Gustav von schmoller and adolph wagner legacy and lessons for civil society and the state

The European Heritage in Economics and the Social Sciences Series Editors: J G Backhaus · G Chaloupek · H.A Frambach Jürgen Backhaus Günther Chaloupek Hans A Frambach Editors Gustav von Schmoller and Adolph Wagner Legacy and Lessons for Civil Society and the State The European Heritage in Economics and the Social Sciences Volume 21 Series editor Jürgen Backhaus Krupp Chair in Public Finance and Fiscal Sociology University of Erfurt Erfurt, Germany Günther Chaloupek Austrian Chamber of Labour Wien, Austria Hans A. Frambach Department of Economics University of Wuppertal Wuppertal, Germany The European heritage in economics and the social sciences is largely locked in languages other than English Witness such classics as Storch’s Cours d’Economie Politique, Wicksell’s Finanztheoretische Untersuchungen and Geld, Zins und Güterpreise or Pareto’s Trattato di Sociologia Generale Since about 1937, partly caused by the forced exodus of many scholars from the German language countries and the international reactions to this event, English has become the undisputed primary language of economics and the social sciences For about one generation, this language shift did not result in a loss of access to the European non-English sources However, after foreign language requirements were dropped as entry prerequisites for receiving the PhD at major research universities, the European heritage in economics and the social sciences has become largely inaccessible to the vast majority of practicing scholars In this series, we hope to publish works that address this problem in a threefold manner An aspect of the European heritage in a language other than English should be critically documented and discussed, reconstructed and assessed from a modern scientific point of view, and tested with respect to its relevance for contemporary economic, social, or political discourse We welcome submissions that fit this bill in order to make the European heritage in economics and the social sciences available to the international research community of scholars in economics and the social sciences More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/5902 Jürgen Backhaus  •  Günther Chaloupek Hans A Frambach Editors Gustav von Schmoller and Adolph Wagner Legacy and Lessons for Civil Society and the State Editors Jürgen Backhaus Universität Erfurt Staatswiss Fakultät Erfurt, Thüringen, Germany Günther Chaloupek (Retired) Austrian Chamber of Labour Vienna, Austria Hans A Frambach Department of Economics University of Wuppertal Wuppertal, Germany ISSN 1572-1744     ISSN 2197-5892 (electronic) The European Heritage in Economics and the Social Sciences ISBN 978-3-319-78992-7    ISBN 978-3-319-78993-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78993-4 Library of Congress Control Number: 2018946098 © Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018 This work is subject to copyright All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations Printed on acid-free paper This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Contents Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    1 Ursula Backhaus, Günther Chaloupek, and Hans A Frambach  ustav Schmoller’s Program and Its Valuation Today and Tomorrow������    7 G Karl-Heinz Schmidt  ustav von Schmoller in the Netherlands 1870–1940 G A Forgotten Economist?����������������������������������������������������������������������������������   21 Robert W J Jansen Schmoller Research in China and Its Potential��������������������������������������������   41 Gang Li  ustav Schmoller and Adolph Wagner: The Idea G of Social Justice in Health Care����������������������������������������������������������������������   49 Ursula Backhaus  imely Lessons for the Post-9/11 World T from Schmoller and Wagner��������������������������������������������������������������������������   65 Nicholas Wolfgang Balabkins  agner’s Law, Money and the Theory W of Financial Crisis: Adolph Wagner’s Early Viennese Publications������������   77 Günther Chaloupek  imilarities and Differences in Central Concepts S of Social Economy: Adolph Wagner’s State Socialism and Heinrich Pesch’s Solidarism��������������������������������������������������������������������   93 Hans A Frambach  dolph Wagner Revisited: Is Redistribution of Income A and Wealth a Public Good?����������������������������������������������������������������������������  107 Andries Nentjes v vi Contents  agner’s Law, Government Size and Economic Growth: W An Empirical Test and Theoretical Explanations for Italy 1861–2008������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  129 Francesco Forte and Cosimo Magazzino  mpirical Evidence for “Wagner’s Law of Increasing E Government Activity” for Austria������������������������������������������������������������������  153 Reinhard Neck and Johannes Jaenicke Meinecke’s Sonderweg������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  175 F L van Holthoon Introduction Ursula Backhaus, Günther Chaloupek, and Hans A. Frambach The contributions to this volume of The European Heritage in Economics and the Social Sciences series are dedicated to Gustav Schmoller and Adolph Wagner, perhaps the most eminent representatives of German economic thought in the second half of the nineteenth century There are important parallels in their lives and works Both came from Southern German states – Schmoller from Württemberg, Wagner from Bavaria; both spent the major part of their academic career at the University of Berlin, the academic centre of the Prussian dominated German Reich; as founders of the Verein für Socialpolitik they were united in their efforts to promote the establishment of encompassing social policy schemes, what earned them the name of Kathedersozialisten (“Socialists of the Chair”) In some points, Wagner’s concept of state socialism went beyond what Schmoller had aimed at with his welfare state model, but both economists held that in principle private ownership of the means of production was essential for the performance of the economy and for raising the standard of living of the working class Schmoller and Wagner were different from each other in their methodological approach to economics as a social science In Max Weber’s characterization, Schmoller and his followers maintained “that the final goal of any science was to bring order into its objects by a system of concepts which are derived from the U Backhaus (*) The Institute of the Social Sciences and the State, Bonn, Germany G Chaloupek Austrian Chamber of Labour (retired), Vienna, Austria e-mail: guenther@chaloupek.eu H A Frambach Department of Economics, University of Wuppertal, Wuppertal, Germany e-mail: Frambach@wiwi.uni-wuppertal.de © Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018 J Backhaus et al (eds.), Gustav von Schmoller and Adolph Wagner, The European Heritage in Economics and the Social Sciences 21, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78993-4_1 U Backhaus et al observation of empirical regularities, hypotheses and verifications, and thereafter gradually perfected towards a perfect and therefore deductive theory.” (Weber 1968, p. 208) Hence, Schmoller laid great emphasis on empirical studies in the field of economic and social history as a prerequisite for arriving at definite concepts and models for the analysis of economic and social reality In pursuit of this approach, Schmoller and the Historical School became the dominant current of economic thought in nineteenth century Germany, producing a wealth of detailed historical studies on a great variety of subjects Schmoller’s textbook Grundriß was an ambitious attempt to draw a summary of the findings of historical