplying) gas from the common pipeline, as was repeatedly the case between Ukraine and Russia While barter was often a response to a lack of liquidity in the market, it led to further demonetization of the energy sector and loss of investments Supplied with inexpensive and plentiful fuel, the energy-dependent Soviet republics were encouraged to develop energy-intensive industries and to gear their economies toward a gas-based economy that largely suited the needs of the Soviet energy export system, which created enormous incentives to rely more and more on energy from other parts of the USSR In contrast to the CMEA states, here the importance of bargaining between both sides was much more limited, with most key energy decisions made on the basis of central planning decisions extended to the various republics Another set of Soviet legacies relates to cultural and mental frameworks regarding energy Instead of looking at energy from a national perspective, most economic elites in Ukraine and Belarus, for example, continued to consider energy in Soviet Union-wide terms They continued to see energy inputs as basically unlimited, and continued to behave as if they lived in an energy-rich state Only gradually did they come to realize their countries’ poverty in energy The second issue concerns what could be called “Soviet energy culture.” In the same way as cheap and plentiful energy supplies served as a bonding agent that—however inefficiently—kept the Soviet economy together, expectations of cheap and plentiful electricity and piped-in residential heating supplies became part of the Soviet population’s cultural definition of welfare, and part of a minimal “social contract” between the regime and its citizens, turning household consumers into carriers of Soviet energy culture As the role of ideology faded, it was this expectation of energy-related welfare, blending into the general anticipation of rising living standards, that became integral to the very legitimacy of Soviet power Even after the demise of the Soviet system, being able to provide such services was widely perceived as a central element of the new states’ legitimacy, with the effect that any problems with such supplies were interpreted by the population—or instrumentalized by the opposition—as 414 M.M BALMACEDA serious breaches of the social contract between the state and its citizens As shown in the “Stop Benzin” protests in Belarus in 2011 and also the 2015 Armenian protests against residential electricity price increases, these legacies also boost the ability of energy issues to mobilize broad segments of the population in ways few other issues have been able to.25 This contributed to a situation where, for the post-Soviet states (and especially for countries such as Belarus lacking strong and widely influential elites articulating more identity-based sources of legitimation), the continuous provision and expansion of residential energy services, especially to the countryside, became an important legitimation element for both the states themselves and for their leaders.26 Implied in this unspoken social contract was the expectation of continued affordable energy prices, which, in the case of the Soviet legacy, could be achieved by the cross-subsidization of residential consumption by industrial consumers Thus, a growing emphasis on the absolute importance of low energy prices began to take shape; the rise of such expectations to a central societal value was facilitated by the economic crisis and high inflation in the early 1990s, which reduced household incomes and would have made hypothetical cost-covering, inflationindexed energy prices even less affordable for the average household This had important effects in both the short and medium term: an excessive focus on sustaining low energy prices in the short term served to exclude some policy options from the discussion and made others much more attractive Low residential prices insulated consumers from the worst