research Schmoller also claimed objective validity for normative implications of the results of social science, provided that the criteria of his methodology are fulfilled Following this concept of economic and social science, the “Schmoller program” (Backhaus 1993/94) extended far beyond the sphere of universities in its endeavour to influence the political process by organizing support from its academic and non-academic advocates for the promotion of social policy reforms If Adolph Wagner was in basic agreement with Schmoller with respect to the possibility of deriving normative propositions from the results of social science investigations, with respect to methodology he followed an orientation that was different from Schmoller’s Therefore, in his writings he represents a current of economic thinking in Germany in the second half of the nineteenth century that did not follow the dominant trend of historicism Like other nineteenth century economists, e.g Mangoldt or Dietzel, Wagner denied that theoretical propositions and explanations could primarily be derived from detailed historical-empirical investigations “Wagner was a systematologist rather than a historical theorist”, whose primary concern in his main field of research “was a theoretical analysis of the rules of ‘social’ finance and tax policy” (Priddat 1997, p. 343) Wagner shared with Schmoller the conviction about the significance of institutions for the economic process, but for him the theoretical point of view was more important than history This can be seen from the “law of increasing state expenditure” that still carries his name As a hypothesis about a long term trend, Wagner first derived it from theoretical rather than empirical considerations If Wagner still enjoys considerable reputation as one of the founders of public finance, his important contributions to monetary theory have largely fallen into oblivion – which is all the more regrettable as contributions from nineteenth century Germany to this area of economic research are rather insignificant, if not infamous (G.F. Knapp’s “state theory of money”) Much influenced by the writings of Thomas Tooke, Wagner was a follower of the Banking School, contributing interesting arguments to the debate about endogeneity of money Even more importantly, his theory of financial crisis, developed around 1860, is a remarkable anticipation of modern crisis theories, though largely unnoticed by contemporary economists In the last decades, a certain revival of interest in the Historical School has occurred, which arises from the uneasiness about the development of modern mainstream economics Especially after the financial crisis of 2008/09 there is an increasing awareness among economists of the relevance of “historical and evolutionary explanations of the workings of complex processes as economic meltdowns, Introduction economic policy making, the power of vested interests, the aims of political elites and the formation of institutions and public opinion” (Cardoso and Psalidopoulos 2016, p. 14) With many economists searching for a method of economic analysis not restricted to abstract mathematical models, the writings of Schmoller and other authors of the Historical School have gained a new topicality with their potential to provide suggestions for a more comprehensive approach to economic reality In the same vein, Wagner’s emphasis on the role of the state as an integral part of economic theory can contribute to correct the blindness of mainstream economics towards institutions and power Above all, “Wagner’s law” can still serve as a fruitful hypothesis for empirical studies of state activities, as two contributions to this volume convincingly demonstrate It has been part of the mission of the Heilbronn Symposia from their very beginning to direct the attention of economists to these neglected currents of economic thought (Backhaus 1993, 1993/94, 1997) One hundred years after Schmoller’s and Wagner’s death in 1917, the contributions to this book take the anniversary as occasion to look into their approach; trace the influence of their ideas in Germany and in other countries; and explore the relevance of their thought in a global economy In the second chapter, Karl-Heinz Schmidt highlights the interdisciplinary approach by Gustav Schmoller Schmidt comments on the “Schmoller program” and Schmoller’s diverse activities at the university and in politics The contribution demonstrates that Schmoller’s career-curve which had steeply risen since the end of the nineteenth century, declined rapidly after Schmoller’s death in 1917 It is a rather recent phenomenon that a new interest in Schmoller and his program has emerged, due to his interdisciplinary empirical approach, also under the aspect of what is called “big data” In the third chapter, Robert Jansen investigates Schmoller’s influence during the turbulent years of high capitalism which lasted from 1870 up to 1940  in the Netherlands, when the country – like Germany – experienced class and labour conflicts The essay examines the relevance of Schmoller’s views about labour relations in Dutch parliamentary debates and economics The economist Gang Li (fourth chapter) sees value in the economic-­developmental aspects of the work of Schmoller By translating parts of the work of Gustav Schmoller into the Chinese language, Li wants to make the tradition of German economic and social thought available to the Chinese scholarly community In this chapter, Gang Li describes the current research on Schmoller in China, the obstacles it is facing, and its potential for future development of the country Social justice is a major concern of both, Gustav Schmoller and Adolph Wagner The aim of the chapter “Gustav Schmoller and Adolph Wagner: The Idea of Social Justice in Health Care”  by Ursula Backhaus is to show, how the idea of social justice relates to health care and its institutions at the time of early industrialization Schmoller designed and suggested market-based social institutions to address three basic risks of life: health insurance, cooperative accident insurance, and provisions in the case of the loss of the breadwinner Wagner not only foresaw the growing influence of the state in developed societies over time, but also formulated the conditions under which the state should play a role in the provision and finance of, for instance, health care Meinecke’s Sonderweg 177 Meinecke was a man with a great heart and an enormous capacity for friendship He writes in his second set of memoirs that until the nineties he was a ‘schroffer Antisemit’.4 Then he learnt to appreciate Jewish scholars as co-workers at the Historische Zeitschrift of which Meinecke was the editor and many Jewish students became his friends Hajo Holborn and Hans Rothfels emigrated to the United States, like so many Jewish intellectuals who suffered from persecution by the Nazis They never gave him up It is useless to try and discover brownish peccadilloes in his writings He never had them He was a conservative at heart, but was willing to learn In Die Enstehung des Historismus (1936) Meinecke wrote down his credo on how to write proper history I recently discovered that the modern conception of how to write history differs markedly from the practice which Meinecke advocated and which conformed to that of the nineteenth-century French historians, such as Guizot and Michelet We tend to look at the past as a foreign subject of which we must discover the true nature Meinecke was in search of his own identity and for that reason made Wilhelm von Humboldt, Goethe and Ranke his heroes And then at the end he had to discover that the pedigree was no longer there With the fall of the Wilhelminian Empire he became a supporter of the Republic of Weimar (though remaining a monarchist