effects of energy dependency on Russia and “made diversification policies, more expensive in the short term, hard to sell politically.”27 The impact of Soviet energy legacies went beyond energy and the economy and also affected the structure of political relationships and political development in these states First among these was the indirect impact of energy relationships on the vertical and horizontal value-added chains (VACs) that had developed around them Important VACs were created along the chain of energy supplies—both vertical VACs, which processed a specific commodity further, and horizontal VACs, related to one commodity’s role in the production of other products (such as in the case of natural gas, where natural gas by-products are used as feedstock for chemical industries, metallurgy, and fertilizers) Once in place, VACs set off path dependencies affecting suppliers, markets, and interest groups alike In fact, it was the economic sectors most closely related to energy VACs, which served as the basis for the rise of some of the richest “oligarchs” in THE FALL OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE LEGACIES OF ENERGY 415 these countries, such as Renat Akhmetov in Ukraine (metallurgy) and Bronislovas Lubys in Lithuania (fertilizers) More generally, Soviet energy legacies synergized with other characteristics and the external environment of the transition period Thwarted or partially delayed economic reforms and Russia’s strive for continued influence in the other post-Soviet states not only led to the preservation of barter and other murky multiple pricing schemes for energy They also set the conditions for the political and economic development of newly independent states after 1991 In particular, this synergy led to unique “rent swamps of the post-Soviet transition” that would significantly affect the incentives for elite behavior and their role in state-building after 1991.28 Some of these legacies—discussed in detail above—were: first, the emphasis on low residential energy prices, which indirectly prevented transparency in the energy trade; second, the fact that prices did not mean much in the planned economy system, which led to unclear and non-transparent bookkeeping; third, the practice of large energy companies taking over important social functions from the state and being compensated with informal privileges, which further reduced the possibility of transparent pricing; and fourth, the weakening of republican-level state institutions through the policies of the Soviet period, which limited the possibilities for governmental oversight and effective governance in the energy area after 1991 Taken together, these factors contributed to a situation where energy trade became one of the most corrupt areas of the economy and set into motion institutional dynamics whereby some powerful economic actors had only limited interest in increasing transparency in energy trade, especially vis-a-vis Russia as the main supplier, and where sustaining energy dependency became a profitable political and economic business While the story of those profitable post-1991 “rents of energy dependency” is told elsewhere,29 it is important to understand their roots in the pre-1991 system CONCLUSION As we have seen from the example of trade arrangements and their legacies, the actual legacies of the CMEA/Soviet energy system were often more complex than appears at first glance Some of the legacies of the Soviet/ CMEA system (such as the impact of barter and lack of price transparency) affected all participants in the system, regardless of whether they were suppliers or importers, a constituent republic of the USSR itself, or part of the more lax CMEA framework Other legacies, such as the long-term 416 M.M BALMACEDA impact of the system on energy development policies in the specific states, differed according to the role of each group of states in the overall system, with the energy-dependent Soviet republics being most