at heart) Heinrich Brüning, the last proper chancellor Germany had was a student and friend Forced to retire from his editorship of the Historische Zeitschrift after 40 years of service Meinecke lived in retirement in his home in Dahlem And then in 1946 he published Die Deutsche Katastrophe It is an acute analysis of what went wrong in Germany Meinecke must have been thinking about it during the final years of the war, but his letters not contain any notion of what he thought These were the grim years of Nazi censorship Die Deutsche Katastrophe was Meinecke’s final statement He realized that Germany could no longer go its own way and he also saw that the red thread to the past was cut Whether he himself realized it as such is unclear, but the remarkable fact of post war Germany is that the special conception of German culture does no longer exist The Anglo-Saxon conception of culture, constantly undermined by global tendencies, prevails In what follows I will pay attention to Meinecke’three major works What I want to bring out is the impact of events on his view of the development of German culture I will only comment on his historical interpretation proper, when it is necessary for my analysis  Meinecke (1949, p. 26); written in 1944 it needed some courage to publish this in 1949 It is fair to say that Meinecke remained an anti-Semite Of course he was against the treatment of the Jews by the Nazis, but he did not mention the holocaust as the greatest Nazi crime while he mentioned the ‘horrible expulsion’ of for instance the Sudeten-Germans Meinecke was a anti-Semite in the sense that Jews were different and not really Germans forgetting how many Jews had made a major contribution to German culture, to mention a few: Heine, Mahler, Freud and Einstein The Dutch Wikipedia mentions that Meinecke was in favour of racial laws against the jews I think this is highly unlikely 178 F L van Holthoon 3  Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat Meinecke wrote in his Erinnerungen: “It was the dream which I shared with many of my generation to unite the inheritance of Goethe and Bismarck into a new harmonious synthesis.”5 The true patriot fuses the ideas of culture and power and the new national state gives expression to this fusion through being a strong and civilized polity Not only in 1946, but already in 1909 when he published his Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat Meinecke knew that under Bismarck the fusion was far from complete The book reads as the story of a great river fed by little streams which then in the flow of the river gives expression to an exalted national pride and dignity Goethe and Schiller from the ‘Sturm und Drang’ period, vom Stein and Humboldt from the war of liberation, formulated the conditions on how the Germans should live together and as a nation present their contribution to the common cause of Europe Obviously practical problems created many stumbling blocks on the road to the realization of these ideals Should there be a großdeutsche solution to national unity which would include all the German speaking regions, but what then to with the Slav speaking regions in the Austrian empire? Should there be a kleindeutsche solution, which excluding the Austrian Empire, would undoubtedly mean that Prussia as the largest state formation would play a hegemonic role within the new German nation? And even within that solution the new nation remained confronted with Slav minorities, particularly in Prussia where its very name is of Slav origin When the Frankfurter parliament failed to reach a solution for national unity in 1849, Bismarck cut the Gordian knot by defeating the Austrians and the French and by browbeating the smaller German states (and Bavaria!) into compliance He constructed a peculiar constitution There was to be a democratically chosen Reichstag (the most democratically chosen parliament at the time) and a Prussian Abgeordnetenhaus with a restricted so-called Dreiklassenwahlrecht This dual structure allowed Bismarck to get his way by relying on either of both parliaments At the same time it frustrated any expression of the national will On the other hand it catered for local interest such as that of the Prussian Junkers who were able to frustrate any national plan if it did not suit their interests The digging of the Mittelland-Kanal between the rivers Ems and the Elbe, with an outlet to Berlin was a sorry example of their power of obstruction They were able to sabotage the plans for digging this canal for years Meinecke was aware of the structural flaw of Bismarck’s formulation of national unity In the final chapter of his book he writes:  Meinecke (1949), p. 284, translated and cited by Sterling (1978), p.118 My translation [Goethes und Bismarcks Erbe in uns harmonisch zu vereinigen und so zu einer neuen Synthese von Geist und Macht zu gelangen, war der Traum, den ich mit so manchen meiner Generation in der Vorkriegszeit geträumt hatte.] Meinecke’s Sonderweg 179 In the first part we have tried to portray the life of the conservative idea of the nation state the liberal version now needs further attention.6 The premiss of the Frankfurter Reichsverfassung, of combining ‘die Einheit und Macht des Ganzen mit der Freiheit der Teile’, was healthy and right, but its execution under Bismarck was not ideal.7 We are not there yet: “Once this flood [of the industrial revolution], forced perhaps by the storms of a political world crisis, will destroy artificially constructed dams Then it will be of the utmost importance whether the new world of liberal and industrial Germany will be politically and nationally firm enough to replace what went down.”8 This long quotation is instructive for Meinecke’s view of national unity on three counts: German history had not reached its optimal solution for national unity, yet The Bismarck regime will undoubtedly collapse under the influence of industrial developments The future may bring a nation state based on unitary and liberal principles Meinecke rejected any teleological scheme (praising Goethe for not having one) Yet in this quotation he came close to it himself There is a chapter in the book on Ranke and Bismarck in which he argues that the patrimonial idea of the monarchy was common to both That may be true, but it does not mean that Ranke endorsed Bismarck’s solution In his first book he maintained that European civilization was a crossbreed of Roman and Germanic elements Ranke’s idea of the primacy of foreign policy meant that each European state had to contribute to peace and cooperation Ranke in the Grosse Mächte gave an updated version of the Holy Alliance He was more großdeutsch than kleindeutsch in his thinking I have the feeling that he became more or less a displaced person in Berlin when Bismarck forced national union with blood and iron Bismarck was a Realpolitiker who was acutely aware of the hazards that the Empire faced, because of its establishment He was against any form of Weltpolitik, and he fought it not by an appeal to German culture, but by diplomacy behind closed doors Meinecke wrote in the quotation that after Bismarck we can take up the thread again However, would an appeal to the values that Goethe, von Humboldt and Ranke had formulated be enough? Meinecke made the perceptive remark that  Meinecke (1911), p. 461) This reprint is defective Most of the Umlauts have fallen away My translation [Das Leben des konservativen Nationalstaatgedankens haben wir im ersten Buche darzustellen versucht, das des liberalen Nationalstaatsgedankens bedarf jetzt noch weiterer Veranschaulichung.]  Meinecke (1911), p. 494  Meinecke (1911), p. 509 My translation [Einmal kann diese Flut [of the industrial revolution], getrieben vielleicht von den Winden einer politischen Weltkrisis, die jetzt künstlich aufgerichteten Dämme zerreißen, und dann wird allerdings alles darauf ankommen, ob das Neuland des liberalen und industriellen Deutschlands die politische und nationale Festigkeit haben wird, um Ersatz für das Zugrundegehende zu bieten Dann wird aber auch der Gedanke, dessen Geschichte wir behandelten, noch einmal eine Zukunft wieder haben.] 180 F L van Holthoon conflicts between the Reichsregierung and the Prussian government led to too much emphasis on foreign policy at the expense of the domestic one (Meinecke 1911, p. 503) Should taking up the thread of idealism cure that problem? Should we not also cultivate the values connected with the industrial expansion, not on the elevated plain of thought, but in the practice of politics and hence possibly leading to an understanding of the new Germany and its neighbours? 4  Die Idee der Staatsräson Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat is too ethereal for my taste Meinecke’s plastic prose too often does not touch the ground of reality Die Idee der Staatsräson is different The historian of ideas will read the text of the book with delight What Meinecke writes on Campanella and the duke of Rohan is brilliant Why did the author of the Sun State advise the Pope and the Spanish authorities on how to use reason of state to defeat their enemies? Because he hoped his use of the reason of state would in the end create a world of peace and happiness for all religions (Meinecke 1962a, p. 976) Meinecke uses the same argument with the leader of the protestants of La Rochelle who after defeat chose the side of Cardinal Richelieu He, according to Meinecke, hoped that in this way he would further the cause of the Huguenots (ibidem, p. 169) In the case of Rohan Meinecke’s analysis seems generous, but suspect to me In my view the duke de Rohan was a typical condottierre who loved to fight, the side he was on being less important It is a sombre book I am presenting When Meinecke discusses Machiavelli as the thinker who defined the new doctrine of reason of state he points at the dualism of the idea that reasons of state allow the prince to transgress the rules of common morality How much margin does he have in this respect? Great is the risk that his own interests prevail over those of his subjects whose interests he is supposed to serve When Meinecke comes to ‘Past and Present’, the concluding chapter in his book, he writes: “If war broke out [between 1815 and 1914], it never spread to a general European conflict; yet it tended more and more to be fought out with the more powerful means which were made available by the nationalization of States and universal military service Generally speaking, therefore, they were not long-winded wars of attrition, but swift, short, intensive wars to defeat the enemy War in itself became more intensive than earlier on, but peace also became more intensive and complete Never were the frontiers of States opened to each other in a more liberal manner, never was international trade easier, never was the freedom of the world-traveller greater than in the last fifty years before the Great War The development of international law was assisted by an increasingly subtle and closely-woven net of international agreements; and at the same time these helped to reinforce the idea of international law, which during the previous centuries had to a certain extent come to provide a counterpart and alternative for the idea of raison d’état.” (Meinecke 1962a, p. 416) The involvement of the masses in the art of government gave rise to violent passions The development of industrial production and of the technical process gave the military a margin of freedom which governments (particularly the German government) could not control And Meinecke concludes: Meinecke’s Sonderweg 181 “Thus today the idea of raison d’état (like many another idea of Western culture) is in the middle of a severe crisis The natural basis of elemental passions which it possesses and which cannot (as we have said in the Introduction) be subdued solely by its utilitarian middle ground, makes a more terrible impression today than ever before; and the civilizing achievements of the modern world tend rather to exaggerate it than restrict it.” (ibidem, p. 423) The reason of state does no longer control the forces unleashed by the modernization of the world and thus it only is able to show its evil faith in ruthless egoism The fragment ‘the utilitarian middle ground’ gives food to thought I will return to it later Let me first pursue the history of the idea of reason of state as Meinecke presents it In relation to Hegel Meinecke’s remarks that he did not limit the grandiose powers of the state in relation to other states by ethical restrictions and he concludes his chapter on Hegel as follows: “Thus the idea of identity and the idea of individuality – these two supreme and fruitful ideas of the contemporary German mind – showed the inner tragic two-edged quality of all great historical ideas and forces.” (ibidem, p. 369) Individuality indicates the aspiration to become a unique personality That aspiration was common among nineteenth-century intellectuals, artists, scientists, politicians and businessmen (the next century added sportsmen to the range) There is nothing wrong with the ambition to make your mark in a world of increasing uniformity, but as soon as individuality is used to refer to the uniqueness of the nation state the reference becomes problematic To what extent are the officials of the nation state entitled to defend this uniqueness, not only towards other states, but also towards their own citizens? The danger that a prudent policy will degenerate in machiavellism of the worst sort is real; the more so, when an appeal is made to identity Identity is an appeal within the nation state to a solidarity which remains bogus when officials and their spokesmen pretend that such solidarity exists when it does not or where it exists on false pretences Hegel’s philosophy is a prime example of a philosophy of change By necessity everything - beliefs and institutions ideas – change in the course of time Human beings are like skippers who have to navigate their vessels while the beacons that should lead them to a safe entry in a harbour, are constantly changing Meinecke and others9 called this philosophy of change Historismus and the two terms identity and individuality are a product of it The latter term marks the goal towards which individuals and men collectively should be striving and identity is an appeal to order amidst change Yet there is another term which gives a forceful perspective to Historismus or historicism in English, and that is necessity We cannot stop or control change In Hegel’s logic it comes to us, because we become conscious of new insights One of the attractive aspects of his philosophy to me is that we can deny the new ideas, but they are still there As soon as we realize that all human beings are free the powerful impact of this new idea of freedom captures us, even if we  The term ‘Historismus’ comes, I think, from the criticism of biblical texts on the basis of textual or historical evidence 182 F L van Holthoon not want to obey it in practice Necessity makes that we should at times adapt our identity in order to save our individuality In Ranke Meinecke saw the perfect example how Germans should celebrate their nationhood Identity was safely anchored in the monarchy and individuality went together with the brotherly attention for the nationhood of other European nations However, as I remarked before, when the German national unity was established Ranke became more or less an outsider His combination of Weltbürgertum and Nationalstaat was out of date and with it Meinecke’s own ideal of German nationhood