immediately influenced by centralized decisions For these states in particular, the legacies of the Soviet/CMEA energy system go well beyond its most obvious elements of energy supply infrastructures and energy dependencies Every aspect of energy trade—be it the modalities of trade used, the approach to energy scarcity, or the very scale at which energy issues were conceptualized— continued to affect these states well beyond the system’s demise Similarly, while most analyses of Soviet legacies, for example of the barter trading system, have focused on the development of uncompetitive economies, perhaps their most important effects would not be seen until later, and in a more indirect manner: they contributed to the opaqueness of energy trade, with attendant impacts on governance issues Some of the effects of these legacies were not immediate or direct Instead, they were “activated” later through their interaction with new factors and developments, such as the swift change in property relations at the time of the Soviet/CMEA dissolution In a sense, what made the system “successful” before 1989 and kept the Soviet alliance together was also the source of difficulties these countries faced in the international environment after 1989 Recent trends and developments have confirmed the importance of legacies from the CMEA period, as well as their limits Undoubtedly, the reality of existing pipelines on the ground made geographic diversification options that involved new and costly infrastructure (such as a gas pipeline from Norway) less attractive in comparison to the status quo More fundamentally, CMEA legacies affected the position of these states between Russia and the West by bringing an uncomfortable reality check to the hopes associated with membership in the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) For states such as Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, the impact of EU membership was weakened by the structural limitation of their isolation from the rest of the EU in terms of energy infrastructure through the mid-2000s But—are pipelines destiny? A few factors prompt us to qualify our answer First, the type of geographical-source diversification that can be constrained by the “steel logic” of pipelines is only one part of the question: no less important are the organization and governance of energy trade even when the energy originates from a single country (“contractual diversification”).30 Second, although the EU’s Third Energy Package (2007) requiring the separation (“unbundling”) of energy production, transportation, THE FALL OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE LEGACIES OF ENERGY 417 and retail in EU states was able to weaken Gazprom’s ability to control the entire natural gas marketing process, it could not physically undo the physical reality of preexisting gas pipeline networks Similarly, if the “steel logic” of preexisting pipelines limited geographic diversification by highlighting the high relative price of building new pipelines to access new suppliers, the example of Russia’s massive investments in projects such as the Nord Stream (gas) pipeline and the Baltic Pipeline System (oil) to move away from sole reliance on CMEA-period export pipelines transiting Ukraine tells us that overcoming such structural legacies is possible given the political will and the ability to command the necessary economic resources Especially following Russia’s armed intervention in 2014–2015, Ukraine’s attempts to secure gas supplies from Slovakia and Hungary through reverse supplies of Russian gas purchased by these states highlight the interconnection between these two types of legacy-related logics (that is, the logics of seemingly static infrastructure and of more modifiable contractual regulations with destination clauses and the resale of Russian gas) Attempts at contractual diversification such as seen in this case are limited both by the infrastructural legacies and by the governance