Meinecke had a low opinion of Grotius and Pufendorf and of utilitarianism in general About Grotius he writes: “[H]e firmly believed in the old illusion, that it would always be possible to distinguish the ‘just war’ from the wars that were unjust and impermissible; and this illusion was capable of actually increasing the difficulty of the situation and of increasing rather than lessening the sources of conflict and occasions of war.” (Meinecke 1962a, p. 209f) And on Pufendorf he writes, first on his century and then on the man himself: The grandiose one-sidedness with which it forced the idea of raison d’état into the life of the individual States was indeed also obliged to reflect itself in a kindred writing of history And One is first impressed, but afterwards also wearied by Pufendorf’s abstract and impersonal mode of writing (ibidem, p. 241) Apart from his appreciation of Pufendorf as a historian (which is fair enough) Meinecke dislikes Grotius and Pufendorf’s attempt to introduce rules in international relations In the case of Grotius the attempt is illusionary, in the case of Pufendorf these attempts are one-sided, but are they? Both are regarded by Istvan Hont as being the founders of a utilitarian school of thought by starting from the paradigm of natural law.10 Everybody knows that Grotius’ expression (which even he regarded as being scandalous) that the notion of natural law ‘would have a degree of validity, even’ if ‘there is no God’ (Grotius 2012, p.  4) This expression suggests a rigid fundamentalist approach on the side of Grotius, but on the contrary that approach is flexible and leaves room for adaptation He rejects (quite rightly) the notion that expediency should be the last word in law making (ibidem, p. 5) However he concedes that expedience is always a necessary ingredient of it He uses three concepts of law: natural law, jus gentium and positive law (in the international field the law of nations) Natural law is an abstract notion indicating that there are eternal standards of justice However, we need the laws made by people all over the world and in history to make these eternal notions manifest Justinian’s codification was meant to order jus gentium in the light of natural law and the law of nations was there to control international relations  Hont (2005) The problem with Hont’s interpretation is that based on Smith’s Lectures on Natural Jurisprudence that does not necessarily mean that he was influenced by it Smith had to lecture on the subject as professor in Glasgow 10 Meinecke’s Sonderweg 183 The utilitarian school of thought that emerged from the national law tradition has been successful in monitoring relations between individuals and unfortunately has been less successful in the field of international relations However, successes there are still greater then those reached by way of power politics and an important factor is also that rules agreed to on the basis of international relations are necessary to promote peace and cooperation between nations I have emphasized the word necessary Meinecke uses the word to indicate the process of nation building as a historical process However, how necessary is nation building and how necessary are power politics? Human beings make their efforts in this direction because they want to, not because they have to The necessity derives its validation from the process which we call the Industrial Revolution which is that tremendous social and technical change which keeps us prisoner and from which we benefit and which increasingly confronts us with the negative aspects of this change The necessity is a product of the fact that we not control the outcome of change, but at best can obey it Meinecke’s idealism in politics is helpless in curing the negative effects of the Industrial Revolution At the end of his book he writes: “The modern mind perhaps sees and feels more sharply and painfully than earlier periods did, all the discontinuities, contradictions and insoluble problems of life, because it has lost the comforting belief in the unequivocal and absolute character of human ideals, on account of the relativizing consequences of historicism and on account of the experiences of modern history which have tended to induce scepticism … But, within the horizon dominated by modern Man, there are only two points at which the Absolute manifests itself unveiled to his gaze: in the pure moral law on the one hand, and in the supreme achievements of art on the other.” (Meinecke 1962a, p. 433) As to the ‘pure moral law’ we must say – with Grotius and the utilitarians – that we must make it instrumental to our needs, before it can function And as to art – or more generally culture – we are bound to ask whether that is not too high-minded an ideal to counter the negative outcome of raison d’état Should we not concentrate on the menus plaisirs and the basic needs of us as ordinary people? Meinecke’s idealism cannot protect us against the violation of our basic needs And in admitting defeat in controlling the negative side of power politics he is saying as much himself 5  Die Enstehung des Historismus “Historicism is just nothing else but the use of the in the grand movement from Leibniz to Goethe’s death newly acquired principles of life in historical life This movement continues a general Western one and crowns the German spirit.” And “Historicism in essence means the replacement of a generalizing way of thinking of historical and human forces by an individualizing observation of historical and human forces.” (Meinecke 1965, p. 2) So the approach to seek for the unique (Individualisierung) is the key concept of historicism There are two more concepts that matter We have met ‘identity’ which 184 F L van Holthoon indicates the need for solidarity in the effort to reach the individual aspect of life In Die Entstehung des Historismus Meinecke adds Entwicklung as another one Development adds the dimension of time and is the reason why historians are the chief interpreters of the movement Those among them or those outside the craft who are seeking for laws or general schemes in history are on the wrong track in deciphering the secrets of the past Historicism tells historians that they must capture the unique in the flow of time The first quotation adds another important aspect to Meinecke’s quest for the German soul Originating in the general European culture historicism becomes a uniquely German achievement and so it is clear that Meinecke’s three books together tell the story of Germany’s Sonderweg I will discuss Meinecke’s book under two headings First follows my commentary on Meinecke’s historical analysis Secondly I will try to interpret it in the light of Meinecke’s life experience With this second aspect the fact looms large that the book was published in 1936, when the Nazis had tightened their grip on German society Meinecke himself had to take leave as chairman of the Historical Commission and as editor of the Historische Zeitschrift, which he had edited for almost 40 years In 1936 Meinecke was living in internal exile He was left alone by the Nazis which is surprising, because he was connected with the circle of officers around general Beck who were responsible for Stauffenberg’s attempt to murder Hitler People were executed for less Meinecke’s subtle and lively style makes it a pleasure to read his report on the philosophers of the Enlightenment, but his approach to them marrs his story Without exception he sees them as the precursors of historicism who remain nevertheless prisoners of the doctrine of natural law, or as he also calls it, of the ‘generalisierende Betrachtung’ Now this approach does not make sense If we can regard these philosophers as precursors they are the forerunners of a great number of developments in