realities affecting whether the leadership of countries such as Slovakia and Hungary will support such proposals When looking at the legacies of the CMEA period as a whole, it becomes clear that these legacies include ways of dealing with energy as well as the most obvious elements of physical infrastructure These legacies bring both opportunities and constraints to Russia’s ability to use energy as a political tool vis-a-vis these states On the one hand, Russia’s role as a (near-) monopolistic supplier of oil and gas was given permanence by the “steel logic” of pipeline infrastructures On the other hand, the importance of oil and gas in Russia’s own domestic economic and political system—partly as a result of CMEA-related impulses—carries important consequences For example, Gazprom’s domestic political weight as employer, supplier, and investor forced the company to “juggle” markets and commitments within the country, the CMEA, and Western Europe More broadly, post-Soviet Russian energy actors use energy for a variety of domestic purposes, which entail both intended and unintended consequences also affecting the use of energy as a means of external political leverage 418 M.M BALMACEDA NOTES CMEA members were the USSR, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, and Vietnam In this chapter, the term “CMEA countries” is meant in the narrower sense of east European CMEA members, excluding Cuba, Mongolia and Vietnam In reference to the pre-1991 period, I use the term “Eastern Europe” to refer to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary and Poland, because it is the historical term used in reference to this period I use the term “Central and Eastern Europe” (CEE) to refer to the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, as well as to Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states after 1989/ 1991 See, for example, John P Hardt, “Soviet Energy Policy in Eastern Europe,” in Sarah M Terry, ed., Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984); John M Kramer, The Energy Gap in Eastern Europe (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990); William M Reisinger, Energy and the Soviet Bloc: Alliance Politics After Stalin (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); Leslie Dienes, Istvan Dobozi, and Marian Radetzki, Energy and Economic Reform in the Former Soviet Union: Implications for Production, Consumption and Exports (New York: St Martin Press, 1994) See Timothy Frye, “The Limits of Legacies: Property Rights in Russian Energy,” in Mark Bessinger and Stephen Kotkin, eds., Historical Legacies of Communism in Russia and Eastern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 90–110 Thane Gustafson, Wheel of Fortune: The Battle for Oil and Power in Russia (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012) Stephen J Collier, Post-Soviet Social: Neoliberalism, Social Modernity, Biopolitics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011) Data for 1989 from the PlanEcon energy database as quoted in Reisinger, Energy and the Soviet Bloc, 19; data for 1970 from Vienna Institute of Comparative Economic Studies, COMECON Data 1989 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), 398–403 Reisinger, Energy and the Soviet Bloc, 21 Ibid., 70 THE FALL OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE LEGACIES OF ENERGY 419 For a discussion of the impact of reputation and prestige on the formation and maintenance of alliances in the Cold War, see Christopher P Carney, “International Patron-Client Relationships: A Conceptual Framework,” Studies in Comparative International Development 24, (1989), 42–55, here 48–51; and Hope M Harrison, Driving the Soviets up the Wall: Soviet-East German Relations, 1953–1961 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 10 Reisinger, Energy and the Soviet Bloc, 53 11 Ibid., 84 12 In analyzing property relations in the Russian energy sector, Frye notes that the impact of Soviet legacies is not sufficient to explain trends in this sector, in particular the widely differing privatization experiences in the oil and gas sectors See Frye, “The Limits of Legacies,” 90–1 13 See Ihor Karp, “Energy Sector of Ukraine: Problems and the Ways of their Solving,” National Security and Defense 14, (2001), 69–70, here 70 14 See Margarita M Balmaceda, The Politics of Energy Dependency: Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania Between Domestic Oligarchs and Russian Pressure (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 70–2 15 See Javier Estrada, Arild Moe and Kare Dahl Martinsen, The Development of European Gas Markets: Environmental, Economic and Political Perspectives (Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, 1995), 168 16 On this topic, see Margarita M Balmaceda, EU Energy Policy and Future European Energy Markets: Challenges and Consequences for the CE States, Untersuchungen des FKKS 27/2002 (Mannheim: Universität Mannheim, 2002) 17 International Energy Agency (IEA), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 2001); IEA, Energy Balances of OECD Countries, 1998–1999 (Paris: OECD, 2001) 18 IEA, Oil Supply Security: The Emergency Response Potential of IEA Countries in 2000 (Paris: OECD, 2001), 149 19 Kramer, Energy Gap, 132 20 Per H€ ogselius, Red Gas: Russia and the Origins of Europe’s Energy Dependence (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 13 420 M.M BALMACEDA 21 Leslie Dienes, “Energy, Minerals, and Economic Policy,” in I S Koropeckyi, ed., The Ukrainian Economy: Achievements, Problems, Challenges (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1992), 129 22 Dienes et al., Energy and Economic Reform, 98 23 This section is based on Margarita M Balmaceda, “The Legacy of the Common Soviet Energy Past: Path Dependencies and Energy Networks,” chap in Balmaceda, The Politics of Energy Dependency 24 See Margarita M Balmaceda, Living the High Life in Minsk: Russian Energy Rents, Domestic Populism and Belarus’ Impending Crisis (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2014) 25 On the “Stop Benzin” protests in Belarus as one of the few successful mass mobilizations in the authoritarian regime of Aleksandr Lukashenka, see Balmaceda, Living the High Life, 173 26 See Margarita M Balmaceda, “Energy Policy in Belarus: Authoritarian Resilience, Social Contracts, and Patronage in a Post-Soviet Environment,” Eurasian Geography and Economics 55, (2014), 514–36 27 Balmaceda, Politics of Energy Dependency, 272 28 See Margarita M Balmaceda, “Between Structures and Actors: ‘Elite Original Sin’ and External Conditions: National and Private Interests in Ukraine’s post-Independence Foreign Economic Policy,” unpublished paper, presented at the symposium “Independent Ukraine 1991 to 2011: Change and Continuity in Ukraine’s Foreign Policy,” Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, April 23, 2012, 6–17 29 See Balmaceda, Politics of Energy Dependency, 3–41 30 On the differences between geographical and contractual diversification: Ibid., 31–2 INDEX A Adenauer, Konrad, 147, 258 Aganbegian, Abel, 268 Akhmetov, Renat, 415 Ala, Hussein, 95, 103n53 Allardt, Helmut, 260 Alvaris, David, 79 Arutiunian, Amazasp, 87 Astafev, Viktor, 25 B Bagirov, Mir Dzhafar, 61, 92 Baibakov, Nikolai, 13, 17, 53, 58, 62–4, 102n27, 174, 177, 195n55, 255, 256, 261, 262, 267, 325, 342n41, 343n55, 344n66 Bakanov, Sergei, 176 Baldridge, Malcolm, 292 Ball, George, 216 Baranovskii, Yurii, 243 Barry, Andrew, 132, 133 Bayat, Morteza Gholi, 90 Beria, Lavrentii, 64, 65, 86–8, 93, 99, 101n19, 102n22, 102n25, 102n26, 104n57–60 Blake, Kristen, 81 Blumenthal, Michael, 288 Bogomiakov, Gennadii, 268 Bogomolov, Oleg, 348–50, 364n10 Boldrini, Marcello, 208, 229n62 Bonomi, Enrico, 212 Boothe Luce, Clare, 205 Brandt, Willy, 39n68, 42n97, 262, 264 Brezhnev, Leonid, 3, 16, 17, 21–4, 31, 39n68, 41n89, 42n104, 167, 239, 253, 255, 256, 259, 261–70, 272, 287, 345, 355, 356, 358, 359, 363n1, 380–3, 385–8 