the nineteenth-century They did not invent the term ‘Enlightenment’; we did to honour or criticize them Meinecke discusses Hume’s writings at length Hume was historian, but also economist and political scientist Meinecke ignores Hume’s activities in these two fields In fact he sins against his own tenet for Hume and the philosophers of the Enlightenment in general are not appreciated according to their own individuality, but whether they fit the dictates of his own philosophy Let me illustrate my criticism in relation to Voltaire and Hume The mechanical way of thinking about man and society] that contributed to these insights for Voltaire was a means to an end, not an end in itself He used it but it did not satisfy him To reach a pure and severe knowing, he enjoyed life too much His sceptical approach to human reality makes his historical insight superficial He had no sense for the development of things and so his history remains ‘ein kaleidoskopartiges Hin und Her von hellen und dunklen Bildern’.11  Meinecke (1965), p. 88 my translation [Das mechanische Denken, das zu diesen Erkenntnissen [about man and society], war für Voltaire Mittel zum Zweck, nicht Selbstzweck Er benutzte es, aber es machte ihn nicht satt Um rein and streng nur erkennen zu wollen, war er zu sehr Genießer.] 11 Meinecke’s Sonderweg 185 “Real historical development can never be complete, it flows on and forms unpredictable new outcomes – in as far as the final limits set to human nature allows this In the end history cannot be closed off with planks.”12 What Meinecke did not catch is that the philosophers of the Enlightenment (including Voltaire) were in search of truth based on experience, not on convention Kant’s aude sapere sums up their efforts They were not besotted by natural law or any other general schemes of explanation Sentiment (to use the eighteenth-century term for emotion) was as important as reason.13 The interesting thing is that they had no great urge to put their truths to the test They accepted the Ancien Régime as it was and only wanted to give it a more human face How else can we explain the fact, that Voltaire, otherwise the great critic of the French contemporary monarchy, made Louis XIV his special hero in Le Siècle de Louis Quatorze About Hume Meinecke writes: “To the end he remained a man of the Enlightenment and where he makes a judgment on historical things, it is always the old stable, static reason of natural law, ‘founded on the nature of things, eternal and inflexible’(Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals14) which he mentions However, it was his great achievement that he considerably restricted its field of influence, that he denied its creative character and gave it only the task of ­separating truth from error and of testing and cleaning the motives which arise from the deeper, creative sources of feeling and taste (sentiment, taste).”15 The second part of this long quotation gives a correct view of Hume’s epistemology, and the first part spoils it Hume refers to natural law not as a metaphysical, but as a methodological concept He is saying that we can never have a science of man if we not have the possibility of comparing human intentions For this we have to act on the assumption that there is uniformity in human nature which enables us to make the comparison Hume never accepted the prescriptive authority of natural law Law, as positive law, was the product of experience 12  Meinecke (1965) p 98, p. 99; my translation And: Echte historische Entwicklung kann nie “fertig” sein oder werden, sie strömt weiter und bildet unberechenbar Neues – soweit es die letzten Schranken die der menschlichen Natur gesetzt sind, erlauben Die Geschichte kann an ihren Enden nicht mit Brettern vernagelt sein.] 13  Hume defined ‘reason’ in two different ways: (1) as a logical instinct and (2) as reasonableness The ‘reason’ of the philosophers came closer to Hume’s second definition than to the first one 14  I cannot find this quotation and so I have translated it myself It seems to me that Meinecke is mixing here two things which are separate As to natural law Hume said no more than that there is a notion of natural justice which has always to be interpreted to become effective As to reason simple see preceding note 15  Meinecke (1965), p. 194; my translation.[Aufklärer blieb er immer, und wo man ihn urteilen hört über menschlich-geschichtliche Dinge, spricht immer noch die alte stabile, entwicklungslose Vernunft des Naturrechts, “gegründet auf die Natur der Dinge, ewig und unbeugsam” (Enquiry concerning the principles of morals) aus ihm Aber seine grosse Tat war es, dass er ihren Wirkungskreis bedeutend einschränkte, dass er ihren schöpferischen Charakter leugnete und ihr nur die Aufgabe zuwies, Wahrheit und Irrtum zu scheiden und die aus den tiefer liegenden, schöpferischen Quellen des Gefühles und Geschmacks (sentiment, taste) emporsteigennden Regungen zu prüfen und zu reinigen.] 186 F L van Holthoon Meinecke gives a sympathetic and positive account of Hume’s History of England, but he does not properly understand Hume’s aim in writing it He writes: “English history is also a process of perfection according to psychological and political experience We know his doctrine of a rhythmic movement in the life of the state, that of violent conquest, which leads to a gradual accommodation between rulers and ruled and the building of authority.”16 This is well written, but in the wrong key Hume does not regard English history as a process leading to perfection He writes it as a political scientist who focuses his attention on the fate of royal authority through the centuries The end of his story is a fortuitous outcome The accommodation between King and Parliament in 1688 was a product of unintended effects One would have expected that Meinecke would have appreciated this outcome of Hume’s History, given the fact that he gave weight to the factor of chance in history, but as he interprets Hume’s History as an inexorable process of perfection, he misses the point of Hume’s concluding remarks.17 The revolution of 1688 created an unstable relationship between authority and liberty, between royal government and parliament The political expertise which Hume derived from English history was that to keep the relationship stable and give authority and liberty each it’s due, the power of Parliament should not interfere with that of the King The King and his minister should rule and Parliament should control their actions Both Voltaire and Hume had their ‘end of history’ in the sense that Francis Fukuyama gave it There is a recipe that will work and those who will not obey it create chaos That takes the unpredictable out of history Hume’s brilliant intellect made him suggest other ideas which in the next century would make a powerful impact One of them was utility With Francis Hutcheson Hume was the godfather of utilitarianism, for which Meinecke only had disdain Thomas Green, the first editor (together with Thomas Grose) of Hume’s works and a fervent admirer of Kant’s idealist philosophy, wrote in an introduction to Hume’s Treatise that Hume produced a philosophy for the honest gentleman, but that it lacked the elevation of idealist philosophy.18 Notwithstanding Green Hume’s pragmatism (another word that Meinecke hated) was more effective in dealing with conflicting ideas and situations than idealism About Herder Meinecke writes: “The real achievement of the sketch of 1774 concerns the persistent introduction of the idea of individuality, which than is worked out as the individuality of the great collective forces, of the folk spirit and spirit of the age.”19  Meinecke (1965), p. 218 My translation [Die englische Geschichte ist also ein Perfektionsprozess gemäss den Gesetzen psychologischer und politischer Erfahrung Wir kennen seine Lehre von der rhytmischen Bewegung im Staatenleben, die von gewaltsamer Machteroberung zur allmählichen Eingewöhnung, Anpassung von Herrschern und Beherrschten und Autoritätsbildung führt.] 17  See van Holthoon (2013) 18  Quoted in van Holthoon (2009), p. 203 19  Meinecke (1965), p.  402; my translation [So liegt also, was die Durchführung des Individualitätsgedankens betrifft, die eigentliche Leistung des Entwurfes von 1774 darin, die Individualität der grossen Kollektivmächte, der Volks- und Zeitgeister, eingebettet in den ebenso individuell betrachteten Gesamtprozess der Geschichte, herausgearbeitet zu haben.] 16 Meinecke’s Sonderweg 187 This is a somewhat long winded appreciation of Herder’s contribution to historicism, but it makes one thing clear: Meinecke is no longer interested in the political implications of historicism for German unity Herder wrote with great sympathy about the struggle of European peoples to find and maintain their cultural identity (including the Slavs, to this day Herder is much loved in countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic), but he offers no solution for the political union of the German speaking people and is not even interested in the problem The finest piece of writing in the book is on Goethe Goethe’s saying ‘dass die Kultur ein höherer Wert sei als der Staat’ must have been close to Meinecke’s heart, certainly in 1936 Goethe, Meinecke’s writes, had a negative and a positive relation to history About the former he quotes Goethe’s ideas as follows: “In Summa: Not the failure of his judgment, but the incapacity of his inner soul made it ultimately impossible for him to understand in the same way that part of world history that has to with war cries, the pressure of peoples, and the fall of kings, morphologically and to decipher these just as nature and the life of man.”20 And about the latter: “The with individuality filled stream of life and values of the totality, is the common and fundamental conception of Goethe for nature and history- while in history the individuality of particular phenomena anyway powerful appears, is it so that in nature individuality remains hidden behind the types and species which the human eye can perceive.”21 Goethe only appreciated cultural achievements in history and that in 1936 became Meinecke’s priority as well “Goethe’ special path to this high level of contemplation is not feasible without reservations, because later generation have been hampered by the empiricism of the nineteenthcentury and the problems of the twentieth-century However, it needs to remain a signpost upwards for us.”22 This became Meinecke’s manifesto in 1936 and given the control of the Nazis on public life it reads almost defiantly In the same year Meinecke gave a talk in the Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften on Ranke He ended his speech as follows:  Meinecke (1965), p. 518; my translation [In Summa: Nicht ein Unvermögen seiner Urteilskraft, sondern ein Unvermögen seines innersten Wesens hat ihn letzten Endes ausser Stand gesetzt, den Teil der Weltgeschichte, der von Kriegsgeschrei, Völkerdrängen und Thronensturz widerhallt, ebenso morphologisch zu begreifen, ebenso durch Entwicklung zu enträtseln wie die Natur und alles übrige Menschenleben 21  ibidem, p. 527; my translation [Der mit Individualität gesättigte Lebens- und Werdestrom des Ganzen, das ist die für die Natur und Geschichte gemeinsame Grundkonzeption Goethes, − wobei dann auf dem Gebiete der Geschichte die Individualität der einzelnen Erscheinungen überhaupt erst machtvoll zur Erscheinung kommt, während sie in die Natur hinter den Typen und Gattungen, die das menschliche Auge allein nur gewahr werden kann, verborgen bleibt.] 22  ibidem, p. 584; my translation .[Goethes besonderer Weg zu dieser Höhe der Betrachtung ist nicht ohne weiteres für den durch den Empirismus des 19 und die Problematik des 20.Jahrhunderts belasteten Nachfahren gangbar Aber ein Wegweiser in die Höhe muss er für uns bleiben.] 20 188 F L van Holthoon “It was the highest reachable level of the marriage of idea and reality This sublime cohesion, this golden chain is general and individual at the same time It wants pursuing even today.”23 The breath of life brings everything together It is clear whom Meinecke had in mind, when he said this Culture had a special meaning for a nineteenth-century German intellectual It was as Wilhelm von Humboldt said the product of Einsamkeit und Freiheit Culture was the cultivation of the mind and led to that untranslatable German word Bildung However, as such it was not only a German ideal Everywhere in Europe the cultivation of the mind was regarded as the highest goal in life and as the way of escaping from the drab existence in industry and business So Die Entstehung des Historismus was not in fact a portrait of the German Sonderweg as Meinecke saw it In his former books the ambition to shape politics to serve culture was that Sonderweg Under the barbaric circumstances of Nazi Germany Meinecke gave up that ambition The Sonderweg became his Sonderweg 6  The German Catastrophe In 1946 Meinecke wrote his assessment of recent German history, the outcome of which had left Germany in ruins and in which Prussia ceased to exist, because East and West Prussia were becoming Polish territory It was an honest and noble retrospect for an old man to write He had to confess that he had to write from memory, because his eyesight had almost gone Meinecke’s main interpretative concept was that of the two waves of nationalism and socialism and how these interfered In the last years before World War One he had become an admirer of Friedrich Naumann’s nationalsocialism and during the thirties he witnessed the perversion of his idea in the Third Reich Meinecke mainly used the concept of the two waves to demonstrate how the ugly form of nationalism, mixed with militarism, had lead to the illusory objective of Weltpolitik (Germany wanting to become a world power) which eventually led to Hitler’s Third Reich In exploring the roots of this nationalism Meinecke presented a harsh verdict on the German bourgeoisie in search of gain Their egoism together with the narrow mindlessness of the military caused a process of degeneration that led to a demise of liberal principles Meinecke did not spare himself He at times had been stimulated by the idea that Germany could aim at an extension of territory and of its spheres of influence, and Naumann’s idea that there could be a positive version of national socialism was also an illusion.24 In a section on ‘The positive Elements of Hitlerism’ he wrote that all  Meinecke, ‘Leopold v Ranke, Gedächtnisrede’, ibidem, App., p. 602; my translation [Es war die höchste bisher erreichte Stufe in der Vermählung von Idee und Realität Dieser erhabene Zusammenhang, diese goldene Kette ist allgemein und in jedem Momente individuell zugleich Sie will noch heute fortgesetzt werden Sumpnoia panta.] 