Brigante-Colonna, Clemente, 215 Brock, William, 292 Brosio, Manlio, 15, 211 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 288, 289, 308n18–20, 309n24 Bucy, J Fred, 289 Bunce, Valerie, 361 Note: Page numbers with “n” denote endnotes © The Author(s) 2017 J Perovic´ (ed.), Cold War Energy, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-49532-3 421 422 INDEX Bush, George, 43n107 Bustani, Emile, 212 Bykov, Fëdor, C Campbell, Robert, 55, 71n46 Carlisle, William, 212 Carter, Jimmy, 25, 284, 288–90 Casey, William, 292, 294, 295, 303, 310n29, 312n40, 313n49 Castro, Fidel, 216, 217 Cazzaniga, Vincenzo, 155n34 Ceaușescu, Nicolae, 409 Cefis, Eugenio, 155n34, 156n45, 208, 229n62, 230n70 Chernenko, Konstantin, 388 Cherniaev, Anatolii, 268 Christians, Friedrich Wilhelm, 270 Chuev, Feliks I., 92 Clark, William, 295 D de Gaulle, Charles, 232, 236, 238 Debré, Michel, 238 Dekanozov, Vladimir, 85, 99, 101n15, 101n16 Delaporte, Pierre, 243 d’Estaing, Giscard, 239 Dienes, Leslie, 410, 411 Downie, Jack, 112 Dulles, Allen, 215 Dymshits, Veniamin, 267 E Ebel, Robert, 148 Erhard, Ludwig, 258 Erroll, Frederick, 120, 127n60 Evdoshenko, Iurii, 67n1 Evseenko, Mikhail, 64 F Fadeev, Nikolai, 357 Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, (King of Saudi Arabia), 303 Falin, Valentin, 42n97 Fanfani, Amintore, 207, 210, 213–15, 220, 221 Fedorenko, Nikolai, 191 Florescu, Mihai, 326 ˝, 352, 366n23 Fock, Jeno Fort, René, 234 France, A W., 111, 126n45, 126n50 G Gaddy, Clifford G., 186, 198n99 Gaidar, Egor/Yegor, 198n99, 316n71 Genscher, Hans-Dietrich, 270, 272 Gierek, Edward, 21 Goldman, Marshall I., 34n1 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 268, 299, 301, 302, 304, 317n82, 360, 362 Gottlieb, Bernard, 111, 124n16, 125n21, 125n23, 125n25, 125n28, 127n52 Gromyko, Andrei, 95, 96 Gronchi, Giovanni, 206, 207, 209, 214 Gubkin, Ivan, 50, 51, 67n1 Guicciardi, Diego, 138, 155n34 Gurov, Evgenii, 208 H Haig, Alexander M., 43n107, 292, 295, 296, 303, 311n39, 312n44 Harriman, Avarell W., 214 Hasanli, Jamil, 77n123, 81, 92, 93 Hecht, Gabrielle, 142 Herbst, Axel, 259, 260 Herman, Leon, 135, 151n3, 153n15 Hitler, Adolf, 8, 52, 55, 82 INDEX Hofland, Arnold, 138, 139 H€ ogselius, Per, 34n1, 133, 219 Honecker, Erich, 21, 381–3, 386–8 Hoskins, Halford, 135, 151n3, 153n15 Huntington, Samuel, 289 I Ickes, Barry W., 186, 198n99 Ickes, Harold, 87 Igolkin, Aleksandr, 68n5 Ivanov, Viktor, 8, 36n30 J Jackson, Henry M., 19, 287 Jaruzelski, Wojciech, 294 Jentleson, Bruce W., 106 Johnson, Lyndon B., 221, 229n59 K Kádár, János, 21 Kaganovich, Lazar, 65, 168 Kalamkarov, Vartan, 177, 330, 333, 342n39, 343n48, 343n49, 344n63 Kavtaradze, Sergei, 85, 86, 88–92, 101n18, 101n19, 102n28, 103n38, 103n41 Kennedy, John F., 25, 214–17, 228n43, 228n44 Khoshtaria, Akakii M., 84 Khrushchev, Nikita, 11, 20, 29, 30, 40n77, 68n6, 165–74, 176–82, 187–91, 191n2, 192n7, 194n31, 197n91, 198n108, 208, 234, 324, 333 Khrushchev, Sergei, 192n7 Kirillin, Vladimir, 261 Kissinger, Henry, 18, 19, 286, 287, 307n13 Kohl, Helmut, 388 423 Kohler, David, 211 Kortunov, Aleksei, 176, 177, 187, 234, 255, 333, 334, 336, 343n47, 343n49, 343n51, 343n58, 344n62, 344n66 Kosygin, Aleksei, 23, 24, 27, 178, 191, 194n31, 219, 236, 255, 256, 260, 261, 265–8, 271, 287, 343n51, 375, 376, 378 Kovacs, Giorgio, 209 Kreps, Juanita, 288 Krzhizhanovskii, Gleb, Kuniholm, Bruce, 79, 80 Kuybyshev, Valerian, 52 Kuz’min, Iosif, 324, 342n41 L Ladygin, V., 350 Leblond, Maurice, 139 Lee, Frank, 117, 127n54, 127n63, 159n69 Lenin, Vladimir, 4, 5, 324 Lesechko, Mikhail, 334, 343n58, 356 Leuschner, Bruno, 324, 341n26 Lipkin, Mikhail, 189 Lloyd, Selwyn, 108 Lomako, Pëtr, 173, 343n48 Lubys, Bronislovas, 415 Lundestad, Geir, 149 Lytle, Mark, 79 M Macmillan, Harold, 114, 121, 134 Maksimov, Mikhail, 90 Malène, Christian de la, 138 Malenkov, Georgii, 65, 93, 104n58, 167–9 Malin, Vladimir, 167 Mao, Zedong, 19 Marjolin, Robert, 137, 138, 140 Marsh, Steve, 122 424 INDEX Mattei, Enrico, 140, 153n18, 202, 204– 11, 214–18, 223, 228n55 Maudling, Reginald, 107, 117, 118, 128n66 McGhee, George C., 216 Medvezhe, Vadim, 22 Merchant, Livingston, 212 Metz, Victor de, 134 Middendorf, John William, 14, 15 Mikoian, Anastas, 65, 101n19, 104n59, 107, 118, 341n29 Mitchell, Timothy, 129n81, 132 Mitterrand, Franỗois, 244, 246 Moiseenko, Viacheslav, 357 Molotov, Viacheslav, 55, 86, 87, 91–3, 95, 98, 99, 101n21, 102n22, 102n25, 102n26, 102n28, 103n38, 103n41, 103n48, 103n50, 104n58, 104n60, 167 Morgenthau, Henry, 87 Moro, Aldo, 220 Mossadegh, Mohammad, 104n62 N Nekrasov, Nikolai, 18 Neporozhnii, Pëtr, 176 Nixon, Richard, 16–18, 286, 287 Nove, Alec, 53 Novikov, Vladimir, 173, 182, 194n36, 264, 342n39 O Odell, Peter R., 106 Ordzhonikidze, Grigorii, 52 Ortoli, Franỗois-Xavier, 357 P Pahlavi, Reza Shah, 91 Panov, Andrei, 54 Patolichev, Nikolai, 209, 238, 258, 259, 261, 262, 329 Pella, Giuseppe, 206 Pervukhin, Mikhail, 168 Pietromarchi, Luca, 153n12, 153n13, 153n18, 207 Piggott, Francis, 143, 146 Pipes, Richard, 295 Pishevari, Jafar, 93, 96, 97, 103n52 Podgornyi, Nikolai, 17, 262 Pompidou, Georges, 232, 237, 238, 250n11, 250n14, 250n15 Powell, Richard, 119, 120, 127n54 Q Qavam os-Saltaneh, Ahmad, 94–7 R Radice, Edward, 146 Raimond, Jean Bertrand, 238, 250n15 Rasputin, Valentin, 25, 42n105 Rathbone, Monroe J., 108, 138 Ratti, Giuseppe, 140, 155n35, 156n45, 208, 230n70 Reagan, Ronald, 25, 31, 233, 244, 284, 290–6, 303, 304, 311n35, 311n39, 312n44, 312n45, 313n49, 317n82 Reed, Gordon, 138 Regan, Donald, 292 Reifman, Alfred, 142 Reinhardt, Frederick, 215, 216 Reisinger, William M., 404 Rickett, Denis, 116, 119, 126n33, 126n36, 126n45, 127n56, 127n58, 127n61–3 Róz˙an´ski, Henryk, 325 Romero, Federico, 82 Rootham, Jasper St John, 117, 118, 126n37 INDEX Rostow, Walt W., 221 Rubin, Barry, 79 Rusakov, Konstantin, 360 Rusk, Dean, 215, 228n51 Russo, Vincenzo, 216 S Saburov, Maksim, 168, 191n2 Sadchikov, Ivan, 85, 96, 102n30 Sa’ed, Mohammad, 89, 90 Schedl, Otto, 258 Schiller, Karl, 259, 260 Schlesinger, Arthur M., 216, 228n42 Schmidt, Helmut, 14, 15, 25, 43n107, 269, 270, 272, 387 Schweizer, Peter, 284, 302–4, 305n4 Scott, J B., 110, 111, 114 Sedin, Ivan, 85, 101n16, 102n30 Segni, Antonio, 213 Semënov, Nikolai N., 192n7 Semënov, Vladimir, 272 Shcherbina, Boris, 256 Shiriaev, Iu., 350, 365n18 Shultz, George P., 296, 313n46, 317n80 Sidorenko, Aleksandr, 177 Sidorovich, Georgii, 332, 342n40 Šimu˚nek, Otakar, 332, 342n40 Sorokin, Aleksei, 259, 334 Stalin, Iosif, 3, 4, 7, 8, 10, 27, 47–67, 79, 84, 86, 87, 88, 91, 92, 96, 98, 99, 103n50, 103n52, 104n57–60, 167, 178, 323, 350, 374, 386 Stent, Angela, 133, 142, 149 Stikker, Dirk, 147 Stock, K L., 109, 124n17 Stockman, David, 292 Stone, Randall, 363n3 Stoph, Willi, 343n53, 375, 392n37, 396n105, 396n108, 396n109, 396n112, 396n114, 396n116–19 425 Stott, William R., 216 Sychev, S., 95, 103n48 Szyr, Eugeniusz, 330 T Taqizadeh, Sayyed Hasan, 94 Thatcher, Margaret, 295, 311n39, 312n45 Tikhomorov, Sergei, 177 Tito, Josip Broz, 11 Trofimuk, Aleksei, 268 U Ustinov, Dmitrii, 178 V Valletta, Vittorio, 218 Vance, Cyrus, 288 Vogel, Wolfgang, 387 Vyshinskii, Andrei, 94 W Wallace, Wiliam, 109 Weinberger, Caspar, 292, 294, 295, 303, 310n29, 313n46, 317n78 Weiss, Gerhard, 355, 366n30, 366n31, 367n33, 367n38, 367n39, 367n43 Wellenstein, Edmund, 357 Wieck, Hans-Georg, 269, 270 Wolff von Amerongen, Otto, 261 Z Zalygin, Sergei, 25 Zellerbach, James, 154n20, 206, 210 Zhivkov, Todor, 381, 394n79 .. .Cold War Energy Jeronim Perovic´ Editor Cold War Energy A Transnational History of Soviet Oil and Gas Editor Jeronim Perovic´ Department of History University of Zurich Zurich, Switzerland... the Cold War David S Painter Oil and Soviet Power Soviet Oil and US Policy The Reagan Administration and the Siberian Natural Gas Pipeline Developments on the World Oil Market The Third Oil Shock... essays on US foreign relations, the Cold War, and international oil politics have appeared in the Cambridge History of the Cold War, Journal of American History, Diplomatic History, Business History