24  Though of course the post-Second World War welfare state is a version of it 23 Meinecke’s Sonderweg 189 the social institutions which should point to support of the masses were a window dressing for brute force Already before World War One Meinecke discovered that the reckless attempt of Wilhelm II at Weltpolitik was very dangerous, because it antagonised all of Germany’s neighbours Wilhelm II was one of the chance factors in Germany’s road to ruin Germany’s foreign policy was led by an amateur whose policy was bluff and had no substance The other chance factor that put Germany on the road to ruin was Hindenburg’s decision to appoint Hitler as Reichskanzler His decisions to dismiss Brüning and to summon Hitler stand in the very forefront of the factors leading Germany along the path to the abyss The chance trait in Hindenburg’s personality stands therefore at the very center of the general causes that drove Germany forward on this path, like a dark warning sign to the final insoluble riddles of world history.25 Is it fair to attach so much importance to the decision of an old man given the enormous pressures put on him by fanatic nationalists? And is Meinecke fully aware of the havoc of mass unemployment? He mentions it, but he does not refer to the galloping inflation which caused the petty bourgeois to lose its entire savings as a factor that made Hitler popular to the small man Meinecke thinks that Brüning would have been able to restore normalcy, given the chance I wonder if this is true, however this is not the place to discuss Hitler’s rise to power That has been done by Karl Dietrich Bracher in extenso Meinecke calls Hitler a gambler and a swindler and that characteristic is well placed Franz Neumann argues that the term totalitarian state is a contradictio in terminis.26 The state as an institution makes for order and continuity, but totalitarian decision making causes improvisation subverting existing institutions at the same time Hitler’s economic policy was not sustainable and was a forecast of the war that would come, so that Hitler could rob the resources of Germany’s neighbours Totalitarianism is a self-propelling force which leads to the ruin of the regime Particularly this is the case when the leader is a nihilist Meinecke quotes Hermann Rauschning’s Revolution of Nihilism That was a far seeing report written before World War Two Meinecke quotation of Hitler’s saying that the German people did not deserve to survive him, is correctly seen as the ultimate goal of the nihilist – and Hitler was one – is to destroy life If he cannot get what he wants, however impossible his goal, he destroys himself by destroying everyone else The suicide bomber of today is the typical example of the nihilist Meinecke’s Sonderweg was his passionate defense of German idealism In the German Catastrophe he wrote: “Whatever springs from the very special spirit of a particular people and is therefore inimitable is likely to make a successful universal appeal This fact is not limited in its application only to the relation of the German to the Occidental spirit It also illustrates a fundamental law of the Occidental cultural community in general.” (Meinecke 1950, p.118) 25 26  Meinecke (1950), p. 70  Neumann (1963) 190 F L van Holthoon This was again the plea for the mission of German idealism, but now the focus was on Europe, not on German nationhood At the present he wrote at the end of his booklet: ‘The German state is crushed and wide lands are lost to us Rule by foreigners is our destiny for a long time’ (ibidem, p. 121) As a nation in order to find our inner strength and to restore our reputation in the world we should concentrate on the achievements of our culture This is how Herder saw the relations of the European peoples and we have seen that Meinecke’s analysis of his work was part of his own uncoupling politics and culture in German idealism and in defining the meaning of Idealism for Germany In 1946 it was difficult if not impossible to foresee how quickly Germany would re-emerge as a powerful state The ultimate irony of German history is that Germany acquired a preponderant (you could almost say hegemonic) role in Europe after two lost wars on the basis of its economic power And yet I wonder how many Germans today would interpret Meinecke’s recommendation other than pious and impractical Except for the lunatic fringe Germans have become pragmatists like their Anglo-Saxon brethren.27 For them as for us Bentham’s saying ‘that pushpin is as good as poetry’ is more important than the distinction between higher and lower pleasures as John Stuart Mill defined them Important is whether motivation leads to a positive outcome in action.28 And that is the reason that utilitarianism is the only possible basis for cooperation between individuals and peoples Meinecke persisted in travelling his Sonderweg to the end He did not revoke idealism as a goal in life He could only interpret pragmatism as a dangerous guideline for the homo faber as manipulator and he had a disdain for utilitarianism as ethical theory As I remarked before one of the facts of post-war Germany is that the special concept of culture, that the majority of nineteenth-century German intellectuals advocated, has disappeared At the conference on Schmoller and Wagner where I presented my paper on Meinecke, two economists asked me afterwards ‘who is this man, I have never heard of him’ I forgot to answer then with: ‘you should remember him, he is one of the founding fathers of the Freie Universität Berlin and its first rector’ Idealism – German and European – is too high minded for our needs On the other hand utilitarianism is necessary for the business of life, but it is not enough to create ethical discrimination Meinecke professed that we should cultivate our values Perhaps we should concentrate on the basic values of justice, democracy and freedom which make our world go round The great minds of the German past may help us in doing so Meinecke was and remains their prophet References Blackbourn D, Eley G (1984), The Peculiarities of German History, Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth Century Germany Oxford University Press, Oxford Grotius H (2012), On the Law of War and Peace Cambridge University Press, ed S.C Neff  Though Brexit shows that the English can lose their heads  I made this point in van Holthoon (1971) Mill did not reject utilitarianism, but tried to make room for higher aspirations See chapter 4: ‘Elite and Society, Two Levels of Aspiration’ 27 28 Meinecke’s Sonderweg 191 Hont I (2005), The Language of sociability and Commerce: Samuel Pufendorf and the Theoretical Foundations of the “Four Stages” Theory’, and ‘Needs and Justice in the Wealth of Nations’, Jealousy of Trade, International Competition and the Nation-State in Historical Perspective Belknap Press, Cambridge, Mass Meinecke F (1911), Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat Bibliolife s.a Meinecke F (1949), Strburg, Freiburg, Berlin, 1901-1919, Erinnerungen Kưhler, Stuttgart Meinecke F (1950) The German Catastrophe, Reflections and Recollections Beacon Press, Boston, S.B. Fay transl Meinecke F (1962a), Machiavellism, The Doctrine of Raison d’Etat and its Place in Modern History Rutledge and Kegan Paul, London Meinecke F (1962b) Ausgewählte Briefwechsel, Koehler, Stuttgart Meinecke F (1965) Die Entstehung des Historismus Oldenbourg, München, C. Hinrichs ed Neumann F (1963) Behemoth, the Structure and Practice of National Socialism New York Sterling REW (1978) Ethos in a World of Power, The Political Ideas of Friedrich Meinecke Princeton University Press, Princeton van Holthoon F L (1971)The Road to Utopia, J.S.Mill’s Social Thought Van Gorcum, Assen van Holthoon F L (2009) Hume, Leven en Werk Klement, Kampen van Holthoon F L (2013) Hume and the End of History David Hume, Historical Thinker, Historical Writer, M.G Spencer ed Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park PA ... http://www.springer.com/series/5902 Jürgen Backhaus  •  Günther Chaloupek Hans A Frambach Editors Gustav von Schmoller and Adolph Wagner Legacy and Lessons for Civil Society and the State Editors Jürgen Backhaus Universität... of the means of production was essential for the performance of the economy and for raising the standard of living of the working class Schmoller and Wagner were different from each other in their... future development of the country Social justice is a major concern of both, Gustav Schmoller and Adolph Wagner The aim of the chapter Gustav Schmoller and Adolph Wagner: The Idea of Social Justice